20-0629 Monday “Daily Bugle”

20-0629 Monday “Daily Bugle”

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Monday, 29 June 2020

  1. Treasury/OFAC Announces Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties
  2. USTR: “Determination Regarding Waiver of Discriminatory Purchasing Requirements with Respects to Goods and Services”
  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: DECCS Unavailable Tuesday, 30 Jun, 0600-0800
  1. EU Sanctions: “European Court Annuls another Ukraine Listing: Klymenko v Council”
  2. The Oklahoman: “Edmond Man Faces Prison for Smuggling Firearms to Middle East”
  1. DLA Piper: “First Emerging Technologies Identified and Controlled for Export in the EAR”
  2. Procopio: “U.S. Relaxes Export Restrictions on Contributions to Standards Bodies”
  3. Steptoe: “US Department of Defense Publishes List of ‘Communist Chinese Military Companies’ Operating Directly or Indirectly in United States…”
  4. Thompson Hine: “Department of Commerce Partially Delays Electronic Export Information (EEI) Filing Requirements for Certain Shipments to China, Russia, and Venezuela”
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 70 Jobs Available -4 New Job Openings This Week
  2. Monica Chavez Moves to Amgen
  1. ECTI Presents: UK/EU Export Controls and Sanctions 101 Webinar; 30 Jun
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  4. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  5. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 

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The ITAR amendments to the ITAR that took effect on 9 March and 25 March are included in the current edition of the BITAR.  Subscribers receive updated editions every time the regulations are amended (usually within 24 hours) so you will always have the current versions of the regulations. Subscribe to the BITAR now to guarantee you have an up-to-date ITAR!    

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85 FR 39040
: Notice
Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing the names of one or more persons that have been placed on OFAC’s list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List) based on OFAC’s determination that one or more applicable legal criteria were satisfied. All property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of these persons are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.
See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for applicable date(s).

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(Source: Federal Register) [Excerpts]
85 FR 39037
: Notice
Office of the United States Trade Representative.
Applicable as of July 1, 2020.
Kate Psillos, International Procurement
Negotiator, Kathryn.W.Psillos@ustr.eop.gov or 202-395-9581, or J. Daniel Stirk, Senior Associate General Counsel, John_Stirk@ustr.eop.gov
or 202-395-3150.
On June 12, 2017 (82 FR 23699), the President announced his intention to commence negotiations with Canada and Mexico to modernize the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). On November 30, 2018, the Governments of the United States, Mexico, and Canada (the Parties) signed the protocol replacing NAFTA with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). On December 10, 2019, the Parties signed the protocol of amendment to the USMCA. On January 29, 2020, the President signed into law the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (Pub. L. 116-113), through which Congress approved the USMCA. On July 1, 2020, the USMCA will enter in force.
Chapter 13 of the USMCA sets forth certain obligations between the United States and Mexico with respect to government procurement of goods and services, as specified in Annex 13-A of the USMCA. Chapter 13 of the USMCA applies only between Mexico and the United States and does not cover Canada.
Section 1-201 of Executive Order 12260 of December 31, 1980 (46 FR 1653) delegates the functions of the President under Sections 301 and 302 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Trade Agreements Act) (19 U.S.C. 2511-2512) to the U.S. Trade Representative.
In conformity with Sections 301 and 302 of the Trade Agreements Act and Executive Order 12260, and in order to carry out U.S. obligations under Chapter 13 of the USMCA, the U.S. Trade Representative has determined that:
Mexico is a country that has become a party to the USMCA and will provide appropriate reciprocal competitive government procurement opportunities to United States products and suppliers of such products. In accordance with Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act, Mexico is so designated for purposes of Section 301(a) of the Trade Agreements Act.
With respect to eligible products of Mexico (i.e., goods and services covered by the Schedule of the United States in Annex 13-A of the USMCA) and suppliers of such products, the application of any law, regulation, procedure, or practice regarding government procurement that would, if applied to such products and suppliers, result in treatment less favorable than accorded:
To United States products and suppliers of such products; or
To eligible products of another foreign country or instrumentality which is a party to the Agreement on Government Procurement referred to in section 101(d)(17) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(17)) and suppliers of such products, shall be waived.
With respect to Mexico, this waiver shall be applied by all entities listed in the Schedule of the United States in Annex 13-A of USMCA.
The designation in paragraph 1 and the waiver in paragraph 2 are subject to modification or withdrawal by the U.S. Trade Representative.

