20-0615 Monday “Daily Bugle”

20-06-15 Monday “Daily Bugle”

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Monday, 15 June 2020

  1. Commerce/BIS: “5-Year Record Retention Requirement for Export and Boycott Transactions”
  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles and Defense Services Commercial Exports FY 2019
  4. UK ECJU: “Export Control Training Bulletin September to November 2020”
  1. Defense News: “US State Department Must Align UAV Export Policy with American Interests”
  2. WSJ: Over 1,300 Chinese Medical Suppliers to U.S.-Including Mask Providers-Use Bogus Registration Data
  1. Arnold & Porter: “A Rare Chance to Shape Arms Regulation Compliance Relief”
  2. Steptoe: “New Executive Order Authorizing Sanctions against International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Officials”
  3. Thompson Hine: “State Department Updates Cuba Restricted List”
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 62 Jobs Available – 6 New Job Listings This Week 
  1. ECTI Presents: UK/EU Export Controls and Sanctions 101 Webinar; 30 Jun
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
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(Source: Federal Register) [Excerpt]
85 FR 36185
Agency Information Collection Activities
The Department of Commerce will submit the following information collection request to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and clearance in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, on or after the date of publication of this notice. We invite the general public and other Federal agencies to comment on proposed, and continuing information collections, which helps us assess the impact of our information collection requirements and minimize the public’s reporting burden. Public comments were previously requested via the Federal Register on 4/6/2020 during a 60-day comment period. This notice allows for an additional 30 days for public comments.
Agency: Bureau of Industry and Security.
Title: 5-Year Record Retention Requirement for Export and Boycott Transactions.
OMB Control Number: 0694-0096.
Form Number(s): None.
Type of Request: Extension of a current information collection.
Number of Respondents: 100,000.
Average Hours Per Response: 1 Second to 1 Minute.
Burden Hours: 258.
Needs and Uses: This collection is necessary under Sections 760 and 762.6(a) of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The five-year retention requirement corresponds with the statute of limitations for violations and is necessary to preserve potential evidence for investigations. All parties involved in the export, reexport, transshipment or diversion of items subject to the EAR and the U.S. party involved in the export transaction involving a reportable boycott request are required to maintain records of these activities for a period of five years. The frequency depends upon how often each entity is involved in an export transaction or one involving a reportable boycott request.
Affected Public: Business or other for-profit organizations.
Frequency: On Occasion.
Respondent’s Obligation: Voluntary.
Legal Authority: Export Control Reform Act 4812(b) and 4814(b)(1)(B).
This information collection request may be viewed at www.reginfo.gov. Follow the instructions to view the Department of Commerce collections currently under review by OMB.
Written comments and recommendations for the proposed information collection should be submitted within 30 days of the publication of this notice on the following website http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain. Find this particular information collection by selecting “Currently under 30-day Review-Open for Public Comments” or by using the search function and entering either the title of the collection or the OMB Control Number 0694-0096.

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[No items of interest for today]

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OGS_a23. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

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Executive Summary
The Department of State’s Blue Lantern end-use monitoring program addressed the evolving nature of arms trade and subsequent challenges associated with diversion in FY 2019. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (PM/DDTC) accomplished this by developing and initiating the first-ever series of joint end-use monitoring checks between the Departments of State and Defense and the completion of the first tranche of Blue Lantern visits tailored to assess the risk of diversion of U.S. defense articles due to the acquisition of foreign companies by entities that pose a potential enhanced risk of diversion.
During FY 2019, PM/DDTC’s Blue Lantern program achieved other notable successes. PM/DDTC enhanced its work with posts in order to improve their ability to keep pace with the rate of checks requested and conduct the checks in a more timely and effective manner. The results were significant, with the Directorate initiating 187 checks and posts closing almost as many (181), and PM/DDTC recommending non-approval of more than 130 license applications, up from 57 during FY 2018. This non-approval rate was supported by better execution of and reports on Blue Lantern checks, the expansion of end-use monitoring efforts described above, and enhanced and regular application of intelligence products.
In addition to these efforts, PM/DDTC modified the way it tabulates its end-use monitoring activities to ensure the numbers it reports better reflect the work being done. The new method, which takes into account only those license applications with a direct bearing on a Blue Lantern check, is a departure from the previous approach, which considered all applications that could be indirectly impacted by Blue Lantern findings. This change in methodology effectively minimizes the possible inclusion of irrelevant cases that could provide false assurances of favorable results. PM/DDTC’s FY 2019 successes are further notable given the 35-day lapse in appropriations spanning December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019. This circumstance interfered with the onboarding and training of new personnel to replace departed colleagues. Further, it hindered travel, embassy operations, and the planning needed to initiate and conduct Blue Lantern checks in FY 2019. Coupled with the new check tabulation method, this was a major factor in an overall reduction in the number of Blue Lantern checks conducted in FY 2019.

