20-0723 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

20-0723 Tursday “Daily Bugle”

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Thursday, 23 July 2020

  1. State Department Updates the Public Guidance for Section 232 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA)
  2. USTR: “Product Exclusions and Amendments – China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation”
  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS:(No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: “General Announcements”
  4. Treasury/OFAC: “Issuance of Amended Ukraine-/Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions”
  5. UK DIT: “Notice to Exporters 2020/12 – the Extension of the China Arms Embargo to Hong Kong”
  1. EU Sanctions: “India Amends SCOMET Export Control List”
  2. Export Compliance Daily: “US Needs New Approach to Semiconductor, 5G Competition with China, Experts Say”
  1. Husch Blackwell: “U.S. Increases Pressure on Russian Gas Pipelines with Imposition of New CAATSA Secondary Sanctions; Issues New General Licenses for Companies Doing Business with GAZ Group”
  2. McCarthy Tétrault: “Canada Changes its Export Policy Toward Hong Kong”
  3. Thompson Hine: “Commerce Adds Chinese Companies to Entity List and Implements Licensing Review Process for Certain Items Related to Treatment of Infectious Diseases”
  1. ECTI Presents: Import 101 for Aerospace Professionals Webinar: 26 Aug
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
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Federal Register
, 23 Jul 2020) [Excerpts]
85 FR 44561: Notice
* ACTION: Notice.
* SUMMARY: The Department of State is updating the public guidance for CAATSA Section 232 on July 15, 2020 to expand the focus of implementation of Section 232 to address certain growing threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy related to Russian energy export pipelines, particularly with respect to Nord Stream 2 and the second line of TurkStream. The Department of State deleted the portions of the public guidance in effect prior to July 15, 2020, that limited the focus of implementation of Section 232 to Russian energy export pipeline projects for which a contract was signed on or after August 2, 2017. In doing so, the Department of State clarified that the focus of implementation will include Russian energy export pipelines such as Nord Stream 2 and the second line of TurkStream.
* DATES: The update to the public guidance for Section 232 is effective on July 15, 2020.

* ADDRESSES: The Department of State has published the updated public guidance for Section 232 on its website. https://www.state.gov/caatsa-crieea-section-232-public-guidance/
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stu Hoffman at CAATSA_EnergySanctions@state.gov or (202)-647-7201.

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Federal Register
, 23 Jul 2020) [Excerpts]
85 FR 44563: Notice
* AGENCY: Office of the United States Trade Representative.
* ACTION: Notice of product exclusions.
* SUMMARY: On August 20, 2019, at the direction of the President, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to modify the action being taken in the Section 301 investigation of China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation by imposing additional duties of 10 percent ad valorem on goods of China with an annual trade value of approximately $300 billion. The additional duties on products in List 1, which is set out in Annex A of that action, became effective on September 1, 2019. The U.S. Trade Representative initiated a product exclusion process in October 2019, and interested persons have submitted requests for the exclusion of specific products. This notice announces the U.S. Trade Representative’s determination to grant certain exclusion requests, as specified in the Annex to this notice, and make certain amendments to previously announced exclusions.
* DATES: The product exclusions announced in this notice apply as of September 1, 2019, the effective date of List 1 of the $300 billion action, and extend to September 1, 2020.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general questions about this notice, contact Associate General Counsels Philip Butler or Megan Grimball, or Director of Industrial Goods Justin Hoffmann at (202) 395-5725. For specific questions on customs classification or implementation of the product exclusions identified in the Annex to this notice, contact traderemedy@cbp.dhs.gov.

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[No items of interest posted]

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OGS_a24. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

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5. State/DDTC
: General Announcements
, 23 Jul 2020)
Additional Measures: DDTC Response to SARS-COV2
   In response to the national emergency President Trump declared on March 13, 2020, as a result of the SARS-COV2 pandemic, the Department of State has taken a number of steps to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on U.S. companies and supply chains overseas. The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) is announcing two new measures aimed at facilitating telework and electronic communication. Each will be the subject of a future notice on this webpage.
Continuation of Temporary Modifications, Suspensions, and Exceptions to the ITAR for Telework due to SARS-COV2
: The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls has ordered an extension until December 31, 2020, of the temporary modifications, suspensions, and exceptions to the ITAR to allow continued telework operations during the current SARS-COV2 public health emergency. These actions are taken pursuant to ITAR §§ 126.2 and 126.3 and are in the interest of the U.S. Government and the security and foreign policy of the United States and will help to ensure continuity of operations within DDTC and among members of the regulated community. The temporary modifications, suspensions, and exceptions were originally described in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Federal Register notice 85 FR 25287, May 1, 2020. DDTC is not extending the other temporary modifications, suspensions, and exceptions related to registration and licensing that were described in that notice. Additional information regarding these actions will be published in the future in the Federal Register.
Mergers, Acquisitions, and Divestiture Notifications and FAQs
: DDTC will begin accepting submissions of notifications of changes to registrations resulting from Mergers, Acquisitions, and Divestitures via DDTC’s DECCS electronic portal. In addition, DDTC will be updating its Registration FAQs page to include a new subheading titled ‘Mergers, Acquisitions, and Divestitures’ that will include new questions and answers to aid registrants in submission of registration-related notifications.

