20-0804 Tuesday ” Daily Bugle “

20-0804 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

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Tuesday, 4 August 2020

  1. Treasury/OFAC: “Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions”
  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: “Congressional Notification Transmittal Sheet”
  4. EU Commission: “EU-Vietnam Τrade Αgreement Εnters into Force”
  5. UK ECJU: “Notice to Exporters 2020/13: Open General Licences Revised and Revoked”
  1. EU Sanctions: “UNSC Committee Guidance on Somalia IED Export Controls”
  2. WSJ: “U.K. Sanctions Guidance Adds to Warnings for Maritime Sector”
  1. Kirkland & Ellis: “Federal Government Moves to Bar Contractors from Using Certain Chinese Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment”
  2. Nicholas Turner: “Sanctions Top-5 for the Week Ending 31 July”
  3. O. Gonzales: “Response to CBP Re-Write of Broker Regulations” – Part 2 of 2
  4. Thompson Hine: “BIS Publishes Final Rule Suspending EAR License Exceptions for Hong Kong”
  1. FCC Academy Presents September Webinars: U.S. Export Controls: ITAR & EAR, and FMS
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  4. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  5. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 

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load to your laptop to keep you updated on the latest amendments, and contain over 800 footnotes of section history, key cases, practice tips & tricks, and extensive Tables of Contents. The ITAR amendments to the ITAR that took effect on 9 March and 25 March are included in the current edition of the BITAR.  Subscribers receive updated editions every time the regulations are amended (usually within 24 hours) so you will always have the current versions of the regulations. Subscribe to the BITAR now to guarantee you have an up-to-date ITAR!    

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(Source: Federal Register, 4 Aug 2020) [Excerpts]
85 FR 47290: Notice
* AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury.
* ACTION: Notice.
* SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing an update to the identifying information of one entity currently included on OFAC’s list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List).

OFAC: Associate Director for Global Targeting, tel.: 202-622-2420; Assistant Director for Licensing, tel.: 202-622-2480; Assistant Director for Regulatory Affairs, tel.: 202-622-4855; or Assistant Director for Sanctions Compliance & Evaluation, tel.: 202-622-2490.

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[No items of interest posted]

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OGS_a23. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

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(Source: State/DDTC, 3 Aug 2020) 
Reports pursuant to Art. 36(d) of Arms Export Control Act.  Read the document here.

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(Source: European Commission), 31 Jul 2020) [Excerpts]
   EU exports to Vietnam will be taxed less as of tomorrow, 1 August. This is the immediate effect of the entry into force of the EU-Vietnam trade agreement that will ultimately scrap duties on 99% of all goods traded between the two sides. Doing business in Vietnam will also become easier for European companies: they will now be able to invest and pitch for government contracts with equal chances to their local competitors. Under the new agreement, the economic benefits go hand in hand with guarantees of respect for labour rights, environment protection and the Paris Agreement on climate, through strong, legally binding and enforceable provisions on sustainable development. …
   The EU-Vietnam agreement is the most comprehensive trade agreement the EU has concluded with a developing country. It takes fully into account Vietnam’s development needs by giving Vietnam a longer, 10-year period to eliminate its duties on EU imports.
   However, many important EU export products, such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals or machinery will already enjoy duty-free import conditions as of entry into force. Agri-food products like beef or olive oil will face no tariffs in three years, while dairy, fruit and vegetables in maximum five years. Comprehensive provisions on sanitary and phytosanitary cooperation will allow for improving market access for EU firms via more transparent and quick procedures.
   It also contains specific provisions to address regulatory barriers for EU car exports and grants protection from imitation for 169 traditional European food and drink products (like Roquefort cheese, Porto and Jerez wines, Irish Cream spirit or Prosciutto di Parma ham) recognised as Geographical Indications. …
The entry into force of the trade agreement has been preceded by its approval by EU Member States in the Council and its signature in June 2019, and the European Parliament’s approval in February 2020. …
   The agreement with Vietnam is the second trade agreement the EU has concluded with an ASEAN member state, following the recent agreement with Singapore. It represents an important milestone in the EU’s engagement with Asia, adding to the already existing agreements with Japan and Republic of Korea.

