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20-0716 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

20-0716 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

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Thursday, 16 July 2020

  1. USTR: “Notice of Product Exclusion – China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation”
  2. USTR: “Section 301 Investigation of France’s Digital Services Tax”
  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings)
  4. Treasury/OFAC: “Amendment of Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations; Publication of Nicaragua-related General License; Amendment of Ukraine-related General Licenses”
  5. USTR: “U.S., Japan Expand Organic Trade Opportunities Livestock Added to Trade Arrangement”
  1. EU Sanctions: “UK Bans 5G Huawei Equipment Due to US Sanctions”
  2. WORLDecr: “Saudi Arabia Joins US Call for no Lifting of UN Arms Embargo on Iran”
  1. R/D Report: “State Department Export Policy Changes”
  2. Steptoe: “US Executive Order Implements, Strengthens Hong Kong Sanctions”
  3. Tuttle Law: “USTR Considering Additional Section 301 Tariffs for Certain EU Goods”
  1. ECS Presents: 15-16 Oct; Toronto, CA; “ITAR/EAR Controls for Non-US Companies”
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  4. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  5. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 

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EXIM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a11. USTR: “Notice of Product Exclusion – China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation”

(Source:
Federal Register
, 16 Jul 2020)
 
85 FR 43291: Notice
* AGENCY: Office of the United States Trade Representative.
* ACTION: Notice.
* SUMMARY: Effective August 23, 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative imposed additional duties on goods of China with an annual trade value of approximately $16 billion as part of the action in the Section 301 investigation of China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. The U.S. Trade Representative’s determination included a decision to establish a product exclusion process, which was initiated in September 2018. Stakeholders submitted requests for the exclusion of specific products and the U.S. Trade Representative granted exclusion requests. This notice announces the U.S. Trade Representative’s determination to make certain amendments to previously granted exclusions and grants an exclusion that previously was published under a different U.S. note to subchapter III of chapter 99 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS).
* DATES: The amendments announced in this notice are retroactive to the date of publication of the original exclusions and do not extend the period for the original exclusions. U.S. Customs and Border Protection will issue instructions on entry guidance and implementation.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general questions about this notice, contact Associate General Counsel Philip Butler or Director of Industrial Goods Justin Hoffmann at (202) 395-5725. For specific questions on customs classification or implementation of the product exclusions identified in the Annex to this notice, contact traderemedy@cbp.dhs.gov.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

EXIM_a22. USTR: “Section 301 Investigation of France’s Digital Services Tax”

(Source:
Federal Register
, 16 Jul 2020)
 
85 FR 43292: Notice
* AGENCY: Office of the United States Trade Representative.
* ACTION: Notice.
* SUMMARY: On December 6, 2019, the U.S. Trade Representative announced a determination that France’s Digital Services Tax (DST) is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce. This notice announces the U.S. Trade Representative’s determination to take action in the form of additional duties of 25 percent on products of France specified in Annex A to this notice. The U.S. Trade Representative has further determined to suspend application of the additional duties for a period of up to 180 days.
* DATES: July 10, 2020: The U.S. Trade Representative determined to take action in the form of additional duties of 25 percent on products of France specified in Annex A. January 6, 2021: The end of the 180-day suspension period for the additional duties.

* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions concerning the investigation, please contact Megan Grimball, Associate General Counsel at (202) 395-5725, Robert Tanner, Director, Services and Investment at (202) 395-6125, or Michael Rogers, Director, Europe and the Middle East at (202) 395-2684. For specific questions on customs classification or implementation of additional duties on products identified in Annex A to this notice, contact
traderemedy@cbp.gov
.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

OGS OTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

(Source:
Federal Register
)
 
* DHS/CBP: NOTICES; Quarterly IRS Interest Rates Used in Calculating Interest on Overdue Accounts and Refunds on Customs Duties [Pub. Date: 17 Jul 2020] (PDF)
 
* Executive Office of the President: EXECUTIVE ORDERS; Hong Kong, U.S. Policy; Normalization Efforts (EO 13936) [Pub. Date: 17 Jul 2020] (PDF)
 
* Treasury/OFAC: RULES; Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations [Pub. Date: 17 Jul 2020] (PDF)
 
* USTR: NOTICES; Extension of Particular Exclusions: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation [Pub. Date: 17 Jul 2020] (PDF)

