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20-1209 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

20-1209 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

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Wednesday, 9 December 2020

(No items of interest posted)

  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings)
  4. Netherlands TCA Presents a Free Webinar: 16 Dec; “E-Commerce and Customs Declarations”
  5. UK DIT Announces New Approach on US Tariffs
  1. EUS: “Court Challenge to UK’s Resumed Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia”
  2. GreekReporter: “US Defense Bill Orders Sanctions on Turkey Over Russian S-400s”
  1. Buckley: “OFAC Sanctions Chinese Tech Company for Supporting Maduro Regime”
  2. Nicholas Turner: “Top-5 Sanctions for the Week Ending 4 Dec”
  3. Steptoe: “Second Circuit’s Decision in Mangouras: Implications for Privilege Assertions in Cross-Border Investigations” [Part III of III]
  4. Winston: “To Which Points of the Export Control Law Should We Pay Attention?”
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Ex/Im Movers & Shakers: Doug Hassebrock Retires from BIS, Joins Lockheed Martin 
  3. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  4. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  5. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  6. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 

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EXIM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

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OGS OTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

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OGS_a22. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

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   Are you doing business in the e-commerce branch and are you importing goods from outside the European Union – including the United Kingdom? Then you’re facing many changes. To help you to prepare for these changes, Dutch Customs is organizing a free webinar “E-commerce and Customs Declarations”.
This free webinar will take place on December 16th, starting at 13:30 CET and finishing around 15:30.
 

Content of the webinar

  • What options do you have when you import goods coming from the UK and declaring these to Customs?
  • What regulatory changes in the law can we expect from 1 July 2021 where e-commerce is concerned? 
  • What are the consequences for your customs declarations?
  • And what does it all mean for the declaration systems of Dutch Customs?
   Customs specialists will provide the answers to these and other pressing questions. Also, they will present cases that have been provided by business operators like yourselves. And naturally you will have the opportunity to put forward cases to them that concern you personally. Do not miss this chance, be there and join the webinar on Wednesday afternoon the 16th of December. We look forward to seeing you. Subscribe to this webinar 
 
Your hosts

   The presentations will be in English and will be given by Frank Heijmann (Head of Trade Relations of Dutch Customs) and Han Bosch (Strategic Policy Advisor E-commerce at Dutch Customs). Albert Veenstra (Professor of Trade & Logistics, Erasmus University Rotterdam) is chairing the webinar.

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  The UK is today announcing an independent approach to the longstanding trade conflicts between the EU and US around steel and aluminium and aerospace tariffs.
  To defend the UK steel industry, International Trade Secretary Liz Truss is rolling over tariffs in response to the unjustified ‘Section 232’ tariffs imposed by the US on aluminium and steel imports. These tariffs will continue from January 1st when the UK becomes an independent trading nation once again.
  The Department for International Trade will launch a consultation to ensure these tariffs are shaped to UK interests and tailored to the UK economy, based on evidence and input from key stakeholders. Details of the scope and timing of the consultation will be confirmed in due course.
  In parallel, the UK government is suspending retaliatory tariffs resulting from the Boeing dispute in an effort to bring the US towards a reasonable settlement and show that the UK is serious about reaching a negotiated outcome. The government reserves the right to impose tariffs at any point if satisfactory progress towards an agreeable settlement is not made.
  The twin announcements are part of the government’s strategy to de-escalate trade tensions so the US and UK can move forward to the next phase of their trading relationship, and ultimately draw a line under a dispute that harms industry on both sides of the Atlantic.
 
International Trade Secretary Liz Truss said:
  • As an independent trading nation once again, we finally have the ability to shape these tariffs to our interests and our economy, and to stand up for UK business.
  • Ultimately, we want to de-escalate the conflict and come to a negotiated settlement so we can deepen our trading relationship with the US and draw a line under all this. We are protecting our steel industry against illegal and unfair tariffs – and will continue to do so – but are also showing the US we are serious about ending a dispute that benefits neither country.
Background
S232 steel and aluminium measures
   In 2018 the United States Government announced that under Section 232 of the US Trade Expansion Act of 1962 it would place tariffs on EU imports of steel and aluminium.
   The ongoing tariffs are unjustified under WTO rules and unfairly target UK steel and aluminium manufacturers and should be removed. Any claim that UK steel and aluminium imports harm US national security is false and without foundation.
  In response, the EU imposed counter-balancing measures on US products. A full list of products targeted is available online.
 