Outage Notice: Monday 27 July

The Defense Export Control and Compliance (DECCS) Registration and Licensing applications will be unavailable to industry from 6:00 AM (EDT) through 8:00 AM (EDT) Monday, July 27 for scheduled system maintenance. Please ensure work in progress is saved prior to the scheduled downtime.

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, 22 Jul 2020)


   Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing nine amended Ukraine-/Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions to reflect the issuance of Ukraine-/Russia-related General License 13O and Ukraine-/Russia-related General License 15I

FAQ 570, FAQ 571, FAQ 586, FAQ 588, FAQ 589, FAQ 590, FAQ 591, FAQ 592, and FAQ 625.
   For more information on this specific action, please visit this page.

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  Open general licences that include Hong Kong will be changed or amended to bring them in line with restrictions on China from 20 July 2020.
   The Foreign Secretary’s statement to Parliament of 20 July that, given the role China has now assumed for the internal security of Hong Kong and the authority it is exerting over law enforcement, the UK will extend to Hong Kong the arms embargo that we have applied to mainland China since 1989 and re-stated on 3 June 1998. This means that open general licences that include Hong Kong will be changed or amended to bring them in line with restrictions on China.

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EU Sanctions
, 22 Jul 2020)
   India’s Directorate General for Foreign Trade (DGFT) has made several amendments to its Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials and Technologies (SCOMET) List, which came into force on 11 July 2020. See 
   The DGFT has made additions to its list of items subject to export controls, including: certain nuclear materials to specified countries, toxic chemical agents added by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and related technology and software. Turbojet and certain aircraft engine technology will now be subject to further controls. Numerous descriptions for items subject to export controls have been updated, including entries on the nuclear, munitions and telecommunications lists.

Export Compliance Daily, 23 Jul 2020) [Excerpts]
   It’s not enough to just restrict sales of chips to Huawei, and convince allies not to use the Chinese company in their 5G networks, experts said at a Senate Banking Committee Economic Policy Subcommittee hearing on July 22. Rather, they testified, both 5G and export controls should be looked at more broadly. Martijn Rasser, senior fellow in the Center for a New American Security’s Technology and National Security Program, said that 5G networks will be essential to all that the U.S. does in technology, so getting 5G right is urgent. …



* Principal Author:
Cortney O’Toole Morgan
, 1-202-378-2389,
Husch Blackwell LLP
   The U.S. Department of State recently published 
updated guidance
pertaining to Section 232 of the 
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(“CAATSA”). The revised guidelines subject energy export pipelines originating from Russia, particularly the Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipelines, to secondary Section 232 sanctions (not to be confused with Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962). The sanctions’ focus is on any persons who, according to the Secretary of State, on or after August 2, 2017 knowingly made an investment or “sells, leases, or provides to the Russian Federation goods or services” which meet the Section 232(a) fair market value thresholds and which “directly and significantly facilitate the expansion, construction, or modernization” of energy export pipelines by Russia.
The U.S. has repeatedly expressed its opposition to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipelines, which the U.S. view as means of creating “national and regional dependencies” on Russian energy which Russia exploits to “expand its political, economic, and military influence and undermine U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.”
  On July 16, 2020, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued two new General Licenses (“GL”) 
and GL 
related to GAZ Group, a Russian conglomerate. These General Licenses extend pre-existing authorizations for transactions with GAZ Group that would otherwise be prohibited under OFAC’s Ukraine- and Russia-related sanctions.  Specifically, GL 13O replaces and supersedes GL 13N, while GL 15I replaces and supersedes GL 15H (previously reported on 
).  GL 13O authorizes through January 21, 2020 certain transactions necessary to divest or transfer debt, equity, or other holdings in GAZ Group and its 50% or greater owned subsidiaries, while GL 15I authorizes certain other activities involving GAZ Group. GL 15I authorizes the following activities:
  • Research, design, development, production, modification, upgrade, certification, distribution, and marketing;
  • Provision or receipt of services, including warranty, maintenance, logistics, storage, shipping, insurance, security, brokerage, legal, banking and financial (including financing and renegotiation of debt), technical and engineering, advertising, and customer services;
  • Entry into joint ventures, contract manufacturing agreements, supplier contracts, and other new contracts associated with activities authorized by paragraph (a);
  • Payment and receipt of dividends and other funds owed by or to GAZ Group relating to activities authorized by paragraph (a);
  • The conduct of financial transactions associated with activities authorized by paragraph (a); and
  • Activities necessary for compliance with paragraph (f)(1)(i), including financial auditing services.
Neither GL 13O nor GL 15I authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by 31 C.F.R. Chapter V.   Parties relying on either GL 13O or GL 15I should be aware that each General License imposes certain terms and conditions which must be met in order to qualify for the applicable authorization.  Additionally, both General Licenses include and impose comprehensive and detailed reporting requirements, so persons engaging in transactions or activities under GL 13O or GL 15I should ensure that they document those transactions and activities carefully.