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, 12 Jun 2020) [Excerpt]
UK ECJU Announced
Export control training bulletin September to November 2020
Foundation and intermediate level export control seminars and licensing workshops are run regionally and in London. Control list classification workshops are London based as they are run by our Technical Assessment Unit.
See the training calendar for details of event locations

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NWS_a16. Defense News: “US State Department Must Align UAV Export Policy with American Interests”

(Source: Defense News, 12 Jun 2020) [Excerpts]
Why is it easier for our allies and partners to buy unmanned aerial vehicles from China than from the United States? The answer lies in U.S. export policy.
Since 1987, the United States has voluntarily adhered to the international nuclear nonproliferation export guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime, or MTCR.
These guidelines classify UAVs as nuclear-capable cruise or ballistic missiles – an assertion that does not align with pragmatic operational realities. Instead of making the world safer, the MTCR and U.S. export policy are opening the UAV market to irresponsible actors. The time has long come for U.S. policy to recognize and treat UAVs for what they are: aircraft. …
Building and sustaining successful coalition operations demands a U.S. policy shift for UAV exports. … Interoperability in the combat aviation arena depends on using equipment that can access U.S. military information enterprises and share data in a real-time, seamless fashion.

NWS_a17. WSJ: Over 1,300 Chinese Medical Suppliers to U.S.-Including Mask Providers Use Bogus U.S. Registration Data

(Source: Wall Street Journal 14 Jun 2020) [Excerpts]
More than 1,300 Chinese medical-device companies that registered to sell protective gear and other equipment in the U.S. during the coronavirus pandemic listed as their American representative the same purported Delaware entity that uses a false address and a nonworking phone number, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis. …


(Source: Arnold & Porter, 11 Jun 2020)
* Principal Author: Soo-Mi Rhee, Esq., 1-202-942-5312, Arnold & Porter
On June 5, the U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, or DDTC, announced that it would accept limited public comment on certain temporary regulatory relief it had granted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic with respect to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, or ITAR. [

As a result of this temporary relief, which was the subject of a DDTC announcement on May 1, companies around the world that work with defense articles and technical data controlled under the ITAR have temporarily faced fewer regulatory obligations. [

Interested parties now have a rare opportunity through this comment period to seek to expand or otherwise shape relief measures to address the continued impact of COVID-19 on ITAR compliance.

This limited opportunity to comment may provide a key avenue for interested parties to protect operational flexibility during the ongoing pandemic.

For example, under the DDTC’s current ITAR approach, contract employees subject to ITAR-compliance will have only until the end of July to return to work in order to qualify as so-called regular employees.

This limited deadline could significantly impact work-at-home policies at a time when many ITAR-regulated companies are wrestling with questions of when, and how, to resume normal operations.

Moreover, the opportunity to advocate for additional relief measures is significant. The continued reduction in operational capacity and increases in telework may negatively impact a wide array of ITAR compliance requirements not covered under the current relief, including record-keeping and export licensing applications.

ITAR-regulated companies under increased strain due to the COVID-19 pandemic should consider whether to take this, and likely only, opportunity to weigh in on these and other compliance requirements.

It is also important to note that, because the DDTC’s prior relief measures are retroactive, this comment period represents a unique chance for companies to reduce or otherwise limit future – as well as past – ITAR compliance issues even if such issues have already been the subject of a voluntary disclosure to the DDTC.

Interested parties must submit comments by June 25. [

Temporary Relief Previously Granted Under the ITAR

The temporary easing of regulatory burdens that the DDTC had granted under the ITAR results from a series of published rules granting relief under specific circumstances.[

Specifically, the DDTC, which administers the ITAR, published a rule that as of May 1 gave effect to, and in some cases expanded, certain previously announced measures intended to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on compliance with the ITAR.[

In particular, the rule announced on May 1 enacted four temporary measures.

First, certain ITAR registration due dates were extended for two months. ITAR registrations set to expire Feb. 29, March 31, April 30, May 31 or June 30 are extended for two months from the original date of expiration.

Second, certain ITAR licenses and agreements were extended for six months.

Effective as of March 13, existing ITAR licenses and agreements that otherwise would have expired between March 13 and May 31 were automatically extended for six months, provided there are no changes to the scope or value of the authorization and no name or address changes are required.

The rule explained that such an extension is appropriate “in light of the unique challenges applicants face in the current environment when attempting to coordinate with US and foreign business partners regarding the scope of applications.”

Third, temporarily, contract employees do not need to work at a company’s facilities to qualify as regular employees.

Effective March 13, contract employees are permitted to work remotely and still qualify as regular employees for purposes of ITAR licensing and authorizations, as long as they are not located in Russia or a country listed in Title 22 Section 126.1 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

This temporary suspension of the ITAR requirement that contract employees must work at a company’s facilities to qualify as a regular employee is effective until July 31, unless the suspension is extended in writing.

