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20-0708 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

20-0807 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

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Wednesday, 8 July 2020

  1. Treasury/OFAC Publishes the Names of One or More Persons that Have Been Removed from OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List)
  2. Commerce/BIS: “Order Denying Export Privileges: Mahin Mojtahedzadeh, a.k.a. Mahin Toussi Mojtahedzadeh, a.k.a. Mahin Mojtahedzadeh Toussi”
  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings).
  4. EU External Action: “Arms control: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty by China”
  1. Arms Control Today: “U.S. Sets Global Partnership Priorities”
  2. Defense News: “Britain Lifts Ban on Saudi Weapons Exports”
  3. EU Sanctions: “OFSI Renews TAFA Designations of Qasam Soleimani & 4 Iranians”
  1. Ankura: “What Telecommunications Equipment or Services Does Your Company Use? An Approach to Prepare for Section 889(B)”
  2. Miller Thompson: “Lender ‘Know Your Client’ Diligence-Compliance with Canadian Sanctions Laws”
  1. ECTI Presents: A Practical Guide to AES Filing Webinar; 9 Jul
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  4. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  5. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 

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EXIM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

(Source: Federal Register) [Excerpts]
 
85 FR 41096
: Notice
 
*
AGENCY: 
Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury.
*
ACTION: 
Notice.
*
SUMMARY: 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing the names of one or more persons that have been removed from OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). Their property and interests in property are no longer blocked, and U.S. persons are no longer generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. OFAC is also removing the name of two vessels that had been identified as blocked property.
*
DATES:
See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for applicable date(s).
*
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
OFAC: Associate Director for Global Targeting, 202-622-2420 ..
.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source: Federal Register) [Excerpts]
 
85 FR 40966
: Notice

 
 

* AGENCY:
Bureau of Industry and Security
.
*
ACTION:
Notice.
* SUMMARY:
On January 30, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, Mahin Mojtahedzadeh, a.k.a. Mahin Toussi Mojtahedzadeh, a.k.a. Mahin Mojtahedzadeh Toussi (“Mojtahedzadeh”), was convicted of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §
1701, et seq. (2012)) (“IEEPA”). Specifically, Mojtahedzadeh was convicted of violating IEEPA by conspiring to unlawfully export gas turbine parts from the United States to Iran without having first obtained the required U.S. Government authorization. Mojtahedzadeh was sentenced to time served, a $100 special assessment and a fine of $5,000. …

Based upon my review of the record and consultations with BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement, including its Director, and the facts available to BIS, I have decided to deny Mojtahedzadeh’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Mojtahedzadeh’s conviction. I have also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Mojtahedzadeh had an interest at the time of her conviction.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

OGS OTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

(Source: Federal Register)
 
* USTR; NOTICES;
Product Exclusion Extensions: C
hina’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation
; [Pub. Date: 9 Jul 2020]

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

OGS_a24. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source:
State/DDTC)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source: European Union External Action, 8 Jul 2020)
 
China has become the 107th State Party to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).
By acceding to the ATT, China, an important arms exporter, contributes to the advancement of the Treaty’s objectives to regulate the international trade in conventional arms, to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and ammunition, and to prevent their diversion. Increased transparency in international arms trade is another important objective of the Treaty.
As with all international treaties, full implementation and universal adherence is essential. This is an important development as a more responsible global arms trade would contribute to peace, security and stability, reduce human suffering, and promote cooperation, transparency and increased confidence. It would also create better conditions for sustainable development. The European Union supports the universalisation and implementation of the Treaty by sharing expertise with countries around the world on how to set up or improve their arms export control systems in accordance with the Treaty. The European Union calls upon all Signatory States to advance their ratification processes.
The European Union encourages other States, especially major arms exporters, importers and transit States, to become State Parties to the ATT before the next Conference of States Parties, thus strengthening the multilateral framework.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

COM NEWS

(Source: Arms Control Association, 8 Jul 2020) [Excerpts]
 
The United States is prioritizing the security of chemicals to help restore the norm against chemical weapons use during its chair of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction for 2020, a State Department official told Arms Control Today.
 
Increasing biological security will also be a key area of focus for the Global Partnership, as the coronavirus pandemic has renewed attention on the “catastrophic impact” that a biological weapon could have, the official said in a June 17 interview.

