20-1013 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

20-1013 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

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[The Daily Bugle was not published yesterday, a U.S. holiday.]
Tuesday, 13 October 2020

(No items of interest posted) 

  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: “Public is Invited to Virtual DTAG Plenary Meeting on 22 Oct”
  4. EU Commission: “EU Sanctions Tool”
  5. EU Commission: “2020 Update of the EU Control List of Dual-Use Items”
  6. EU Council: “EU Sanctions Regime for Chemical Weapons Renewed for One Year”
  7. EU Council Extends Nicaragua Sanctions Regime for One Year
  8. UK DIT: “Strategic Export Controls – Country Pivot Report”
  1. Bellingcat: “How British-made Sniper Rifles Ended up in Yemen, Syria and Ukraine”
  2. Taiwan News: “China Preparing New Export Control Law in Response to US Entity List”
  1. Fried Frank: “U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on Iran’s Financial Sector”
  2. LMCS: “Former Buffalo Grove Businessman Charged with Illegally Exporting Gun Parts to Ukraine”
  3. Pillsbury: “Federal Court Temporarily Pulls the Teeth Out of California’s Alligator and Crocodile Product Ban”
  4. Steptoe: “US and EU Actions to Address Supply Chain Threats Caused by Reliance on Critical Mineral Imports”
  5. Thompson Hine: “BIS Implements Controls on Water Cannons and Amends Licensing Policy to Address Human Rights Violations”
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 61 Jobs Available – 10 New Job Openings This Week
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  4. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  5. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 

Are You Keeping Up to Date with the Latest Regulations?

  Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR and Bartlett’s Annotated FTR are Word documents to down-

load to your laptop to keep you updated on the latest amendments, and contain over 800 footnotes of section history, key cases, practice tips & tricks, and extensive Tables of Contents.  The ITAR amendment of the ITAR that took effect on 28 September is included in the current edition of the BITAR.  Subscribers receive updated editions every time the regulations are amended (usually within 24 hours) so you will always have the current versions of the regulations.  Subscribe to the BITAR here to guarantee you have an up-to-date ITAR!


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(Source: Federal Register)
* Treasury/OFAC: NOTICES; Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Pub. Date: 14 Oct 2020] (PDF) and (PDF)

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OGS_a22. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

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OGS_a33. State/DDTC: “Public is Invited to Virtual DTAG Plenary Meeting on October 22, 2020″
  The Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG) will meet in open session from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. EDT on Thursday, October 22, 2020.  The membership of DTAG consists of private sector defense trade representatives appointed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, who advise the Department on policies, regulations, and technical issues affecting defense trade.
  The following agenda topics will be discussed and final reports presented:  
   (1) Provide feedback to DDTC as DDTC works to consolidate exemptions into a single part of the ITAR.
   (2) Help develop a comprehensive compliance risk matrix to help prevent ITAR violations and diversions by various business functions involved in ITAR activities.
   (3) suggest a draft (a) form or attachment that indicates when Part 130 information will be reported (e.g, annually, but in a separate filing, at the same time as the company’s registration), and (b) Part 130 (annual) report form.
  The meeting will be held in WebEx. There will be one WebEx invitation for each attendee, and only the attendee should use the invitation. In addition, each attendee should access the virtual meeting from a private location. Please let us know if you need any of the following accommodations: live captions, digital/text versions of webinar materials, or other (please specify).  

  Members of the public may attend this virtual session and will be permitted to submit written questions before the date of the meeting.  Members of the public may also submit a brief statement (less than three pages) to the committee in writing for inclusion in the public minutes of the meeting. Members of the public who wish to attend this session must provide name and contact information, including an email address and a phone number, and any request for reasonable accommodation to the DTAG Alternate Designated Federal Officer (ADFO), Neal Kringel, via email at DTAG@state.gov by COB Wednesday, October 21, 2020. (The 5 October deadline was waived.)

  FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Barbara Eisenbeiss, PM/DDTC, SA-1, 12th Floor, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20522-0112; telephone (202) 663-2835 or email DTAG@state.gov.

