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19-1001 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

19-1001 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

Tuesday, 1 October 2019

TOP
The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events. Subscribe here. Contact us for advertising 

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  1. Items Published in Today’s Federal Register 
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions 
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)   
  3. State/DDTC: (No New Postings.)
  4. Treasury/OFAC: (No New Postings.)
  1. Jane’s 360: “China Aims to Join Arms Trade Treaty”
  1. R.L. Cassin: “Wisconsin Marketing Firm Pays $10 Million Resolve FCPA Offenses”
  2. S.L. Clark and D.O. Hindin: “Security Assistance Programs – A Guide for the Perplexed”
  3. J.W. Boscariol and C. Francis: “Canada Adopts New Export Controls and Brokering Requirements”
  4. T&B Alerts: “Changes to Export Controls in September 2019”
  1. Johanna Reeves Joins AOCG 
  1. ECS Presents “ITAR/EAR Boot Camp: Achieving Compliance” on 8-9 Oct in Savannah, GA 
  2. FCC Presents “U.S. Export Controls: ITAR from a non-U.S. Perspective,” 26 Nov in Bruchem, the Netherlands
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: DHS/Customs (5 Apr 2019), DOC/EAR (21 Aug 2019), DOC/FTR (24 Apr 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), DOE/AFAEC (23 Feb 2015), DOE/EINEM (20 Nov 2018), DOJ/ATF (14 Mar 2018), DOS/ITAR (30 Aug 2019), DOT/FACR/OFAC (9 Sep 2019), HTSUS (3 Sep 2019) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a11. Items Published in Today’s Federal Register

(Source:
Federal Register)
 

[No items of interest noted today.]

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OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a12. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions

(Source: Federal Register, 1 Oct 2019.)
 

 [No items of interest noted today.] 

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OGS_a23. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)

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OGS_a34
. 
State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
(Source: DDTC)
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OGS_a45
. 
Treasury/OFAC: (No new postings)
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NWSNEWS

NWS_a16. 
Jane’s 360: “China Aims to Join Arms Trade Treaty”
(Source:
Jane’s 360, 30 Sep. 2019.)
 
Author: Jon Grevatt
 
China is looking to join the UN-sponsored Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which seeks to regulate international trade in conventional military equipment, as early as possible, the Chinese foreign ministry has confirmed.
Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said on 28 September that “China has initiated the domestic legal procedures to join the ATT”. He added, “China is currently going through the relevant domestic legal procedures as required and striving for its accession to the ATT at an early date.”
Geng described the move as a “significant step” in China’s participation in military trade governance. “It demonstrates China’s resolution to support multilateralism and forge a community with a shared future for mankind,” he said.


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COMMCOMMENTARY

 
* Author: Richard L. Cassin, Editor at Large  

 
Quad/Graphics Inc. agreed Thursday to pay the SEC nearly $10 million to settle violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for long-running bribery schemes and cover-ups in Peru and China.
 
The Sussex, Wisconsin print and digital marketing company disgorged $6.9 million and prejudgment interest of about $960,000, and agreed to pay a civil penalty of $2 million.  The SEC resolved the enforcement action through an internal administrative order (pdf) and didn’t go to court. The company settled without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings.
 
Quad/Graphics violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions, the SEC said.  The company also violated U.S. sanctions and export laws by concealing transactions with a state-controlled Cuban telecommunications company. The DOJ declined to prosecute Quad/Graphics, according to a September 19 declination letter (pdf) published Friday. “We have reached this conclusion despite the bribery committed by employees of the Company’s subsidiaries in Peru and China,” the DOJ said. … 
 
The SEC said that despite becoming a publicly traded company with a large global workforce and operations in high risk areas, Quad’s compliance program was “almost non-existent” in 2010.  Quad/Graphics today has about 21,000 employees and operations in ten countries. It trades on the NYSE under the ticker “QUAD.”  The Peru subsidiary was formerly part of World Color Press. Its plant in Lima specializes in printing textbooks and school exam. It also prints directories, magazines, catalogs, and retail inserts, as well as telephone directories.  The China subsidiary sold automated systems to print newspapers and other products. The SEC said Thursday it considered Quad/Graphics’ self- disclosure, cooperation, and remedial efforts.
 
