20-0929 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

20-0929 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

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Tuesday, 29 September 2020

  1. State Department Updates List of Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (Cuba Restricted List)
  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings)
  4. DOJ: “Two Iranian Men Charged by Federal Grand Jury in Scheme to Send Export-Controlled Computer Servers to Iran”
  5. Hong Kong TID: “Approval-in-Principle Arrangement for Bulk Users of Strategic Commodities Licensing Service (AIP)”
  1. EU Sanctions: “US Commerce Dept Imposes Export Controls on SMIC”
  1. DLA Piper: “Trading on WTO Terms – What Does It Actually Mean for Your Business?”
  2. Reed Smith: “President Trump Signs EO to Unilaterally Enforce UN Arms Embargo on Iran”
  3. Sidley: “Country of Origin/Substantial Transformation Decision”
  4. Thompson Hine: “Further TikTok Developments – Commerce Identifies and Prohibits Certain Transactions Effective 27 Sep”
  1. ECS Presents: 15-16 Oct; “ITAR/EAR Controls for Non-US Companies”
  2. FCC Academy Presents: 6-7 Oct; “Designing an ICP” & “Implementing an ICP”
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. A New BITAR is Available 
  3. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  4. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  5. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  6. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 


(Source: Federal Register, 29 Sep 2020) [Excerpts]
85 FR 61079: Notice
* ACTION: Updated publication of list of entities and subentities; notice.
* SUMMARY: The Department of State is publishing an update to its List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (Cuba Restricted List) with which direct financial transactions are generally prohibited under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR). The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) generally will deny applications to export or reexport items for use by entities or subentities on the Cuba Restricted List.
* DATES: September 29, 2020.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Emily Belson, Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation, 202-647-6526; Robert Haas, Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, tel.: 202-453-8456, Department of State, Washington, DC 20520.

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OGS_a23. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

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(Source: Commerce/BIS, 28 Sep 2020)[Excerpts]
A U.S. federal grand jury has indicted two Iranian men with participating in a conspiracy to procure and illegally send export-controlled computer servers to Iran. Ebrahim Azadegan, 42, and Alireza Alvandi, 45, were named in a 10-count indictment returned on September 25 that charges them with violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, which restrict the export of goods and services from the United States to foreign nations. Azadegan and Alvandi were also charged with conspiracy, wire fraud, smuggling goods out of the United States, and money laundering.
According to the indictment, from January 2013 through July 2017, Azadegan, Alvandi, Dana Point resident Johnny Tourino, and Spectra Equipment, Inc. purchased, sent, and attempted to send computer servers to Iran without obtaining licenses from the U.S. government that are required under IEEPA. Tourino and Spectra were previously indicted in a separate case in 2018 and are scheduled to go on trial in January.
The computer servers were dual-use commercial goods, meaning they had both a commercial application and a military or strategic one. The computers were controlled by the Commerce Control List for anti-terrorism and national security reasons.
Azadegan, Alvandi, and Tourino allegedly falsely told the manufacturer that the computer servers were intended for Slovenia, when they knew they were intended for Bank Mellat, an Iranian financial institution.  . . . 

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OGS_a56. Hong Kong TID: “Approval-in-Principle Arrangement for

Bulk Users of Strategic Commodities Licensing Service (AIP)”



This circular informs and reminds traders of the application requirements and the subsequent usage of the Approval-in-Principle Arrangement for Bulk Users of Strategic Commodities Licensing Service (“AIP”). Strategic Trade Controls Circulars No. 9/2009 and 12/2009 on the same subject are hereby superseded.
AIP is a trade facilitation measure for companies which frequently import / export strategic commodities of relatively less sensitivity.

What is AIP and how does it work?

 Under AIP, the processing of strategic commodities licence applications and the issuance of licences are streamlined and expedited.

(A) Eligible types of strategic commodities 

Subject to the review by Trade and Industry Department (“TID”) on individual case and product, strategic commodities classified under Category 5 (Part 2) – information security and some classified under Category 3 – electronics are eligible for AIP.

