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20-0717 Friday “Daily Bugle”

20-0717 Friday “Daily Bugle”

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Friday, 17 July 2020

  1. DHS/CBP: “Quarterly IRS Interest Rates Used in Calculating Interest on Overdue Accounts and Refunds on Customs Duties”
  2. Treasury/OFAC: “Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations”
  3. USTR: “Extension of Particular Exclusions – China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation”
  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS:(No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC:(No new postings)
  4. Treasury/OFAC: “Amendment of Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations; Publication of Nicaragua-related General License; Amendment of Ukraine-related General Licenses”
  5. Treasury/OFAC: “Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Essentra FZE Company Limited”
  1. WORLDecr: “NASA Among US Agencies to Phase Out Use of Some Chinese Tech in August”
  1. Freshfields: “US Response to China and Hong Kong: Recent Events, Potential Future Actions, and What it Means”
  2. Kelley Drye: “U.S. Warns that Nord Stream 2 and Second Line of TurkStream are Now in Scope for U.S. Secondary Sanctions”
  1. ECTI Presents: Import 101 for Aerospace Professionals Webinar: 26 Aug
  2. Friday List of Approaching Events: 202 Events Posted This Week, Including 9 New Events
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  4. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  5. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 

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EXIM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

 
85 FR 43590: Notice
* AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security.
* ACTION: General notice.
* SUMMARY: This notice advises the public that the quarterly Internal Revenue Service interest rates used to calculate interest on overdue accounts (underpayments) and refunds (overpayments) of customs duties will decrease from the previous quarter. For the calendar quarter beginning July 1, 2020, the interest rates for overpayments will be 2 percent for corporations and 3 percent for non-corporations, and the interest rate for underpayments will be 3 percent for both corporations and non-corporations. This notice is published for the convenience of the importing public and U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel.
* DATES: The rates announced in this notice are applicable as of July 1, 2020.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bruce Ingalls, Revenue Division, Collection Refunds & Analysis Branch, 6650 Telecom Drive, Suite #100, Indianapolis, Indiana 46278; (317) 298-1107.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

 
85 FR 43436: Rule
* AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury.
* ACTION: Final rule.
* SUMMARY: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is amending the Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations to incorporate the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018 by updating the authority citation and the prohibited transactions and delegation sections. OFAC is also adding a general license authorizing certain United States government activities.
* DATES: This rule is effective July 17, 2020.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: OFAC: Assistant Director for Licensing, 202-622-2480 

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

 
85 FR 43639: Notice
* AGENCY: Office of the United States Trade Representative.
* ACTION: Notice and request for comments.
* SUMMARY: On August 20, 2019, at the direction of the President, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to modify the action being taken in the Section 301 investigation of China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation by imposing additional duties of 10 percent ad valorem on goods of China with an annual trade value of approximately $300 billion. The additional duties on products in List 1, which is set out in Annex A of that action, became effective on September 1, 2019. The U.S. Trade Representative initiated a product exclusion process in October 2019, and as of the date of this notice, has issued six product exclusion notices under this action and anticipates issuing a seventh notice in the coming days. The product exclusions granted under these notices are scheduled to expire on September 1, 2020. The U.S. Trade Representative previously decided to consider a possible extension for up to twelve months of particular exclusions granted under the initial five product exclusion notices. The U.S. Trade Representative has decided to consider a possible extension for up to twelve months of particular exclusions granted under the sixth notice and a forthcoming seventh notice of product exclusions.
* DATES: July 15, 2020: The public docket on the web portal at https://comments.USTR.gov will open for parties to submit comments on the possible extension of particular exclusions.
August 14, 2020 at 11:59 p.m. ET: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments on the public docket by this deadline.
* ADDRESSES: You must submit all comments through the online portal: https://comments.USTR.gov.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Associate General Counsel Philip Butler or Assistant General Counsel Benjamin Allen at (202) 395-5725.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

OGS OTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

[No items of interest posted]

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

OGS_a25. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source:
Treasury/OFAC, 16 Jul 2020)
 
   The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is amending the Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 582) to incorporate the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018. OFAC is also adding a general license authorizing certain United States government activities. This regulatory amendment is currently available for public inspection with the Federal Register and will take effect upon publication in the Federal Register on July 17, 2020.
   In addition, OFAC is amending two general licenses related to GAZ Group by issuing Ukraine-related General License No. 13O, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Necessary to Divest or Transfer Debt, Equity, or Other Holdings in GAZ Group,” and Ukraine-related General License 15I, “Authorizing Certain Activities Involving GAZ Group.”