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

OGS_a24. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source:
Treasury/OFAC, 16 July 2020)
 
  The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is 
amending the Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 582) to incorporate the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018.  OFAC is also adding a general license authorizing certain United States government activities.  This regulatory amendment is currently available for public inspection with the Federal Register and will take effect upon publication in the Federal Register on July 17, 2020.  
  In addition, OFAC is amending two general licenses related to GAZ Group by issuing Ukraine-related General License No. 13O, “Authorizing Certain Transactions
Necessary to Divest or Transfer Debt, Equity, or Other Holdings in GAZ Group,” and Ukraine-related General License 15I, “Authorizing Certain Activities Involving GAZ Group.”

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source:
USTR
, 14 Jul 2020)
 
  The United States and Japan announced the expansion of their organic equivalence arrangement to include livestock products. The arrangement goes into effect July 16, 2020 and reduces costs and streamlines the process for anyone involved in the organic livestock supply chain by requiring only one organic certification.
  “Opening new markets for America’s organic farmers and ranchers continues to be a priority for USDA,” said the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Marketing and Regulatory Programs Under Secretary Greg Ibach. “Japan is already one of the top export markets for U.S. organic products. This agreement opens additional opportunities for everyone involved in the international supply chain for livestock, from farm to table.”
  “Japan is a key international partner in the organic market sector,” said U.S. Trade Representative Chief Agricultural Negotiator Gregg Doud.  “This expanded arrangement protects and increases access for American organic farmers, ranchers, and businesses to the third largest U.S. organic export market”.
  The Japan Agricultural Standards (JAS) now require organic livestock products imported from the United States to either be certified under the JAS or USDA organic regulations. Today’s announcement marks the addition of livestock to the existing U.S.-Japan organic trade arrangement that has allowed plant-based products to be certified to either country’s organic standards since 2014.
USDA has established equivalence arrangements with major organic export markets including Canada, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan. These arrangements eliminate the need for dual certifications, avoiding double fees, inspections and duplicative paperwork.
Leading up to today’s announcement, technical experts from the United States and Japan conducted thorough on-site audits to ensure that the regulations, quality control measures, certification requirements and labeling practices are compatible. The trade partners will continue to hold regular discussions and review each other’s programs periodically, ensuring the terms of the arrangement are being met.
  Additional details on this and other organic trade arrangements, are available on the USDA National Organic Program website at
https://www.ams.usda.gov/organic.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

COM NEWS

(Source:
EU Sanctions
, 15 Jul 2020) [Excerpts]

 
   The UK’s Culture Secretary Oliver Dowden has
 
announced
 
in the House of Commons that:
  • Procurement in the UK of new Huawei 5G equipment affected by US restrictions on Huawei will be prohibited from 31 December 2020;
  • Operators will be required to remove Huawei equipment from their 5G networks by 2027; and
  • The existing ban on Huawei from the most sensitive “core” parts of the 5G network remains in place.
   The statement says the powers to implement and enforce the above obligations will be set out in the government’s new Telecoms Security Bill. The decision is said to have been reached following a report by the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), which said that the security assessment of Huawei’s presence in the UK had “significantly changed” in light of the US Commerce Department’s restrictions imposed on Huawei in May 2020. The US imposed exports controls on US-origin software and technology that could be supplied to Huawei to design and manufacture semiconductors, which affects 5G technologies (see
 
post).
   The NCSC came to the conclusion, with which the government agreed, that Huawei would need “to do a major reconfiguration of its supply chain as it will no longer have access to the technology on which it currently relies and there are no alternatives which we have sufficient confidence in”. The Secretary of State said that “given the uncertainty this creates around the Huawei supply chain, the UK can no longer be confident it will be able to guarantee the security of future Huawei 5G equipment”. Press release
 
here.