(B) Eligible companies

To be eligible for AIP, the company must:

(a) register with TID and have an E-Account under the Strategic Commodities Control System Website (“SC Website”) (for details, please refer to “Open an E-Account“);
(b) be a frequent applicant of strategic commodities licences, for example, issued with at least 100 licences covering the AIP-eligible strategic commodities in the past 12-month period; and

(c) have a good compliance record as demonstrated by, for example  

(i)having no conviction record involving strategic commodities in the past 24-month period; and 

(ii) receiving no more than ten warning letters involving strategic commodities issued by TID on average per year in the past 24-month period.


(C) Application Procedures

The application procedures for AIP generally include the following:
(a) Company to contact TID to indicate interest.
(b) TID to conduct a preliminary assessment and if the company’s eligibility is confirmed, send an AIP application form to the company.
(c) The applicant to complete and submit to TID the application form and the relevant supporting documents about the detailed information on the import and export shipments to be covered by AIP which includes, for example, information on the products (i.e., brands and model numbers), the foreign exporting countries/places, destinations, foreign exporters, consignees, end-users, etc.
(d) TID to conduct a comprehensive examination and review on the applicant, products, entities, countries/places under application.
(e) TID to inform the applicant of the result and decision, i.e., whether the AIP application is to be approved and if it is, the to-be-approved products, entities and countries/places which may not necessarily be the same as those under application.
(f) The applicant to complete and submit to TID the undertaking and declaration at 
Appendix A.
(g) TID to issue an Approval-in-Principle letter (“AIP letter”) to the applicant which will set out: (i) the approved products, entities and countries/places; and (ii) the validity period (normally one year) of the subject AIP.

(D) Making and submitting licence applications under AIP

Same as all strategic commodities licence applications, making and submitting a licence application within the scope as set out on an AIP letter (“AIP’s licence application”) must also be done on a pre-shipment basis.  Applicants can do it electronically and efficiently via their E-Accounts under SC website.

(E) Process and Issuance of Licences under AIP

Upon receipt, an AIP’s licence application is processed by TID’s system automatically and will be approved within the same day, regardless of it is a working or non-working day, if no complication is involved.
After an AIP’s licence application is approved, a notification message and a softcopy of the licence (“AIP’s licence”) will be sent to the applicant electronically.  AIP’s licences can be printed out by the applicants themselves.  It is therefore not necessary for applicants to collect the approved AIP’s licences at TID.  
Specimens of AIP’s licences are at Appendices B and C
Compared to other strategic commodities licences, the specific features of AIP’s licences include:

(a) no application receipt number is printed; 
(b) an Approval-in-Principle agreement number is at the lower left-hand corner on all pages; 
(c) the background is in light grey colour with concealed watermark showing “Trade and Industry Department” in Italics; 
(d) a visible digital signature (in the form of the logo of the Trade and Industry Department) signed by an electronic certificate of Trade and Industry Department is applied at the bottom of the first page; 
(e) the digital signature will bear a cross if the softcopy of the AIP’s licence has been altered in an unauthorised manner; and 
(f) a licence access number and a QR code are at the upper left-hand corner and at the lower right-hand corner.

The licence access number and the QR code at paragraph 10(f) above are for facilitating verification of AIP’s licences, where necessary.  By entering the licence number and the licence access number at the dedicated webpage on SC Website or scanning the QR code directly, the departmental copy of the relevant AIP’s licence will be retrieved and shown.  If any inconsistency or altered contents are found on the AIP’s licence, traders should notify TID as soon as possible.


Important Note

Please note that an AIP letter is NOT equivalent to a licence required under the Import and Export Ordinance (Cap 60) and Import and Export (Strategic Commodities) Regulations (Cap 60G).  It only facilitates and expedites the application process of import / export licences for strategic commodities. Besides, TID may at any time suspend, revoke and cancel any AIP as well as revise the approved products, entities, countries/places and validity period of any AIP if circumstances warrant.  TID also reserves the right to reject or refuse to renew any AIP application.


