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20-0624 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

20-0624 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

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Wednesday, 24 June 2020

  1. Treasury/OFAC Removes Persons and Properties from SDN List
  2. Treasury/OFAC Adds Persons and Properties to SDN List
  3. USTR Announces Product Exclusion and Amendments: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation
  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings)
  4. Commerce/Census: “Exports Between the United States and Puerto Rico – When to File Electronic Export Information”
  5. Commerce/ITA: “Swiss Companies, U.S. Jobs, Global Response”
  6. UK Gov Announces New Guidance on the UK’s Sanction Regime
  1. Reuters: “Trump Administration Sees No Loophole in New Huawei Curb”
  1. Crowell Moring: “Key Lessons Learned as UK’s AML Regulator Shows its Teeth”
  2. Husch Blackwell: “BIS Allows U.S. Companies to Work with Huawei on Standards”
  3. Shearman: “European Commission Expands Arsenal to Curtail Foreign Subsidies”
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  4. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  5. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 

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EXIM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

 
85 FR 38020
: Notice
 
*
AGENCY:
Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury.
ACTION:
Notice.
*
SUMMARY:
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing the names of one or more persons that have been removed from OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). Their property and interests in property are no longer blocked, and U.S. persons are no longer generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. OFAC is also removing the name of two vessels that had been identified as blocked property.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source: Federal Register) [Excerpt]
 
85 FR 38018
: Notice
 
*
AGENCY:
Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury.
*
ACTION:
Notice.
*
SUMMARY:
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing the names of one or more individuals, entities, and vessels that have been placed on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). OFAC has determined that one or more applicable legal criteria were satisfied to place the individuals and entities on the SDN List. All property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of these individuals and entities are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. The vessels placed on the SDN List have been identified as property in which a blocked person has an interest.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source: Federal Register) [Excerpt]
 
85 FR 38000
: Notice
 
*
AGENCY:
Office of the United States Trade Representative.
*
ACTION:
Notice of product exclusion and amendments.
*
SUMMARY:
In September 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative imposed additional duties on goods of China with an annual trade value of approximately $200 billion as part of the action in the Section 301 investigation of China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. The U.S. Trade Representative initiated a product exclusion process in June 2019, and interested persons have submitted requests for the exclusion of specific products. This notice announces the U.S. Trade Representative’s determination to grant an additional exclusion request, as specified in the Annex to this notice, and corrects technical errors in previously announced exclusions.
*
DATES:
The product exclusions announced in this notice will apply as of September 24, 2018, the effective date of the $200 billion action, and extend to August 7, 2020. The amendments announced in this notice are retroactive to the date that the original exclusions were published.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

OGS OTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

(Source: Federal Register)

 

* Treasury/OFAC; NOTICES;
Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties
; [Pub. Date: 25 Jun 2020] (PDF)
 
* State/DDTC; NOTICES;
Sanctions Actions Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Syria
; [Pub. Date: 25 Jun 2020] (PDF)
 
* USTR; NOTICES;
Extension of Particular Exclusions:
China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation
; [Pub. Date: 25 Jun 2020] (PDF) (PDF)

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

OGS_a25. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source:
Global Reach Blog,
23 Jun 2020) [Excerpt]
 
First in a series of blogs about U.S.-Puerto Rico Shipping Regulations
This is the first of a three-part blog series designed to explain export regulations between the United States and Puerto Rico. In the first of this series, we tackle the question of why the rules of the game differ for the states and Puerto Rico, a U.S. territory.  
 
Perhaps the best place to start is by reviewing U.S. export filing rules. These are generally straightforward, requiring shippers to track products’ travels from origin to destination. Things get a little trickier when exports meet the definition of “shipment” in Section 30.1 of the Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR), triggering a requirement to file Electronic Export Information (EEI) in the Automated Export System (AES). …
 
FTR defines “shipment” as, “All goods being sent from one U.S. Principal Party in Interest [USPPI] to one consignee located in a single country of destination on a single conveyance and on the same day.” It applies to shipments abroad and to/from the extended United States, which includes Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, that meet the mandatory FTR filing requirement or when goods are valued over $2,500 per Schedule B/HS code.
 