(Source:
WORLDecr, 16 Jul 2020) [Excerpts]
 
   Saudi Arabia has said it wants ‘appropriate measures’ to ensure the continuation of a UN arms embargo on Iran that is set to expire in October – weighing in with the United States, after the UN Security Council cold-shouldered a 30 June call by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to have the embargo extended indefinitely.
   The official Saudi Press Agency reported that the kingdom’s Council of Ministers called on the international community to ‘deal seriously with the nuclear and ballistic programs being developed by Iran,’ insisting that ‘the international community should take a firm stance against Iran and appropriate measures to continue an arms embargo on the Iranian regime.’
   The embargo will expire this year in accordance with the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (‘JCPOA’) nuclear deal that Iran signed with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany in 2015. President Trump unilaterally pulled out of the agreement in 2018, but now Washington insists it can still use the deal to push for an arms embargo against Iran.
   Iran, angry at the United States for pulling out of the deal and at France, Germany and the United Kingdom for what it says are ‘concerns regarding implementation,’ says it is no longer bound by the agreement and has exceeded the accord’s limits on uranium enrichment.
   The Trump administration has threatened that if the embargo is not extended, the United States will try to invoke a ‘snapback’ provision of the JCPOA to re-impose the UN sanctions through the Security Council, a move other nations say would be unwise and legally invalid.
   The New York Times reported that, ‘Representatives of Britain, France and Germany voiced unease at both the expiration of the embargo and the American approach, particularly the snapback, which they flatly opposed…The European powers said they hoped to find some way to limit Iranian access to arms through a compromise negotiated in the framework of the 2015 agreement, not an action imposed by the Security Council.’

The arms embargo applies to Iran importing or exporting most kinds of weapons, including aircraft and tanks. Some limits on missile and nuclear technology will remain in place for a few more years. 

COM COMMENTARY

 


* Principal Author:
Johanna Reeves
, Esq., 1-202-715-9941,
Reeves & Dola LLP


 
STATE DEPARTMENT UPDATES SUPPRESSOR POLICY

   On July 10, the U.S. Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) posted a 
Web Notice Regarding an Update to its Suppressor Policy
(this link takes you to the general news and events page on DDTC’s website; be sure to scroll down for the policy update on suppressors). This notice, which has received considerable attention both from firearm groups and the New York Times, reads as follows:

 
   “Effective immediately, the Department of State has rescinded its April 18, 2002, firearms sound suppressor policy. This policy provided for enhanced guidelines for the approval and issuance of export licenses for sound suppressors and restricted their export to only official end users such as government or military entities. Henceforth, DDTC will handle suppressor exports in a manner consistent with other USML-controlled technologies. This requires that applicants must identify a specific end user.  Applications for the permanent export of hardware must include purchase documentation, a DSP-83 non-transfer and end use certificate (as suppressors are considered Significant Military Equipment under the USML), an end-user statement, and an import permit (if required by the destination country). Consistent with current licensing practices, all licenses will be reviewed and adjudicated on a case-by-case basis, and any pre-license checks or post shipment verifications will be conducted as deemed necessary and appropriate based on the totality of the circumstances of the transaction.  Standard staffing protocols within the Department and interagency will be applied as required.”
   It is no surprise that the web notice has elicited cheers from the firearms industry and jeers from the gun control groups. Regardless, it is important to not lose sight of the details, where the devil so often lurks. According to the notice, “DDTC will handle suppressor exports in a manner consistent with other USML-controlled technologies.” DDTC goes on to explain that “all applicants must identify a specific end-user,” which is a standard requirement for all other articles controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. In our request for clarification on this point in the civilian context, DDTC has advised that it will not authorize the export of suppressors to dealers or distributors without the ultimate end-user (i.e.the customers) being listed on the license and a DSP-83 executed by that individual. In other words, license applications that state “for commercial resale in NAMED COUNTRY” as an end-use/end-user will not be acceptable for suppressors.
 
LICENSING POLICY CHANGE FOR HONG KONG
   On July 14, 2020, the President signed an 
Executive Order
 (“EO”) suspending or eliminating different and preferential treatment for Hong Kong. For purposes of the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, among other laws specified in the EO, Hong Kong is treated as the People’s Republic of China. Pursuant to the EO, DDTC issued the following 
policy notice
 
today: “Hong Kong is now considered to be included in the entry for China under section 126.1(d)(1) of the ITAR and therefore subject to a policy of denial for all transfers subject to the ITAR. The U.S. government is taking this action because the Chinese Communist Party has fundamentally undermined Hong Kong’s autonomy and thereby increased the risk that sensitive U.S. items will be illegally diverted to the PRC.”
   DDTC’s notice includes the following three FAQs (it is noteworthy that existing authorizations to export defense articles or defense services to Hong Kong are not revoked or rescinded [see FAQ #2 below]):
 