Companies interested in AIP are welcome to contact our Strategic Trade Controls Branch at 3403 6424 or 3403 6056.

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(Source: EU Sanctions, 28 Sep 2020) [Excerpts]
  It has been reported that the US Commerce Department has written to US computer chip companies to advise that exports of US-origin software and chip-making equipment to China-based Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) and its subsidiaries will be subject to military end use licensing requirements. According to the letter, such exports “may pose an unacceptable risk of diversion to a military end use in the People’s Republic of China”.
  In April 2020, the US expanded its controls on technology exports to China which could be used to develop weapons, military aircraft or surveillance equipment, and removed certain licence exceptions to prevent goods intended for civilian use being diverted for military applications.


COM_a18. DLA Piper: “Trading on WTO Terms – What Does It Actually Mean for Your Business?”

(Source: DLA Piper, 24 Sep 2020) [Excerpts]

* Principal Author: John Forrest, 44-20-7796-6891, DLA Piper


  The chances of a no deal Brexit are increasing by the day. 

  Boris Johnson has signalled that he would be willing to walk away from the negotiations without a deal if a trade agreement between the UK and the EU has not been not finalised by the next meeting of the European Council on 15 October 2020. The EU for its part does not seem to be wanting to walk away. However, the likelihood of the UK leaving the EU without a deal and reverting to World Trading Organisation (WTO) trading terms has increased. Investment bank Morgan Stanley increased the probability of no deal from 25% to 40%; Japanese bank Nomura predicts the chances of a no-deal could be as high as 60%; and the ratings agency Fitch has made no deal its most likely outcome. 
Without a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU, trade between the UK and the EU will be conducted on WTO terms. The UK will become a “third country” in the EU’s eyes, which means that the import and export of goods and services between the UK to the EU will face new customs and regulatory barriers for the first time in over 40 years. In addition, the UK would lose the benefits of FTAs between the EU and third countries which have not been ‘rolled over’ (which currently includes Mexico and Canada). 
It is now more important than ever to prepare your business for trading on WTO terms. But what does trading on WTO terms actually mean? Here we answer that question by outlining the key principles of the WTO, what trading on WTO terms means for the goods and services sectors, and how you can best prepare your business for the end of the transition period. 
What is the WTO?
  The WTO is a multilateral international organisation dealing with the rules of international trade. It also provides a forum through which to negotiate trade agreements and settle trade disputes. It currently has 164 members – including the UK – and its members account for 98% of world trade. 
  If a WTO member does not have a free trade agreement (FTA) with other countries, then they trade under the framework created through various WTO agreements that establish the general rules applicable to all WTO member states – what we colloquially refer to as “WTO terms”.
Key principles of trading on WTO terms
  Trading on WTO terms is underpinned by two key principles of non-discrimination: 
  • Most-favoured nation (MFN) principle – in the absence of an FTA between two or more WTO members, countries cannot discriminate between their trading partners. For example, if Country A allows Country B to have preferential treatment (e.g. through a 5% reduction in their tariffs for agricultural products), unless an exemption applies, Country A would be required to afford all other WTO members with the same tariff reduction.  