The bottom line: You do not have to file EEI when sending products state to state but you do when shipping from the United States to Puerto Rico – and vice versa. Puerto Rico’s territorial status does provide some privileges, though, such as EEI exemptions in some cases.
 
The figure below shows export shipments that, as of publication, require shippers to file EEI in the AES. As a reminder, the extended United States are the territories enclosed in the light-red bubble (the United States, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands). To explain, EEI filings are required for the following transactions, shown as solid arrows in the figure:
 
United States
Puerto Rico
United States
U.S. Virgin Islands
United States
Foreign Country
Puerto Rico
U.S. Virgin Islands
Puerto Rico
Foreign Country
U.S. Virgin Islands
Foreign Country
 
Many shipments from the United States, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to Canada are EEI-exempt unless FTR states otherwise, as indicated by the dashed arrow in the figure stretching between the United States and extended United States to our neighbor to the north.
 
You will notice that for Pacific and other U.S. territories, shipments to them and originating from them are excluded from the EEI filing requirements (FTR 30.2(d)(2)). However, shipments originating from the extended United States transiting through these territories to foreign destinations require filing.
 
The following is the list of Pacific and other U.S. territories as shown in the figure:
  • American Samoa
  • Baker Island
  • Guam
  • Howland Island
  • Jarvis Island
  • Johnston Atoll
  • Kingman Reef
  • Midway Islands
  • Navassa Island
  • Northern Mariana Islands
  • Palmyra Atoll
  • Wake Island
 
Why is EEI required for shipments between the United States and Puerto Rico?
There is a statistical need for these data. The Census Bureau’s Economic Directorate collects and processes data on shipments between the United States and Puerto Rico through the AES. Shippers use these data to gauge Puerto Rico’s trade economy and goods produced there. The information is also used to help compile Puerto Rico’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The GDP is one of the most anticipated economic indicators and the primary measure of the nation’s economy.
 
This information is also available for use by the Puerto Rico government and its citizens through Census Bureau programs. For example, the Puerto Rico Planning Board publishes statistical reports based on Census Bureau EEI data.
Despite EEI requirements, the Census Bureau and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) classify U.S.-Puerto Rico shipments as domestic. This has a few implications, for example CBP’s treatment of these shipments as well as their exclusion from foreign trade publications (FT-900).
 
Finally, filing EEI generates an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) that must be on commercial loading documents so that CBP can verify a shipment was filed in the AES.
 
Be sure to come back for our next blog in this series in which we cover special situations where EEI may or may not be required, and how to handle shipments that involve the United States, Puerto Rico and a foreign country.
 
Have questions or need immediate assistance? Contact us at <emd.askregs@census.gov> or 1-800-549-0595, option 3. 

This entry was posted on Tue Jun 23 2020 and filed under AESExports and Trade Regulation.

 
Back to top

 
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(Source:
Tradeology
, 23 Jun 2020)
 
Statement of Edward T. McMullen, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland and Liechtenstein: 
 
A lot has changed in the course of just a few months in 2020. One thing that has not changed: The U.S.-Swiss business relationship remains strong and is a critical part of our overall bilateral ties. In fact, I have been impressed by the innovation and efficiency of Swiss and American companies, working together to find a solution to the pandemic. Switzerland and the United States have a long tradition of cooperation in business and research; we are natural partners, who share common values such as entrepreneurship, the rule of law, freedom, and democracy.
 
In my nearly three years as Ambassador, I’ve been honored to meet with Swiss companies of all sizes that are supporting jobs in the United States. During the pandemic, I’ve been excited to learn about U.S.-Swiss corporate partnerships working towards vaccines and treatments, Swiss companies that have increased production of critical healthcare equipment, and the companies that have changed their operations to produce resources for the global response. Not only did these companies take swift and decisive action in support of COVID-19, they also increased their U.S. footprint, with operations in many states across the country, thereby providing many more jobs to Americans. The current Administration’s adoption of strong economic growth policies, including low corporate tax rate, and drastic reductions in regulations greatly aided Swiss investors’ pursuit in their U.S. expansions. Our SelectUSA representative and I are in regular contact with these companies and others to assist whenever needed.
 
