;

20-1112 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

20-1112 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

(The Daily Bugle was not published yesterday, 11 Nov, a U.S. holiday.)

 this copy of the Daily Bugle to others or share this subscription link
Thursday, 12 November 2020

(No items of interest posted) 

  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings)
  4. Treasury/OFAC: “Treasury Sanctions Procurement Network Supplying Iranian Military Firm”
  5. EU Council Extends Sanctions on Venezuela until 14 Nov 2021
  6. UK ECJU: “Notice to Exporters 2020/15 — Contacting the MOD Team in ECJU”
  7. UK ECJU: “Prepare to Import Goods from the EU to Great Britain from 1 Jan 2021”
  8. UK ECJU: “Training on Export Control Compliance”
  1. EUS: “EU Reaches Agreement on New Dual-Use Export Control Rules”
  2. The Local: “Danish Company Charged with Violating EU Sanctions on Syria”
  1. Husch Blackwell: “BIS Requests Comments on Proposed Controls for Certain Software”
  2. KWM: “New Export Control Law — 5 Issues Remains to be Clarified” (Part II of II)
  3. Steptoe: “The Joy of Sanctions — OFAC Paints Picture of High-Risk Artworks”
  4. Tuttle Law: “The 30 Second Briefing — Where do I Find Information on Antidumping and Countervailing (AD/CVD) Duties?”
  1. ECTI Presents 18-21 Jan 2021: San Diego, CA; “United States Export Controls (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) Seminar Series”
  2. FCC Academy Presents: 1 and 3 Dec; “U.S. Export Controls: ITAR/EAR” and “FMS”
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  4. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  5. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 

Are You Keeping Up to Date with the Latest Regulations?
 

  Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”) and Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”) are Word documents to download to your laptop to keep you updated on the latest amendments. They contain over 800 footnotes of section history, key cases, practice tips & tricks, and extensive Tables of Contents.  Subscribers receive updated editions every time the regulations are amended (usually within 24 hours), so you will always have the current versions of the regulations.  Subscribe to the BITAR and BAFTR here to guarantee you have an up-to-date annotated versions of these essential regulations.  

EXIM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

OGS OTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

(Source: Federal Register)

* Treasury/OFAC: NOTICES; Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Pub. Date: 13 Nov 2020] (PDF)

* USTR: NOTICES; Product Exclusion:  China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation [Pub. Date: 13 Nov 2020] (PDF)

 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

OGS_a22. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source: Treasury/OFAC, 10 Nov 2020) [Excerpts]
 
  The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has designated a network of six companies and four individuals that facilitated the procurement of sensitive goods, including U.S.-origin electronic components, for Iran Communication Industries (ICI), an Iranian military firm designated by the United States in 2008 and by the European Union in 2010 for being owned or controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), the overall manager and coordinator of Iran’s ballistic missile program. ICI, a subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries, which falls under MODAFL, produces various items including military communication systems, avionics, information technology, electronic warfare, and missile launchers.  “The Iranian regime utilizes a global network of companies to advance its destabilizing military capabilities,” said Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “The United States will continue to take action against those who help to support the regime’s militarization and proliferation efforts.”
Treasury’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, an authority aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters. Concurrent with Treasury’s designations, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia is filing charges by criminal complaint against two entities and one individual that have also been designated today. ….
 
Click here to see specially designated nationals list update

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

  
  The Council today extended the EU sanctions regime against Venezuela for one year, until 14 November 2021.
  The decision was taken in light of the ongoing political, economic, social and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, with persistent actions undermining democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The measures include an embargo on arms and on equipment for internal repression, as well as a travel ban and an asset freeze on 36 listed individuals in official positions who are responsible for human rights violations and/or for undermining democracy and the rule of law.
  These measures are intended to help encourage democratic shared solutions in order to bring political stability to the country and allow it to address the pressing needs of the population. The targeted measures are flexible and reversible and designed not to harm the Venezuelan population.
  The relevant legal act will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 13 November 2020.