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* Defense Department;
Proposed Rules
Federal Acquisition Regulation:
Inflation Adjustment of
Acquisition–Related Thresholds
; [Pub. Date: 30 Jun 2020] (PDF)
Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Statement of Material Change, Merger, Acquisition, or Divestment of a Registered Party
; [Pub. Date: 30 Jun 2020] (PDF)

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OGS_a24. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

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(Source: EU Sanctions, 29 Jun 2020)
As previously reported, the General Court of the EU has decided that a number of the individual listings on the EU’s Ukraine sanctions list (which targets those said to be responsible for the “misappropriation of State funds”) are unlawful because the EU has not properly verified whether the decisions of the Ukrainian authorities leading to the allegations contained insufficient information or that the procedures respected rights of defence.  You can access all the Ukraine-related EU judgments here.
The judgment in Case T-295/19 Klymenko v Council is another example (25 June 2020). Link to judgment here. The Court held that the EU Council had not properly checked whether Mr Klymenko’s rights of defence were respected in the ongoing criminal proceedings against him in Ukraine. In particular, the Council had not responded to or considered Mr Klymenko’s complaints that (inter alia) the pre-conditions for trying him in his absence had not been fulfilled, he had been given a publicly appointed lawyer who did not provide him with a proper defence, the Ukrainian procedure did not permit him to appeal against the decision of the investigating judge, and he was not being tried within a reasonable time.  Accordingly, Mr Klymenko’s listing (which had lasted until March 2020) was annulled again by the Court, for the third time. Mr Klymenko was relisted in March 2020 (see post) so remains on the EU sanctions list the AUECO said. 

(Source: The Oklahoman, 27 Jun 2020) [Excerpts]
An Edmond [Oklahoma] man faces 30 years in prison after pleading guilty to illegally shipping firearms to the Middle East, as well as other firearms violations.  On Friday, Randy Lew Williams, 57, pleaded guilty to violating the Arms Export Control Act, making a false statement to a firearms dealer and possession of an unregistered firearm.
FBI personnel in Abu Dhabi notified the FBI Oklahoma City Field Office that a FedEx shipment had been seized in Dubai on Dec. 19, 2018, according to an affidavit.  The shipment contained multiple Glock pistols and firearms parts, and records indicated the shipment was sent from Williams, at an address in Oklahoma City, authorities said. …

Williams did not have a federal firearms license from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, nor authority from the Department of State to export defense weapons outside the United States.  He was charged with knowingly making a false and fictitious statement to a firearms dealer in connection to his acquisition of three Glock pistols and two Glock pistol frames, and was in possession of a 5.56 caliber rifle that had a barrel of less than 16 inches.


