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19-0731 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

19-0731 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

Wednesday, 31 July 2019

TOP
The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events. Subscribe here. Contact us for advertising 

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  1. President Continues National Emergency Concerning Lebanon
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions 
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  4. Dutch Government Releases Report on Dutch Arms Export Policy for 2018
  1. Defense News: “UK Defense Exports set New Record in 2018”
  2. Reuters: “U.S. Appeals Court upholds Ruling against Chinese Banks in N. Korea Sanctions Probe”
  1. M. Mancuso, A. Rapa & A. Cotterill: “Economic Sanctions and Export Controls Update Q2 2019 (Part I of II)”
  2. M. Volkov: “Five Common Weaknesses in OFAC Sanctions Compliance Programs”
  3. S. Becker, N. Fischer & S. Hafeez: “Update on U.S. Government Review of “Emerging and Foundational” Technologies”
  1. ECTI Presents United States Export Control (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) Seminar in Amsterdam
  2. FCC Presents “Designing an ICP for Export Controls & Sanctions”, 1 Oct in Bruchem, the Netherlands
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: DHS/Customs (5 Apr 2019), DOC/EAR (27 June 2019), DOC/FTR (24 Apr 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), DOE/AFAEC (23 Feb 2015), DOE/EINEM (20 Nov 2018), DOJ/ATF (14 Mar 2018), DOS/ITAR (19 Apr 2018), DOT/FACR/OFAC (23 July 2019), HTSUS (22 July 2019) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

(Source: Federal Register, 31 July 2019.)
 
84 FR 37559: ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS; Lebanon; Continuation of National Emergency
 
On August 1, 2007, by Executive Order 13441, the President declared a national emergency with respect to Lebanon pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the actions of certain persons to undermine Lebanon’s legitimate and democratically elected government or democratic institutions; to contribute to the deliberate breakdown in the rule of law in Lebanon, including through politically motivated violence and intimidation; to reassert Syrian control or contribute to Syrian interference in Lebanon; or to infringe upon or undermine Lebanese sovereignty. Such actions contribute to political and economic instability in that country and the region.
 
Certain ongoing activities, such as Iran’s continuing
arms transfers to Hizballah–which include increasingly sophisticated weapons systems–serve to undermine Lebanese sovereignty, contribute to political and economic instability in the region, and continue to constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared on August 1, 2007, and the measures adopted on that date to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond August 1, 2019. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency with respect to Lebanon declared in Executive Order 13441.
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OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a12. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register, 24 July 2019.)

 

[No items of interest noted today.]

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OGS_a23
.
Commerce/BIS (No new postings.)

(Source: Commerce/BIS)

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OGS_a34. 
State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
(Source: State/DDTC)

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OGS_a45. Dutch Government Releases Report on Dutch Arms Export Policy for 2018

(Source:
Rijksoverheid, 31 July 2019.)
 
The report can be found
here (in Dutch).

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NWSNEWS

NWS_a16
Defense News: “UK Defense Exports set New Record in 2018”

(Source:
Defense News, 30 July 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
Sales of Typhoon jets to Qatar and F-35 related components to the U.S. were largely behind a record breaking year which saw British defense exports in 2018 reach £14 billion, according to new figures released July 30 by the Department for International Trade(DIT).
 
Export sales rose by £5 billion compared with 2017, boosting the British into second place in terms of global defense exports and pushing Russia and France into third and fourth place, respectively, for the year. 
 
The DIT report illustrates how reliant Britain is on Middle East partners like Saudi Arabia and Qatar for its high performing exports business. The report shows that close to 80 percent of all British defense exports came from the region last year. Anti-arms campaigners in Britain are currently mounting a challenge against the legality of some previous defense exports to the Saudis. …

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NWS_a27. Reuters: “U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Ruling Against Chinese Banks in N.Korea Sanctions Probe”

(Source:
Reuters, 30 July 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
A U.S. appeals court said on Tuesday it had upheld a ruling by a U.S. judge who held three large Chinese banks in contempt for refusing to comply with subpoenas in a probe into violations of sanctions on North Korea, opening the way for heavy daily fines. 
 
“The District Court’s contempt orders against all three Banks appealed from in these causes is hereby affirmed,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit said in a filing on Tuesday. It did not make public the reasons. 
 