Airbus and Boeing disputes
   In 2019 the WTO Appellate Body, the final court of appeal at the WTO definitively ruled that the US has continued to unlawfully subsidise aircraft manufacturer Boeing, causing significant harm to Airbus.
   The WTO’s ruling in this 16 year-long dispute confirms that the United States has not complied with obligations to withdraw subsidies previously declared illegal by the WTO Appellate Body in 2012, adversely affecting the UK and EU aerospace industry.
  Following the findings, in October the EU was authorised in a WTO arbitration and has gone on to place retaliatory tariffs on $4 billion worth of US products in the Boeing dispute.

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COM NEWS

 
  Last year we reported that the Court of Appeal ruled that the Government should not have granted export licences for the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia that could be used in the conflict in Yemen. The Court said that when assessing whether there was a “clear risk” that exports might be used to commit violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), as required by the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, the Government had not considered whether IHL violations had occurred.
  The Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) has now brought a judicial review claim (press release) challenging the Government’s decision in July this year to resume arms sales to Saudi Arabia on the basis that any violations of IHL were “isolated incidents”. The claim follows a UN panel of experts’ report saying that “third states transferring arms to parties in the conflict in Yemen […] may be violating their obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty” and that there had been “documented patterns of serious violations of international humanitarian law”.

(Source: GreekReporter, 4 Dec 2020) [Excerpts]

 
  The House and Senate Armed Services Committees reached consensus on the annual defense policy bill unveiled Thursday which, among other things, gives a mandate to the U.S. President to sanction Turkey for its acquisition of the Russian S-400 air missile defense system.
  Though President Donald Trump has held off sanctioning Turkey for the purchase under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA, the defense bill would order that five or more sanctions under CAATSA be imposed within 30 days.
  The sanctions include a ban on US banking and property transactions, the denial of US visas and forcing US lenders to deny loans to any sanctioned companies.
  Defense News reports that the duty would fall to the Trump administration unless the bill is signed after next week.Otherwise it would fall to President-elect Joe Biden, who is due to be inaugurated Jan. 20.
  Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Bob Menendez, D-N.J., was among lawmakers who hailed the inclusion of the language in the $740.5 billion, 4,517-page National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA.
  The legislation also includes a provision that would authorize the US Air Force Secretary to use the six Turkish F-35A aircraft that were never delivered to Ankara after Turkey was suspended from the F-35 program.
  The bill, which is the product of weeks of negotiations to reconcile House and Senate versions, is expected to be taken up in both chambers next week.

COM COMMENTARY

 
  On November 30, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions against a Chinese technology company for allegedly “having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions.” The sanctions, issued pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, reflect Treasury’s continued efforts to hold persons who offer support to the Maduro regime accountable. As a result, all property and interests in property belonging to the identified individuals subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and “any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by the designated individuals, are also blocked.” U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.
   Concurrently, OFAC issued Venezuela-related General License (GL) 38 and a related frequently asked question. GL 38 authorizes the wind down of transactions and activities involving the sanctioned company or any entity owned-directly or indirectly at a 50 percent or greater interest-through January 14, 2021, which would otherwise be prohibited by E.O. 13692. According to OFAC, GL 38 does not authorize (i) any debit to the sanctioned entity’s accounts on a U.S. financial institution’s books; or (ii) any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations.

(Source: Medium, 8 Dec 2020) [Excerpts]