Q1: The EO provides that the President is terminating export licensing suspensions for exports of defense articles to certain Hong Kong persons. Are exports of defense services to those Hong Kong persons permitted? 
A:
 Section 902(a)(3) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246, 22 U.S.C. 2151 note) prohibits “[t]he issuance of licenses under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act for the export to the People’s Republic of China of any defense article on the United States Munitions List….” As a result, the President is not required to make a determination under section 902(b)(2) of that Act in order for DDTC to authorize exports of defense services to Hong Kong persons. DDTC will review on a case-by-case basis license applications to export defense services to Hong Kong persons who (1) are physically located outside of Hong Kong or the PRC and (2) were authorized to receive defense articles prior to July 14, 2020. Exporters may continue to rely on available exemptions consistent with the provisions of ITAR § 126.1(a).
We refer you to the U.S. Department of Commerce for additional information on exports to Hong Kong controlled under the Commerce Control List.
 
Q2:
 
I have a previously approved export authorization which names Hong Kong as a transfer territory. Is this authorization still valid?
A: Yes. Current, valid, non-exhausted authorizations naming Hong Kong as a transfer territory are not affected by the Executive Order. At this time the Department is not taking steps to revoke or rescind previously approved authorizations to export defense articles or services to Hong Kong.

 
Q3: Does this action apply to all end-users in Hong Kong, or just government entities?


A: In accordance with the Executive Order, Hong Kong is now treated as China under section 126.1(d)(1) of the ITAR and there is a presumption of denial for license requests where a Hong Kong person is named as an end-user, licensee (signatory) or sublicensee, or where Hong Kong appears as a marketing, transfer, re-transfer, re-export, sales, or distribution territory.

 
* Principal Author: Wendy Wysong, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson LLP 
 
  On July 14, President Trump issued an Executive Order (EO) strengthening and expanding sanctions mandated by Congress under the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (HKAA), which the president also signed into law on July 14. In particular, the EO introduces blocking sanctions against foreign persons pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in response to recent developments in Hong Kong.


  The EO also directs US agencies to undertake steps to suspend or eliminate different and preferential treatment for Hong Kong pursuant to section 2020 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. [FN/1]


  This client alert summarizes the background of the EO, sanctions provisions of the HKAA, and open questions that may be addressed by the US government in the coming weeks.
 
Recent Developments
   The HKAA’s enactment and the adoption of the EO represent the culmination of a rapid escalation of tensions over several weeks between the United States and China over Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR).
   On May 21, a spokesperson for the PRC’s National People’s Congress (NPC) announced the body would consider a resolution authorizing the adoption of national security legislation for the HKSAR.  The same day, US Senators Pat Toomey (R-PA) and Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) introduced the HKAA, which would, among other things, authorize sanctions against foreign persons (individuals and entities) who materially contribute to “the failure of the Government of China to meet its obligations” under the 1984 Joint Sino-British Declaration or the Basic Law of the HKSAR and foreign financial institutions (FFIs) that “knowingly conduct a significant transaction” with such persons.
   One week later, on May 28, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo submitted the 2020 Hong Kong Policy Act Report to Congress, certifying that the HKSAR “does not continue to warrant treatment under United States laws in the same manner as US laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1997.” The secretary’s certification was pursuant to section 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, as amended, which requires the Department of State to certify to Congress annually whether Hong Kong continues to warrant differential treatment under US law.
   On May 29, the president announced that his administration would “begin the process” of revoking the HKSAR’s separate treatment from mainland China under US laws, a status afforded to the HKSAR under the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. Furthermore, he said that his administration would sanction Chinese and Hong Kong officials “directly or indirectly involved in eroding” the HKSAR’s autonomy.
   On June 25, the US Senate passed the HKAA by unanimous consent. A slightly revised companion bill passed the House of Representatives on July 1, also by unanimous consent. On July 2, the US Senate passed the revised version, sending it to the president for his signature. On July 14, the president signed the bill into law, issuing a statement that the HKAA “addresses China’s failure to meet certain obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration.”
 