COM_a211. McCarthy Tétrault: “Canada Changes its Export Policy Toward Hong Kong”

* Principal Author: John W. Boscariol, Esq.
, 1-416-601-7835
  In response to the passage of Hong Kong’s national security legislation (“Security Law”), Canada will treat exports and transfers of sensitive goods and technology to Hong Kong the same as those destined for mainland China, and will prohibit exports of sensitive military items to Hong Kong. Global Affairs Canada announced the major policy changes in a 
Notice to Exporters
 issued July 7th, 2020.
  Under the new policy, all export permit applications for items listed on the 
Export Control List
 destined for Hong Kong will be “closely scrutinized”, and permits for exports or technology transfers inconsistent with Canada’s domestic and international legal obligations, foreign policy, or security interests will be denied. Canada currently maintains export controls over a broad range of dual-use goods and technology, including those relating to cybersecurity, information security (encryption), telecommunications, integrated circuits, computers, navigation, avionics, sensors, aerospace and nuclear items, as well as defence and weapons-related items.
Hong Kong National Security Law
Security Law
, which came into effect July 1, 2020, has sparked global controversy. It is widely perceived as a mechanism to suppress Hong Kong’s independence, and human rights activism, by breaking the constitutional arrangement, commonly known as the “one country, two systems” agreement, that made Hong Kong a semi-independent Special Administrative Region of China in July of 1997.
  The Security Law introduces four major offenses punishable by life imprisonment: separatism, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign countries. Allegedly, these broadly-worded offences will permit China to target Hong Kong’s pro-democracy activists, who have been staging regular protests against the loss of Hong Kong’s independence from China.
  There are concerns that the Security Law could weaken the independence of Hong Kong’s judiciary by enabling China to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over “complex” cases, such as those involving foreign countries or foreign elements, cases where Hong Kong’s government is “unable to effectively enforce” the Security Law, and cases where a “major and imminent threat to national security has occurred”. It is anticipated that the Security Law will also permit the Chinese government to transfer important prosecutions and trials to mainland China, and to hear those cases in a more controlled and less transparent environment, where defendants are afforded fewer protections.
Furthermore, two newly instituted security bodies operating in Hong Kong but directly accountable to China – the Committee for Safeguarding National Security and the Office for Safeguarding National Security – will be able to directly interfere with Hong Kong’s affairs. Both security bodies have extensive powers, and their decisions are not subject to judicial review.
Canadian Export Policy Changes Toward Hong Kong
  Canadian export policy toward Hong Kong was built on the presumption that the former British colony is autonomous from China. The passage of the Security Law, which severely curtails this autonomy, propelled Canada to reconsider its approach. In this sense, the Canadian decision to treat exports of sensitive goods to Hong Kong in the same way as those destined for mainland China is not surprising.
  The decision to apply additional scrutiny to export permit applications is likely to significantly impact Canadian exporters to Hong Kong, especially exporters of dual-use items and technologies. This could lead to more stringent permit conditions and longer processing times.
  However, it remains to be seen how the situation with export of military items to Hong Kong will unfold. The Notice to Exporters states that Canada will not issue export permits for “sensitive military items”, but it does not clarify how “sensitive” will be defined. This approach differs from Canada’s recent prohibition against the supply of all military items to Turkey, where new export permit applications were 
presumptively denied
 for all Group 2 items.
  It should be noted that for exports of military items, the new substantial risk test will be applied. Under this test, introduced into the Export and Import Permits Act in September of 2019, when deciding whether to issue a permit for the export of arms, ammunition, and implements or munitions of war, Canada will take into consideration whether there is an “overriding risk” that granting a permit would contribute to the following:
  • Undermining of peace and security;
  • A serious violation of international humanitarian law or international human rights law;
  • An offense under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism or transnational organized crime to which Canada is a party;
  • Serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.
  To date, the only publicly released assessment under the substantial risk test can be found in the 
Final report: Review of export permits to Saudi Arabia