DLA Piper
, 26 Jun 2020)
* Principal Author:
Thomas M. deButts
Esq., 1



, DLA Piper
In its long-awaited debut, the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has 
published a Final Rule
 that identifies the first [FN/1] “emerging technologies” described in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) [FN/2] The ECRA directed BIS to lead a regular interagency process to identify and add to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) controls on “emerging” and “foundational” technologies that are “essential to the national security of the United States.” Having been designated as “emerging technologies” by the interagency process, the Final Rule imposes export controls on (i) certain precursor chemicals, (ii) the Middle East respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus (MERS-related coronavirus), and (iii) single-use cultivation chambers with rigid walls. 
Although additional controls on more prevalent technologies are expected soon – such as on artificial intelligence, robotics, or additive manufacturing – the Final Rule reflects the results of the February 2020 meeting of the Australia Group – a 42-nation multinational export control regime that drives cooperation and consistency in global export controls.  The US has agreed to implement changes to the EAR in accordance with this meeting, and, in doing so, has identified these items as “emerging technologies.”
Effective June 17, 2020, the Commerce Control List (CCL) will reflect appropriate changes to Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) 1C350, 1C351 and 2B352.  In addition to enhanced export controls on these items, their designation as an “emerging technology” makes them a “critical technology” under the regulations governing the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).  CFIUS will have expanded jurisdiction to review foreign investments in US businesses engaged with these items, and mandatory filing with CFIUS may be required for such investments.
Emerging technologies identified in the Final Rule
The Final Rule identifies a narrow band of items as emerging technologies, including certain precursor chemicals, the Middle East respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus (MERS-related coronavirus), and single-use cultivation chambers with rigid walls.  Specifically, the following ECCNs will be revised to add items and implement chemical/biological (CB) and anti-terrorism (AT) controls:
(1) ECCN 1C350 (Chemical Weapons Precursors): addition of 
24 precursor chemicals and mixtures
 containing 30 percent or more of one of these chemicals.
(2) ECCN 1C351 (Human and Animal Pathogen and Toxins): addition of the Middle East respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus (MERS-related coronavirus).
(3) ECCN 2B352 (Equipment Capable of Use in Handling Biological Materials): amended to include a technical note to ECCN 2B352.b to specifically identify that the ECCN controls single-use cultivation chambers with rigid walls.
Notably, the technology for the development, production, or use of these items will now be controlled under ECCNs 1E001, 2E001, 2E002 or 2E301.
Additional emerging technology designations forthcoming
The Final Rule is notable primarily because it represents the initial designation of emerging technologies under the ECRA and provides some insight into how BIS will treat emerging technologies going forward.  This Final Rule demonstrates BIS’s effort to consult with multilateral regimes to identify emerging technologies and work towards consistent global controls.  In addition, as part of its effort to identify emerging technologies, BIS has formed the Emerging Technology Technical Advisory Committee (ETTAC), which met for the first time on May 19, 2020. We expect several additional rulemakings this year that will identify additional categories of items as emerging and foundational and impose export controls where none exist today. These future rulemakings – some of which are deep into the approval process – may similarly impose controls for reasons other than national security (NS), including, for example, regional stability (RS) or other reasons, with each imposing differing levels of restrictions on exports.  Another expected, but notable development, is the use of “emerging technologies” to restrict items tangential to the targeted technology.  In this Final Rule, BIS has also controlled related testing, inspection and production equipment and related materials, thus broadening the scope and impact of the “emerging technologies” designation.
Earlier this year, export controls were imposed on a specific geospatial imagery software under ECCN 0D521.  Although the result may be substantially the same, this software was not designated as an “emerging technology.”  For more information, see our previous client alert: https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2020/01/commerce-imposes-export-licensing-requirement-on-geospatial-imagery-software/
BIS outlined several categories for potential control as “emerging technologies” in a November 2018 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.  See our description of these categories here: https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2018/11/bis-wants-your-help-with-emerging-technology-export-controls/

(Source: Procopio, 16 Jun 2020)
* Author: Michael Jones, Esq., 1-


, Procopio
Yet another U.S. export control rule involving exports to Huawei and similar companies is about to take effect. It’s worth noting that the new interim rule from the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) relaxes current export restrictions, specifically on contributions to standards bodies.
Effective June 18, 2020, BIS is rescinding their August 2019 Advisory Opinion prohibiting sharing of non-published information with Huawei at meetings of standards bodies. The new rule allows technical information that is classified as either EAR99 or controlled for Anti-Terrorism Reasons only (AT1) to be shared with any member of a standards organization, including entities that have been placed on one of the restricted entity lists by BIS, including Huawei. The technical information can only be shared if such a release is made for the purpose of contributing to the revision or development of a “standard” in a “standards organization.”
The U.S. government has defined standards as those that are “developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, both domestic and international,” and defined a standards organization as “domestic or international organizations which plan, develop, establish, or coordinate voluntary consensus standards using agreed-upon procedures.” The revised rule does not specifically define “contributing to the revision or development of a standard,” but a reasonable interpretation of that phrase might include activities and releases that are directly related to the revision or development of the standard.
Under this revised rule, researchers and developers will not be committing an export violation if they release information at a standards bodies meetings or as part of a contribution to the standard, so long as the technology being released either EAR99 or restricted under U.S. export control law for only AT1 reasons.  Releases to restricted entities that are not for the purpose of contributing to the standard remain prohibited.
As BIS has requested comments on this interim rule within 60 days, it is possible that the agency may further revise export control rules. Procopio attorneys will continue to monitor these ever-changing rules to provide the most up-to-date guidance to help clients continue to maintain full legal compliance.