Quad’s remedial actions included firing employees involved in the improper conduct, giving the compliance department a bigger role and more resources, hiring a new International Trade Compliance Manager, and recruiting and training new compliance and internal audit staff with anti-corruption expertise.

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COM_a2
8
S.L. Clark and D.O. Hindin: “Security Assistance Programs–A Guide for the Perplexed”

(Source: National Defense) [Excerpts]
*Author: Samantha L. Clark, Esq., sclark@cov.com; and Doron O. Hindin, Esq., dhindin@cov.com, both of Covington & Burling LLP

Each year, the U.S. government authorizes billions of dollars’ worth of security assistance to friendly foreign countries to support ongoing defense cooperation and in pursuit of security and diplomacy goals. In fiscal year 2018 alone, it authorized defense exports totaling $192.3 billion, an increase of 6 percent from the preceding fiscal year.
The prodigious 2018 sum is composed of $55.66 billion in foreign military sales, a security assistance program administered by the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The remaining sum of $136.6 billion was authorized through direct commercial sales, an acquisition route for both private and government purchasers that is administered principally by the State Department’s directorate of defense trade controls.
The Defense Department’s inspector general March 19 announced that an audit was about to commence on the FMS agreement development process. The audit will assess how the DSCA, military departments and other stakeholders coordinate foreign government requirements for defense articles and services and whether the Defense Department makes appropriate use of the results of the FMS agreement development process. The House Armed Services Committee mandated the audit in response to congressional concern over the “slow, cumbersome and complicated” FMS program, with its uncoordinated acquisition processes that do not necessarily support U.S. national security objectives or the U.S. defense industrial base. Recommendations from audits often become legislative initiatives in the following year’s annual defense policy bill.
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 authorizes the president, with approval from the secretary of state, to sell, lease and grant defense articles and services to friendly foreign governments and to international organizations. This presidential authority has been delegated to the State Department and to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
Under the program, foreign government purchasers acquire defense articles or services directly from the U.S. government, which in turn fulfills the foreign government requirements either from military stocks or through private sector procurement. By contrast, a direct commercial sale exists when, pursuant to Defense and State Department approval, a foreign government makes a purchase directly from a private contractor, oftentimes after internal negotiations over the country-specific requirements that need to be integrated into the items being acquired.  Typically, these two transactions must be financed completely by the foreign government purchaser. However, in the pursuit of U.S. national interests and to support allied forces, Congress routinely appropriates funds in order to finance select critical transactions.
Parties to an FMS transaction consist of the U.S. Defense Department and the foreign government purchaser. The terms of the transaction negotiated by the parties are memorialized in a “letter of offer and acceptance,” the government-to-government contract for the acquisition. With a letter in hand, the U.S. government then fulfills the requirements, either by turning to its stock or to private contractors.
When administering an FMS case, the U.S. government is bound by the thousands of rules codified in the security assistance management manual. The services follow the manual, but generally also follow their own internal security assistance manuals, which provide their interpretations and offer additional directives relevant to the particular service or department.  Although the letters are tailored to the particular transaction and the foreign government requirements, many key provisions are predetermined by the rules. For example, each letter must include the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s most current “LOA standard terms and conditions,” which, among other things, commits the U.S. government to “in general, employ the same contract clauses, the same contract administration, and the same quality and audit inspection procedures as would be used in procuring for itself.”  . . .
The rules in the manual and in other government-issued security assistance guidelines apply directly only to U.S. agencies, and not to private contractors. Instead, private contractors bidding on and fulfilling FMS requirements are bound by the general legal apparatus of U.S. procurement law as governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. Accordingly, from the perspective of private contractors, it is generally immaterial whether defense articles or services are being provided for use by the U.S. government or for resale to an FMS purchaser. In both scenarios, U.S. government contracting law applies. As a result, it is not uncommon for U.S. contractors to perform on FMS cases without ever knowing that the items they are supplying are intended for foreign government end-users.
That said, exceptions do exist in which U.S. contractors develop direct relationships with the FMS purchasers. For example, the regulations exempt the U.S. government from holding a competitive bidding process in response to a sole-source FMS request. In addition, it is not uncommon in this context for a contractor to interact directly with the foreign government purchaser in order to negotiate offsets and countertrade agreements or to assist in negotiating the letter of offer and acceptance with the U.S. government.
In a direct commercial sales transaction, foreign governments engage directly with private contractors to purchase defense equipment or services. The U.S. government is not a party to the transaction and instead operates in an oversight and regulatory capacity, ensuring that export control laws are observed and that national interests are safeguarded.