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   Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) has removed Hong Kong as a permitted destination from 20 open general export licences (OGELs), one open general transhipment licence (OGTL) and one open general trade control licence (OGTCL).

   Find the relevant document here.

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(Source: EU Sanctions, 4 Aug 2020) [Excerpts]

The UN Security Council Committee concerning Somalia has published an Implementation Assistance Notice, which provides a summary of the export controls on components which will be used, or pose a significant risk of being used, to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The restrictions were imposed under resolution 2498 (2019), as amended, given the recent increase in IED attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab.

The notice provides a list of the controlled components, and details on information sharing procedures. It also reminds member states of the obligation to notify the Committee within 15 days of a controlled item being exported to Somalia, which is authorised unless there is evidence that it could be used to manufacture an IED.

(Source: The Wall Street Journal, 3 Aug 2020) [Excerpts]
A U.K. enforcement agency is urging the maritime industry to be on the lookout for illicit practices that could be used to evade sanctions, the latest regulator to warn about compliance risks facing the industry.

Guidance by the U.K.’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, which is part of the country’s Treasury department, indicates companies are susceptible to suspicious shipping practices such as the intentional disabling of vessel-tracking systems to conduct illegal trade and the falsifying of documentation for maritime transactions.

Maritime insurance companies, charterers, customs and port state controls, and flag registries are among the sectors exposed to the risks, the agency said. …

Entities and individuals in the maritime sector need to assess their own risks and conduct sufficient due diligence to ensure compliance with sanctions, according to the agency, which emphasized the importance of understanding sanctions regulations in high-risk jurisdictions and using vessel-tracking systems and subscription-based resources to verify ownership structures of customers and business partners.

The guidance highlights the additional compliance obligations for companies operating in the maritime industry as they navigate the similar but different sanctions systems between the U.S. and the U.K., said Eric Lorber, a vice president at advisory firm K2 Intelligence/Financial Integrity Network.
The U.K. is in the process of transitioning to its own set of sanctions compliance guidelines as part of its departure from the European Union. …


* Principal Author: Mario Mancuso, P.C., Esq., 1-202-389-5070, Kirkland & Ellis LLP
   On July 14, 2020, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory (“FAR”) Council published an interim rule restricting federal government contractors from using, in their own systems, certain covered telecommunications and video surveillance equipment and services from designated Chinese companies, such as Huawei Technologies Company (“Huawei”). Subsequently on July 28, 2020, the Department of Defense published a memorandum further explaining some of the nuances of the rule. Despite calls for a delayed effective date to facilitate compliance, the interim rule is scheduled to take effect on August 13, 2020.
The rule implements Section 889(a)(1)(B) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Pub. L. 115-232) (“FY 2019 NDAA”) and extends the restrictions already in effect beyond the telecommunications supplies and services the federal government actually acquires from contractors. Contractors have until September 14, 2020, to submit comments before the interim rule is finalized, and both prime contractors and subcontractors considering new federal contracts, or extensions or renewals under existing agreements, would be well-advised to examine their enterprises and supply chains before certifying their compliance. 
The View from Washington
   The interim rule is an extension of the FY 2019 NDAA, which became law in August 2018 and already restricts direct federal purchases of covered equipment and services as of August 2019. Nonetheless, the publication of the interim rule still could place further strain on the increasingly fractious relationship between the U.S. and China insofar as it represents another salvo aimed at Huawei and similar Chinese companies. Huawei, in particular, already is the primary target of numerous U.S. government actions affecting both inbound and outbound transactions, including its addition to the BIS Entity List, which severely restricts Huawei’s ability to procure items subject to U.S. export and reexport controls.
   In addition to the federal procurement prohibitions set forth in Section 889, Huawei, among others, seems likely to be deemed a “foreign adversary” for purposes of transactions with U.S. parties concerning Information and Communications Technology and Services. A proposed rule authorizing the U.S. Department of Commerce to review and potentially block or unwind such transactions retroactive to May 2019 was published in late November 2019, but has not yet been finalized.
Key Features of the Interim Rule
   The interim rule implements Section 889(a)(1)(B) of the FY 2019 NDAA, providing, e.g., that executive agencies are prohibited from: entering into, or extending or renewing, a contract with an entity that uses any equipment, system, or service that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system.