In a ruling in May, Beryl Howell, Washington D.C.’s chief federal district judge, held the banks in contempt for refusing to comply with U.S. investigators’ demands that they hand over records connected to the alleged movement of tens of millions of dollars in violation of international sanctions on North Korea. …

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COMMCOMMENTARY

COM_a18
M. Mancuso, A. Rapa & A. Cotterill: “Economic Sanctions and Export Controls Update Q2 2019 (Part I of II)”

(Source:
Kirkland & Ellis, 29 July 2019.)
 
* Authors: Mario Mancuso, Esq.,
mario.mancuso@kirkland.com, +1 202 389 5070, Anthony Rapa, Esq.,
anthony.rapa@kirkland.com, +1 202 389 5019, Abigail Cotterill, Esq.,
abigail.cotterill@kirkland.com, +1 202 389 5029, all of Kirkland & Ellis.
 
Several important legislative, regulatory, and enforcement updates took place related to economic sanctions and export controls for the second quarter of 2019. Kirkland & Ellis attorneys discuss these actions, and what they may indicate about trends and takeaways in the second half of 2019.
 
The View from Washington: Key Compliance Takeaways
 
– The Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) continued to build on its heightened Q1 enforcement efforts, bringing 13 settlement and penalty actions against non-U.S. financial institutions, as well as U.S. and non-U.S. companies across a wide array of industries including shipping, software, and e-commerce travel.
 
– OFAC issued 
A Framework for Compliance Commitments (the Framework), which formally puts companies on notice of its expectations with respect to an effective economic sanctions compliance program (SCP). Notably, OFAC expressly indicated that it would take into account whether a company maintains an effective SCP in determining what penalties to impose in the event of violations.
 
– OFAC’s action quickly followed the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) publication of its 
Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs guidance, indicating marked interagency attention and coordination in corporate enforcement actions and an increased government-wide focus on national security and foreign policy-related cases.
 
– With respect to export controls, the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security’s (BIS) placement of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (Huawei) on the 
Entity List coupled with the president’s issuance of the 
Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (the Executive Order), would seem to raise the stakes of the trade war and reflect increasing strategic competition between the U.S. and China.
 
Legislative and Regulatory Updates
 
OFAC Compliance Framework
On May 2, OFAC published its Framework, setting out guidance regarding its expectations for effective SCPs. The Framework formalizes the enhanced focus on SCPs seen in recent enforcement actions, and indicates that the presence or absence of an effective SCP will be a factor for consideration in assessing appropriate penalties for apparent violations.
 
OFAC indicated that, at a minimum, an effective SCP consists of five elements: (1) management commitment; (2) risk assessment; (3) internal controls; (4) testing and auditing; and (5) training. OFAC emphasizes that an effective SCP needs to be risk-based, i.e., shaped to the organization and its risk factors, as well as dynamic, i.e., constantly updated and recalibrated.   
Entity Listing and Executive Order
 
On May 16, BIS designated Huawei and 68 of its affiliates on the Entity List, an action which effectively denies Huawei access to the U.S. supply chain by imposing a licensing requirement (with a policy of denial) with respect to the export, re-export, and transfer to Huawei of parts, components, software, and technology subject to the Export Administration Regulations.

Under a 
temporary general license in effect until August 19, BIS has authorized certain transactions with Huawei, including those necessary to maintain and support existing fully operational networks and equipment, subject to pre-existing contracts between Huawei and third parties.

Perhaps indicative that Huawei is an instrument in the ongoing trade negotiations between the U.S. and China, on June 29, President Trump announced at the 
G20 in Japan that he was prepared to ease restrictions on Huawei. However, on July 9, Commerce Secretary Ross 
stated that, though the U.S. would issue licenses to export to Huawei “where there is no threat to U.S. national security,” both the scope of items requiring licenses and the licensing policy of denial remain unchanged.

The Huawei Entity List additions came on the same day as President Trump’s May 15 Executive Order, which lays a framework for forthcoming rules that could impose a broader sectoral ban on dealing with Huawei and other Chinese companies. As the Executive Order gives relevant federal agencies the authority to act against what the U.S. may determine poses an unacceptable risk to national security, it could also cover parties from countries including Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

With implementing rules expected in October, the full contours of the covered prohibitions, and the extent of their reach, have yet to be determined.