  • National treatment (NT) principle – when goods or people from another WTO member state enter the territory of a member state, they must be treated in the same way as domestic goods and local people. For example, if Country A provides tax breaks for its struggling domestic automotive industry, all automotive companies that have operations in Country A will be entitled to such tax breaks, regardless of whether the company is domestic or foreign i.e. from Country B.
Individual commitments and the schedule of concessions
In addition to the general rules and principles, WTO members make individual ‘commitments’ which are outlined in ‘schedules of concessions’. These schedules set out specific tariff and trade concessions in respect of goods e.g. maximum tariff levels; as well as market access commitments (i.e. how much access will be granted to foreign entities to establish and operate in the domestic market). 
  As an EU member state and during the transition period, the UK’s concessions and commitments on goods and services were contained within the schedule of concessions and commitments for goods and services of the European Union. However post-Brexit, and as a WTO member in its own right, the UK will have its own schedule of concessions with respect to goods and services. The UK circulated these schedules on goods and services to the WTO on 24 July 2018 and 3 December 2018 respectively. At present, both schedule of concessions are broadly similar with the EU schedule of concessions and commitments, but it is envisaged that the UK will make more substantive changes in due course following negotiations with other WTO members. 
What does the import and export of goods between the UK and EU (and vice versa) look like under WTO terms?
The WTO agreement that governs WTO terms in respect of goods is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the “GATT”). 
Whereas goods may currently be exported from the UK to the EU with minimal or no customs requirements, under WTO terms, there will be a customs border between the UK and EU. Goods traded between the UK and EU member states will be subject to tariffs. The UK will also leave the EU’s Single Market, with the consequence that free movement of goods and harmonised regulatory standards come to an end. The benchmark for these tariffs between the UK and EU will be determined based on their relative tariff commitments to the WTO. However, business should not assume that trade with ‘friendly’ English-speaking countries will necessarily be conducted on preferable terms. As the MFN principle dictates, all trading partners with whom the UK does not have an FTA should be treated consistently. 
In practice, reverting to WTO terms will have the following effects:
Importing goods from an EU member state to the UK 
  From 1 January 2021, importers from the EU to the UK will need to make import declarations as well as needing to register for an Economic Operator Registration and Identification (EORI) number with HM Revenue and Customs in the UK. In addition, the rules for importing some types of goods will change with respect to required licenses, regulatory standards and labelling. 
Importers will also need to pay customs duties on all imports, but this will vary depending on the classification of the relevant goods being imported. The UK Government has created a website where businesses can check the UK Global Tariff that will apply to specific goods they import from 1 January 2021 (see here).
Exporting goods from the UK to an EU member state 
  From 1 January 2021, exporters from the UK to the EU will need to make export declarations, as well as needing to register for an EORI number with HM Revenue and Customs in the UK. As businesses have already been complying with EU licenses, regulatory standards and labelling when exporting to the EU from the UK, in order to continue doing so, UK businesses will need to comply with these same requirements. 
  Exporters will also have to pay customs duties on all exports, but these will be at the same rates as currently applicable on exports from countries outside the EU (third countries) into the EU and pre-Brexit UK. In practical terms, this is likely to impact upon the timelines for delivery to customers in the EU as well as the costs of shipping given the additional administrative burdens involved. UK businesses should liaise with logistics providers to estimate the procedures, increased time, and costs, including customs agents’ costs, for delivery of its goods from the UK to the EU in the event of a no deal. …
What should you be doing? 
  Whilst trading on WTO terms provides a basic framework for world trade, there are a number of inadequacies that UK and EU businesses need to both identify and mitigate against. We suggest that you: 
  • Step up your Brexit preparations and ready your business to trade on WTO terms at the beginning of next year.
  • Start conducting focused supply chain risk assessments to analyse the tariff and non-tariff barriers, including regulatory approvals, customs procedures and rules of origin, in your current and future key markets.
  • Begin to engage with the UK and EU governments to inform and influence the outcome of negotiations in your interest.