 
* Author: Nicholas Turner, Esq., 852-5998-7559, Steptoe & Johnson HK
 
  Here are five things that happened this week in the world of economic sanctions that I think you should know about.
  1. The US Department of Defense added four names to the list of so-called “Communist Chinese military companies” under Section 1237 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1999. They are: China Construction Technology Co. Ltd. (CCTC), China International Engineering Consulting Corp. (CIECC), China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC), and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC). (More on this below.)
  2. The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) named China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation (CEIEC) as a Specially Designated National (SDN) under Executive Order 13692 for helping the Venezuelan government monitor and restrict Internet content. According to a Treasury Department news release, “CEIEC provided Venezuela . . . a commercialized version of China’s ‘Great Firewall.'” US persons have until 14 January 2021 to wind down transactions with CEIEC under General License 38.
  3. US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) unveiled a Withhold Release Order (WRO) on cotton and cotton products from Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) imported into the United States, based on reports of XPCC’s use of forced labor. As explained in a CBP news release, CBP can release a shipment held under a WRO if an importer proves it “was not produced with forced labor.”
  4. OFAC sanctioned an individual in Mexico under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (FNKDA) for acting on behalf of a prominent narcotics trafficker in Mexico accused of orchestrating the murder of a US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent in 1985. Separately, OFAC sanctioned one individual, three of his associates, and four related companies under the FNKDA for supporting the Clan del Golfo in Colombia.
  5. OFAC named the Kaniyat militia in Libya and its leader as SDNs under the Global Magnitsky Sanctions program (Executive Order 13818). According to a Treasury Department news release, the militia is “responsible for the murder . . . as well as torture, forced disappearances, and displacement of civilians” in Libya.
Comments
   There are now 35 companies listed by the Department of Defense under Section 1237 of the NDAA 1999. As previously discussed, the recently issued Executive Order 13959 will soon prohibit US persons from some transactions in securities of the companies. The Executive Order kicks in on 11 January 2021 for 31 of the companies and 1 February 2021 for the four newly added companies. Meanwhile, the securities industry is anxiously awaiting guidance from OFAC on the scope of the prohibition.
Isn’t XPCC already an SDN under the Global Magnitsky Sanctions program? Why the WRO? As it happens, most goods would cease being blocked property under Executive Order 13818 once purchased from XPCC by distributors or manufacturers outside the United States. Up next: the Senate may vote on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which, if signed into law, would put a mega-WRO on all products from China’s Xinjiang Province.
Breaking: The US State Department announced sanctions on 14 members of China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee under Executive Order 13936 for their roles in promulgating the Hong Kong National Security Law. More on this next week.

COM_a310. Steptoe: “Second Circuit’s Decision in Mangouras: Implications for Privilege Assertions in Cross-Border Investigations” [Part III of III]

(Source: Steptoe, 4 Dec 2020) [See parts I and II in the Monday and Tuesday Daily Bugles.]
 
* Principal Author: Patrick F. Linehan, Esq. 1-202-429-8154, Steptoe & Johnson LLP
 
  The Second Circuit found the district court did not address the statute’s requirement that discovery not be “in violation of a legally applicable privilege” or consider whether Spanish privilege law was “legally applicable.” In doing so, the Second Circuit held that “[i]n circumstances where the parties dispute which nation’s privilege law furnishes the ‘legally applicable privilege,’ and those competing national laws provide different results, courts should first conduct a choice-of-law analysis to determine which body of privilege law applies.”  
  The Second Circuit held that “the ‘touch base’ test is the proper choice-of-law test for purposes of determining which privileges are ‘legally applicable’ in the § 1782 context.” The court reiterated the “touch base” analysis in this context:  Under the touch base test, a court applies “the law of the country that has the ‘predominant’ or ‘the most direct and compelling interest’ in whether … communications should remain confidential, unless that foreign law is contrary to the public policy of this forum.” … The country with the predominant interest is either “the place where the allegedly privileged relationship was entered into,” or “the place in which that relationship was centered at the time the communication was sent.” … Thus, “communications relating to legal proceedings in the United States, or that reflect the provision of advice regarding American law, ‘touch base’ with the United States and, therefore, are governed by American law, even though the communication may involve foreign attorneys or a foreign proceeding.”  

  The Squire defendants argued that the “touch base” analysis should not apply, because, if US law was found to control, it could lead to discovery that might infringe on another country’s laws and could “encourage reciprocal infringements of US privileges.” The Second Circuit rejected this argument, noting that a foreign jurisdiction can refuse to order discovery of documents that are privileged under its own law.

 