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  This Tool is intended to assist EU economic operators, especially Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), interested in engaging in business involving Iran.
  The development of the EU Sanctions Tool (“Tool”) has been funded under the Partnership Programme managed by the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments.
  The Tool provides an easily accessible source of information on EU restrictive measures. Its objective is to give a first general and non-binding orientation to assist EU economic operators, especially EU SMEs, in pursuing business projects, in full awareness and compliance with EU restrictive measures against Iran.


  The Tool is divided into four parts:
  1. The first part determines whether the Tool is applicable to a specific EU economic operator interested in engaging in business with Iran;
  2. The second part determines whether the EU economic operator is permitted to engage with the proposed business partner in Iran;
  3. The third part provides an assessment of whether the proposed activity involving Iran is compliant with EU restrictive measures; and
  4. The final section, Conclusion, presents a summary of any applicable restrictions based on the answers given.
  For further assistance on restrictive measures, please consult the following complementary resources:

Iran specific resources

  1. EU Q&A on Due Diligence on Restrictive Measures for EU Businesses dealing with Iran;
  2. EU JCPOA Information Note, concerning lifted and currently applicable sanctions as well as any exceptions and the necessary requisite authorisations regarding certain activities;
  3. EU information page and Q&A on the JCPOA Procurement Channel.

General information on EU restrictive measures

  1. EU Sanctions Map offering easily accessible information on all EU restrictive measures regimes currently in place; and
  2. EU Sanctions Guidelines.
  Note that the implementation of EU restrictive measures is within the competence of EU Member States; EU operators are encouraged to contact the national competent authority (NCA) in their respective Member State for further assistance.

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(Source: European Commission, 8 Oct 2020)

  On 7 October 2020, the European Commission adopted the annual Delegated Regulation that updates the EU dual-use export control list in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. This brings it in line with the decisions taken within the framework of the international non-proliferation regimes and export control arrangements in 2019 and until end of February 2020 (in order to take into account the decisions taken in the Australia Group in February 2020). The majority of the changes result from amendments agreed at the Wassenaar Arrangement, but important changes also reflect the decisions taken in the Australia Group in February 2020.
  The main changes resulting from amendments at the Wassenaar Agreement include the following:

  • New decontrol note for certain carbon “fibrous or filamentary materials” (1A002 – Note 5)
  • Replacement of national equivalents with “equivalent standards” (1A005.b.)
  • Amendment to control entry for planar absorbers made of sintered ferrite (1C001.a -Note 1.d.2.)
  • Amendment to control entry for metal alloys (1C002 – Technical Note 3)
  • Amendment to control entry for fluids and lubricating materials (1C006.d.)
  • Amendment to control entry for anti-friction bearings and bearing systems (2A001)
  • Addition of a New Note to control entry for machine tools equipped with electronic
  • devices for “numerical control” (2B001 – Note 4)
  • Amendment to control entry for simulation software (3D003) and new Technical Note for local definition of ‘computation lithography’ (Technical Note & Note)
  • New local definition of ‘floating-point’ and ‘fixed-point’ for technology for the development or production of microprocessor microcircuits (3E002.a., .b., .c. –
  • Technical Notes 1 & 2)
  • New entry for certain “software” specially designed for monitoring or analysis by law enforcement (5D001.e.1., .2.) including new Technical Notes 1 & 2 and related decontrol note
  • Amendment to control entry for Information security system to refer to secure
  • “cryptographic activation” (5A002.a.)
  • Amendment to decontrol note for information security system in order to include gateways (5A002.a. – Note 2.h.)
  • New entry for systems, equipment and components for defeating, weakening or
  • bypassing “information security” (5A004.b.1. – .2.) accompanied with a Technical Note and decontrol notes Note 1 and Note 2
  • Amendment to entries 5D002.a.3. and 5D002.c.3. to include new sub-paras
  • New decontrol Note for “technology” for information security system (5E002.a.-Note)
  • Amendment to control entry for space qualified components for optical system(6A004.c.4)
  • Amendments to control entry for some lasers (6A005.a.1. – .2.a.)
  • New entry for “sub-orbital craft” (9A004.h.)
  • New local definition for ‘combined cycle engines’ (9A011 – Technical Note)
  • Amendment to control entry for ‘fan blades’ including new sub-paras (9E003.a.11.a. -.b.) and a new local definition of ‘fan blades’ (Technical note to 9E003.a.11.a)