For example, Lonza, one of the world’s leading suppliers to the pharmaceutical, biotech and specialty ingredients markets, recently announced a partnership with Massachusetts-based biotechnology firm Moderna to jointly manufacture vaccines to combat the coronavirus. Our Embassy team and SelectUSA have worked with Lonza for several years, and I salute their work in this field. I and SelectUSA Investment Specialist Sandor Galambos visited the Lonza facility in Greenwood, South Carolina in May 2019 to celebrate the progress of a $46 million expansion. The event marked the ceremonial groundbreaking of the project’s second phase. Governor McMaster attended the event as well.
 
In a fast-track procedure, Swiss multinational healthcare company Roche Diagnostics received emergency approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to sell to labs the first commercially approved test for the coronavirus in the United States. I am grateful that Roche Diagnostics’ top-notch technology has been made available to millions of Americans and people around the world.
 
As part of my engagement with company principals in Switzerland, I will visit the Hamilton Medical facility in the coming weeks to witness the terrific work the company is doing for humanity. Hamilton Medical ramped up its production of ventilators at its Reno, Nevada, facility to meet the needs of the United States and more than 100 other countries. These efforts are not only beneficial in supporting global health care heroes, but also supporting hundreds of additional jobs in the United States and providing skills training to U.S. workers. President Trump mentioned Hamilton’s role in ventilator supplies at White House press briefings, and Vice President Pence welcomed the delivery of Hamilton ventilators to the national stockpile on April 8.
 
Firmenich, the world’s largest privately-owned fragrance and taste company, has increased its production capacity to produce hand sanitizer gel for hospitals, as well as for medical and emergency services across the United States. President of Firmenich North America Matthew Furner told me, “We all have an obligation to lead our business responsibly. We at Firmenich are proud that this is alwayscentral to how we do business.” Mr. Furner joined the Swiss delegation to attend the SelectUSA Investment Summit in Washington, D.C., in 2019. He was a featured guest on a panel at the SelectUSA Investment Summit to hear from CEOs on the state of the industry and the myriad opportunities in the United States for potential investors in the food and beverage and agriculture sectors.
 
These are just a few examples of the many ways the U.S.-Switzerland partnership, led by innovative Swiss and American companies, is helping fight the global pandemic. You can follow our team at @USEmbassyBern to learn about more examples. And when this fight is over, Swiss companies will continue to create jobs and support innovation in the United States, just as so many U.S. firms do in Switzerland.

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

(Source:
UK ECJU
, 23 Jun 2020)
 
On 23th of June, the UK Government realesed a guidance on the Uk’s sanction regime
which comes into force from 11pm on 31 December 2020.
 
 
 
 

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  

COM NEWS

(Source:
Reuters
,
23 Jun 2020) [Excerpt]
 
The U.S. government sees no loopholes in a new rule aimed at crimping global chip sales to China’s Huawei and will “aggressively” crack down on any bid to disobey the intent of the curb, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross said on Tuesday.
 
The rule, released in May, expands U.S. authority to require licenses for shipments of some foreign-made chips to the telecoms equipment giant. It was drafted after China hardliners in the administration became frustrated that Huawei’s blacklisting last year by the United States over national security concerns did not go far enough to cut off its access to global supplies.
 
The “Department of Commerce would like to alert you to a recent amendment to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations … that may affect business that you may conduct with the HiSilicon, Huawei Technologies, and other Huawei affiliates,” Matthew Borman, a Commerce Department official, wrote in the letter dated June 16.  

COM COMMENTARY

(Source:
Crowell Moring
, 23 Jun 2020)
 
* Principal Author:
Michelle J. Linderman
, Esq.,
44

20

7413

1353
, Crowell Moring
 
Only four months after the the United Kingdom’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) issued a £20.47 million penalty against Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) for alleged violations of the U.K.’s Ukraine- and Russia-related sanctions (see our alert here), another bank is in the news for regulatory breaches. This time it is the London arm of Commerzbank AG (Commerzbank), which was hit by the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) on 17 June with a fine of £37.8 million ($47.4 million) for failures in its anti-money laundering controls.
 
The FCA is the UK’s conduct regulator for financial services firms. Financial institutions operating in the UK are required to take steps to minimise their risk of being used to facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing. These include taking reasonable care to establish and maintain an effective, risk-based anti-money laundering (AML) control framework, and to comply with applicable Money Laundering regulations. 
 