(Source: Reed Smith, 24 Sep 2020)

* Principal Author: Leigh T. Hansson, Esq., 44-20-3116-3394, Reed Smith LLP
  On Monday, September 21, 2020, President Trump signed a new Executive Order authorizing the imposition of sanctions on persons engaged in certain conventional arms-related transactions with Iran. The Executive Order, titled “Blocking of Certain Persons with Respect to the Conventional Arms Activity of Iran,” followed Saturday evening’s announcement that the United States would enforce a “snapback” of sanctions under the nuclear treaty with Iran of 2015 (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA).
  In issuing the recent Executive Order, the United States announced that it will enforce the United Nations arms embargo beyond October 18, 2020, the date the embargo is scheduled to expire. Last month, the United Nations Security Council declined to extend the arms embargo beyond that date. The European participants of the JCPOA have since vowed not to cooperate with the United States in its efforts to reimpose the United Nations sanctions.
  In conjunction with signing the Executive Order, the Trump Administration designated a number of individuals and entities. Some of these were targeted under Executive Order 13382, an existing authority, which authorizes the imposition of sanctions on proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, while others were targeted under the new Executive Order. Among the designations were an Iranian nuclear agency, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Logistics, entities engaged in ballistic missile activity, and a number of officials and subsidiaries of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, which was previously sanctioned in January of 2020. Venezuela’s president, Nicolas Maduro, who was already designated under the Venezuela sanctions program, was also sanctioned under the new Executive Order. Finally, five Iranian nuclear scientists were added to the Entity List, meaning a specific license from the U.S. Department of Commerce is required before any person sells or transfers goods subject to the Export Administration Regulations (which includes almost all U.S.-origin items) to them.
The Executive Order
Under the terms of the new Executive Order, those engaged in the following activities can be designated:
  • Any person that “materially contributes” to the sale, supply, or transfer of arms to or from Iran, whether directly or indirectly. This includes transfers to military end-users in Iran as well as any transfers “for the … benefit of Iran.”
  • Any person that provides Iran with technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services, or assistance related to the sale, manufacturing, or use of conventional arms.
  • Any person that “materially contributes” to or is likely to materially contribute to, the proliferation of arms or arms-related material or items intended for military end-uses or military end-users.
  Additionally, and as with nearly all of President Trump’s sanctions-related executive orders, non-U.S. persons may be designated if the U.S. government determines that they “have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.”
  The U.S. decision to unilaterally enforce the arms embargo will make it more difficult for the Iranian military to find suppliers. The immediate impact on civilian global trade, however, is likely to be minimal. An important caveat is that suppliers of dual use goods, those that can be used for both military and civilian purposes, should consider taking additional steps to ensure that their goods are not transferred to military end-users or for military end-uses in Iran, in violation of the new Executive Order.

  International disagreement over whether the United States has the authority to reimpose sanctions suspended under the terms of the JCPOA will play out at the International Court of Justice. The United States has described its most recent actions as enforcing the multilateral snapback provisions of the JCPOA; however, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in May, 2018 and the remaining parties to the agreement (China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom) have taken the position that the United States cannot trigger snapback. Hearings are taking place this week and a ruling is expected before the year’s end.