Mangouras’ Implications for Privilege Assertions In the Context of Multi-Jurisdictional Investigations
     In addition to clarifying the choice of law analysis in the context of cross-border litigation, Mangouras’ crystallization of the touch base doctrine, beyond its interpretation of Section 1782, has broader implications for how investigative lawyers should approach the invocation of privilege during investigations, and the assertion of privilege in any multi-jurisdictional investigation that may follow. In an ideal world, lawyers managing investigations being conducted in multiple countries simultaneously are incentivized to structure and document cross-border investigations with an eye toward which privilege law will apply to which aspects of the investigation under Mangouras in any litigation, whether filed in the United States or abroad given the availability of US discovery under Section 1782. Those considerations could include factors such as: (1) how broadly to define the scope of an investigation in an engagement letter (i.e., which jurisdictions are likely to initiate their own investigation); (2) how to frame the purpose of major communications; (3) who should be included in the circulation of major attorney-client communications; and (4) who should be present for witness interviews (this analysis could even differ depending on the location of the interview), among other considerations. These factors could prove relevant to establishing which of the potential jurisdictions on which the communications could “touch base” under Mangouras, in the event those communications are later the subject of discovery in either US litigation or a Section 1782 application.
    The practical reality, however, is that in fast-moving internal investigations there is often pressure to obtain substantive answers quickly. Delay can lead to stale evidence, tainted witnesses, or even business consequences for the client. The suggestions in the previous paragraph are therefore aspirational, not necessarily prescriptive. Counsel should do their best to consider the forgoing factors at the outset and remain flexible as facts and findings emerge, which could change the privilege analysis.
    Mangouras may also have implications for communications and provision of information from defense counsel to prosecutors in parallel investigations in the United States and abroad that may coincide with or follow the internal investigation. Certain attorney-client communications and work product generated during the prior investigation that would ordinarily be privileged under US law may not be under the privilege law of another jurisdiction. Although prosecutors often give deference to attorney-client communications occurring in non-US jurisdictions, the Second Circuit has now provided more aggressive prosecutors with a basis from an authoritative court to argue that such a document, if it is not protected under the law in the jurisdiction where it “touches base,” must be produced under a grand jury or other government subpoena, or in reciprocal criminal discovery under Rule 16.
    The Mangouras decision sets the table for increasing disputes regarding the privileged status of international communications. Mangouras emphasizes the need to consider foreign privilege rules and the interests of foreign governments in applying those rules to the facts of each case. The resulting litigation will likely be complex and time-consuming because it will require both research into foreign law and fact-intensive argument. Trial court judges are often reluctant to wade into foreign privilege law-as emphasized by the trial court judge here-because resolving complicated legal questions is far more difficult and time consuming when the legal questions arise from a foreign legal doctrine.
    As with most privilege issues, the best way to limit litigation costs is often to consider the possibility of litigation at the outset of an international project or engagement. By considering the potential for litigation, international businesses can frame confidential communications in the way that most strongly implicates the desire of the more protective nation to maintain confidentiality. If, for example, Nation A protects communications between one company’s general counsel to a joint venturer’s CEO, but Nation B does not, then the general counsel would be well advised to emphasize in real time the aspects of key communications that increase their ties to Nation A over Nation B.
Privilege law is not simple, and neither is international choice of law analysis. But as cross-border privilege disputes persist, Mangouras may mark a significant move toward more consistency in which privilege rules apply in the context of cross-border investigations.

(Source: Winston, 4 Dec 2020)

 
* Principal Author: Cari N. Stinebower, Esq., 1-202-282-5788, Winston & Strawn LLP
 
  On October 17, 2020, the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the “Export Control Law” or “the law”) was adopted at the 22nd Session of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress (“NPC”); it took effect on December 1, 2020. The law was listed into the annual legislative work plan of the State Council in 2016. The Ministry of Commerce issued the draft for comments on June 16, 2017. After three deliberation sessions by the Standing Committee of the NPC on December 28, 2019; June 28, 2020; and October 13, 2020, the law was finally approved by vote. The approval of the law is particularly significant in light of the Sino-U.S. trade war. Despite the trade war, the legislation still adopts a more prudent attitude and many adjustments have been made to the provisions through several reviews.  The law appears to parallel similar U.S. export control laws and regulations including the Export Administration Regulations and the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations.  Concepts within the law will be familiar to U.S. businesses and to Chinese enterprises who import U.S. origin components. Corresponding infrastructure such as automated licensing portals, enforcement notifications, and hotlines will be announced subsequently.
  The promulgation of the Export Control Law has made up for the lack of higher-level law in the area of export control. The export control system, covering nuclear, chemical, biological, missile, and military products, has been developed, with the export control law as its core, together with “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-purpose Nuclear Products and Related Technologies” and other export control regulations and relevant normative documents. The new legal system of export control will play an important role in safeguarding China’s national security and interests and actively fulfilling international obligations such as non-proliferation.
  The promulgation of the Export Control Law is very relevant to many enterprises, especially those involved in foreign trading. Other specific types of enterprises affected by the adoption of the law and how those enterprises can respond to the changes are both important questions deserving of additional attention. These questions are addressed below.
 