Some changes result from amendments and new controls agreed at the Australia Group, including:  

  • New entry for 24 chemicals, including Novichok nerve agent precursors (1C350.66. to
  • 1C350.89)
  • Amendment to decontrol note for chemical mixtures (1C350 – Note 3) 
  • New entry for Middle East Respiratory Syndrome-related coronavirus (MERS-related
  • coronavirus – 1C351.a.59) 
  • Amendments to control entries for valves and components (2B350.g.1.a. – .2.a.) and
  • new Technical Note on Nominal size and Nominal Pipe Size of such items 
  • New Technical Note for cultivation chamber holding devices (2B352.b. – Technical
  • Note 2)
  • Some changes result from amendments agreed at the Missile Technology Control Regime, including:
  • New local definition for ‘CEP’ and new Technical Note for ‘CEP’ (7A103.c. – Technical Note 2)
  • Amendment to control entry 7A117 and related Technical Note (‘Circle of Equal Probability’ being replaced by ‘CEP’ (Circular Error Probable of Circle of Equal Probability)
  • Amendment to entry for turbojet and turbofan engines (9A101.a.1. – .a.2.) and new Technical Note for clarification on determination of specific fuel consumption (9A101.a. – Technical Note 2)
  • Amendment to control entry for test benches or test stands (9B117).
  Other changes were substantially editorial changes made to bring Annex I controls in line with Regime controls and changes for the correction of minor errors.
  Subject to the Council and the European Parliament raising no objections within a period of 2 months, the Commission Delegated Regulation is scheduled for publication in the Official Journal of the European Union on 14 December 2020 and will enter into force on the day following that of its publication.

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  The Council today decided to extend the regime allowing the EU to impose restrictive measures on persons and entities involved in the development and use of chemical weapons by one year, until 16 October 2021.
  The sanctions regime was introduced in 2018 as a follow-up to the conclusions of the European Council of 28 June 2018. The objective was to counter the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, which pose a serious threat to international security. The regime was due to apply until 16 October 2020. On the basis of a regular annual review, it was decided to extend the restrictive measures for a further year.
  Restrictive measures currently apply to nine persons – five linked to the Syrian regime and four involved in the Salisbury attack using the toxic nerve agent Novichok –  and one organisation, the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), the Syrian regime’s principal entity for the development of chemical weapons.
  The restrictive measures consist of a ban on travel to the EU and an asset freeze for persons, and an asset freeze for entities. In addition, persons and entities in the EU are forbidden from making funds available to those listed.
The objective of the EU sanctions regime is to support the global prohibition of chemical weapons as laid down by the Chemical Weapons Convention, at a moment when chemical attacks are increasing in various parts of the world.