The primary regulator in these transactions is State’s directorate of defense trade controls, which takes guidance from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Defense Technology Security Administration, and from various military departments. Compliance with the International Traffic In Arms Regulations (ITAR), which implements the Arms Export Control Act and is overseen by State, is required for the export of defense articles, which includes any hardware and technical data related to items with military application. For less sensitive defense and dual-use items, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security is the relevant export control licensing authority.
Because contractors in these transactions sell directly to the foreign purchasers and not to the U.S. government, the burden of U.S. procurement law is avoided. Moreover, because the strictures of the security assistance management manual and of other U.S. agency rules do not apply, parties can negotiate the terms of sale with greater freedom and flexibility. However, the manual also maintains an “FMS-only list” that enumerates categories of items that are ineligible for direct transactions, such as fighter aircraft, missiles, sonar and unmanned systems.
But even when permitted, there are drawbacks to direct transactions, as contractors are exposed to an array of risks and imbalances associated with negotiating with and selling directly to foreign governments. Such risks include, among others, exposure to allegations of foreign corruption, sovereign immunity defenses that could be raised by the buyer in the event a dispute emerges, or the imposition by the foreign government of expensive or unreasonable offset or countertrade requirements. Moreover, it is not uncommon for contractors to find it difficult to negotiate favorable terms with foreign governments, which, for example, routinely insist on subjecting the contract to their domestic choice of law and to resolving disputes before their local courts.
Meanwhile, Congress routinely appropriates funds to finance purchases by friendly foreign governments. Each year, the president submits a foreign military financing budget request for consideration by the Senate and House committees on appropriations. The foreign operations and related programs appropriations subcommittees review the request and determine the level of funding to set in that year’s appropriations bill.
When utilizing the financing, most countries are required to fulfill their procurement through the foreign military sales route, utilizing their allotted funds as “FMS credit” to finance approved purchases. However, 10 designated countries, when in good standing with the United States and authorized to receive security assistance, are permitted to utilize the financing also through direct sales purchases, through a transaction framework known as direction commercial contracting. The countries are: Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Portugal, Pakistan, Yemen and Greece. 
Generally, the financing is earmarked for advanced weapons systems aimed at preserving a foreign ally’s qualitative military edge, while supporting interoperability between U.S. and foreign military forces. As a result, the policy is to deny requests for low technology items or commodities, such as fuel, food, small caliber weapons and munitions or office equipment.
In FMS credit transactions, the financing allocated for a particular country is deposited into a trust account established and administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency on behalf of that country. The money in that account is used to pay the U.S. government, if the FMS is fulfilled through Defense Department stock, or private contractors fulfilling requirements. From the perspective of private contractors, there are no operative differences between bidding and performing on a U.S. government contract funded by FMS credit or, for regular cases, by national funds of the foreign government. In both scenarios, the payor is the U.S. government.
Several statutory restrictions limit use of FMS credit. Thus, absent an offshore procurement waiver, credit is generally not available to non-U.S. vendors or for any end-items whose value is composed of 50 percent or more non-U.S. content. Waivers may only be issued if, with concurrence from the Departments of Commerce and State, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency determines that the allocation of U.S. funds will not adversely impact the U.S. economy or defense industrial mobilization base. In addition, credit is not available for co-production abroad of U.S.-origin items and may only cover transportation costs incurred from U.S. flag ships or aircraft.
An additional bedrock rule in the guidelines is that for items with mixed U.S. and non-U.S. content, absent an exception, the financing may be used only to cover the cost of the U.S. content. As a result, contractors performing on a direct commercial contract must maintain strict “cost accounting” records that distinguish between U.S. and non-U.S. content. Those records must be reported to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency as a prerequisite for payment.
The guidelines do not clarify when an item is deemed to have been “manufactured and assembled” in the United States, and guidance rooted in the Buy American Act or the Trade Agreements Act is inapposite, given that those U.S. procurement laws do not apply to direct contracts. Instead, prior to allocating financing in such contracts, the agency generally expects to see that an item underwent a process in the United States that resulted in substantial added value and significant U.S. employment.
The guidelines make clear that any unwillingness or inability by a contractor to comply with them can lead to debarment from future direct contracts, unless it actively demonstrates that past non-compliance has been remediated and provides reasonable assurances of future adherence to regulations.
The security assistance programs discussed above present distinct risks and opportunities. Their applicable regulatory frameworks are complicated and continually evolve, and they will likely undergo yet further reform as they incorporate the results of the inspector general’s latest audit. Nonetheless, when navigated with the proper care, these programs offer vast contracting opportunities for U.S. and foreign companies, provide strategic support to foreign allies, and play a key role in U.S. defense and foreign policy.