   The restrictions apply, e.g., to solicitations issued on or after August 13, and any resultant contracts, as well as to solicitations issued prior to August 13, provided the resulting award occurs after that date.
Covered Telecommunications Equipment or Services
“Covered telecommunications equipment or services” is defined to mean:
  • Equipment produced by Huawei or ZTE Corporation (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities);
  • For the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced by Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company (“Hikvision”), or Dahua Technology Company (“Dahua”)  (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities); [FN/1]
  • Telecommunications or video surveillance services provided by such entities or using such equipment; or
  • Telecommunications or video surveillance equipment or services produced or provided by an entity that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, reasonably believes to be an entity owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of a “covered foreign country,” which is defined as the People’s Republic of China.
Substantial or Essential Component
   The term “substantial or essential component” means any component necessary for the proper function or performance of a piece of equipment, system or service.
Critical Technologies
   Section 889 adopts the definition of “critical technologies” provided in the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, which expanded the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. Such technologies include, in particular, certain items subject to the prevailing U.S. export controls regimes, including any “emerging” or “foundational” technologies identified by the U.S. Department of Commerce in accordance with the Export Control Reform Act of 2018.
   Though the definitions above track those set forth at Section 889(a)(1)(A) of the FY 2019 NDAA, the term “use” is unique to Section 889(a)(1)(B) and is the crux of its more expansive restriction. It is neither defined in the FY 2019 NDAA nor the interim rule and, as drafted, could result in prime contractors and their subcontractors being barred on the basis of even attenuated or ancillary use of covered equipment. For example, on June 10, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord testified that the provision potentially could invalidate a major prime contractor as a result of the use of a subcontractor “six or seven levels down the supply chain” of “one camera in a parking lot.”
   Due in part to the risks of such an expansive interpretation, the U.S. Department of Defense, several members of Congress, and key industry stakeholders have advocated for a delayed implementation date beyond August 13, though thus far to no avail. For example, though amendments were offered to the FY 2021 NDAA in both the House and the Senate to extend the deadline, currently it appears they will not be voted on until September.
   There are two exceptions to the prohibitions: one for certain third-party connection services such as backhaul, roaming and interconnection agreements; and another for certain equipment without the ability to route or redirect user data traffic, or have visibility into user data.
   An agency may contract with an entity “to provide a service that connects to the facilities of a third-party, such as backhaul, [FN/2] roaming,[FN/3] or interconnection arrangements.” [FN/4] This exception applies only to an agency that is contracting with an entity to provide a service. Therefore, the exception does not apply to a contractor’s use of a service that connects to the facilities of a third-party, such as backhaul, roaming, or interconnection arrangements. As a result, executive agencies are prohibited from contracting with a contractor that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services to obtain backhaul services from an internet service provider, unless a waiver is granted.
Further, an agency may procure “telecommunications equipment that cannot route or redirect user data traffic or [cannot] permit visibility into any user data or packets that such equipment transmits or otherwise handles.”
Key Compliance Considerations
   If implemented on time as drafted, Under Secretary Lord testified that the new restrictions stand to pose a meaningful compliance burden, in light of the “heavy lift” to identify covered equipment. A contractor’s failure to abide by the requirements set forth in the interim rule could be construed as a material misrepresentation or breach of contract that potentially could lead to termination, as well as financial penalties. In addition, knowing noncompliance could potentially expose a contractor to liability under the civil False Claims Act.
Prime Contractors
   The interim rule requires that the party executing the contract with the federal government (“offeror”) provide the representation at Section 52.204-24 as to whether it uses covered telecommunications equipment or services. If so, it is required to make certain disclosures regarding, e.g., the manufacturer of the equipment and a detailed description of the same. Importantly, the offeror is to make this representation after conducting a “reasonable inquiry,” which is defined as:
an inquiry designed to uncover any information in the entity’s possession about the identity of the producer or provider of covered telecommunications equipment or services used by the entity that excludes the need to include an internal or third-party audit.
   The prohibitions set forth in Section 889(a)(1)(B) expressly do not flow down to subcontractors because, according to the FAR Council, the prime contractor is the only entity with which an agency contracts. However, as the “reasonable inquiry” standard imposed on prime contractors expressly requires that they make a representation as to equipment or services “used by the entity,” it seems prime contractors could very well extend their due diligence to the subcontractors and/or seek a parallel representation from them, even if the prohibitions nominally do not flow down.
   The FAR Council apparently also is considering the expansion of the scope of the prohibitions detailed in the interim rule to any affiliates, parents and subsidiaries of an offeror that are domestic entities. Presumably, this is regardless of whether any of these entities is reasonably expected to participate in the performance of a federal contract.
   The proposed expansion of the prohibitions to entities affiliated with the offeror is unsurprising given that the use by a prime contractor of covered equipment is prohibited even if that equipment has no nexus to the performance of a contract.
   The interim rule also establishes an agency-initiated process that authorizes case-by-case waivers that would expire no later than August 13, 2022. The submission of an offer following an affirmative representation regarding the use of covered equipment essentially will constitute a waiver request, which the FAR Council anticipates likely will take agencies a few weeks to process. Agencies reasonably may decline to initiate the waiver process and proceed to make awards to contractors not requiring waivers. Note that there is also the possibility of a waiver without an expiration date, though the authority to issue it vests with the Director of National Intelligence separate and apart from the interim rule.
Key Takeaways
   The interim rule is the latest iteration in the U.S. government’s comprehensive effort to insulate government agencies from Chinese-supplied telecommunications and other equipment citing national security concerns.
Despite efforts to extend the effective date of the interim rule, including amendments to the FY 2021 NDAA which could be heard in September, and efforts that still could be taken up as part of stimulus legislation in relation to COVID-19, it now appears likely that the requirements will take effect on August 13.
   Accordingly, prime contractors should undertake to identify the possible use of covered equipment throughout their supply chains and subcontractors should also be prepared for prime contractors to make inquiries or request certifications.
   Comments on the interim rule are due by September 14 and provide an opportunity for contractors to detail the likely significant compliance burdens attendant to the implementation of the interim rule with the aim of having the FAR Council address the impact of these burdens on industry.