1. Which kind of exports are regulated by the Export Control Law?
  “Export” as stipulated in the Export Control Law includes exports, deemed exports, and special exports.
(1) Exports: Defined as the transfer of controlled items from China to overseas.
(2) Deemed exports: Defined as the provision of controlled items by Chinese citizens, legal entities, and unincorporated organizations to foreign organizations and individuals.
  As to the deemed exports, please note that the law does not limit the location where export occurs; that is, if both Chinese and foreign subjects are located in China or abroad, the export between the two subjects will still be deemed an export and subject to the Export Control Law. U.S. businesses are familiar with the concept, as it also is present in U.S. export controls. For example, passing a USB flash drive containing restricted technology from a Chinese company to a foreign individual in China is likely to be deemed an export. The inclusion of deemed exports within the scope of control breaks through the restrictions on the place where the controlled act occurs, and to a great extent, extends the scope of application of the Export Control Law.
(3) Special exports, etc.: Specifically including transit, transshipment, through transportation and re-exports of controlled items, or export from special customs supervision areas such as bonded areas and export processing zones, export supervised warehouses, bonded logistics centers, and other bonded supervision places.
  Here, it is important to pay attention to the concept of re-exports, which is juxtaposed with other special exports, and should be implemented in accordance with relevant provisions of the Export Control Law.
  In the previous deliberation process, there was great controversy surrounding “deemed exports” and “re-exports.” Some individuals think that the inclusion of these acts into the scope of export control will affect Chinese enterprises that play important roles in the international supply chain; however, these acts are still included in the Export Control Law. The connotation and denotation of these two types of acts is dependent on further supporting regulations.
 
2. How to judge whether the export items are controlled items?
  The legislative purpose of the Export Control Law is to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation. Therefore, the State controls the export of dual-use items, military products, nuclear and other goods, technologies and services related to the maintenance of national security and interests, and the performance of international obligations such as non-proliferation (hereinafter collectively referred to as “controlled items”). The above-mentioned controlled items include relevant technical data and other data.
  Specifically, the Export Control Law adopts the current system of an export control list, supplemented by temporary control and supplementary control to determine the controlled items.
(1) Export control list: The State export control department will formulate, adjust, and publish the export control list in accordance with the Export Control Law and other laws and regulations, the export control policies, and the prescribed procedures, together with the relevant departments.
(2) Temporary control: The State export control department may implement temporary control over goods, technologies, and services beyond the export control list upon approval, and make an announcement. The implementation period of temporary control shall not exceed two years. The assessment will be conducted before the expiration of the implementation period of the temporary control. Based on the assessment results, the temporary control will be cancelled, extended, or included in the export control list.
(3) Supplementary control: In addition to the controlled items specified in the export control list and temporary control, the exporter knows or should know, or has been informed by the State Administration of export control, of the items involved in export that may: (a) endanger national security and interests; (b) be used in the design, development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; or (c) be used for the purpose of terrorism and other risks, belong to the scope of export control.
  Therefore, in actual operation, enterprises should first compare the items they are considering for export with the export control list and the temporary control list. Even if the items do not fall into one of these two categories, enterprises should still assess whether the items fall within the three categories listed in the supplementary control list. This provision increases the duty of enterprises. For many export items with broad uses, the possibility of being considered “controlled items” within the meaning of the law also increases. Therefore, the Export Control Law also specifically stipulates that if an exporter is unable to determine whether the goods, technologies, and services to be exported fall within the definition of “controlled items” as specified by the law, the administrative department of export control shall timely reply upon the inquiry of the exporter. If the item to be exported is a controlled item, then the enterprise shall apply to the State export control department for permission.
 
3. What is the impact of the export control list on the exports?
  The Export Control Law establishes an export control list for importers and end-users that may be considering importing an item that satisfies one or more of the following criteria:
(1) violates the requirements of end-user or end-use management;
(2) endangers national security and interests; or
(3) would be used for terrorist purposes.
  For the importers and end-users listed in the export control list, the State export control department may take necessary measures such as prohibiting or restricting the trading of controlled items and ordering the suspension of the export of controlled items. An exporter shall not violate the regulations to deal with the importers and end-users listed in the export control list. If it is necessary to trade with the importers and end-users listed in the export control list under special circumstances, it may apply to the State export control department. If the importers and end-users listed in the export control list no longer have the above situation after taking measures, they can apply to the State Administration of export control to remove them from the control list; the State Administration of export control may, according to the actual situation, decide to remove the importers and end-users from the control list.
  This requires exporters to submit the end-user and end-use certifying documents of the controlled items to the State export control department when exporting, and the relevant certifying documents should be issued by the end-user or the government agencies where the end-user is located. End-use and end-user certificates also are a concept used under the parallel U.S. export controls regulations.  The end-users of controlled items shall also undertake that they shall not change the end-use of the controlled items or transfer them to any third party without the permission of the State export control department. This concept of in-country re-transfers will be familiar to U.S. businesses.  Moreover, the Export Control Law also requires exporters and importers to report to the State Administration of export control immediately if they find that the end-user or end-use is likely to change.
  This regulation actually puts forward higher requirements for exporters. Exporters need to stipulate the limit to the end-user and end-use in the contract into which it enters with importers or end-users, pay attention to whether the end-user and end-use are likely to change in the performance of the contract and even after the performance, and report to the State export control department in a timely manner. This requires enterprises to establish internal compliance systems and operate more effectively. Particularly, the Export Control Law clearly stipulates that the State export control department can issue general licensing and some other convenient measures to some controlled items for those enterprises that have established internal compliance systems for export control and perform well. This regulation puts forward higher requirements for enterprises in the establishment of compliance systems, and requires enterprises to increase investment in the establishment and operation of internal compliance systems to meet the challenges brought by these changes.
 