  
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(Source: McCarthy Tètrault Blog) [Excerpts.]
 
* Authors: John W. Boscariol, Esq., atjboscariol@mccarthy.ca, 416-601-7835; Carmen Francis, Esq., atcfrancis@mccarthy.ca, 416-601-8854; Oksana Migitko, omigitko@mccarthy.ca, 416-801-8542; all of McCarthy Tétrault, LLP, Toronto
 
Ground-breaking changes are now in force impacting Canadian export controls and certain activities abroad regarding export controlled goods and technology.
 
Earlier this month Canada became a State Party to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a treaty establishing standards for international trade in a broad range of conventional arms that currently counts more than 100 State Parties. To meet its ATT obligations Canada amended the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) and adopted a package of brokering regulations, namely, the Brokering Control List, Brokering Permit Regulations, Regulations Specifying Activities that Do Not Constitute Brokering, General Brokering Permit No 1, and General Export Permit No 47 (ATT Package). This ATT Package came into force on September 1, 2019. Please see our previous publication on the brokering controls and new standards for export and brokering permits here.
 
The newly-established legislative scheme imposes controls over brokering activities. This is a significant development for Canadian industry as this is the first time such controls have been introduced in Canada. Therefore, anyone involved in international trade in defence goods or technology should review the ATT Package thoroughly, and assess the implications for their business activities. 
 
How Did We Get Here?
 
The path to Canada’s ATT accession has been long and tedious. The ATT was first addressed in the UN in December 2006. The underlying reason for the discussion was that while there are some international standards in place with respect to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, the area of conventional arms remained untouched.
 
The ATT has been the subject of heavy negotiation. It took six years to adopt it, and it has taken Canada a further six years to accede to the ATT. Not until in March 2019 did Global Affairs Canada submit the ATT Package for public consultation. The responses gathered during the consultation period largely supported suggested regulatory steps which led to the adoption of the ATT Package with only minor technical changes.
 
Extraterritorial Application
 
The biggest hurdle in the path of Canada’s accession to the ATT has been the extraterritorial application of brokering controls. During ATT negotiations, Canada objected to the proposed brokering provisions voicing concerns over the efficacy of extraterritorial application due to practical enforcement obstacles. However, the amended EIPA prohibits unauthorized brokering by any Canadian company or individual whether one is located in Canada or abroad, which essentially means that new Canadian brokering obligations apply on an extraterritorial basis. All persons in Canada as well as Canadians (including permanent residents) abroad now require a Canadian permit to engage in brokering activities. An offence committed outside of Canada can be prosecuted in any territorial division of Canada.
 
In sum, businesses who are engaged – either directly or indirectly – in defence-related transactions should carefully review the ATT Package, and in particular its application in scenarios where Canadian companies facilitate arms purchases or sales that do not involve exports from Canada.
 
Definition of Brokering
 
The EIPA defines brokering as an activity aimed “to arrange or negotiate a transaction that relates to the movement of goods or technology included in a Brokering Control List from a foreign country to another foreign country”. This means that the import or export of goods or technology in or out of Canada or negotiations or arrangements solely in respect of such transfers are not covered by the new brokering regulations. As was pointed out in our previous publication on the brokering controls here, there is uncertainty as to whether a transaction involving the movement of technology from one place to another that does not include the disclosure of the contents of that technology (e.g., on a USB key that remains unopened) is captured by the new brokering regulations.
 