Commerzbank is a large international, commercial bank headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany, which operates in the UK through its branch, Commerzbank London. Commerzbank London acted as a hub for sales, trading and the due diligence process for a significant number of the bank’s global customers, and was required to have in place AML policies and procedures, comprehensive and proportionate to these activities, to enable it to identify, assess, monitor and manage money laundering risk. During the period from October 2012 to September 2017, the FCA identified a number of alleged shortcomings in Commerzbank London’s financial crime controls. These included alleged failures to:
 
(a)
Conduct timely periodic due diligence on its clients, which resulted in a significant number of existing clients not being subject to timely know-your-client (KYC) checks. By 1 March 2017, 1,772 clients were overdue for updated due diligence checks. A material number of these clients were able to continue to transact with the bank’s London branch due to the implementation of an exceptions process, which was not adequately controlled or overseen and which became “out of control” by the end of 2016;
 
(b)
Address long-standing weaknesses in its automated tool for monitoring money laundering risk on transactions for clients. For example, in 2015 Commerzbank London identified that 40 high-risk countries were missing from, and 1,110 high-risk clients had not been added to, the bank’s transaction monitoring tool; and,
 
(c)
Have adequate policies and procedures in place when undertaking customer due diligence (CDD) on clients.
 
The FCA therefore found Commerzbank London to have breached Principle 3 of its Principles for Businesses, which requires firms to have adequate risk management systems in place. The FCA stated that these failings created “a significant risk that financial and other crime might be undetected.”
The FCA found that the failings were particularly serious because they persisted following visits by the FCA to Commerzbank London in 2012, 2015 and 2017, in which the agency specifically pointed out these weaknesses. Further, they occurred against a backdrop of heightened awareness within Commerzbank of weaknesses in its global financial crime controls following action taken against the bank by US regulators in 2015.
 
Commerzbank London benefitted from a 30% discount on the original penalty of £54,007,800 because it agreed to resolve the matter at an early stage. It also undertook a significant remediation exercise to address the shortcomings in its AML control framework and increased the number of employees in the Financial Crime Team in Compliance from what had been just three full-time employees in London to 42.
 
This penalty is the second-largest to be imposed by the FCA following the penalty it imposed on Standard Chartered Bank last year of £102 million over breaches of AML regulations.
 
Practical Considerations
The FCA notice provides useful reminders for financial institutions about what they are required to do in order to manage their AML risks. These include:
  (1)
Ensuring that they have appropriate, risk-based procedures for applying CDD measures when establishing a business relationship or carrying out a transaction for a customer;
  (2)
Applying CDD at other appropriate times to existing customers on a risk basis;
  (3)
Applying scrutiny to transactions undertaken throughout the course of their relationship with a customer;
  (4)
Keeping documents, data or information obtained for the purposes of applying CDD measures up-to-date;
  (5)
Applying, on a risk basis, enhanced customer due diligence measures (EDD) and enhanced ongoing monitoring in any situation which by its nature presents a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing; and
  (6)
Establishing and maintaining appropriate and risk-based policies and procedures relating to the above.
 
It will also be important for financial institutions to ensure that, if they are given warnings by the regulator about weaknesses in their AML control frameworks, they take immediate remediative action. This may include pausing new customer onboarding until such time as appropriate CDD checks can be completed; ensuring that customers’ CDD information is updated on a periodic basis according to each customer’s risk profile, and increasing the headcount of financial crime control staff and/or engaging third-party vendors to ensure that  
KYC and other customer diligence can be carried out timely.
 
Based on recent enforcement actions, regulators in the UK are beginning to police and enforce financial crime regulations more stringently and successfully. This is in line with the recent, more aggressive approach to AML enforcement taken by other EU regulators in recent years such as those in Denmark and Sweden. With the departure of the UK from the EU and following the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020, how the UK proceeds in relation to implementation of any further EU AML legislation will depend on what, if any, withdrawal agreement applies. If there is “no deal”, the UK will have to decide whether to remain aligned with the EU or not. Whatever the position on new legislation, it seems doubtful that the UK will weaken its enforcement approach.