Fourth, temporarily, regular employees working with data transferred under an ITAR agreement can work remotely in most countries not expressly approved by the DDTC on the face of the agreement.

Effective March 13, regular employees of entities who are working remotely in a country not currently authorized by a technical assistance agreement, manufacturing license agreement, or exemption to send, receive, or access any technical data authorized for export, reexport, or retransfer to their employer via a technical assistance agreement, manufacturing license agreement, or exemption are permitted to work remotely as long as the employee is not located in Russia or a country listed in ITAR Section 126.1.

This authorization for remote work under certain circumstances is effective until July 31, unless extended in writing.

As reflected in the DDTC’s original announcement of these measures, the relief applies retroactively to March 13, when the president declared the COVID-19 national emergency.

Therefore, in certain circumstances, these measures retroactively mitigate or eliminate actions from March 13 onward that would in other circumstances have been considered ITAR violations.

Limited Opportunity to Comment

The June 5 announcement provides interested parties with a limited opportunity to comment on these, and potentially additional, relief measures in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. The announcement notes that the DDTC will limit comments to three topic areas:     

The effectiveness of each of the ITAR-relief measures on the operating environments of the regulated community during the COVID-19 pandemic;
Whether the expiration dates of these measures should be extended; and
Additional temporary relief measures necessary to respond to specific difficulties in connection with ITAR compliance as a direct result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Parties have until June 25 to submit comments.


The DDTC’s announcement of a special comment period on temporary relief measures reflects the agency’s continued awareness of the substantial burdens that the COVID-19 pandemic has placed on compliance with the ITAR. It could also suggest the DDTC’s openness to considering additional relaxation of regulatory requirements.

Companies that benefit from these kinds of special suspensions, modifications and provisions to the ITAR – or might benefit through other regulatory relief – should carefully consider whether to submit comments.

Because the window to comment is limited to 15 days, interested parties should act quickly to take advantage of this rare opportunity to expand or otherwise impact the scope of the DDTC’s relief measures.

1] https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2020-12580.pdf?utm_source=federalregister.gov&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=pi+subscription+mailing+list.

2] For a in depth look at these, and other, regulatory relief measures enacted by DDTC, see Enforcement Agencies Grant Temporary Trade Sanctions and ITAR Compliance Relief Due to COVID-19, Arnold & Porter (May 8, 2020), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2020/05/covid19-trade-sanctions-itar-compliance-relief.

3] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/06/10/2020-12580/international-traffic-in-arms-regulations-temporary-suspension-modification-or-exception-to.

4] DDTC’s relaxation of certain requirements is consistent with the general approach by the Trump Administration to relieve regulatory burdens in the interest of economic recover from the Coronavirus pandemic. For a discussion of relief in areas other than ITAR compliance, see Executive Order on Regulatory Relief Issued to Support Economic Recovery, Arnold & Porter (June 4, 2020), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2020/06/eo-on-regulatory-relief-to-support-recovery.

5] 85 Fed. Reg. 25287 (May 1, 2020).

International Compliance Blog
, 14 Jun 2020)
* Principal Author:
Ali Burney
, Esq.,
+1 202 429 8098
, Steptoe & Johnson
On June 11, 2020, the President issued a new Executive Order, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court” (the “ICC EO”).  The ICC EO authorizes economic sanctions and travel restrictions on persons who are engaged in efforts by the ICC to investigate and prosecute U.S. and allied personnel for alleged war crimes.
The President issued the ICC EO pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in response to the ICC’s “assertions of jurisdiction over personnel of the United States and certain of its allies, including the ICC Prosecutor’s investigation into actions allegedly committed by United States military, intelligence, and other personnel in or relating to Afghanistan.” In invoking IEEPA, the President declared that “any attempt by the ICC to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute any United States personnel without the consent of the United States, or of personnel of countries that are United States allies and who are not parties to the Rome Statute or have not otherwise consented to ICC jurisdiction, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”
Although the ICC EO does not immediately impose restrictions on any ICC personnel or supporter, the ICC EO authorizes the imposition of sanctions and travel prohibitions in several circumstances.
, the ICC EO authorizes the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, to impose blocking sanctions against any “foreign person” determined to have “directly engaged in an effort by the ICC to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute” any US personnel or any personnel from a US-allied country without the consent of the US government or the US allied country’s government.
, the ICC EO authorizes the imposition of blocking sanctions against any foreign persons determined: (i) to have provided material assistance (including financial support) to any persons whose property or property interests are blocked pursuant to the ICC EO (“Blocked Persons”) or for any of the sanctionable activities targeted by this EO, or (ii) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted for or on behalf of any Blocked Persons.
, the ICC EO imposes restrictions on entry into the United States by Blocked Persons and their “immediate family members,” i.e., spouses and children.
The United States is one of the few countries in the world that is not a state party to the Rome Statute (which created the ICC).   US government officials from both political parties have long criticized the ICC’s investigation of US personnel for alleged war crimes in Afghanistan as politically motivated and inappropriate.  Former National Security Advisor John Bolton, a sharp critic of the ICC, first threatened sanctions against the ICC in 2018.  Nonetheless, the use of the sanctions tool against the ICC is novel and will be controversial. The United States traditionally has deployed sanctions against foreign adversaries of the United States, non-state actors such as terrorists, weapons proliferators, and human rights abusers, and their supporters.   
This EO authorizes sanctions targeting an international institution that was established to prosecute persons who commit genocide and other serious international crimes.  The choice of economic sanctions as a tool to register opposition to the ICC’s work in Afghanistan is noteworthy.
The ICC EO does not immediately impose sanctions on anyone.  At this stage it is unclear if the US government actually intends to target ICC officials and their immediate family members or if this EO will be more symbolic and serve as a threat against any potential ICC action in the future. The Secretary of State, in published remarks, has stated that the “designations will be made on a case-by-case basis against specific individuals or entities.”
In addition to the ICC EO, Attorney General Barr, in published remarks, stated on June 11 that the Department of Justice is investigating the ICC Prosecutor’s Office, because of “substantial, credible information that raises serious concerns about a long history of financial corruption and malfeasance at the highest levels of the office of the prosecutor.”