 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source: UK ECJU, 10 Nov 2020) [Excerpts]
 
  This notice provides the contact email which must be used by exporters wishing to apply for or renew OGEL approval letters from the Ministry of Defence.
  It has come to our attention that some exporters are sending correspondence to out of date team contacts and email addresses. As a result, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) team in Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) are not receiving these requests, which means that a response cannot be sent.
With immediate effect all requests from exporters for open general export licence (OGEL) approval letters, Crown Exemption letters and all enquiries of a general nature about MOD Form 680 applications should only be sent to:
Enquiries will be acknowledged and actioned by a named Desk Officer in the MOD Team.
  There are 3 types of OGEL that require UK exporters to obtain an approval letter from the MOD. These are:
  • UK government defence contracts, military goods
  • collaborative Project Typhoon and military goods
  • collaborative project A400M
  If exporters continue to encounter difficulties in contacting the MOD Team, then please telephone the ECJU Helpline on 020 7215 4594.

 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source: UK ECJU, 10 Nov 2020) [Excerpts]
 
  The process for importing goods from the EU will change. Businesses in England, Wales and Scotland need to complete the following actions to continue importing from EU countries from 1 January 2021.
(1)          Check if you should follow this step by step
(2)          Find out how to declare goods from 1 January 2021
(3)          Make sure you have an EORI number starting with GB
(4)          Check the rate of tax and duty you’ll need to pay
(5)          Check if you can make the importing process quicker

 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source: UK ECJU, 10 Nov 2020)
 
  Courses, seminars, workshops and webinars to help exporters understand their obligations under export control legislation. Click here to read the full bulletin.

 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

COM NEWS

 
  The EU Council has announced that agreement has been reached on an updated regulation which will set out the EU regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items. The agreement now needs to be endorsed by the EU Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper), after which Parliament and Council will be called upon to adopt the regulation at first reading. See the Commission’s original proposal here.
  The new regulation will include:
  • Provisions imposing stricter controls on cyber-surveillance technology which could be linked to human rights violations and security threats;
  • An EU-level coordination mechanism allowing for greater exchange between member states on exports of cyber-surveillance technology;
  • 2 new general EU licences authorising certain exports of cryptographic items and intra-group technology transfers;
  • Mechanisms allowing for improved cooperation between licensing and customs authorities, allowing for strengthened enforcement;
  • A new provision on transmissible controls which would allow a member state to introduce export controls on the basis of the legislation established by another member state;
  • Provisions to harmonise the rules applicable to certain services (technical assistance) at EU-level; and
  • New reporting rules to enhance transparency.

(Source: The Local, 12 Nov 2020) [Excerpts]

 
  Denmark’s financial crimes unit on Wednesday announced charges against a Danish company suspected of violating EU sanctions on Syria by delivering large quantities of fuel to Russian warplanes there.
  The transactions, carried out between 2015 and 2017, amounted to 647 million kroner (87 million euros), according to the Danish State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SØIK).
  “On 33 occasions, a Danish company sold a total of about 172,000 tonnes of kerosene to Russian companies, as a result of which the kerosene was delivered to Syria in violation of EU sanctions against Syria,” it said in a statement.
  It did not name the company, but Danish media reported it was shipping company Dan-Bunkering which allegedly did business with the Russian firm Maritime, responsible for supplying fuel to Russian military aviation in war-torn Syria.
  SØIK said that through intermediaries, the fuel was delivered to the Mediterranean Sea and then to an unknown recipient in Syria’s Banias port.
A holding company and the director of one of the companies involved are also being prosecuted for eight of the 33 transactions, SØIK said.
  EU sanctions have been in force against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime since December 2011 and are subject to annual review.
They include an oil embargo and a freeze on Syrian central bank assets within the European Union.
  The Syrian conflict erupted in early 2011 when Assad’s forces staged a brutal crackdown on anti-government protests, sparking violence that has since claimed hundreds of thousands of lives.
  Moscow’s military intervention in 2015 helped turn the tide of the war, with Russian air power allowing Syrian government forces to win back large parts of the country from rebels and jihadists.