Items That Fall Under the Brokering Controls
 
The new Brokering Control List identifies the items for which a brokering permit is required. It encompasses all Group 2 (Munitions List) and newly formed Group 9 items listed on the ECL (eight ATT categories of full-system conventional arms), as well as other ECL items, including dual-use ones, that are likely to be used to produce or develop a weapon of mass destruction.
 
The New Substantial Risk Test
 
Canada’s commitments under the ATT require that proposed exports and brokering activities be assessed to determine whether there is an “overriding risk” that the grant of a permit on certain brokering activity would contribute to the following:
· 
undermining of peace and security;
· 
a serious violation of international humanitarian law or international human rights law;
· 
an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism or transnational organized crime to which Canada is a party; or
· 
serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.
 
Of interest is the fact that Canada’s implementation of its ATT commitments employs a “substantial risk” threshold, rather than the original “overriding risk” language set out in the ATT itself. This differing terminology has ostensibly been used because the concept of “substantial risk” is one that is used elsewhere in Canadian legislation, and consequently the Canadian government has described it as a more familiar standard than that of “overriding risk.” The question as to whether a substantial risk standard is in fact an easier threshold to cross than overriding risk remains an open one.
 
Assessing Substantial Risk
 
In its administrative guidance explaining the application of the substantial risk test, the Canadian Government describes the threshold as being met where “compelling evidence exists of a connection between the proposed export and the negative consequences.” This clearly suggests an evidence-based assessment, as opposed to one that considers hypothetical or speculative risks.
 
Notably, this is the first instance in which such humanitarian factors have been expressly incorporated into the export/import controls framework. This recent development demonstrates increasing alignment between Canada’s export control regime and the objectives pursued by its economic sanctions program.
 
If it is determined that there is a substantial risk that the intended export or brokering activity would result in any of the above negative consequences, and such risk cannot be mitigated, the permit application must be denied. 
 
Mitigating Factors
 
As noted, mitigating factors will be taken into consideration in the application of the substantial risk test. While these will ultimately vary on a case-by-case basis, additional end-use statements or declarations from the importing state regarding the intended use of the goods may be of assistance, along with undertakings and/or guarantees not to use the goods in question for purposes counter to the objectives of the ATT, Likewise, the existence of transparency and information-exchange agreements between Canada and the importing state may mitigate in favour of permit approval. Accordingly, permit applicants should leverage these factors when assembling their application packages.
 
Export to the United States
 
While Canadian business has enjoyed permit-free export and transfer of most military items to the United States since World War II, compliance with the ATT required Canada to report on its export of full-system conventional arms, including those shipped to the United States.
 
To satisfy this ATT obligation, Canada has created the eight ATT categories of full-system conventional arms that will require a permit to be exported to the United States. The new General Export Permit No. 47 provides a streamlined permitting process that eliminates the need to file individual export permit applications for the majority of ATT items. The permit-free movement of other military goods and technology to the United States remains intact.
 
Implementation
 
The industries and entities potentially affected by the ATT Package include Canadian defence, security, and aerospace industries, companies that manufacture, export and/or broker military and dual-use goods and technologies, and those providing related technical and after-sale services. These companies should be carefully reviewing the impact of the new controls on their export and technology transfers from Canada, as well as their activities outside Canada.

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(Source: Thomsen and Burke LLP Newsletter) [Excerpts.] 
 

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MSEX/IM MOVERS & SHAKERS

MS_a114.
Johanna Reeves Joins Alpha Omega Consulting Group

(Source: Christine McGinn, christine.mcginn@alphaocg.com )
Johanna Reeves, attorney at Reeves & Dola, LLP, has announced that she has joined Alpha Omega Consulting Group LLC, https://alphaocg.com/. Johanna can be reached at
jreeves@reevesdola.com, johanna.reeves@alphaocg.com or 202-683-4200.