(Source: Sidley, 29 Sep 2020)
* Principal Author: Ted Murphy, Esq., 1 202 736 8016, Sidley
Earlier this month, the U.S. Court of International Trade issued an interesting decision that should resonate with anyone who has been wrestling with country of origin/substantial transformation questions in recent months.  A copy of the decision is attached for your reference (Cyber Power Systems (USA) Inc. v. United States, Slip Op. 20-130 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2020)).
This case involves a challenge to a decision by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) to exclude an importer’s merchandise due to confusion around its country of origin.  In short, the plaintiff-a manufacturer and importer of, among other electrical devices, uninterruptible power supplies (“UPS”)-declared and marked imported UPS as being made in the Philippines.  The UPS were assembled in, and exported to the United States, from the Philippines.  CBP requested additional information to substantiate the country of origin.  According to the court, the importer provided conflicting information to CBP regarding where certain components were produced and the nature of the assembly operations performed in the Philippines (e.g., the importer claimed that the main printed circuit board assembly (PCBA) of a certain model were manufactured in the Philippines, but a process flow document showed that components were soldered to the board in China).  CBP determined that the origin was China.  When the importer refused to change the country of origin marking on the product from the Philippines to China, CBP excluded the merchandise from entry.  The importer protested that decision; CBP denied the protest; and the importer filed suit at the CIT challenging CBP’s determination that the origin is China and seeking a preliminary injunction to force CBP to release the merchandise. 
In considering the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court noted that application of the substantial transformation test to the UPS “may prove dispositive” (i.e., whether the UPS is Philippines origin or Chinese origin would resolve the matter).  The court then went on to state:  
“With 80 years of application in various contexts (country of origin marking, government procurement, voluntary restraint agreements, Generalized System of Preferences eligibility, drawback eligibility), the substantial transformation test should, one would anticipate, be fairly straightforward to apply. It is not.” 
The court then went through some of the judicial precedent applying the substantial transformation test and noted the “seemingly disparate” nature of the decisions (and referred to specific decisions, such as Energizer Battery, as being “somewhat counterintuitive”).  The court ultimately denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, in part, because it was not clear how the substantial transformation test would be applied to these facts given the different approaches taken by the courts (and hence, the plaintiff was unable to show it was likely to succeed on the merits). 
CBP precedent (i.e., country of origin rulings issued at the administrative level) is even more jumbled than the judicial precedent referred to in Cyber Power Systems.  Historically, the assembly of a meaningful number of parts and components from various origins during a multi-step, time-intensive process that requires skilled operators or sophisticated/expensive equipment typically resulted in a substantial transformation.  In recent rulings, however, CBP has increasingly relied on the “essence test” to conclude that the country of origin of a finished good is based on the origin of a particularly-important component (e.g., the origin of a PCBA for a consumer electronics product).  These rulings show that the substantial transformation precedent is evolving and that CBP may be affording less weight to the traditional substantial transformation factors (e.g., number of components assembled, skill level of operators, etc.).  To the extent this trend continues, it will likely be impacted by the court’s ultimate decision in Cyber Power Systems.  
So, in short, if you are confused by the substantial transformation test, then it probably means that (i) you are doing it right (i.e., it is confusing), and (ii) you are in good company. 
The evolving (and often confusing) administrative and judicial precedent on substantial transformation, combined with the unprecedented re-alignment of supply chains that is occurring due to the US-China trade war, COVID-19 and other factors, means that it is now more important than ever that companies revisit, update and document the country of origin rationale for their products.  Failing to do so could lead to unfortunate surprises, such as unanticipated duty liability, shipment delays and other increased costs at the border. 

(Source: Smartrade, 24 Sep 2020)

  On September 24, 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a Federal Register notice listing prohibited transactions with ByteDance Ltd. and its subsidiaries including TikTok, Inc., pursuant to President Trump’s August 6, 2020 Executive Order declaring TikTok a national security threat and directing Commerce to define the scope of prohibited “transactions” with TikTok by September 20, 2020. The notice was published after a myriad of legal activity that took place from September 18 through September 21, 2020, with respect to mobile applications, WeChat and TikTok including, but not limited to, actions taken by Commerce against WeChat and TikTok, announcements by Walmart and Oracle of their new deal with TikTok to form TikTok Global, and a federal court injunction enjoining Commerce’s intended action against WeChat.
  In its September 24 notice, Commerce has reiterated that it would no longer allow certain transactions between U.S. parties and the Chinese parent company, ByteDance Ltd. or its subsidiaries, including TikTok, Inc. The notice does not include WeChat, as the federal injunction enjoining Commerce’s actions was specific to WeChat. Absent an interim injunction for TikTok, as of September 27, 2020, the following transactions will be prohibited:
  Any provision of services to distribute or maintain the TikTok mobile application, constituent code, or application updates through an online mobile application store, or any online marketplace where mobile users within the land or maritime borders of the United States and its territories may download or update applications for use on their mobile devices.
As of November 12, 2020, the following transactions will also be prohibited:
  • Any provision of internet hosting services enabling the functioning or optimization of the TikTok mobile application within the land and maritime borders of the United States and its territories;
  • Any provision of content delivery network services enabling the functioning or optimization of the TikTok mobile application within the land and maritime borders of the United States and its territories;
  • Any provision of directly contracted or arranged internet transit or peering services enabling the functioning or optimization of the TikTok mobile application within the land and maritime borders of the United States and its territories; and
  • Any utilization of the TikTok mobile application’s constituent code, functions, or services in the functioning of software or services developed and/or accessible within the land and maritime borders of the United States and its territories.
  The notice exempts the following transactions from the categories of prohibited activity, which will continue to be authorized:
  • Payment of wages, salaries, and benefit packages to employees or contractors;
  • The exchange between or among TikTok mobile application users of personal or business information using the TikTok mobile application;
  • Activities related to mobile applications intended for distribution, installation or use outside of the United States by any person, including but not limited to any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and all ancillary activities, including activities performed by any U.S. person, which are ordinarily incident to, and necessary for, the distribution, installation, and use of mobile applications outside of the United States; and
  • The storing of TikTok mobile application user data in the United States.
  Finally, the notice goes on to identify a sixth category of transactions that may be prohibited at a later future date, specifically,  “any other transaction by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, with ByteDance Ltd., or its subsidiaries, including TikTok Inc., in which any such company has any interest.”