COM COMMENTARY

(Source: Hush Blackwell, 10 Nov 2020)
 
* Principal Auhtor: Julia A. Banegas ,Esq., 1-202-378-2317, Husch Blackwell
 
  Under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (“ECRA”), the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) is authorized to establish controls on the export, reexport or in-country transfer of “emerging and foundational technologies.”  On August 27, 2020, BIS issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking, requesting comments on the definition of, criteria for and identification of certain foundational technologies.
  On November 6, 2020, BIS published a proposed rule in the Federal Register proposing to add certain software to the Commerce Control List (“CCL”) and thereby place export controls on it.  BIS seeks comments on its proposed rule by December 21, 2020 so that it can ensure the proposed controls are “effective and appropriate” regarding their potential impact on “commercial or scientific applications.”
  Specifically, BIS determined that certain software for the operation of nucleic acid assemblers and synthesizers, which are controlled under Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) 2B352, are capable of being used to generate “pathogens and toxins without the need to acquire controlled genetic elements and organisms.”  In other words, BIS determined that this type of software can be used to effectively circumvent export controls on genetic elements and organisms.  BIS proposes to amend the CCL by adding ECCN 2D352 to control such software, in order to ensure that a lack of controls cannot be exploited to further the development of biological weapons.

(Source: China Law Insight, 5 Nov 2020) [Part I was published Monday]
 
* Principal Author: Feng Wang, King & Wood Mallesons
 

Issue 3: How to regulate the controlled activities under the Export Control Law?

  Compared with the previous export control regulations, the Export Control Law explicitly includes deemed export and re-export as controlled activities for the first time, greatly expanding the scope of controlled activities. In physical exports, the controls could be conducted through regulating customs declaration. In technology exports, however, due to their various forms and the lack of checkpoints, there are many difficulties in actual regulation. Under the current Regulations on the Administration of the Import and Export of Technology, China controls cross-border technology-related exports based on contracts. This contract-based control is inapplicable to deemed exports taking place within the territory of China and the widespread non-contract-based cross-border technology transfers (e.g., intra-group collaborative development of technology). Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the regulation regime  after the implementation of the Export Control Law. The difficulties in this regard

mainly lie in the following two aspects:

  1) How to strengthen the regulation of technology export control?

  Owing to the unique nature of technology, it is difficult to regulate technology export control through a single channel. In order to enforce the regulations effectively, it is necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the characteristics of the entire business process of technology from R&D to export, and to identify feasible checkpoints according to different circumstances and stages. For example, for R&D involving foreigners in China, the corresponding export license may be a pre-condition for the relevant foreigners to obtain a work permit in China; for technology exports with cross-border income, the foreign exchange receipts of the relevant entities in cross-border trade in services may be verified. This also implies that the technology export regulatory authorities may not rely on a single export control authority, but rather require the coordinated supervision of multiple non-export control regulators, such as the government authorities in relation to labor, foreign exchange, and banking. Article 29 of the Export Control Law provides for the obligations of other departments to assist the export control authorities, and it is believed that the requirements will be further clarified in future rulemaking.
 

  2) How to balance the demand for facilitating daily technological R&D activities with the compliance to regulatory export controls requirements?

   Due to the current diverse forms of international trade and R&D, intra-group cross-border R&D and technical services and the provision of a full range of after-sales technical services for products have become common business models. The overly tight regulatory requirements may affect the daily operation of enterprises or force some enterprises to relocate their affected R&D activities out of China, thereby weakening China’s competitiveness in international trade and technology competition. In view of this, in addition to a clear control licensing system, it is also necessary to prepare corresponding general license, license exceptions and exemption mechanisms for technology export regulation, so as to facilitate frequent and routine cross-border technology exchanges. The export control regimes of other jurisdictions generally set up a series of licensing exceptions and exemption conditions for certain business activities. For example, under the US export control regime, while there are very broad criteria for controlled acts, an exemption mechanism is also set for acts, such as basic research, that are not controlled under the EAR. Acts such as cloud data transfer between multinational corporations are not considered controlled under the EAR if certain conditions are met. In specific scenarios such as the employment of overseas R&D personnel and technical exchange and cooperation between parent and subsidiary companies, corresponding license exceptions can be applied according to the control risks and requirements of different items without the requirement to obtain relevant licenses. These regulations facilitate the daily operation of enterprises while meeting regulatory requirements, and help enhance their awareness of and compliance. We suggest that these mechanisms could be referred in the follow-up implementation rules of the Export Control Law.