(Source: Medium, 4 Aug 2020)
* Author: Nicholas Turner, Esq., 852-5998-7559, Steptoe & Johnson HK
Here are five things that happened this week in the world of economic sanctions that I think you should know about.
   (1) The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) named two Chinese individuals and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) under the Global Magnitsky Sanctions program for their involvement in human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Province (XUAR). The XPCC is linked to Chen Quanguo, a PRC government official sanctioned by OFAC in July 2020 for overseeing activities in the XUAR. OFAC also issued General License 2, authorizing US persons to wind down certain XPCC-related activities through 30 September 2020.
   (2) The European Union added six individuals and three entities in China, North Korea, and Russia to the EU Sanctions List for their involvement in cyber-related attacks. These are the first designations under the EU’s cyber-related sanctions since the program’s adoption in May 2019. The targets include one Chinese national previously indicted by the US Department of Justice in December 2018 and individuals and entities sanctioned by OFAC in December 2016, September 2018, and December 2018, respectively, including a division of Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).
   (3) OFAC announced a US$ 824,314 settlement with a US-based manufacturer for violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) caused by the company’s subsidiaries in Italy and Turkey. According to the OFAC settlement notice, between 2012 and 2015, the subsidiaries sold products to Iran via distributors in violation of the ITSR at 31 CFR 560.215.
   (4) OFAC named a Syrian businessman and nine of his companies as SDNsunder the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13582 in connection with luxury shopping and hotel development projects in and around Damascus. The US State Department simultaneously sanctioned three individuals and the First Division of the Syrian Arab Army under Executive Order 13894 in response to atrocities committed by the Syrian military.
   (5) The US State Department released a list of 22 materials determined to be used in connection with Iran’s nuclear, military, or ballistic missile programs (who knew there were so many types of aluminum?). The State Department press statement reminds that persons who knowingly transfer such materials to Iran could be targeted with secondary sanctions under Section 1245 of the Iranian Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act.
   There’s always so much to learn from OFAC settlements. In the latest case, we are reminded (again) that non-US entities that are owned or controlled by US persons must comply with the ITSR. Unfortunately, an employee of the manufacturer (who, OFAC tells us, was not a sanctions expert) decided it was A-OK for the foreign subsidiaries to continue their Iranian sales as long as they worked through distributors. (Not so.) Several years and 74 violations later, the company’s management realized the mistake when OFAC issued now-defunct General License H, which permitted US companies’ foreign subsidiaries to do certain Iranian business. The good news: thanks to their cooperation with OFAC and compliance remediation, the company’s monetary penalty was reduced from a maximum of almost USD 20 million to a mere USD 824,314.
   For the legal scholars out there: you might be interested in this analysis on the HKU Legal Scholarship Blog of the unsettled question of the application (or non-application) of Article 29(4) of the Hong Kong National Security Law to financial institutions and companies that are required to comply with foreign sanctions of their home jurisdictions. The authors are Professor Albert H.Y. Chen, a member of the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, and Professor Simon N.M. Young, both of the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law.