 
* Principal Author:
Cortney O’Toole Morgan
, Esq., 1-202-378-2389, Husch Blackwell
 
The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) published a notice in the Federal Register announcing a rule change effective June 18, 2020, which amends the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) to allow for the release of certain technology to Huawei Technologies, Co., Ltd. and 114 of its non-U.S. affiliates designated on the Entity List without a license “if such release is made for the purpose of contributing to the revision or development of a ‘standard’ in a ‘standards organization.'”  Despite being added to the Entity List by BIS in 2019 (as previously reported on here), Huawei and its foreign affiliates still participate in several international standards organizations in which U.S. companies also participate.  BIS states in its notice “[a]s international standards serve as the building blocks for product development and help ensure functionality, interoperability, and safety of the products, it is important to U.S. technological leadership that U.S. companies be able to work in these bodies in order to ensure that U.S. standards proposals are fully considered.”
 
As a result of Huawei’s entity list designation, BIS has received questions regarding the applicability of the EAR in the context of standards setting or development.  On August 19, 2019, BIS issued a “General Advisory Opinion Concerning Prohibited Activities in the Standards Setting or Development Context When a Listed Entity is Involved”, which addressed the applicability of certain types of releases.  With the issuance of this new interim final rule, that previous guidance has been rescinded.   
 
The new rule removes certain licensing requirements imposed by the original listing and removes the need to determine the application of controls to those releases.  The interim final rule revises ninety-three entries, which list Huawei and its 114 foreign affiliates by changing the text in the Licensing Requirement column from “For all items subject to the EAR (See §744.11 of the EAR)” to “For all items subject to the EAR (see § 744.11 of the EAR), EXCEPT for technology subject to the EAR that is designated as EAR99, or controlled on the Commerce Control List for anti-terrorism reasons only, when released to members of a ”standards organization” (see § 772.1) for the purpose of contributing to the revision or development of a ”standard” (see § 772.1).”
 
According to the notice, the definition of a “standard” for the purpose of this rule can be found in the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) Circular A-119.  BIS welcomes comments from interested parties on the impact of the rule change on or before August 17, 2020.


(Source:
Shearman
, 18 Jun 2020)
 
* Principal Author:
Matthew Readings
, Esq.,
44

20

7655

5937
, Shearman & Sterling
 
On June 17, 2020, the European Commission published its highly anticipated White Paper detailing its “anti-subsidy tool,” aimed at rectifying supposed distortions in the EU caused by foreign subsidies. Stakeholders have until September 23, 2020 to submit their views-a pre-COVID type timescale representing the significance of this shift. The current Commission has ambitions to be a “geopolitical European Commission” as proclaimed by Commission President von der Leyen-boosting “European sovereignty” and fostering national champions into formidable competitors capable of competing on the global stage.
 
The White Paper supports these goals and aims to patch over gaps in the Commission’s trade and competition toolkits. However, the gaps are not as obvious as that. There are no specific examples referred to by the Commission in justifying the proposal and the three “Modules” it proposes raise a number of issues, including extra-territorial enforcement challenges, expansion of Commission executive power and conflicting regimes. Ultimately, there are questions as to whether EU citizens will actually benefit-or if this is to protect European firms.
 
(a)
Module 1: All Types of Foreign Subsidies
. This catch-all instrument would allow Member States or the Commission to deal with distortive foreign subsidies in “all market situations”-i.e. for goods, services, and investments. The Commission already has sweeping powers to manage subsidies handed out by European governments to companies active in the EU; and these powers would extend the Commission’s reach to companies active in the EU but receiving money from foreign governments.

The Commission proposes that subsidies in excess of € 200,000 granted over three years could be subject to review. In line with the Commission’s existing EU state aid rules, these subsidies could comprise: export financing (leaving aside the Member States’ own significant export credit operations), subsidies to ailing undertakings (such as debt forgiveness), open-ended debt guarantees, tax reliefs and subsidies facilitating an acquisition.

 
(b)
Module 2: Foreign Subsidies Facilitating the Acquisition of EU Companies
. This Module is aimed at ensuring that foreign subsidies do not confer an unfair benefit in the market for corporate control. In a process similar to the merger control notification process, the Commission proposes that companies benefitting from foreign subsidies would need to notify and receive approval for acquisitions of “European” companies above given thresholds (qualitative and quantitative-e.g. turnover above € 100 million), to a competent supervisory authority-which is proposed to be the Commission itself.
 