where Canada determined there was no substantial risk involved in exporting military items and technology to Saudi Arabia, as there was no credible evidence that Canadian military items were being used to commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law.
Current Export Permits to Hong Kong
  The Government of Canada has not made any public statement concerning the status of preexisting export permits. It may reasonably be assumed that their valid status remains intact, as this approach would be similar to how Canada handled the recent prohibition against the export of military items to Turkey, in that permits issued prior to the prohibition were permitted to continue during their period of validity.
Are Economic Sanctions Against Hong Kong and China Next?
  The United States, Canada’s closest and most important trading partner, has responded to the Security Law by implementing the 
Hong Kong Autonomy Act
, which authorizes sanctions on individuals and entities “that materially contribute to China’s failure to preserve Hong Kong’s autonomy,” as well as an 
Executive Order
 ending Hong Kong’s preferential trade treatment. The U.S. Secretary of State, Michael R. Pompeo, has also 
 that the United States is terminating exports of U.S. defense equipment to Hong Kong, and will now impose the same restrictions on U.S. defense and dual-use technologies transfers to Hong Kong as it does for China.
As a result of amendments made in recent years to Canada’s 
Special Economic Measures Act
Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law)
, the Canadian government has expanded authorities to implement economic sanctions against states, individuals, and entities when states or foreign nationals are involved in gross violations of human rights or acts of significant corruption. Under these authorities, Canada has recently implemented sanctions against Saudi Arabia, Russia, Venezuela, Myanmar, Nicaragua, and South Sudan.
  To date, Canada has not implemented any economic sanctions in response to Hong Kong’s Security Law, and has provided no indication that such measures are imminent. Recently, 64 members of Canada’s House of Commons and Senate, along with community leaders, issued a 
 calling for Canada’s government to impose Magnitsky sanctions against China and Hong Kong in connection with human rights issues in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet.

Trump and Trade
, 21 Jul 2020)

   Effective July 22, 2020, pursuant to a 
Federal Register notice
, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has placed 11 Chinese entities on the Entity List stating that all “have been implicated in human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China’s campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, forced labor and high-technology surveillance against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).” This action comes shortly after Commerce and other federal agencies cautioned U.S. businesses about conducting sufficient supply chain due diligence regarding the Chinese government’s repression of ethnic minorities, see 
Thompson Hine International Trade Update of July 2020

   Specifically, BIS determined that Changji Esquel Textile Co. Ltd.; Hefei Bitland Information Technology Co. Ltd.; Hefei Meiling Co. Ltd.; Hetian Haolin Hair Accessories Co. Ltd.; Hetian Taida Apparel Co., Ltd.; KTK Group; Nanjing Synergy Textiles Co. Ltd.; Nanchang O-Film Tech; and Tanyuan Technology Co. Ltd. are engaging in activities contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States through the practice of forced labor involving members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR. BIS also determined that Xinjiang Silk Road BGI and Beijing Liuhe BGI are enabling activities contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States through conducting genetic analyses used to further the repression of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR.
   These actions establish entity-specific license requirements for the export, re-export and transfer of U.S goods and technology to these designated parties.  Specifically, BIS has imposed a license requirement for all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) with case-by-case license review policy for certain items with specified Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs). Additionally, BIS states that “in light of the current global pandemic, BIS has adopted a policy of case-by-case review for items subject to the EAR that are necessary to detect, identify and treat infectious disease.” BIS has adopted a license review policy of presumption of denial for all other items subject to the EAR and removed these entities from being eligible for any license exceptions.

   In this notice, BIS has also modified the Entity List as to 37 other Chinese entities previously determined to be engaged in or enabling human rights abuses in Xinjing. See Federal Register notice of June 5, 2020. Specifically, and again, in light of the current global pandemic, BIS has modified the license review policy for these 37 entities “to reflect a policy of case-by-case review for items subject to the EAR that are necessary to detect, identify and treat infectious disease.” The license review policy for these entities otherwise remains the same. 


* What: 
Import 101 for Aerospace Professionals
* When: 26 Aug; 1:00 p.m. (EDT)
* Where: Webinar
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker: 
Marc Binder
* Register:
or Ashleigh Foor, 1-540-433-3977,

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EN_a114. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)

* Raymond Chandler
 (Raymond Thornton Chandler; 23Jul 1888 – 26 Mar 1959; was an American-British poet, novelist, and screenwriter. In 1932, at the age of 44, Chandler became a detective fiction writer after losing his job as an oil company executive. In addition to his short stories, Chandler published seven novels during his lifetime, all of which featured the character Philip Marlowe. Most were made into motion pictures, some more than once.)
  – “She jerked away from me like a startled fawn might, if I had a startled fawn and it jerked away from me.”
  – “The streets were dark with something more than night.

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The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
Latest Update 
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.


5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 
22 Jul 2020: 85 FR 44159: Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List; Revision of Existing Entries on the Entity List.

DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.   24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates.  

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.



22 July 2020: 
85 FR 44188:
amending 126.1(u)
.  The latest edition of the
is 22 July 2020.


DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

17 Jul 2020:
85 FR 43436:
Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations. 


1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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