 
Enforcement Developments
 
Non-U.S. Financial Institutions
 
On April 9, OFAC reached a $639 million 
settlement with Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) for apparent violations of the former Burma and Sudan sanctions programs, as well as the Iran, Syria, and Cuba sanctions programs.
 
From June 2009 to June 2014, SCB processed 9,335 sanctioned country transactions valued at over $437 million through or to the United States, in many cases involving SCB’s Dubai branch processing transactions for Iran-related customers through its office in New York or other U.S. financial institutions. SCB had not voluntarily self-disclosed, and the apparent violations were considered egregious.

Notably, the OFAC settlement was part of a $1.1 billion global settlement with related state, federal, and U.K. authorities pursuant to an investigation initiated by OFAC in 2013 into Iranian accounts SCB Dubai continued to maintain, despite SCB having entered into a settlement with OFAC for similar conduct in 2012.

On April 15, OFAC announced 
settlements totaling $611 million with UniCredit Bank AG, UniCredit Bank Austria AG, and UniCredit S.p.A. (together, UniCredit), for apparent violations of multiple sanctions programs, including the Iran, Syria, Cuba, and former Libya programs. OFAC noted that the apparent violations were not voluntarily disclosed, and were in multiple instances egregious. The UniCredit settlements resulted from coordinated interagency effort, and were announced in conjunction with enforcement actions by DOJ and New York state authorities, which led to a combined $1.3 billion resolution.

Between January 2007 and December 2012, UniCredit processed more than 2,800 sanctioned country-related payments valued at over $650 million through U.S. financial institutions. OFAC found that UniCredit Bank AG acted with intent to circumvent U.S. sanctions in maintaining formal “OFAC neutral” procedures to conceal the sanctioned country nexus in transactions to be processed through intermediary U.S. financial institutions.

It also found that the bank acted with reckless disregard in operating U.S. dollar accounts on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and its subsidiaries and affiliates, and in failing to implement controls to prevent such activity. OFAC likewise found UniCredit acted with reason to know it was violating U.S. law in processing U.S. dollar-denominated payments under letters of credit issued for delivery of oil from Kazakhstan, while having access to information showing that its customer would ultimately send that oil to Iran.

 
(Part II of II will be included in the Daily Bugle of 1 Aug 2019.)

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COM_a2
9
M. Volkov: “Five Common Weaknesses in OFAC Sanctions Compliance Programs”

(Source:
Volkov Law Group Blog, 30 July 2019, Reprinted by permission.)
 
* Author: Michael Volkov, Esq., Volkov Law Group,
mvolkov@volkovlaw.com, 240-505-1992.
 
As companies elevate their “game” in sanctions compliance, it is important that compliance officers critically examine the strengths and weaknesses of their compliance programs.  Many companies already have a screening technology but little else beyond a basic screening process.
 
From my vantage point, I have observed some common weaknesses:
 
Segregation of Duties and Control Process:  Many companies maintain a screening program and assign the responsibility to a single person.  Such an arrangement can be risky.  A single employee may incorrectly or corruptly “approve” a transaction despite significant red flags or even a negative result.  By segregating the process into discrete tasks (e.g. review and approval), a company can eliminate this risk.  Further, a company should create a specific procedure for identifying a red flag, elevating the red flag and resolving the red flag.  A documented and established process for screening and resolution of issues is a critical component of an effective sanctions compliance program.
 
Beneficial Ownership and the 50 Percent Rule: The compliance community recognizes the importance of identifying beneficial owners of a specific organization.  It is a critical part of due diligence and risk management for not only sanctions but anti-corruption and money laundering risks.  Compliance officers have to implement information gathering processes to include beneficial ownership and verification of such ownership.  In the sanctions context, such information is critical for applying the 50 Percent Rule, which extends a sanctions prohibition against a named entity or individual to any related entities in which the entity or individual (or combination thereof) owns 50 percent or more.  The OFAC prohibition therefore extends beyond those entities or individuals listed as a Specially Designated National to unlisted but related entities as well.  Too often companies ignore the beneficial ownership requirement and the 50 Percent Rule when evaluating a specific transaction.
 