The Global Partnership is a multilateral initiative founded in 2002 to prevent the use and proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.
Initially focused on disposing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related facilities in former Soviet countries, the Global Partnership expanded its geographic scope in 2008. The initiative now implements projects worldwide to secure and destroy WMD-related materials and support partnering countries’ efforts to adhere to international nonproliferation instruments. Its work is guided by six core principles, which include managing and destroying WMD materials, implementing effective border and export controls, protecting facilities that house dual-use materials, and implementing international treaties aimed at preventing WMD proliferation. …

(Source: Defense News, 8 Jul 2020) [Excerpts]
 
Britain has lifted a yearlong ban on the export of military equipment to Saudi Arabia, the government announced July 7.
Weapon sales to Saudi Arabia were banned in June 2019 after a U.K. Court of Appeal ruled that the government may have contravened international humanitarian law by approving weapon sales to the Saudis that might have been used in the civil war in Yemen.
Britain is one of the largest exporters of defense equipment in the world, largely thanks to Saudi Arabia’s purchase over more than 30 years of Tornado and Typhoon combat jets as well as Hawk jet trainers. Raytheon Paveway IV precision-guided bombs, partly built in the U.K., are also among the list of recent significant sales to Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia leads a coalition of Middle Eastern nations in a protracted and bloody war against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels trying to seize Yemen.
In an action brought by anti-arms trade campaigners, the court ruling forced the British government to reassess whether previous export licenses had been issued on the correct legal basis, given alleged violations of international humanitarian law by the Saudi military, specifically reported airstrikes that hit civilian targets.

(Source: EU Sanctions, 8 Jul 2020)
 
The UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) has renewed the listings of 5 former officials of the IRGC-QF under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010 (TAFA). Notice here. They are: Hamed Abdollahi, Manssor Arbabsiar, Ali Gholam Shakuri, Abdul Reza Shahlai, and Major General Qasem Soleimani. Qasem Soleimani remains UN-designated even though (as the amended listing records) he was killed by US forces in January.

COM COMMENTARY

(Source: Ankura Consulting Group, July 1, 2020) [Excerpts]
 
* Principal Author: Alan Levesque, Esq. alan.levesque@ankura.com, 1-202-797-1111
 
Overview:
The U.S. government continues to express serious security concerns about activities of certain Chinese telecom companies, including their involvement in 5G networks across the globe, presence in the U.S. telecommunications market, – as reflected in the FCC’s June 30 actions, and continued undermining of U.S. export controls. Section 889 of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) sought to address some of these concerns by proscribing the sale and use of any equipment or service that uses either “covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system” or as “critical technology as part of any system.” As described below, “covered telecommunications equipment” currently includes a range of specified telecommunications and video surveillance equipment. The implementing guidance for Section 889(A) used the definition of “critical technology” contained in the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA).
 
Covered Telecommunications Equipment or Services
:
 
* Telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities)
* For the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities,  physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced by Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, or Dahua Technology Company (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities)
* Telecommunications or video surveillance services provided by such entities or using such equipment
* Telecommunications or video surveillance produced or provided by an entity that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence or the Director of the Federal Bureau of investigation, reasonably believed to be an entity owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to the [People’s Republic of China]
(The information above was obtained from Section 889(f)(3) of the 2019 NDAA)
 
Section 889(A), prohibiting the sale of covered telecommunications equipment or services to U.S. government executive agencies, went into effect in August 2019. Part A impacts business units directly engaged in pursuing and delivering under government contracts.
 
Section 889(B), prohibiting use of “covered telecommunications equipment or services” by both U.S. government contractors and recipients of federal funds, goes into effect in August 2020. As written, Section 889(B) will likely reach across a company’s business units and supply chain, even impacting the operations of business units overseas that are not directly involved in U.S. government contracting. A rule issued by the Department of Defense and General Services Administration with implementing guidance for Section 889(B) is pending and is expected to provide clarity around critical questions such as the scope of the “use” prohibition and further detail concerning specific telecommunications equipment or services.
 
Media reports have suggested that industry groups are pressing regulators to delay implementation of Section 889(B), particularly in light of the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. On June 10, 2020, Ellen Lord, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, testified before the House Armed Services Committee and expressed concerns with the implementation timeline and suggested more time might be necessary to prevent serious disruption to the Defense Industrial Base (DIB).
 