TE_a112. ECS Presents: 15-16 Oct; “ITAR/EAR Controls for Non-US Companies”

(Source: ECS)
*What:  ITAR/EAR Controls for Non-U.S. Companies
*When:  15-16 Oct
*Where:  Your Computer
*Sponsor: Export Compliance Solutions & Consulting (ECS)
*ECS Speakers:  Suzanne Palmer, Mal Zerden
*Register: here or write to liz@exportcompliancesolutions.com or call 1-866-238-401

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EN_a114. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)

* Miguel de Cervantes (Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra; 29 Sep 1547 – 22 Apr 1616; was a Spanish writer widely regarded as the greatest writer in the Spanish language, and one of the world’s pre-eminent novelists. He is best known for his novel Don Quixote, a work often cited as both the first modern novel, and one of the pinnacles of literature.)
  – “A proverb is a short sentence based on long experience.”
  – “Never stand begging for that which you have the power to earn.”
  – “Jests that give pains are not jests.”
* Ludwig von Mises (Ludwig Heinrich Edler von Mises; 29 Sep 1881 – 10 Oct 1973; was an Austrian School economist, historian, logician and sociologist. Mises wrote and lectured extensively on the societal contributions of classical liberalism. He is best known for his work on praxeology, a study of human choice and action.)
  – “Modern society, based as it is on the division of labor, can be preserved only under conditions of lasting peace.”
  – “ The worst evils which mankind has ever had to endure were inflicted by bad governments.”
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EN_a215. A New BITAR is Available

(Source: Editor)

The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), section 126.1(r), was amended yesterday (85 FR 60698 of 28 Sep 2020) to update defense trade policy toward Cyprus.  That amendment is contained in the new 28 Sep 2020 edition of Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (the BITAR), now available as a Word document for download to BITAR subscribers. In addition to the verbatim regulation, the BITAR contains nearly a thousand footnotes of section histories, key cases, practice tips & tricks, FAQs, and extensive Tables of Contents.   Subscribers receive updated editions every time the regulations are amended (usually within 24 hours) so you will always have the current version of the ITAR.  The BITAR is the ultimate ITAR practitioner’s tool. If you consider yourself an ITAR expert (or want to become one), you MUST have a copy of the BITAR!  
Subscribe to the BITAR here to guarantee you have the up-to-date ITAR.   
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The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
Latest Update 


5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 
22 Sep 2020: 85 FR 59419 Additions of Entities to the Entity List and Corrections of entries on the Entity List.

DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.   24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates.  

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.


28 Sep 2020:  85 FR 60874: Temporary Amendment for Republic of Cyprus. The latest edition of the BITAR is 29 Sep 2020. 

DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
Update of Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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