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OGS_a77. EU Council Extends Nicaragua Sanctions Regime for One Year
  The Council has today extended the existing framework for imposing targeted restrictive measures in view of the situation in Nicaragua for one year, until 15 October 2021.
  The sanctions regime was introduced in October 2019 after the Council had repeatedly expressed its concern about the deteriorating political and social situation in Nicaragua, and firmly condemned the repression of political opponents, demonstrators, independent media and civil society going on since April 2018.
  The existing framework provides for the possibility of imposing targeted and individual sanctions against persons and entities responsible for human rights violations or abuses or for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Nicaragua, as well as persons and entities whose actions, policies or activities otherwise undermine democracy and the rule of law.
  Sanctions consist of a travel ban to the EU, an asset freeze for persons and an asset freeze for entities. In addition, EU persons and entities are forbidden to make funds available to those listed.
  Since the introduction of the framework, six persons have been sanctioned.
The EU remains extremely concerned about the ongoing deterioration of democracy and human rights in Nicaragua. Repression by security forces and pro-government armed groups must stop. 
   The EU expects the Government of Nicaragua to abide by the commitments, in their entirety, made in their March 2019 agreements with the opposition. This includes the re-establishment of civil and political rights and guarantees, the liberation of the remaining political prisoners and the dropping of all charges against them, the return of international human rights bodies to Nicaragua and an agreement on electoral and institutional reforms between the government and the opposition – including political parties and current members of the National Coalition – with the aim of guaranteeing credible, inclusive and transparent elections in 2021.
  The EU reaffirms its commitment to supporting the Nicaraguan people, including by helping to strengthen the rule of law and supporting economic and social development for the most vulnerable.

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OGS_a88. UK DIT: “Strategic Export Controls – Country Pivot Report”
Read the full report here.

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(Source: Bellingcat, 10 Oct 2020) [Excerpts]
  Accuracy International (AI), a British based firearms manufacturer has made a name for itself selling sniper rifles around the world. Its products are renowned for their reliability, durability and are generally considered as some of the best on the market. 
  The range of the rifle can provide a warring party with a significant advantage over its opponents – back in 2009, British soldiers used the rifle to take out two Taliban fighters in Afghanistan from a distance of 2,475 meter. …
  The rifle has been exported to many countries around the globe. We traced a few of these exports, and tried to reconstruct the full circle: from license, to export to actual deployment. While doing so, however, we began to wonder whether UK arms export control mechanisms were effective given some of the locations we saw these weapons appearing in.

  The UK is a signatory to the International Treaty on Arms Trade (ATT), which looks to regulate the cross-border trade in conventional arms. It has also implemented the EU common Position on Arms Exports and has its own domestic rules that aim to prevent licenses being granted when there is a risk recipients would use them aggressively against another country or for internal repression. These rules also state that caution must be taken in granting licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established.
  In responding to the research conducted for the UK Arms project, a UK government spokesperson said the country operates “one of the most comprehensive export control regimes in the world” and “rigorously assesses all export licences in accordance with strict licensing criteria.”
  Yet despite that, we were able to find Accuracy International sniper rifles appearing in Russia’s volatile North Caucasus region as well as conflict zones in Ukraine, Yemen, and Syria. 
  Accuracy International did not respond to requests for comment for the UK Arms project before publication. There is no suggestion of any illegality on their part. …
  Both the UK government and Accuracy International were contacted as part of the UK Arms project. Accuracy International did not respond before publication.

A spokesperson for the UK government said: “The UK operates one of the most comprehensive export control regimes in the world.

  “The Government takes its export responsibilities seriously and rigorously assesses all export licences in accordance with strict licensing criteria. We will not issue any export licences where to do so would be inconsistent with these criteria.
 “The Government also supports responsible defence and security industries, which make an important contribution to the UK’s global economic competitiveness, as well as sustaining tens of thousands highly skilled manufacturing and engineering-based jobs across the UK.”

(Source: Taiwan News, 13 Oct 2020) [Excerpts]

  Beijing is preparing a new export control law that would prohibit Chinese companies from doing business with foreign firms on national security grounds.

According to Nikkei Asia, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) is set to discuss the proposed law designed to protect national interests in a session beginning today. The new legislation could go into effect as early as 2021, the report said.