(Source: Trump and Trade, 12 Jun 2020)
* Principal Author:
Brent Connor
, Esq., 1-202-263-4188, Thompson Hine
Shortly after taking office, President Donald Trump announced a foreign policy shift toward Cuba with the issuance of National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba (NSPM).  In announcing President Trump’s revised policy in June 2017 (see Trump and Trade Update of June 20, 2017), the United States once again restricted certain travel and sought to limit providing any advantages to the Cuban military.  As a result, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the State Department re-instituted certain export restrictions and prohibitions that had been waived during the presidency of Barack Obama.   
Details of this new Cuba policy were detailed in a Thompson Hine International Trade Update bulletin of November 20, 2017.  Generally, BIS re-instituted a policy of denial for license applications to export or re-export goods to, or for use by, certain entities or subentities the State Department identified on its Cuba Restricted List.  In addition, OFAC implemented changes to the authorizations allowing for travel to Cuba and related transactions and amended its regulations to restrict certain financial transactions for entities on the Cuba Restricted List.
Importantly for this policy shift, the State Department compiled the list of entities under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions were prohibited “as it would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.”   
This Cuba Restricted List includes various Cuban government ministries, state-owned holding companies, numerous hotels, tourist agencies and marinas, as well as multiple entities directly serving the defense and security sectors of the Cuban economy. The list will be updated as necessary, and State has clarified that entities or subentities owned or controlled by another entity or subentity on the Cuba Restricted List are not treated as restricted unless specifically named on the list.   
The State Department has updated this list on six occasions including most recently on June 12, 2020.  This recent update added six new Cuban entities:
Hotel Marqués de Cardenas de Montehermoso
Hotel Regis
Pestana Cayo Coco (also Hotel Playa Paraiso)
Centro de Buceo Varadero
Centro Internacional de Buceo Gaviota Las Molas
Delfinario Cayo Naranjo
The State Department has republished the Cuba Restriction List in its entirety in the Federal Register.  Companies considering doing business in Cuba are reminded of the significant re-implementation of U.S. export control and financial restrictions toward Cuba by President Trump and that due diligence during any transaction and consideration of the need for any BIS or OFAC licenses is critical.


11. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 75 Jobs Available; 6 New Job Openings This Week

(Source: Events & Jobs Editor)

Job Title
Job Location
Job ID
BAE Systems
, AZ
Cargolux Airlines 
Luxembourg, LU
General Atomics 
San Diego, CA
Rivian Automotive
Illinois, US
Rotterdam, NL
Total Lubmarine 
Hong Kong, HK

All Job Openings:  Click here to see the complete list of job openings. 

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* What: UK/EU Export Controls and Sanctions 101
* When: 30 Jun; 1:00 p.m. (EDT)
* Where: Webinar
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker: Richard Tauwhare
* Register: here or contact Ashleigh Foor, 1-540-433-3977

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The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
Latest Update 
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.
5 Apr 2019:84 FR 13499: Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation.


5 June 2020: 85 FR 34495 and 85 FR 34503: Additions and Amendments of the Entity List.      
DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.   Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  

23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359, comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.


DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War.

14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.

6 May 2020: 85 FR 26847, Notice (not an amendment) temporarily reducing the registration fee schedule in ITAR 122.3 until April 30, 2021. 


DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

10 Apr 2020:
85 FR 20158:

North Korea Sanctions Regulations. 


1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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