Ultimately, failure to comply with Section 889(B) can lead to a termination of a contract or potential False Claims Act (FCA) liability. Accordingly, even before issuance of the regulations, companies doing business with the U.S. government or receiving federal funding should start to proactively assess the potential impact of Section 889(B) on their business operations, supply chains, and compliance programs. The implementing rule will likely include a waiver application process for compelling circumstances.
 
Elements of Section 889(B) Compliance Assessment
:
 
889(B) Compliance Assessment representation. Review of Federal funding/contracts. Identification of Telecom equipment/services. Development of policies, processes, and controls. Inventory of existing vendors. Inventory of existing vendors.
 
Section 889(B) compliance will require cross-functional collaboration and integration across a range of stakeholders. Specifically, company counsel and compliance functions will need to work with their global counterparts in procurement, finance, IT, and sales and marketing to map company supply chains and identify the areas of heightened risk.
 
An effective assessment will position the company to quickly and effectively respond to Section 889(B) regulations, once issued. The assessment should focus on the following elements:
 
Review of Federal Funding or Contracts
 
Section 889(B) applies to an award of a new contract, or extension or renewal of an existing contract, as well as entities receiving federal funds (e.g., grants). Legal and compliance departments should work with procurement, sales, marketing, and finance counterparts to create an inventory of their organization’s federal contracts, identify when existing contracts or funding will be up for renewal or extension, catalogue any receipt of federal funding, and then identify how Section 889(B) will impact each of those processes.
 
Identification of Telecommunications Equipment and Services
 
Company counsel and compliance functions should work closely with IT counterparts – both at the corporate level and at the business unit level – to create or update an inventory of the range of telecommunications equipment and services used internally within their business operations, and cross-reference any specific equipment or services covered in the Section 889(B) rule issued by DoD and GSA.
 
The inventory should carefully detail the type and function of telecommunications equipment or services. Equipment or services involved in the transmittal of national security-sensitive data or information will likely raise more concern from a regulator perspective.
 
This inventory will provide the foundation for conducting a detailed assessment to then verify which telecommunications equipment and services are proscribed by Section 889(B), and identify which should be prioritized for modification of contracts, requests for certifications from vendors that the items are not subject to Section 889(B), or identification of potential replacement vendors.
 
*  Inventory of Existing Vendors
 
Company counsel and company functions should work with their procurement and IT counterparts to identify vendors that are providing telecommunications equipment and services across the company’s global business operations. Depending on the nature of the procurement system, this may be a simple or a complex operation requiring review of multiple enterprise resource planning systems. Should the inventory identify entities that are subsidiaries or affiliates of named Chinese telecom providers, companies should begin to identify potential replacement vendors. Finally, companies need to carefully assess those vendors that provide managed services and who may be using proscribed covered equipment or services.
 
Review of Existing Vendor Contracts and Standard Contracting Provisions
 
Conducting an inventory and assessment of vendors will enable company counsel and compliance functions to work with their procurement and supply chain counterparts to develop a process to update existing contracts to include representations, warranties, and other contractual provisions regarding Section 889(B) compliance, as well as consideration of additional, relevant contractual clauses, including, for example, focused audit rights for higher risk vendors.
 
Company legal counsel and compliance functions should review standard or form contracts to ensure they include representations, warranties, and other contractual provisions that appropriately address and allocate Section 889(B) risk.
 
Update Policies, Processes, Controls, and Recurring Internal Audits
 
Companies should identify existing policies and processes that will require updating to comply with Section 889(B). This may include changes to third-party risk assessments or new procurement requirements to verify the sourcing of telecommunications equipment or services prior to onboarding of a new vendor. At the same time, company counsel and compliance functions will need to review their existing inventory of internal controls to verify these adequately address the risk profile Section 889(B) seeks to address. Companies also should put in place rigorous self-audits to assess ongoing compliance with Section 889(B). In many cases, companies will be able to build on existing good governance processes already in place to assure compliance with Section 889(A).