(Source: International Compliance Blog, 27 Jun 2020) [Excerpts]
* Principal Author: Wendy Wysong,
Steptoe & Johnson, LLP
On June 24, 2020, the US Department of Defense (“DoD”) sent a letter to Senator Tom Cotton enclosing a list of twenty companies headquartered in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) which DoD determined are operating directly or indirectly in the United States and are “Communist Chinese military companies.”  Titled “Qualifying Entities Prepared in Response to Section 1237 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (PUBLIC LAW 105-261),” the “DoD List” includes some Chinese companies frequently associated with the Chinese military, and others that may not have been previously associated with the Chinese military.
For companies doing business with the US government, the US government may consider the inclusion of any of the listed companies in a government contractor’s supply chain as a “supply chain risk” that must be assessed, particularly in connection with information technology.  DoD contractors are already prohibited by their contracts from acquiring certain items and services from “any Communist Chinese military company.”
While not a sanctions list itself, the DoD List may lead to sanctions actions by the US government, as well as reactions from business partners assessing the risk of further action against the listed companies by the US government, particularly for listed companies that are not currently subject to US sanctions.  Pressure from Congress may continue for the administration to continue to update this list, and to impose restrictions on the companies on this list.
Section 1237 of the Act
In relevant part, Section 1237(a) authorizes, but does not require, the President to impose sanctions, with the exception of import-related restrictions, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) “in the case of any commercial activity in the United States by a person that is on the list” published under Section 1237(b).  It appears that the President is not required to declare a national emergency in order to impose such sanctions, as is typically the case under IEEPA.
According to the original Section 1237(b), the Secretary of Defense, within 90 days after enactment of the Act (i.e., within 90 days after October 17, 1998), “shall make a determination of those persons operating directly or indirectly in the United States or any of its territories and possessions that are Communist Chinese military companies and shall publish a list of those persons in the Federal Register.”  An amendment to the Act in 2000 required the initial determinations to be made “not later than March 1, 2001,” suggesting that DoD had failed to make any determination prior to that date.
The Act as amended requires the Secretary of Defense to produce classified and unclassified versions of the list, update the list on an annual basis, and share the list with the US Congress and with relevant US government agencies.   Changes to the list are to be made in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The Act defines the term “Communist Chinese military company” as:
any person identified in the Defense Intelligence Agency publication numbered VP-1920-271-90, dated September 1990, or PC-1921-57-95, dated October 1995, and any update of those publications for the purposes of this section; and
any other person that: (i) is owned or controlled by the People’s Liberation Army; and (ii) is engaged in providing commercial services, manufacturing, producing, or exporting.
The term “People’s Liberation Army” means the land, naval, and air military services, the police, and the intelligence services of the People’s Republic of China, and any member of any such service or of such police.
Impacts on US Government Contractors and Subcontractors
The publication of this list by DoD has immediate ramifications for US government contractors and other companies participating in the supply chain for the US government.  Based on existing rules addressing the supply chain for the US government, companies should assess whether the publication of this list triggers any existing prohibitions on doing business with companies owned or controlled by the Chinese military or a foreign government.
Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”), federal agencies are prohibited from “procuring or obtaining” “any equipment, system, or service” that uses “covered telecommunications equipment or services” for certain critical technology or a “substantial or essential component of any system.”  FAR 4.2101.  When this prohibition was initially introduced by Congress in 2018, it made headlines because it expressly identified five major China-based technology companies.  But the statute and the implementing regulations broadly define this prohibition as including other unnamed companies if telecommunications or video surveillance equipment or services are “produced or provided by an entity that the Secretary of Defense . . . reasonably believes to be an entity owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of a covered foreign country.”  FAR 4.2101(4).
Section 514 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2018 provides that, for a “high-impact or moderate-impact information system” (as defined by NIST’s Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information Systems), agencies must review the “supply chain risk for the information systems against criteria developed by NIST and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to inform acquisition decisions.”  This includes consideration of risk related to sabotage presented by involvement of “one or more entities identified by the United States Government as posing a cyber threat, including … those that may be owned, directed, or subsidized by the People’s Republic of China.”
Outside the area of information technology, there are existing prohibitions that might be triggered by this publication.  For example, DoD’s supplement to the FAR (DFARS Subpart 225.770) prohibits contractors from delivering any supplies or services covered by the United States Munitions List that are acquired, directly or indirectly, from a “Communist Chinese military company.”
These are only a few examples.  In any procurement, particularly those involving information systems or information technology, the US government has broad discretion to undertake assessments of cybersecurity and supply chain risk, and those considerations could adversely impact a company’s eligibility for award.  As a result, companies should assess whether this publication has a potential impact on supply chain risk for their business.
IEEPA Sanctions
Although the DoD List is not a sanctions list, Section 1237(a) of the Act does authorize the President to impose at least some IEEPA sanctions against persons included on the list.  Under IEEPA, the President has broad authority to investigate, regulate, block, or prohibit transactions that are “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”  Examples of such transactions include transactions that involve US persons, the US financial system, or US-origin goods or services. When IEEPA sanctions are applied to specific companies, it is usually done by adding them to OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”) and Blocked Persons.
Observations:  [Click HERE to continue reading.]