Summary of the Sanctions Provisions of the EO
   Section 4 of the EO incorporates the major sanctions requirements of the HKAA and the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (HRDA), authorizing both the secretaries of state and treasury to impose blocking sanctions on foreign persons who are determined to be or have been “involved, directly or indirectly, in the coercing, arresting, detaining, or imprisoning of individuals under the authority of, or to be or have been responsible for or involved in developing, adopting, or implementing, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Administrative Region” (4(a)(i)) or “responsible for or complicit in, to have engaged in, directly or indirectly:”
   Actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Hong Kong (4(a)(ii)(A));
Actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, or autonomy of the HKSAR (4(a)(ii)(B));
Censorship or other activities with respect to the HKSAR that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of the HKSAR, or that limit access to free and independent print, online or broadcast media (4(a)(ii)(C)); or
   The extrajudicial rendition, arbitrary detention, or torture of any person in the HKSAR or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or serious human rights abuse in Hong Kong (4(a)(ii)(D)).
Section 4(a)(iii) authorizes blocking sanctions on any leader or official of “an entity, including any government entity, that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in” the activities described above or any entity blocked pursuant to the EO.
   As with other sanctions EOs, the new EO, at section 4(a)(iv) and (v), targets persons determined to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to section 4, as well as persons owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person sanctioned under section 4.
   Last, at section 4(a)(vi), the EO authorizes blocking sanctions against any “member of the board of directors or a senior executive office” of an entity blocked under the EO.
 
Individuals sanctioned under the EO, as well as their immediate family members, will also be subject to US visa restrictions.
 
FFI Sanctions
   As described below, the HKAA creates a process for identifying, and ultimately imposing sanctions against, FFIs that “knowingly” engage in “significant” transactions with parties that have contributed to the current situation in Hong Kong. The EO does not specifically address FFI sanctions. Accordingly, the HKAA’s framework for FFI sanctions appears to remain in place, pending further action by President Trump or the Treasury Department.
   Specifically, Section 5(a) of the HKAA requires the secretary of state, in consultation with the secretary of the treasury, to submit a report to Congress within 90 days of the law’s enactment identifying any foreign person who “is materially contributing to, has materially contributed to, or attempts to materially contribute to the failure” of the Government of China to meet its obligations under the Joint Declaration or the Basic Law. Under Section 5(b) of the HKAA, between 30 and 60 days later, the secretary of the treasury, in consultation with the secretary of state, must submit a report identifying any FFI that knowingly conducts a significant transaction with a foreign person identified under section 4 of the EO and subsequent reporting to Congress under the HKAA. Section 5(d) of the HKAA allows the secretary of state to exclude a foreign person or FFI from a report and subsequent sanctions, if its activities (i) do not “have a significant and lasting negative effect that contravenes the obligations of China under the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law;” (ii) are not likely to be repeated; and (iii) have “reversed or otherwise mitigated through positive countermeasures.”
   Section 7(b) of the HKAA directs that the president impose sanctions from a “menu” of 10 sanctions on FFIs identified in a report under Section 5(b) that include:
     (1) A prohibition on lending by US financial institutions
     (2) A prohibition on acting as a primary dealer of US government debt
     (3) A prohibition on serving as a repository of US government funds
     (4) Restrictions on foreign exchange transactions
     (5) Restrictions on banking transactions
     (6) A prohibition or restrictions on property transactions under US jurisdiction
     (7) Restrictions on the export of US goods, technology, or services from the United States to the FFI
     (8) Restrictions on US persons investing in debt or equity of the FFI
     (9) US travel bans against corporate officers, principals, or significant shareholders
    (10) Sanctions against officers of the FFI
 
  The president must apply at least five of the sanctions described in Section 7(b) against an FFI within one year of its identification in a Section 5(b) report. After two years, the president must apply all ten of the sanctions listed in Section 7(b).
 
Open Questions
   As with most sanctions statutes, which rely on the Executive Branch for their implementation, the HKAA raises a number of questions that will be clarified in the weeks and months to come. The most pressing is the identities of the foreign persons to be sanctioned under the EO, and the implementation of the reporting and sanctions requirements on FFIs under the HKAA.
   Although Section 5(a) of the HKAA requires the identification of foreign persons who have materially contributed to events in Hong Kong in a congressional report within 90 days of the law’s enactment, the sanctions under the EO could be imposed immediately, even before a congressional report has been filed.
   The timing and implementation of the FFI sanctions in the HKAA remains unclear. For example, it is unclear whether FFIs are at risk of sanctions immediately, or whether they do not face potential sanctions until after the administration files its first report under Section 5(a) of the HKAA. The president may also issue another EO addressing FFI sanctions at a later date.
   Financial institutions, in particular, will likely seek guidance on the meaning of “significant transaction” for the purposes of the HKAA. The Treasury Department has provided a list of factors that it considers in defining the term in the context of the Iran, Russia, and other programs, but it may adopt other standards with respect to Hong Kong. Given that the HKAA is likely to be used to target Chinese and HKSAR government officials, the Treasury Department may be asked to clarify whether quotidian services – deposit accounts, credit cards, mortgages, lending, brokerage accounts, and private banking, among others – will be excluded.
   It also remains to be seen how the State and Treasury Departments will interpret Section 5(d) in evaluating whether a foreign person or financial institution should be excluded from a report to Congress for having “reversed or otherwise mitigated through positive countermeasures” actions leading to their identification, and the extent to which a financial institution’s transactions must be related to the issue of Hong Kong’s autonomy to qualify as significant for the purposes of the HKAA.
__________________
[FN/1]: These measures will be the subject of a separate publication.