4. What are the legal liabilities for violation of export control obligations?
  Under the Export Control Law, those who violate export control obligations are subject to administrative and even potential criminal responsibility according to, and corresponding with, the facts and circumstances of the violation.
(1) Administrative liability
Articles 33 to 39 of the Export Control Law make clear the legal responsibilities of the exporters and others that are subject to its provisions. Among them, as the primary parties subject to the law, the exporters will be given a warning, ordered to stop the illegal acts, face confiscation of their illegal gains and/or fines, ordered to suspend their business for rectification, and even be disqualified from engaging in the export of relevant controlled items. According to the illegal acts and circumstances, the maximum amount of fine can reach 10 times to 20 times the illegal turnover (Article 37: the transaction with the subject listed in the export control list). As for the calculation of fines, it should be noted that the base number is determined by the amount of illegal turnover, which has been significantly improved compared to most of the other penalties that are calculated with the base of illegal income listed in “Regulations on the administration of technology import and export” and other relevant laws and regulations.
  In addition, Article 39 of the Export Control Law provides on the basis of the above penalties, where an exporter is punished for violating the provisions of the law, the State export control department may refuse to accept its application for export license within five years from the date that the punishment decision takes effect, and may prohibit the person directly in charge, and other persons directly liable, from engaging in the relevant export business activities for five years. Anyone who has been criminally punished due to irregularities in export control shall be banned from engaging in the relevant export operation activities for life, and the violation of the law by an exporter will be included in its credit record. Therefore, it is clear that the person directly in charge of, and other persons directly liable for engaging in, the relevant export business activities may be severely punished, and the impact may even affect production and operation activities other than the export of controlled items once they are found to have violated the law.
(2) Criminal liability
  Whoever, in violation of the Export Control Law, exports controlled items, the export of which is prohibited by the State, or exports controlled items without permission, will be investigated for criminal liability. According to the relevant provisions of the criminal law, the relevant illegal acts may constitute the crime of smuggling, the crime of illegal business operations, the crime of divulging state secrets, and/or the crime of forging, altering, buying, and selling official documents, certificates, and seals of State departments. The person directly in charge of, and other persons directly liable for,  engaging in the relevant export business activities may also be investigated for corresponding criminal liabilities according to the law.

EN EDITOR’S NOTES

EN_a112. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)

 
* John Milton (9 Dec 1608 – 8 Nov 1674; was an English poet and intellectual best known for his epic poem Paradise Lost (1667), written in blank verse, and widely considered to be one of the greatest works of literature ever written. William Hayley’s 1796 biography called him the “greatest English author” and he remains generally regarded “as one of the preeminent writers in the English language”.)
  – “The mind is its own place and in itself, can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven.”
 
* Redd Foxx (John Elroy Sanford; 9 Dec 1922 – 11 Oct 1991; better known by his stage name Redd Foxx, was an American stand-up comedian and actor. He is best remembered for his portrayal of Fred G. Sanford on the television show Sanford and Son.)
  – “Health nuts are going to feel stupid someday, lying in hospitals dying of nothing.”
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(Source: Editor)

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The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
 
Agency 
Regulations 
Latest Update 
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.

 

5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 
DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. 

18 Nov 2020: 
85 FR 73411:  Revisions to Export Enforcement Provisions. 

DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.  
24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Kimberley Process Certificates.  The latest edition of the BAFTR is 
9 Nov 2020.
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM)

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110.  

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

 
DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. 

28 Sep 2020: 85 FR 60874: Temporary Amendment for Republic of Cyprus. The latest edition of the BITAR is 28 Sep 2020. 

 
DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
Amendment of Cuban Assets Control Regulations.
 
 
USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), Revision 8.

1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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