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source:
Treasury/OFAC, 16 Jul 2020)
 
  The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $665,112 settlement with Essentra FZE Company Limited (“Essentra FZE”). Essentra FZE, a cigarette filter and tear tape manufacturer located in the United Arab Emirates, has agreed to settle its potential civil liability for three apparent violations of the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 510. Specifically, Essentra FZE exported cigarette filters to the DPRK through a network of front companies in China and other countries using deceptive practices, and received payment for the shipment of these goods into its bank accounts at the foreign branch of a U.S. bank between September 2018 and December 2018. OFAC determined that Essentra FZE did not voluntarily self-disclose these apparent violations, and that these apparent violations constitute an egregious case.

  For more information, please visit the web notice, and settlement agreement.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

COM NEWS

(Source:
WORLDecr, 16 Jul 2020) [Excerpts]
 
   A trio of US government agencies – the Department of Defense (DoD), the General Services Agency (GSA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) – have published an interim rule which creates a ‘Prohibition on Contracting with Entities Using Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services of Equipment.’
   Those entities include Huawei, ZTE, Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, and Dahua Technology Company.
   More specifically, the agencies are ‘amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to implement section 889(a)(1)(B) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2019.’
The summary of the rule explains:
  “Section 889(a)(1)(B) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 prohibits executive agencies from entering into, or extending or renewing, a contract with an entity that uses any equipment, system, or service that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system. The provision goes into effect August 13, 2020.
   “The statute covers certain telecommunications equipment and services produced or provided by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation (or any subsidiary or affiliate of those entities) and certain video surveillance products or telecommunications equipment and services produced or provided by Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, or Dahua Technology Company (or any subsidiary or affiliate of those entities). The statute is not limited to contracting with entities that use end-products produced by those companies; it also covers the use of any equipment, system, or service that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system.”

COM COMMENTARY

 
* Principal Author: Nabeel Yousef, Esq., 1-202-777-4563; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP
 
  On July 14, 2020, President Trump signed into law the Hong Kong Autonomy Act and an Executive Order on “Hong Kong Normalization.”  We address in this briefing the active US responses and additional anticipated actions, as well as explain how these could impact business with China.  The United States might ultimately not be alone in its response, as other countries are also reacting to the Hong Kong National Security Law (NSL).

  After over 3 years of shifting US policy toward China, the United States is setting into motion a multifaceted response, including in reaction to the adoption of the (NSL) on June 30, 2020.  Within the United States, there is broad support across the political spectrum for US countermeasures to the NSL, including export control restrictions and sanctions.  The United States has also accelerated and taken new action against China on unrelated issues.


  As covered in more detail below, the US response to China has thus far included:
(1) a new sanctions program targeting foreign financial institutions (Hong Kong Autonomy Act);
(2) Hong Kong increasingly being treated the same as mainland China through the removal of the so-called “special status” (United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992; Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization);
(3) a Hong Kong arms embargo (International Traffic in Arms Regulations);
(4) the termination of Hong Kong export control preferences (Export Administration Regulations);
(5) sanctions designations and warnings related to Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet (Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act of 2016; Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020; Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018);
(6) the expansion of Chinese telecom and technology export restrictions, as well as the targeting of additional companies (Export Administration Regulations; DOD List; FCC);
(7) threatened delisting of Chinese companies (Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act);
(8) the introduction of COVID-19 and Hong Kong retaliation bills (COVID-19 Accountability Act); and
(9) potential US dollar restrictions.
 
Link to Timeline: 
US Response to China
 
  Even where the US government and Trump administration’s actions do not have an immediate impact, responding to China is an active US policy priority and regulatory focus that should be taken into account when doing business, conducting due diligence, or considering strategy related to China and Hong Kong.
 
New Sanctions Program Targets Foreign Financial Institutions
  On July 14, 2020, President Trump signed into law the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (
HKAA
). The HKAA establishes a new sanctions program that involves a stepped process and broad executive discretion to target certain foreign   persons and foreign financial institutions.


  Starting July 14, the US Secretary of State has 90 days to supply Congress with a report identifying “foreign persons” who have materially contributed to “the failure of the Government of China to meet its obligations under the Joint Declaration or the Basic Law,” which sets forth the constitutional principle of  “one country, two systems.”  In addition, the HKAA authorizes sanctions on any foreign financial institution that “knowingly” conducts a “significant” transaction with any foreign person identified by the Secretary. Such financial institutions, if not removed from the Secretary’s periodic reports, will then be subject to “menu-based” secondary sanctions, up to and including broad restrictions on transacting in US property, access to the US financial system, and access to US dollars.


  See below Timeline: Hong Kong Autonomy Act. 