(c)
Module 3: Foreign Subsidies in EU Public Procurement
. To address a supposed unfair advantage of bidders who have access to foreign subsidies, facilitating undervalued bids, Module 3 proposes a notification mechanism, which would require bidders to notify authorities (the Commission in coordination with national authorities) of foreign subsidies.

This module seems confused. If a company receives a foreign subsidy and uses it to provide public services to EU citizens-effectively a foreign government is reducing the cost of public services for EU citizens. It’s far from clear that such a situation either arises in a material way or that, if it does, it’s wise to try and stop it.

 
Enforcement Challenges
. The Commission’s goals face clear enforcement challenges, particularly concerning access to evidence. Foreign governments may (in fact are quite likely to) respond by prohibiting their companies from sharing any information regarding subsidies they receive. This already happens where U.S. export control or sanctions policy conflicts with other governments, for example.
 
The Commission hopes to overcome this issue with “adequate investigative tools,” for example, by seeking information from other market players or imposing fines for failure to share information. The Commission also expects to use its experience in trade defence to assess whether foreign subsidies exist. To that end, it may well rely on its country reports in the context of anti-dumping (notably for China) to ground the existence of distortions.
Retaliation is also a real risk-especially as EU State aid information is already public and can readily be used by trading partners to impose retaliatory measures.
 
Expansion of Executive Power
. The Commission unsurprisingly foresees a central role for itself as a supervisory authority under Modules 1 and 3 (in a shared system with national authorities) and further-also unsurprisingly-proposes itself as the sole supervisory authority under Module 2. This marks a notable expansion of its executive power, in contrast with the recently adopted EU foreign investment regime, where the Commission’s role is largely to coordinate and to provide non-binding opinions on transactions.
Moreover, the proposed assessments fold in an “EU interest test” whereby subsidies that contribute to the EU’s policy objectives (e.g. job creation, digital transformation) may be allowed. This risks being a highly politicized and discretionary exercise, further expanding the Commission’s decision-making powers. The Commission is accustomed to applying such criteria in State aid-in a manner that is effectively outside judicial supervision.
 
Conflicting or Duplicative Processes
. The proposals insufficiently dispense with real issues of conflicting and overlapping remits already in existence under the EU merger control regime, EU trade defense instruments, EU bilateral free trade agreements and the WTO system. For instance: the new instrument would be “without prejudice to the current rules on antitrust and mergers;” any overlaps with FTA dispute settlement could be addressed “during an [actual] action;” and, even where parallel procedures are notified under both the FDI regime and the new foreign subsidies regime, they are still complementary as they “aim at different objectives.”
 
Broader Implications: Brexit
. If the Commission receives the extensive set of powers anticipated in its proposal, it will remove the rationale for the kind of subsidy control the EU has sought to impose on the U.K. via the current trade negotiations. Provided the U.K. adopts similar tools, this should make an EU/U.K. FTA easier.
 

Fundamentally, the announcement as part of the Commission’s industrial strategy demonstrates a dramatic shift away from the principles of global free trade, which the European Union has extolled for generations. During the announcement, Commissioner Vestager framed this legislative agenda in the context of the most difficult geo-political environment in recent history and the challenges to the rules based multilateral order. Beyond the technical difficulties which the Commission will inevitably face in designing such a grand new package of measures, this represents a radical shift and yet another step towards a more protectionist and fragmented world. The proposal is likely to meet with resistance from numerous countries, not least China, which has already sounded its alarm regarding “new trade barriers” planned by the EU. 


EN EDITOR’S NOTES

EN_a114. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)
  

* Henry Ward Beecher (24 Jun 1813 – 8 Mar 1887; was an American Congregationalist clergyman, social reformer, and speaker, known for his support of the abolition of slavery.)
 
 
– “It is the heart that makes a man rich. He is rich according to what he is, not according to what he has.”

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

 

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
 
Agency 
Regulations 
Latest Update 
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.

 

5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 
DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. 
DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.   24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates.  
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM)

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110.  

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

 
DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. 
6 May 2020: 85 FR 26847: Notice (not an amendment) temporarily reducing the registration fee schedule in ITAR 122.3 until April 30, 2021. 
 
DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

5 Jun 2020:
85 FR 84510:

Syria Sanctions Regulations. 

 
 
 
USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), Revision 8.

1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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