  The bill employs the same national security language the U.S. Department of Commerce has used with its Entity List to blacklist Chinese tech companies like Huawei, according to the report. Beijing has criticized Washington for using national security as an excuse to pressure Chinese firms.
  Under the new law, the Chinese government could ban exports of strategic materials and advanced technology to specific companies if placed on Beijing’s unreliable entity list. The list is likely to include U.S. companies but could also contain firms from other countries if they follow Washington export restrictions on China.
  China’s Ministry of Commerce first released a draft of this bill in June 2017, which was subsequently deliberated on by the NPC in December 2019 and June 2020, the report stated. The new law would mark certain products, technologies, and services prohibited from export unless Chinese suppliers submit documentation to Beijing.
  Officials would then choose to approve the exports based on their impact on national security, potential for military use, and the identity of the clients. The list of materials protected under the legislation could include rare-earth elements, of which China controls 60 percent of the global market, one source told Nikkei Asia.
  The Ministry of Commerce will be setting up an interagency “working mechanism” that will decide what companies will be listed as entities, according to China Business Review. If companies change their behavior in a way that satisfies Beijing, they can be removed from the list; while foreign companies can also apply to be removed, how that mechanism will work remains unclear.
Being placed on the list could lead to potential punishments, such as having import and export activities with China restricted; investment in China restricted; personnel and transportation vehicles restricted; work permits, stay, or residence qualifications for personnel restricted; and fines, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce.
  The new law will also include a clause that lets Beijing hold companies liable for violating its export controls outside of China; however, the details remain unclear concerning this aspect, Nikkei Asia reported.


* Principal Author: Michael T. Gershberg, Esq., 1-202-639-7085, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP 
  On October 8, 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of the Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on the Iranian financial sector, authorized under Executive Order 13902 of January 14, 2020. Under the new measures, OFAC added 18 major Iranian banks to the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. These new sanctions will have minimal effect on U.S. businesses, which are already broadly prohibited from dealing with Iran. However, the Iranian financial sector will now generally be subject to secondary sanctions, which target non-U.S. businesses dealing with the sanctioned entities. These additional sanctions are intended to further pressure Iranian leadership by cutting off Iran’s remaining connections to the global financial system.
  If any foreign financial institution knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction related to the designated Iranian banks, it may be barred from opening any correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States. However, OFAC provides for a 45-day wind-down period for previously non- sanctionable activity. OFAC also issued General License L, extending any pre-existing authorizations, exemptions, and licenses under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) to the newly blocked financial institutions. As in the past, the sanctions do not apply to transactions related to agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices.
  According to Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, the sanctions are intended to “stop illicit access to U.S. dollars.” He states that U.S. sanctions “will continue until Iran stops its support of terrorist activities and ends its nuclear programs.”
  U.S. companies and financial institutions should thoroughly review their engagements with U.S. and non- U.S. businesses that may be involved with Iran. Non-U.S. businesses in the affected sectors should ensure compliance with U.S. sanctions regimes to avoid facing serious repercussions and losing access to the U.S. financial system. If you have any questions regarding the Iran sanctions program or how it may affect your business, please reach out to the contacts listed below.

  The former owner of a Buffalo Grove [Illinois] drilling equipment distributor has been charged for illegally exporting gun parts to Ukraine over a three-year span, federal prosecutors said.  Glenn Stepul, 33, who now lives in Miami Beach Florida and previously lived in Wheeling, is facing several federal charges.  Stepul owned a Buffalo Grove business that distributed horizontal directional drilling equipment.
  From 2014 to 2016, Stepul conspired with a Ukrainian resident, Andriy Yakin, and an unindicted co-conspirator in Ukraine to violate the Arms Export Control Act, according to the U.S. Justice Department.  The three allegedly either exported or attempted to export pistol slides and stainless-steel gun barrels from the United States to Ukraine without obtaining the required authorization from the U.S. Department of State, according to an indictment in U.S. District Court in Chicago. Stepul, Yakin, and the unindicted co-conspirator also conspired to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act by exporting or attempting to export rifle scopes and night-vision cameras from the United States to Ukraine, without obtaining the required authorization from the U.S.  The charges allege that Stepul commingled and concealed some of the export-controlled items inside shipments of drilling equipment sent to Ukraine. One such shipment was intercepted by customs officials in Lviv, Ukraine, in September 2014, the indictment states.  Stepul had completed a customs declaration falsely describing the items inside the parcel as household goods, cosmetics, toys, stationery, and cassettes, the indictment states.  . . .