Link to Timeline: 
Hong Kong Autonomy Act
 
  Critically, the HKAA grants the Executive Branch broad discretion over the implementation of key elements of the new HKAA sanctions program, including discretion with respect to:  
  1. the definition of “materially contribute” and the criteria for a “significant” transaction;
  2. reporting to Congress the identity of foreign persons and foreign financial institutions that meet the HKAA’s criteria;
  3. the timeframe for imposing “mandatory” sanctions on those identified in reports, where the first imposition of sanctions might not occur for another 15 months;
  4. waiving the application of sanctions;
  5. excluding a foreign person or foreign financial institution from a report; and
  6. removing a foreign person or foreign financial institution from a report and terminating related sanctions.
  The HKAA provides a framework for this new sanctions program, and US regulators will likely provide further guidance after the HKAA becomes law.  It appears for now at least that the process and timing for implementing sanctions under the HKAA are designed to allow foreign persons and foreign financial institutions an opportunity to defend against the threat of sanctions after being included in a report and to demonstrate that the alleged activity targeted by the HKAA “has been reversed or otherwise mitigated through positive countermeasures.”
 
The United States Begins Terminating Hong Kong’s Special Status
  The US government has begun to strip Hong Kong of its special status under US law.  The July 14 Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization formally directs the administration to take all appropriate action to terminate preferential treatment of Hong Kong under US rules.  The Executive Order ultimately aims to align treatment of Hong Kong with that of China for all US regulatory, immigration, and other purposes.  Additionally, the Executive Order authorizes sanctions against persons determined to be involved in or responsible for certain activities related to the National Security Law.


  The Executive Order follows a US State Department report on May 28, 2020, and a related announcement by President Trump that signaled the official change of US policy on Hong Kong and directed the US government to begin the process of eliminating Hong Kong’s special treatment. US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo then certified to Congress that Hong Kong does not continue to warrant differential treatment under the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (
USHKA
). Even prior to the Executive Order, the United States has suspended preferential export licensing exemptions and officially extended the US-China arms embargo to Hong Kong.


  Under the USHKA, Hong Kong previously benefitted from preferential treatment under US export controls and arms restrictions:  Hong Kong was treated as a different export destination than mainland China, and the US arms embargo on China did not apply to Hong Kong.  Hong Kong’s preferential export treatment under the USHKA was premised on Hong Kong being a more trustworthy recipient of US technology and arms than mainland China.  But as of June 29, 2020, Hong Kong no longer benefits from preferential export control treatment in many respects and is now covered by the US arms embargo on China.
  Some US preferences for Hong Kong remain intact. Specifically, the various tariffs that the United States imposes on China – including under Section 301 (unfair trade practices), Section 201 (injury to domestic industries), and Section 232 (threat to national security) – still do not apply to imports of Hong Kong origin goods.  It is not clear if US import tariffs on China will be expanded to cover imports from Hong Kong.  (Note that imports from Hong Kong of Chinese-origin goods have generally been subject to these higher tariffs, unless the goods are further processed in Hong Kong such that the goods are deemed to become of Hong Kong origin.)
 
US Imposes Sanctions and Issues Warnings Concerning Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet
  The United States has taken various actions in recent weeks against Chinese government and Chinese Communist Party (
CCP
) officials related to the situation in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet.  The most decisive action comes from the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (
OFAC
), which on July 9, 2020, added four Chinese officials and one Chinese government entity to the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (
SDN list
) in connection with human rights abuses against ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (
XUAR
). The Treasury Department imposed the OFAC sanctions under 
the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
, which is increasingly being used to target and sanction those involved with human rights abuses around the world.


  The US State Department also imposed visa restrictions (but not asset-freezing sanctions) on named and unnamed Chinese government and CCP officials for undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy; for human rights abuses targeting Uyghurs, ethnic Kazaks, and other minorities; and for obstructing travel to the Tibetan Autonomous Region under the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018.
  Additional sanctions and visa restrictions may be forthcoming because the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (
UHRPA
), which was signed into law on June 17, 2020, requires that the President provide a list of senior Chinese government officials responsible for serious human rights abuses against Turkic Muslims in China’s XUAR.  The UHRPA also requires State Department reporting on human rights in Xinjiang (including estimates of the internment camp populations in XUAR) and targets Chinese harassment or intimidation of Uyghurs living in the United States.
  In an unusual step,
several US government agencies issued a joint Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory
 on July 1, 2020, that warns companies of the potential risks presented from doing business in China related to Xinjiang internment camps or labor.  Although the advisory, visa restrictions, and UHRPA do not impose sanctions, they caution companies of the potential perils of engaging in certain activities and may be harbingers of future sanctions or other actions.
 