(Source: Author, 31 Jul 2020)

[This is Part 2 of this article; a continuation of the first section published on Friday, 31 Jul 2020.]
3. Making customs brokers responsible for proper classification and valuation changes and heightens their standard of care.
  As for the heightened standard of care, CBP writes the following in its Federal Register Notice:
Section 111.39 describes the requirements for brokers giving advice to clients. Currently, paragraph (a) requires a broker not to withhold from or provide false information to a client. CBP proposes moving part of the second sentence from paragraph (a) to a new paragraph (b) titled “Due diligence” and, in that paragraph, adding language to specify that a broker must practice due diligence in providing advice on the proper payment of any duty, tax, or other debt or obligation owing to the U.S. Government….CBP proposes to add the requirement that the broker also explain the proper corrective action to better advise the client and to clarify the level of professionalism that is expected in the broker/importer relationship.

  When customs violations were found in the past, CBP first and foremost sought to pin liability on the importer. Thanks to this new due diligence obligation, CBP has equal grounds to now come after customs brokers when there are errors in valuation/appraisal, tariff classification, duty and fee payment, or any other facet of customs compliance. If CBP did not intend such a sweeping change, CBP should clarify. But if that is CBP’s intent, the heightened standard of care will undoubtedly gratify importers who always felt that customs brokers should shoulder more of the compliance responsibility. In contrast, customs brokers will be unsettled by this new expectation of them and by the concomitant increased liability. Moreover, it is a circumstance that cannot be attenuated by the terms and conditions/limitations on liability that are standard in many customs broker contracts.

4. Forcing customs brokers to provide corrective advice to importers is the unlawful practice of law and imposes irreconcilable conflicts of interest/duties.
  CBP’s Federal Register Notice explains that “CBP proposes to add the requirement that the broker also explain the proper corrective action.” Thus, this is the third new duty that CBP seeks to thrust upon customs brokers. CBP is instructing customs brokers to be legal advisors to importers. This is not an exaggeration. CBP is instructing customs brokers to guide importers through the legal options and complexities that surface in the face of violations. Few customs brokers possess the legal expertise to perform this duty adequately. Moreover, CBP is asking customs brokers to practice law without a law license, an illegality imposed by state law that CBP cannot overcome through regulation.
  In sum, CBP wishes to require that a customs broker function as a “force multiplier” in the service of CBP by snitching on the importer. CBP also wants the customs broker to be responsible for correctly valuing and classifying the importer’s products. CBP also now expects the customs broker to advise the importer on which corrective actions to take in the presence of violations. This piling on of duties creates a teetering Jenga tower of irreconcilable conflicts of interests whose inevitable toppling will benefit no one, save perhaps CBP. It is a construct that is as unwise as it is illegal. Go back to the drawing room, CBP, and give the trade community a reasonable opportunity to chime and improve upon your proposed regulations. It will spare everyone unnecessary heartache.