  The Export Control Law imposes significantly heavier penalties on violations of export control regulatory requirements, and introduces a blacklisting system into China for the first time. This reflects China’s resolution to strengthen its export control enforcement in the future. To ensure the effectiveness of the export control regulatory system, a powerful enforcement agency is a must. Given the specialty of export control enforcement and the difficulty in relevant investigations, we can refer to the experience and regulations of the US for the improvement and enforcement of the enforcement agency. The US enforcement of export control is led by the Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”) of the BIS, and supported by several departments. As the lead agency, OEE has eight field offices in the US, has deployed special agents to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in nine locations, and has regional Export Control Officers in eight locations around the world, including Beijing and Hong Kong SAR. As federal law enforcement officers, OEE agents have the same powers as FBI agents, including the authority to carry guns, make arrests, execute search warrants, serve subpoenas, and seize cargo. The enforcement actions of the OEE have access to technical support from the Office of Enforcement Analysis of the BIS. Besides the Department of Commerce, the US Customs, as a port supervisory authority, confirms the declared export control information of goods through the Automated Commercial Environment in the export declaration, examine and supervise suspicious goods, and communicate with BIS on relevant information in real time to ensure full supervision on the export of controlled goods in the customs clearance process. Relying on such a comprehensive enforcement system, BIS enforces the law with high efficiency. In fiscal year 2018, BIS confiscated property valued at more than US$9.6 million, launched 43 investigations on administrative violations, and imposed civil fines of more than US$1 billion.

  Compared with the US, China has not yet established an agency with the functions stated above under its current export control enforcement framework. In practice, China has been regulating controlled goods by Customs. Since Customs is not a specialized agency for export control, no statutory mechanism is in place for Customs to collaborate with departments such as the MOFCOM, who is responsible for technical management, to address problems in export control enforcement. In addition, Customs is only empowered to supervise tangible goods, but do not have the function of supervising technology export, which leads to certain deficiencies in export control regulation. The Export Control Law expressly specifies the unified control and enforcement mechanism of the State Council and the Central Military Commission. In this context, China will improve the structure of the relevant law enforcement departments in a timely manner to ensure effective export control enforcement.


Issue 5: How to understand the countermeasures under the Export Control Law?

  Article 48 of the Export Control Law provides that countermeasures may be taken against the countries or regions that are found to have abused export control measures endangering the national security and interests of China. Considering this unique export control mechanism and the recently released Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (the “UEL Provisions”), we believe that many foreign enterprises are concerned about the subsequent regulatory and enforcement developments, especially the interpretation of rules that may be issued. For the provisions of Article 48, we believe that subsequent legislation may provide further clarification, including:
 
1) How to understand the abuse of export control measures endangering China’s national security and interests?
  Specific countermeasures may require an assessment of the status and impact of existing international multilateral export controls. The US first proposed that export control regulation would be strengthened in the area of emerging and fundamental technologies following the enactment of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. Instead of unilateral legislation, the US seeks to integrate relevant technologies into the multilateral control mechanism under the Wassenaar Arrangement, making the US actions multilateral, aiming to achieve joint control of other regions by relevant participating states. In December 2019, the plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement participating states adopted the US proposal to strengthen multilateral controls on six emerging technologies and added them to the multilateral control list of Wassenaar Arrangement. Since China is not a participating state of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the revised list means all future exports of relevant technologies from Wassenaar Arrangement participating states to China will be subject to corresponding control requirements. In addition to the US, other countries and regions, including the EU and Japan, have corresponding military embargoes and special export control requirements on China. For example, Japan’s export control system excludes China from its non-white list and includes many Chinese entities in its foreign user control list. In light of the above, careful consideration is needed on how to define the criteria for determining abuse of export control measures in order to achieve the effect of anti-boycott and blocking without affecting the normal development of China’s international trade.
 

2) How to understand countermeasures?