Export Controls Target Chinese Telecom, Technology and Other Companies
  US export controls on China and Chinese companies have been on the rise for several years, notably since the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (
BIS
) imposed a Denial Order on ZTE in 2018.  The most recent and significant export control actions against China occurred when BIS added Huawei to its entity list in 2019, continued to ramp up restrictions on Huawei, and (effective June 29, 2020) terminated certain export control licensing exceptions and expanded military end use restrictions for China.
  BIS has also targeted dozens of Chinese companies and organizations for their activities related to Xinjiang by adding them to the Entity List – most recently, 28 entities on October 9, 2019, including Dahua Technologies and Hikvision, followed by another nine entities on June 5, 2020.  This is in addition to a great number of Chinese organizations on the Entity List for other reasons including circumventing US export controls or engaging in military-related activities, such as the 24 Chinese organizations that were also added on June 5th.  Other countries around the world are also ramping up restrictions on Chinese telecom and technology companies, including the UK’s announcement on July 14, 2020, that it will begin implementing a ban on Huawei in UK 5G mobile networks and eventually other networks.
  In what appears to be more of a political than practical move against Chinese companies, the US Department of Defense (

DOD
) released a list on June 24, 2020, of 20 major Chinese companies that DOD determined to be owned or controlled by China’s military.  Under apparent pressure from US Senators, DOD compiled the list as mandated in a provision of a 1999 law that had never before been exercised.  The list includes Chinese corporations active in the telecommunications, technology, aviation, and other sectors in China.  The list does not impose sanctions and, based on BIS guidance, does not appear to presumptively result in export control restrictions.


  More recently, on June 30, 2020, the US Federal Communications Commission (
FCC
) issued its long-anticipated designation of Huawei and ZTE as national security risks, thereby effectively cutting them off from the FCC’s Universal Service Fund.  US restrictions on Huawei and ZTE equipment in networks, however, are not new.


 
Pending Legislation Threatens to Delist Chinese and Hong Kong Companies
  On May 20, 2020, the US Senate unanimously passed a bill called the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act that could 
potentially result in the future delisting from US exchanges
 of companies whose auditors cannot be inspected by the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (
PCAOB
) because a foreign governmental authority is prohibiting the inspection.  This legislation could affect up to approximately 245 companies based in mainland China or Hong Kong.  It is not yet clear, however, if the bill will become law (in its current form or otherwise) or whether it would ultimately require delisting of such companies before 2024 as contemplated.
  NASDAQ has also filed 
three proposed rulemakings
 
that would make its listing requirements more restrictive for companies principally administered in China and other emerging markets, for reasons including if the auditor cannot be inspected by the PCAOB.
 
Congress Introduces COVID-19 and Hong Kong Retaliation Legislation
  In early May 2020, legislation was introduced in the US Senate and House called the COVID-19 Accountability Act that would authorize sanctions in connection with the Chinese government’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak.  The companion bills would authorize sanctions on Chinese officials, entities, and affiliates – as well as visa restrictions on student and exchange visas for Chinese nationals – if the President cannot certify that the Chinese government (i) is cooperating with efforts related to the COVID-19 outbreak; (ii) has prohibited “wet markets” that can expose humans to health risks; and (iii) has released and dropped all charges for anyone involved in protests in Hong Kong related to COVID-19.  At this time, it is not clear whether the bill is likely to become law.
 
Trump Administration Contemplates US Dollar Restrictions
  It has been reported that the Trump administration has been considering limiting Hong Kong banks’ access to US dollars and US dollar clearing in order to damage Hong Kong’s US dollar peg, but that such limitations are not likely to be imposed.  Hong Kong pegs its dollar to the US dollar via the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s currency purchases and sales, in order to boost or depress the Hong Kong dollar’s exchange rate against the US dollar.  Because of significant US dollar reserves in Hong Kong, it has been reported that Hong Kong is more than able to defend its peg.  The fact that the Trump administration may have considered such a move, however, suggests that the US government is continuing to explore novel ways to respond to the NSL.
 
Conclusion

   Recent US government actions against China appear to be gaining momentum.  Further bipartisan action by Congress or the Trump administration could become increasingly likely as the NSL is implemented and as part of the US/China trade war.  For example, existing US laws impose reporting obligations on the President that could become fodder for further executive action or congressional legislation, including reports on (i) China’s efforts to use Hong Kong to evade US export controls and economic sanctions; (ii) individuals responsible for committing acts that violate internationally recognized human rights in Hong Kong; and (iii) exceptions to the prohibition on export licenses for specified munitions to the Hong Kong Police Force.  Additional reporting by the administration and mandatory sanctions, particularly under the HKAA, might also be expected in the coming months. 