(Source: Trump and Trade, 26 Jun 2020)
* Principal Author: David Schwartz, Esq., 1-


, Thompson Hine
On June 25, 2020, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced that it would be delaying the effective date for certain filing requirements set forth in April 2020 regulations on military-related exports to China, Russia and Venezuela.  After significant pushback from industry representatives that more time was needed to transition to the additional Electronic Export Information (EEI) filing requirements, BIS has delayed implementing and enforcing one aspect of the regulation until September 27, 2020.  Other aspects of the April rulemaking will still become effective on June 29, 2020
In April 2020, BIS issued a final rule intended to prevent efforts by entities in China, Russia and Venezuela from acquiring U.S. technology that could be used in the development of weapons, military aircraft or surveillance technology through civilian supply chains or under civilian-use pretenses.  See Trump and Trade Update of April 28, 2020.  This rule expands licensing requirement controls on China, Russia and Venezuela to cover “military end users” in all three countries, in addition to “military end uses.” It also broadens the list of items controlled and potentially requiring an export license, including items such as semiconductor equipment, sensors, and other technologies sought for military end use or by military end users in these countries.  The list of such items is set forth as Supplement 2 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations.   
The rule also expands EEI filing requirements when the destination is China, Russia or Venezuela by removing two exemptions: (i) from filing EEI for any shipments valued under $2,500 and (ii) from reporting the Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) when the only reason for control is anti-terrorism (AT).  This aspect of the rule essentially requires all U.S. exporters shipping to China, Russia and Venezuela to file EEI data on all exports to these countries regardless of the value.  It was this aspect of the final rule that received strong opposition by industry.
As a result, BIS has announced that while the EEI filing requirement for items subject to Supplement No. 2 to Part 744 will become effective on June 29, 2020, EEI filings for exports to China, Russia or Venezuela of items controlled by ECCNs not listed in Supplement No. 2 will not be required until September 27, 2020.


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(Source: Editor)
Monica Chavez, formerly with Eaton Corporation, has been appointed Director, Global Trade Compliance, Amgen Inc., in their Thousand Oaks, CA, corporate headquarters.  Contact Monica at mchave04@amgen.com or 1-626-437-8356.
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ECTI Presents: UK/EU Export Controls and Sanctions 101 Webinar; 30 Jun 
Webinar; 24 Jun

(Source: Ashleigh Foor)
* What: UK/EU Export Controls and Sanctions 101
* When: 30 Jun; 1:00 p.m. (EDT)
* Where: Webinar
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker: Richard Tauwhare
* Register: here or contact Ashleigh Foor, 1-540-433-3977

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EN_a115. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)

* Mel Brooks
(born Melvin Kaminsky, June 28, 1926, age 94, is an American actor, writer, producer, director, comedian, and composer. He is known as a creator of broad film farces and comic parodies. Brooks began his career as a comic and a writer for television shows. In middle age, Brooks became one of the most successful film directors of the 1970s, with many of his films being among the top ten moneymakers of the year of release. His best-known films include The Producers, The Twelve Chairs, Blazing Saddles, Young Frankenstein, Silent Movie, High Anxiety, History of the World–Part I, Spaceballs, and Robin Hood: Men in Tights.)
  – “If you’re alive you’ve got to flap your arms and legs, you’ve got to jump around a lot, for life is the very opposite of death, and therefore you must at very least think noisy and colorfully, or you’re not alive.”
* Giacomo Leopardi
(Giacomo Taldegardo Francesco di Sales Saverio Pietro Leopardi; 29 Jun 1798 – 14 Jun 1837) was an Italian philosopher, poet, essayist, and philologist. He is considered the greatest Italian poet of the nineteenth century and one of the most important figures in the literature of the world.)
  – “Old age is the supreme evil, for it deprives man of physical pleasures while allowing his appetites to remain, and it brings with it every possible sorrow. Yet men fear death and desire old age.”
Monday is pun day

I have a photographic memory but I’ve never developed it.

The Boy Scouts had a big argument about where they should camp… It was in tents!

What did the janitor say when he jumped out of the closet? “SUPPLIES!!”

An arrogant crook going down in an elevator = A condescending con, descending.

My dad passed away when he was losing blood, and couldn’t remember his blood type to tell the rescue squad. But as he died, he inspired us all with his last words, “Be positive! Be positive!”

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The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
Latest Update 
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.


5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 
DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.   24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates.  

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.

6 May 2020: 85 FR 26847: Notice (not an amendment) temporarily reducing the registration fee schedule in ITAR 122.3 until April 30, 2021. 
DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

5 Jun 2020:
85 FR 84510:

Syria Sanctions Regulations. 


1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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