Countermeasures may be taken in the following options:

  •  Imposing equivalent export control restrictions on the relevant countries and regions;
  • Imposing equivalent export control restrictions on specific entities from relevant countries and regions;
  • Denying the applicability in China of the export control requirements of relevant countries and regions.
  For the first option, because of the different positions of different countries in international trade and their correspondingly different needs for items and technologies, it may be difficult to assess and identify applicable equivalent export control restrictions in practice. It may be debatable whether direct export controls imposed on the relevant countries and regions would have the expected anti-boycott effect;
  The second option is an applicable countermeasure immediately available after the implementation of the UEL Provisions. However, as we mentioned in another article entitled “Four Key Issues on China’s Unreliable Entity List”, the implementation of the UEL Provisions also has a series of problems. Therefore, if China intends to adopt this option in future export control, it still needs to further improve relevant supporting legislation and operational rules to ensure the enforceability and effect of countermeasures.
  The third option is the anti-boycott regime prevailing in the US and the EU to prevent domestic entities from complying with the requirements of unilateral controls and sanctions imposed by other countries. As we have stated in the previous article, the US and the EU have extensive and successful experience in anti-boycott regimes, so the EU blocking statute and the US anti-boycott laws are ideal references for China to establish its anti-boycott regime. However, neither the UEL Provisions nor the Export Control Law directly and explicitly prohibits domestic entities from complying with the export control regimes of other countries. It is hard to clearly explain the underlying considerations for the absence of such prohibitions at the current state of China. However, we can clearly see the anti-boycott policy is trending in China.
 

Summary

  Since the end of World War II, the European and American countries have implemented the export control regimes for more than 70 years. China has not made major adjustments in its export control regime until 2020. Following the milestone enactment of the Export Control Law, China is bound to have further rules and regulations to improve relevant regulatory systems. . . .  

(Source: Steptoe, 10 Nov 2020)
 
* Principal Author: Wan Yi Ho, Esq, 852-6401-9968, Steptoe
 
  On October 30, 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued an advisory on potential sanctions risks arising from dealings in high-value artwork (the “Advisory”). The Advisory follows a July 2020 report from the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations detailing how the art industry could be used to evade U.S. sanctions, notably in regard to sanctioned Russian individuals.
  The Advisory focuses on the market for high-value artwork and provides guidance on mitigating risks related to transactions involving persons on the OFAC List of Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”) and territories subject to comprehensive sanctions (i.e., Crimea, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria).
The Advisory targets art galleries, museums, private art collectors, auction companies, agents, brokers, and other participants in the art market. In describing the vulnerabilities in the market, the Advisory notes that the lack of transparency and high degree of anonymity and confidentiality in the sale and purchase of high-value artworks make the market attractive for illicit actors to obscure their identities and source of funds.
  Of note, the Advisory clarifies that artwork that function primarily as an investment asset or medium of exchange would not be covered by the “informational material” exception in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) and the Trading with the Enemy Act which exempts certain published materials (including artwork) from sanctions. This clarification is in line with earlier guidance given in OFAC’s FAQs 812 to 814, published in 2019, which state that transactions involving Specially Designated Global Terrorists and artwork are prohibited without exception.
  The July 2020 Senate Report, which discussed Russian SDNs’ use of the art industry to evade U.S. sanctions, also recommended that OFAC issue comprehensive guidance interpreting IEEPA’s informational exception’s application to artworks, and urged OFAC to interpret this exception narrowly.
The Advisory makes reference to the Senate Report in describing how sanctioned Russian individuals used shell companies to purchase high-value artwork, thereby evading OFAC’s blocking sanctions. The Senate Report also described the art industry as the “largest legal, unregulated market in the United States” without a requirement to maintain anti-money laundering (“AML”) and anti-terrorism financing controls. It found that, although several large auction houses had voluntary AML controls, some failed to perform adequate due diligence on purchasers and undisclosed clients.
 
  In this regard, the Advisory reminds U.S. persons, in particular, of the broad prohibition against engaging in direct or indirect transactions with SDNs and comprehensively sanctioned territories, which could provide OFAC a basis for imposing civil penalties. Under OFAC’s “strict liability” regime, a U.S. person dealing in art could be held liable for breaching OFAC sanctions, even if the U.S. Person did not positively know of the involvement of a sanctioned person. Similarly, non-U.S. persons that process transactions related to such sales through the United States or the U.S. financial system could be held liable for violating OFAC sanctions.
  The Advisory recommends that persons involved in the high-value art trade, who may face exposure to transactions involving sanctioned persons, undertake a sanctions risk assessment and consider implementing risk-based compliance measures to mitigate any identified risks.