 
 
  Today the U.S. State Department published updated guidance indicating that significant transactions related to Nord Stream 2 and the second line of TukStream may be subject to U.S. secondary sanctions penalties under Section 232 of CAATSA.

  Section 232 authorizes the U.S. government to impose a bevy of sanctions on non-U.S. parties that make investments in Russian energy export pipelines or that provide goods, services, technology, information, or other support that directly and significantly facilitates the maintenance or expansion of Russian energy export pipelines.  Previous guidance exempted Nord Stream 2 from the threat of secondary sanctions by excluding projects for which a contract was signed before August 2, 2017.  The new guidance removes that provision and now states explicitly that Nord Stream 2 is within scope for Section 232.


The new State Department guidance includes a safe harbor that allows non-U.S. companies to engage in activities “ordinarily incident and necessary” to wind down operations and agreements involving Nord Stream 2, but it includes three important caveats:
  • The activities must be consistent with prior State Department guidance;
  • The activities must be undertaken pursuant to pre-existing written agreements; and
  • Persons engaging in the activities must take reasonable steps to wind down those activities.
  Standard repair and maintenance activities related to Nord Stream 2 are now sanctionable, unless they qualify for the wind down safe harbor.
Secondary sanctions are discretionary and highly political.  The changes do not prohibit transactions related to Nord Stream 2, nor do they mean that non-U.S. parties will automatically be subject to sanctions for supporting the project.  That said, the U.S. government is strongly signaling that enforcement of Section 232 secondary sanctions may soon be coming.  Secondary sanctions penalties under CAATSA can include restrictions on doing business with the U.S. government, export financing and licensing limits, travel bans, and more significant penalties to prohibit sanctioned persons from doing business in the United States or with the U.S. financial system.


TE EX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

 
* What: 
Import 101 for Aerospace Professionals
* When: 26 Aug; 1:00 p.m. (EDT)
* Where: Webinar
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker: 
Marc Binder
* Register:
here 
or Ashleigh Foor, 1-540-433-3977,

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

(Sources: Event sponsors)  
 

Submit your event in the Submission section at the end of this newsletter.  
 
[Editor’s note:  This Daily Bugle Event List has grown so large that we have run out of space to display it, so we are displaying here only the new events in the Daily Bugle, while maintaining a 
LINK HERE to the full list.]
 

On-Line:

Published every Friday or last publication day of the week. Send events to
events@fullcirclecompliance.eu, composed in the below format:
 
#
* Date: (Location;) “Event Title”; <Weblink>” Event Sponsor;
 
On-Line:
 


* 21 Jul: “
Complying with CUSMA: Key Trade Tools for Unlocking Benefits
“; Blake, Cassels & Graydon (U.S.) LLP



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EN EDITOR’S NOTES

EN_a114. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)
 

* Phyllis Diller (Phyllis Ada Diller; née Driver; 17 Jul 1917 – 20 Aug 2012; was an American actress and comedienne, best known for her eccentric stage persona, self-deprecating humor, wild hair and clothes, and exaggerated, cackling laugh. Diller was one of the first female comics to become a household name in the U.S., credited as an influence by Joan Rivers, Roseanne Barr, and Ellen DeGeneres, and others.  She was also one of the first celebrities to openly champion plastic surgery, for which she was recognized by the cosmetic surgery industry.)
  – “Burt Reynolds once asked me out. I was in his room.” 
  – “
Best way to get rid of kitchen odors: Eat out.”
  – “You know you’re old if they have discontinued your blood type.”
  – “
My photographs don’t do me justice – they just look like me.
 
Friday funnies:
A man had only a few minutes to buy an important item and rush back to work for a meeting, but he couldn’t find a parking space. “Lord,” he prayed. “If you open a space up for me, I swear I’ll give up drinking and gambling, and I’ll and go to church every Sunday.”  Suddenly, the clouds part and the sun shines on an empty parking spot. Without hesitation, the man says: “Never mind, Lord, I found one!”

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

 

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
 
Agency 
Regulations 
Latest Update 
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.

 

5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 
DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. 
DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.   24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates.  
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM)

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110.  

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

 
DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. 
6 May 2020: 85 FR 26847: Notice (not an amendment) temporarily reducing the registration fee schedule in ITAR 122.3 until April 30, 2021. 
 
DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

17 Jul 2020:
85 FR 43436:
Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations. 

 
 
 
USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), Revision 8.

1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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