(Source: Miller Thompson, 7 Jul 2020)
 
* Principal Author:
Rebecca Jennings
, Esq., 416-597-6078, Miller Thompson
 
In light of the continuing globalization of trade and international cross border financing arrangements, it is critical to determine if a transaction is prohibited by sanctions laws. Under Canadian and international law, there are a variety of sanctions laws that apply to all individuals and businesses in Canada and to all Canadian citizens and Canadian-incorporated businesses operating outside of Canada. Understanding the restrictions and your obligations as a lender is essential.
Overview of Economic Sanctions Laws
 
(1)
Criminal Code
Part II.1 of the Criminal Code
[FN/1]
 outlines terrorism related offences, including the financing of terrorism. The Criminal Code clearly states that any dealing in property of terrorist groups, including certain entities outlined in the Regulations Establishing a List of Entities (as established under the Criminal Code and discussed further below), or providing or facilitating any financial or related service for any terrorist activity or group is strictly prohibited. In determining whether a financial institution knowingly financed a terrorist group, the courts will look to determine if the lender was wilfully blind. Meaning, did the lender deliberately refrain from making inquiries, including conducting proper due diligence, so as not to have its potential suspicions confirmed or the terrorist connections of its borrowing group revealed.
 
(2)
United Nations Act
When sanctions are enacted by the United Nations Security Council they are adopted into Canadian law through regulations made under the United Nations Act
[FN/2]
. Sanctions made pursuant to the United Nations Act generally include prohibitions against providing financial or technical assistance, trade restrictions and arms embargoes. Currently, there are sanctions in place against Somalia, North Korea, South Sudan, Sudan, Central African Republic, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Mali and Libya.
 
(3)
Special Economic Measures Act
Pursuant to the Special Economic Measures Act
[FN/3]
(“SEMA”), the Government of Canada has the ability to impose sanctions on foreign persons and jurisdictions where the government is of the opinion that a breach of international peace and security has occurred that is likely to cause a serious international crisis. It is important to note that SEMA provides the Government of Canada the authority to impose these sanctions without a UN Security Council resolution. Regulations enacted under SEMA generally prohibit dealings in the property, including the financial assets, of persons designated under the regulations. Currently, Canada has enacted regulations under SEMA against Burma, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Venezuela, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Libya, Zimbabwe and Nicaragua.
 
(4)
Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act
The Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act
[FN/4]
 (“JVCO”) also known as the ‘Sergei Magnitsky Law’, provides for measures that can be taken against foreign nationals who have committed extrajudicial killings, torture or other gross violations of internationally protected human rights. As part of JVCO, the Government of Canada can prohibit individuals and entities in Canada, or any Canadian citizen or corporation outside of Canada, from entering into or assisting in financial transactions that relate to property held by a foreign national. An order made under JVCO is effective for five years and can be extended thereafter.
Pursuant to JVCO, federally and provincially regulated businesses (including banks, credit unions, insurance companies, trust and loan companies and investment managers) have a duty to determine on a continuing basis whether they are in possession or control of property that they have reason to believe is subject to an order or regulation under JVCO.
 
(5)
Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act
The Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (“FACFO”)[FN/5] authorizes the Government of Canada to issue orders directing that property located in Canada of a politically exposed foreign person be seized, frozen or sequestered when there is internal political turmoil in a foreign state. Additionally, FACFO allows the Government of Canada to restrict business transactions with politically exposed foreign persons. As with the sanctions under JVCO, FACFO sanctions expire after five years unless extended by the Canadian Government.
Lender Due Diligence Reference Materials
As part of lender “know your client” and anti-money laundering procedures, lenders should carefully consult the following materials to ensure that the borrower and/or its affiliates are not included on any of the following lists:
 
(a)
The United Nations updates a consolidated list of all designations under United Nations Security Council resolutions. This is a link to the full consolidated list.
(b)
Pursuant to section 83.05(1) of the Criminal Code, the Governor in Council may, by regulation, establish a list on which the Governor in Council may place any entity if, on the recommendation of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the Governor in Council is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that (a) the entity has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity; or (b) the entity has knowingly acted on behalf of, at the direction of or in association with an entity outlined in (a) above. Linked here is the Schedule of the Regulations Establishing a List of Entities.
(c)
The Government of Canada has published the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List which outlines individuals and entities that are subject to specific sanction regulations under SEMA and JVCO. This is a link to the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List.
(e)
Any individuals designated under FACFO are not currently included in the above-noted consolidated list. However, the FACFO lists can be accessed through the FACFO Tunisia Regulations or the FACFO Ukraine Regulations.
 