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TEEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

TE_a115.
ECS Presents “ITAR/EAR Boot Camp: Achieving Compliance” on 8-9 Oct in Savannah, GA

(Source: ECS)
 
* What:  ECS ITAR/EAR Boot Camp:  Achieving Compliance
* When:  October 8-9, 2019
* Sponsor:  Export Compliance Solutions & Consulting (ECS)
* ECS Instructors:  Suzanne Palmer, Mal Zerden
* Registe here or by calling 866-238-4018 or email spalmer@exportcompliancesolutions.com.

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TE_a216. FCC Presents “U.S. Export Controls: ITAR from a Non-U.S. Perspective,” 26 Nov in Bruchem, the Netherlands  

This intermediate-level training course is specifically designed for compliance professionals and those in a similar role who aim to stay up-to-date with the latest International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) requirements that apply to non-U.S. transactions. The course will cover multiple topics relevant for organizations outside the U.S. that are subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, including but not limited to: the U.S. regulatory framework, key ITAR concepts and definitions, tips regarding classification and licensing, essential steps to ensure an ITAR compliant shipment, how to handle a (potential) non-compliance issue, recent enforcement trends, and the latest regulatory amendments, including the latest U.S. Export Control Reform developments. Participants will receive a certification upon completion of the training.

Details
* What: U.S. Export Controls: The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) from a non-U.S. Perspective
* When: Tuesday, 26 Nov 2019
 – Welcome and Registration: 9.00 am – 9.30 am
 – Training hours: 9.30 am – 4.30 pm
* Where: Full Circle Compliance, Landgoed Groenhoven, Dorpsstraat 6, Bruchem, the Netherlands
* Information & Registration: via the
event page or contact FCC at
events@fullcirclecompliance.eu or + 31 (0)23 – 844 – 9046
* This course can be followed in combination with “U.S. Export Controls: The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) from a non-U.S. Perspective” (27 Nov 2019), and/or “The ABC of Foreign Military Sales” (29 Nov 2019). Please see the event page for our combo pricing deals.

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ENEDITOR’S NOTES

 
* Fletcher Knebel (Fletcher Knebel; 1 Oct 1911 – 26 Feb 1993; was an American author. He wrote fifteen books, most of them fiction, and all of them dealing with politics, intrigue and social upheaval. His best-known novel is Seven Days in May, about an attempted military coup in the United States. The book was a success, reaching number one on the New York Times bestseller list, and was made into a successful movie also named “Seven Days in May.”)
– “Smoking is one of the leading causes of statistics.”
– “Our forefathers made one mistake. What they should have fought for was representation without taxation.”

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EN_a318
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

 

*
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.  Implemented by Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs & Border Protection.

  – Last Amendment: 5 Apr 2019:
84 FR 13499-13513: Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation
 


DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR)
: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security.


  – Last Amendment: 21 August 2019: 
84 FR 43493-43501
: Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List and Revision of Entries on the Entity List and 84 FR 43487-43493: Temporary General License: Extension of Validity, Clarifications to Authorized Transactions, and Changes to Certification Statement Requirements

 


* DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.  Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau.
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.
  – The latest edition (4 July 2019) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR is a 152-page Word document containing all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.   

 

DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense.
  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)
 
 
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359, comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. This rule also identifies destinations with respect to which most assistance would be generally authorized and destinations that would require a specific authorization by the Secretary of Energy.
 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Nov 2018, 10 CFR 110.6, Re-transfers.
 

* DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War.  Implemented by Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives.
  – Last Amendment: 14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239-9240: Bump-Stock-Type Devices 

 

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. Implemented by Dep’t of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
  – Last Amendment: 30 Aug 2019: 84 FR 45652, Adjustment of Controls for Lower Performing Radar and Continued Temporary Modification of Category XI of the United States Munitions List.  
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 30 August 2019) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR is a 371-page Word document containing all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment. The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website. BAFTR subscribers receive a $25 discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.
 

* DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders.
Implemented by Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

– Last Amendment: 9 Sep 2019:
 84 FR 47121-47123 – Cuban Assets Control Regulations

  

* 
USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA)
, 1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex. Implemented by U.S. International Trade Commission. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
 

 – Last Amendment: 4 Sep 2019: Harmonized System Update (HSU) 1915    

 – HTS codes for AES are available here.
 – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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EN_a0319
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published  
here

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EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; and Assistant Editor, Alexander Witt. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 7,500 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

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