(Source: Pillsbury Alerts, 12 Oct 2020) [Excerpts]
* Principal Author:  Eric Moorman, Esq., Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 
  California’s recent ban on the importation and sale of alligator products in the state has faced significant legal pushback from retailers and wholesalers of alligator products, the federal government, and others, and has raised questions about the state’s authority to regulate the sale and import of animal products where the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has authorized such activities in foreign and interstate commerce. 
  Effective January 1, 2020, the California Legislature banned the importation and sale of alligator products within the State.  Two lawsuits filed by a Louisiana state agency, landowners and retailers of alligator products have challenged the ban on preemption and Commerce Clause grounds. The ban is subject to a temporary restraining order while the court considers whether to enjoin its enforcement.  . . .

  Overall, prior cases suggest that courts have viewed preemption and Commerce Clause challenges to state regulation of wildlife and animal products with skepticism. However, Delacroix and April in Paris offer a unique twist absent from these earlier cases: they ask the court to consider the adverse effects of California’s alligator products ban on public and private efforts in the State of Louisiana (and elsewhere) to conserve and protect alligator habitat. Banning the sale of alligator products in California, Plaintiffs argue, will have far-reaching consequences beyond the immediate economic impact on farmers, producers and retailers: it may remove private landowners’ economic incentive to dedicate their lands to alligator conservation efforts. Regardless of the outcome of these cases, they offer yet another vivid chapter in the unfolding struggle for regulatory control between California and the federal government over the sale and import of exotic animal products.


MS_a116. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 61 Jobs Available – 10 New Job Openings This Week

* Alchemy Shipping & Logistics; London, UK; Trade Compliance Specialist 
* Cargolux Airlines; Luxembourg;Coordinator Compliance Defense; Job ID: 770
* Hitachi; Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Contract Manager (m/f/d) 
* Honeywell; Charlotte, NC; Sr. Trade Compliance Analyst; Job ID: 247338 
* Leonardo DRS; Bridgeton, MO; Trade Compliance Specialist; Job ID: 100091; Contact Details: LaCreta Burns, 1-3145534460, 
* Microsoft; Redmond, WA; Sr Manager, Export Control; Job ID: 870014
* Siemens; Madrid, Spain; Logistic Project Operator; Job ID: 224128
* Thermo Fisher Scientific; Hillsboro, OR; Trade Analyst; Job ID: 132058BR
* Torrent Pharma; Philadelphia, PA; DEA Associate 
* Upwork; Phoenix, AZ; Compliance & Ethics Associate Counsel 

Click here for the full list.   

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EN_a117. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)

* Margaret Thatcher (Margaret Hilda Thatcher, nee Roberts; 13 Oct 1925 – 8 Apr 2013; was a British stateswoman who served as prime minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990. She was the longest-serving British prime minister of the 20th century and the first woman to hold that office. A Soviet journalist dubbed her “The Iron Lady”, a nickname that became associated with her uncompromising politics and leadership style.
  – “I am extraordinarily patient, provided I get my own way in the end.”
* Benjamin Harris Brewster (October 13, 1816 – April 4, 1888) was an attorney and politician from New Jersey, who served as United States Attorney General from 1881 to 1885.
  – “A lawyer starts life giving $500 worth of law for $5 and ends giving $5 worth for $500.”
Monday was pun day, but we didn’t publish on Columbus day, so here are your puns:
* What is a tornado’s favorite game to play? Twister.
* How does the moon cut his hair? Eclipse it.
* How do you talk to a giant? Use big words.
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The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
Latest Update 


5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 

9 Oct 2020: 
85 FR 64014:  Revisions to the Unverified List (UVL)

DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.   24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates.  

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.


28 Sep 2020: 85 FR 60874: Temporary Amendment for Republic of Cyprus. The latest edition of the BITAR is 28 Sep 2020. 

DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
International Criminal Court-Related Sanctions Regulations.

1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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