(Source: Tuttle Law, 9 Nov 2020)
 
* Author: George R. Tuttle, III. Esq., 1-415-254-5986, Tuttle Law
 
  Antidumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD) are not tariffs and are not identified in the Tariff Schedule. Although the ITC has a role in AD or CVD investigations (https://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations.htm), the actual rates of AD or CVD duty are set by the International Trade Administration (ITA) of the Department of Commerce through a separate investigation, and these rates are subject to annual review and adjustment.
  CBP maintains a public database of many (but not all) instructions implementing the orders at https://aceservices.cbp.dhs.gov/adcvdweb.
These instructions contain information on rates of AD/CVD duties applicable to producers/exporters from the subject country. They also have contact information at the ITA for further information. Questions about the scope of AD/CVD orders should be referred to the contacts in the instructions or to “Contact Import Administration” at https://www.trade.gov/enforcement/operations/.
  The two sites linked below can be used to find the Department of Commerce case number, which can be used when searching the CBP instruction site linked above.
  The most relevant tariff classification numbers associated with products subject to AD/CVD duties are maintained for the convenience of administration by U.S. Customs and importers. These HTSUS number are flagged in ACE and are there to alert brokers and entry filers that goods classified under the HTSUS number in question may be subject to AD/CVD duties. However, to be certain, the broker or importer would be expected to review the written scope of products covered by the order. The written scope description of products currently subject to AD/CVD order can be found at https://legacy.trade.gov/enforcement/operations/scope/index.asp.
  If there is a question or doubt about whether the scope of the order includes the product in question, U.S. Customs expects importers to seek a scope determination from the Department of Commerce, as U.S. Customs is not responsible for interpreting the scope of the order. More information on what is required to file a scope request can be found at https://legacy.trade.gov/enforcement/operations/scope/index.asp.

TE EX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

(Source: Jessica Lemon)
 
* What: United States Export Controls (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) Seminar Series
* When: ITAR Seminar: 18-19 Jan 2021; EAR/OFAC Seminar: 20-21 Jan 2021
* Where: San Diego, CA: Doubletree Hotel San Diego Downtown 
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker Panel: Greg Creeser and Marc Binder
* Register: here or contact Jessica Lemon, 1-540-433-3977, jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

U.S. Export Controls: ITAR & EAR from a non-U.S. Perspective (Tuesday, 1 Dec 2020)
Presenters: Jim Bartlett & Marco Crombach
Register or find more information here

 
The ABC of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (Thursday, 3 Dec 2020)
Presenters: Mike Farrell & Jim Bartlett
Register or find more information here
* Register for both and take advantage of our discounted price!
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN EDITOR’S NOTES

EN_a117. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)

 
 * Elizabeth Cady Stanton (12 Nov 1815 – 26 Oct 1902; was a leader of the women’s rights movement in the U.S. during the mid- to late-1800s.)
 – “The moment we begin to fear the opinions of others and hesitate to tell the truth that is in us, and from motives of policy are silent when we should speak, the divine floods of light and life no longer flow into our souls.”
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

 

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
 
Agency 
Regulations 
Latest Update 
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.

 

5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 
DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. 

9 Oct 2020: 
85 FR 64014:  Revisions to the Unverified List (UVL)

  

24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Kimberley Process Certificates. 

 

The latest edition of the BAFTR is 9 Nov 2020.
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM):

DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110.  

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

 
DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. 

28 Sep 2020: 85 FR 60874: Temporary Amendment for Republic of Cyprus. The latest edition of the BITAR is 28 Sep 2020. 

 
DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
Amendment of Cuban Assets Control Regulations.
 
 
USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), Revision 8.

1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The Daily Bugle Archive

Are you searching for updates from the past editions of the Daily Bugle? 

We publish a list of over 100 trade compliance job openings every day.

Submit your job for free.
PermanentJobListView All Job Openings

Are you looking for a new job in trade compliance? Click here to see the current job openings.

We publish a list of over 100 trade compliance events every day. Submit your event for free.

PermanentJobListView All Events

Are you looking for an upcoming event?   Click here to see upcoming events.

Scroll to Top