Tariffs for Certain EU Goods”

 
* Author: 
George R. Tuttle III
, Esq., 1-415-254-5986, 
Tuttle Law
 
   The USTR recently published a 
notice in the Federal Register
 
announcing that modifications to the list of Section 301 tariffs are being considered for goods imported from certain current and former European Union (EU) member States. In addition to adding more goods to the list of products subject to Section 301 tariffs, the USTR is considering increasing the current tariffs up to 100% of the declared value of the imported goods.
   The review is being taken as part of the Section 301 investigation involving the enforcement of U.S. World Trade Organization (WTO) rights in the large Civil Aircraft dispute. Currently, the Section 301 tariffs are at 25% for a wide variety of EU goods, including apparel, food stuffs, tools, wines and liquors, and 15% on new aircraft. These tariffs were initially imposed on October 18, 2019 in response to a WTO ruling that the U.S. may levy up to $7.5 billion annually in countermeasures for EU subsidies provided to aircraft manufacturer Airbus.
The USTR is soliciting comments regarding 3 lists of products included in Annexes 1-3 to the Federal Register notice. 
  Annex 1 lists the products currently subject to the Section 301 tariff, and the USTR requests comments regarding whether a product should continue to be subject to the Section 301 tariff and, if so, should the tariff be increased to up to 100% of the declared value.
   Annex 2 lists products originally published in the April and July 2019 notices in this investigation but not currently subject to the tariff. The USTR requests comments on whether to make these products subject to the Section 301 duties and if so at what amount up to 100% of the declared value.
Annex 3 is a new list of products being considered for the imposition of additional duties. Again, the USTR requests comments regarding whether additional duties should be imposed and if so at what amount up to 100% of the declared value. 
   See the 
Federal Register notice
 
for the complete Annex 1, 2 and 3 lists.
   Comments are due by July 26, 2020
 
and should include whether imposition of additional duties under Section 301 would be appropriate to enforce U.S. WTO rights and whether maintaining or imposing additional duties would cause disproportionate harm to U.S. interests, including small or medium-size businesses and consumers.


TE EX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

 
*What:  ITAR/EAR Controls for Non-U.S. Companies
*When:  15-16 Oct
*Where:  Toronto, CA
*Sponsor: Export Compliance Solutions & Consulting (ECS)
*ECS Speakers:  Suzanne Palmer, Mal Zerden
*Register: 
here
 or write to 
liz@exportcompliancesolutions.com
 or call 1-866-238-4018

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN EDITOR’S NOTES

EN_a114. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)
 

* Orville Redenbacher (Orville Clarence Redenbacher; 16 Jul 1907 – 19 Sep 1995; was an American businessman most often associated with the brand of popcorn that bears his name.  The New York Times described him as “the agricultural visionary who all but single-handedly revolutionized the American popcorn industry.”)
  – “Every once in a while, someone will mail me a single popcorn kernel that didn’t pop. I’ll get out a fresh kernel, tape it to a piece of paper and mail it back to them.”

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

 

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
 
Agency 
Regulations 
Latest Update 
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.

 

5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 
DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. 
DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.   24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates.  
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM)

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110.  

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

 
DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. 
6 May 2020: 85 FR 26847: Notice (not an amendment) temporarily reducing the registration fee schedule in ITAR 122.3 until April 30, 2021. 
 
DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

5 Jun 2020:
85 FR 84510:

Syria Sanctions Regulations. 

 
 
 
USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), Revision 8.

1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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