   The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has published the final rule in the Federal Register amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to suspend all License Exceptions for Hong Kong that provide preferential treatment as compared to those available for exports to China.  This amendment to the EAR implements the announcement BIS made on June 30, 2020, which provided that, as of June 30, these License Exceptions were no longer available for exports and reexports to Hong Kong or transfers within Hong Kong.  Additionally, the final rule is adding a new, Hong Kong-specific paragraph to EAR Section 740.2 (“Restrictions on all License Exceptions”), as well as making some other conforming changes to Section 740.2.
   A License Exception is an authorization contained in Part 740 of the EAR that allows exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) of items subject to the EAR that would otherwise require a license for export to the destination.  As a result of the suspensions, absent a license from BIS, no items subject to the EAR may be exported to Hong Kong, reexported to Hong Kong, or transferred within Hong Kong unless it would otherwise be eligible for export to China under the applicable reason for control or a License Exception available for exports to China.  The suspended License Exceptions for Hong Kong include:
  • Shipments of Limited Value (LVS) (§740.3);
  • Shipments to Group B Countries (GBS) (§740.4);
  • Technology and Software under Restriction (TSR) (§740.6);
  • Computers, Tier 1 only (APP) (§740.7(c));
  • Temporary Imports, Exports, Reexports, and Transfers (in-country) (TMP) (§740.9(a)(11), (b)(2)(ii)(C, and (b)(5));
  • Servicing and Replacement Parts and Equipment (RPL) (§740.10(a)(3)(viii), (a)(4), (b)(1) except as permitted to Country Group D:5, and (b)(3)(i)(F) and (ii)(C));
  • Governments (GOV) (§740.11(c)(1)-Cooperating Governments only));
  • Gift Parcels and Humanitarian Donations (GFT) (§740.12);
  • Technology and Software Unrestricted (TSU) (§740.13);
  • Baggage (BAG) (§740.14) (except as permitted by §740.14(d));
  • Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (AVS) (§740.15(b)(1), (b)(2), (c));
  • Additional Permissive Reexports (APR) (§740.16(a) and (j)); and
  • Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) (§740.20(c)(2)).
   BIS has taken this action as part of a broader U.S. policy change toward Hong Kong in response to the newly imposed security measures on Hong Kong by China.   For more information on related developments concerning Hong Kong, please see Trump and Trade posts for June 1, 2020, June 30, 2020, and July 16, 2020.


ITAR & EAR from a non-US perspective
Tuesday, 8 September 2020
More Info
The ABC of Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
Tuesday, 29 September 2020
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EN_a114. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)

* Percy Bysshe Shelley (4 Aug 1792 – 8 Jul 1822; was one of the major English Romantic poets, widely regarded as one of the greatest lyric and philosophical poets in the English language. A radical in his poetry as well as in his political and social views, Shelley did not see fame during his lifetime, but recognition of his achievements in poetry grew steadily following his death. Shelley became a key member of a close circle of visionary poets and writers that included Lord Byron, John Keats, Leigh Hunt, Thomas Love Peacock and his own second wife, Mary Shelley, the author of Frankenstein).
  – “Soul meets soul on lovers’ lips.”
  – “Nothing wilts faster than laurels that have been rested upon.”
  – “The more we study the more we discover our ignorance.”
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The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
Latest Update 


5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 
31 Jul 2020: 85 FR 45998: Revision of the Export Administration Regulations and Suspension of License Exceptions for Hong Kong. 
DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.   24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates.  

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.


29 Jul 2020: 85 FR 45513 Extension to Certain Temporary Suspensions, Modifications, and Exceptions due to Corona Virus.  The latest edition of the BITAR is 29 July 2020.  

DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

17 Jul 2020: 85 FR 43436: Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations. 


1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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