Sanctions Search Mistakes: On occasion, companies make mistakes when conducting searches.  They fail to recognize close “matches” or ignore refinements to identifiers or common spellings in specific geographic areas.  Unfortunately, OFAC screening is not just a “yes” or “no” process – it involves more judgment calls and investigation than recognized.  As the stakes increase, companies have to invest in training and auditing to ensure consistent quality and accuracy in searches.
 
Third-Party Risk Mitigation:  In order to mitigate potential third-party risks and transfers of products to prohibited persons and countries, companies have to employ a robust set of controls to ensure compliance by third parties.  A company cannot sell its products to a distributor, who in turn, redistributes the product to a prohibited party.  To mitigate such risks, companies have to secure robust OFAC compliance certifications as part of a contract, and monitor and verify resale of products to lawful parties.  Such activity has to be included in regular training and auditing programs.
 
Failure to Audit, Measure and Improve:  A vital part of any compliance program is to review its performance.  An independent review of a compliance program provides important insights into performance, weaknesses in the program, and remediation of the program.  If a company is committed to maintaining an effective sanctions compliance program, the company has to audit, test and monitor the program. 

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COM_a3
10
S. Becker, N. Fischer & S. Hafeez: “Update on U.S. Government Review of “Emerging and Foundational” Technologies”

(Source:
Pillsbury Global Trade and Sanctions Law, 29 July 2019.)
 
* Authors: Stephan E. Becker, Esq.,
stephan.becker@pillsburylaw.com, +1 202 663 8277, Nancy A. Fischer, Esq.,
nancy.fischer@pillsburylaw.com, +1 202 663 8965, Sahar J. Hafeez, Esq.,
sahar.hafeez@pillsburylaw.com, +1 202 663 8051, all of Pillsbury.
 
Recent comments from Bureau of Industry (“BIS”) officials at the BIS Update indicate the U.S. Government is progressing towards more detailed proposed rules with respect to both “emerging” and “foundational” technologies that will be come subject to future export controls. This required rulemaking is part of an interagency effort mandated by the under the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”) of 2018.
 
The ECRA requires the U.S. Government, led by the Commerce Department, to identify and place export controls on “emerging” and “foundational” technologies. Once identified, the technologies will be subject to unilateral (i.e., United States) controls, with a license requirement for a number of countries, including China. Such technologies are also to be proposed for multilateral control by other countries, such as through U.S. participation in The Wassenaar Arrangement. These export control efforts are running in parallel to the U.S. Treasury Department-led effort to implement new regulations governing foreign investment reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”).
 
As discussed 
here, in November 2018, BIS issued a notice seeking public comment on criteria for identifying “emerging technologies”. The comment period closed in January 2019 with approximately 200 comments submitted. Since then, BIS officials have engaged with stakeholders and have been formulating their analytical framework for establishing controls on such technologies. Technologies identified in the notice 
list include biotechnology, artificial intelligence (“AI”) and machine learning technology, quantum information and sensing technology, additive manufacturing (e.g., 3D printing), and robotics. With regard to AI, BIS noted that its review falls under three categories: (1) analyzing whether new processors continue to be captured appropriately under existing controls for AI technologies; (2) identifying AI technologies that are not currently controlled; and (3) identifying very specialized applications of AI that should be controlled.
 
Recent statements from U.S. Government officials and members of Congress suggest the intention is 
not to implement blanket controls; rather, BIS will be employing a risk-based approach aimed at identifying key technologies that should be controlled. As part of their analysis, the officials noted that they are assessing the foreign availability of the technology at issue.
 
BIS officials stated that the proposed rule on “emerging technologies” will be issued in “weeks, not months.” The timing is important because: (1) “emerging technologies” identified through this process will become subject to stricter export controls, and (2) certain types of foreign investments in U.S. companies that develop the identified emerging technologies will be subject to mandatory filings with CFIUS. We anticipate a large number of interested industry participants will submit comments on the proposed rule, seeking to further refine and clarify the types of technologies warranting control.
 
With respect to “foundational technologies”, BIS advised that the process for identifying such technologies will be similar to the one for “emerging technologies”. We therefore expect BIS to release representative categories for foundational technologies to be issued in the near future, likely sequenced in coordination with the proposed rule for emerging technologies.