Other Canadian Business Restrictions

Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
[FN/6]
 (“FEMA”) allows the Government of Canada to protect Canadians and Canadian businesses from the extraterritorial application of foreign laws. Under FEMA, Canadian sovereignty is protected, including Canada’s international trading and commercial interests, by allowing the Government of Canada to respond to unacceptable extraterritorial assertions of foreign jurisdiction. Currently, the following two blocking orders have been issued pursuant to FEMA:
(a) The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 1992 (the “1992 Order”)-blocks the extraterritorial application in Canada of the United States embargo against Cuba. The 1992 Order prohibits a Canadian corporation, including its directors, officers and employees, from complying with an extraterritorial measure of the United States in connection with any trade between Canada and Cuba.
(b) The Certain Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 2014 (the “2014 Order”)-prohibits any person from Canada with complying with the United States “Buy America” requirements in connection with the redevelopment of premises leased by the State of Alaska from the Prince Rupert Port Authority.
 
Canadian Anti-Discrimination Laws
The Provinces of Ontario and Manitoba have each enacted a Discriminatory Business Practices Act [FN/7]. The purpose of the legislation is to prevent discrimination in Ontario and Manitoba on the grounds of race, creed, colour, nationality, ancestry, place of origin, sex or geographical locations of persons employed in or engaging in business. The legislation strictly prohibits a person from refusing to engage in business with another person on account of any of the above-noted grounds. The legislation also includes an obligation to report any request to participate in prohibited activities.
 
Export and Import Permits Act
The Export and Import Permits Act[FN/8] (“EIPA”), imposes export and import trade controls on specific goods and on goods coming from specific jurisdictions. The controls are outlined in the following three lists:
(i) The Area Control List sets out a list of countries that have export controls imposed by the Government of Canada.
(ii) The Export Control List sets out a list of goods that have export controls imposed by the Government of Canada.
(iii) The Import Control List sets out a list of goods that have import controls imposed by the Government of Canada.
 
Conclusion
A thorough due diligence process is key to determining if a potential borrower and/or its affiliates is flagged by any Canadian or international sanctions laws. Incorporating a review of the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List and the Regulations Establishing a List of Entities under the Criminal Code early on can help to ensure that any red flags are caught at the outset of the diligence process.

 

[FN/1]
 Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c. C-46.
[FN/2]
 United Nations Act, RSC, 1985, c. U-2.
[FN/3]
 Special Economic Measures Act, S.C.1992, c.17,s.1.
[FN/4]
 Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, SC 2017, c. 21.
[FN/5]
 Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, SC 2011, c. 10.
[FN/6]
 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, RSC 1985, c F-29.
[FN/7]
 Discriminatory Business Practices Act (Ontario), RSO 1990, c. D. 12 and Discriminatory Business Practices Act (Manitoba), CCSM c. B120.
[FN/8]
 Export and Import Permits Act, RSC 1985, c. E-19.


TE EX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

(Source: Ashleigh Foor)
 
* What: A Practical Guide to AES Filing 
* When: 9 Jul, 2020; 1:00 p.m. (EDT)
* Where: Webinar
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker: Jonathan Young
* Register: here or contact Ashleigh Foor, 1-540-433-3977

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN EDITOR’S NOTES

EN_a113. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)
  

* Jean de La Fontaine
(8 Jul 1621 – 13 Apr 1695; was a French fabulist and one of the most widely read French poets of the 17th century. He is known above all for his Fables, which provided a model for subsequent fabulists across Europe and numerous alternative versions in France, as well as in French regional languages.)
  – “Everyone has his faults which he continually repeats: neither fear nor shame can cure them.”
  – “Everyone believes very easily whatever they fear or desire.”
  – “It is twice the pleasure to deceive the deceiver.”

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

 

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
 
Agency 
Regulations 
Latest Update 
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.

 

5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 
DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. 
DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.   24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates.  
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM)

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110.  

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

 
DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. 
6 May 2020: 85 FR 26847: Notice (not an amendment) temporarily reducing the registration fee schedule in ITAR 122.3 until April 30, 2021. 
 
DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

5 Jun 2020:
85 FR 84510:

Syria Sanctions Regulations. 

 
 
 
USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), Revision 8.

1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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