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TEEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

TE_a1 11. ECTI Presents United States Export Control (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) Seminar in Amsterdam 

(Source: Jill Kincaid;
jill@learnexportcompliance.com)
 
* What: United States Export Control (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) Seminar Series in Amsterdam, The Netherlands (for EU and other non-US Companies)
* When: ITAR Seminar: Sep 30-Oct 1, 2019; EAR/OFAC Seminar: Oct 2-3, 2019
* Where: Amsterdam, Hilton Amsterdam Hotel; Apollolaan 138, 1077 BG, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker Panel: Scott Gearity, Greg Creeser, Stephan Müller
* Register
here, or email
Jessica Lemon, 540-433-3977.

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TE_a212. FCC Presents “Designing an ICP for Export Controls & Sanctions”, 1 Oct in Bruchem, the Netherlands

 
This training course is designed for compliance officers, managers, and other professionals who aim to enhance their organization’s compliance efforts. The course will cover multiple topics and tackle various key questions, including but not limited to:
– Setting the Scene: ensuring compliance in the export control and sanctions arena
– What is expected from your organization? A closer look at the official frameworks and guidelines from U.S. and European government agencies
– Key elements of an ICP
– Best practice tips for enhancing your current compliance efforts  
– Internal controls samples (policies, procedures, instructions)
– Strategic benefits of having an ICP.
* What: Designing an Internal Compliance Program (ICP) for Export Controls & Sanctions
* Date: Tuesday, 1 Oct 2019
* Location: Full Circle Compliance, Landgoed Groenhoven, Dorpsstraat 6, Bruchem, The Netherlands
* Times:
  – Registration and welcome: 9.00 am – 9.30 am
  – Training course hours: 9.30 am – 4.30 pm
* Level: Intermediate
* Target Audience:  the course provides valuable insights for both compliance professionals, employees and (senior / middle) management working in any industry subject to U.S. and/or EU (member state) export control laws and sanctions regulations.
* Instructors: Drs. Ghislaine C.Y. Gillessen RA and Marco M. Crombach MSc.
* Information & Registration: click
here or contact us at 
events@fullcirclecompliance.eu or 31 (0)23 – 844 – 9046.  

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ENEDITOR’S NOTES

 

*
Milton Friedman (31 Jul 1912 – 16 Nov 2006; was an American economist who received the 1976 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his research on consumption analysis, monetary history and theory; and the complexity of stabilization policy.)

 –
“When government–in pursuit of good intentions–tries to rearrange the economy, legislate morality, or help special interests, the costs come in inefficiency, lack of motivation, and loss of freedom. Government should be a referee, not an active player.”

 –
“We have a system that increasingly taxes work and subsidizes nonwork.”

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EN_a314
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

 

*
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.  Implemented by Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs & Border Protection.

  – Last Amendment: 5 Apr 2019:
84 FR 13499-13513: Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation
 


DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR)
: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security.

  – Last Amendment: 27 June 2019: 84 FR 30593-30595: Revisions to the Unverified List


 
* DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.  Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau.
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.
  – The latest edition (4 July 2019) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR is a 152-page Word document containing all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.   

 

DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense.
  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)
 
 
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359, comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. This rule also identifies destinations with respect to which most assistance would be generally authorized and destinations that would require a specific authorization by the Secretary of Energy.
 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Nov 2018, 10 CFR 110.6, Re-transfers.
 

* DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War.  Implemented by Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives.
  – Last Amendment: 14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239-9240: Bump-Stock-Type Devices 

 

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. Implemented by Dep’t of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
  – Last Amendment: 19 Apr 2019: 84 FR 16398-16402: International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Transfers Made by or for a Department or Agency of the U.S. Government   
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 4 July 2019) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR is a 371-page Word document containing all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment. The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website. BAFTR subscribers receive a $25 discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.
 

* DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders.
Implemented by Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

– Last Amendment: 23 July 2019: 84 FR 35307 – July 2019 Amendments to Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations; Transnational Criminal Organizations Sanctions Regulations; and Hizballah Financial Sanctions Regulations [amendment of 31 CFR Parts 566, 590, and 594.] 

  

* 
USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA)
, 1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex. Implemented by U.S. International Trade Commission. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
 
– Last Amendment: 22 July 2019: Harmonized System Update (HSU) 1913  
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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EN_a0315
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published  
here

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EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; and Assistant Editors, Alexander Witt and Sven Goor. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 7,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission, provided attribution is given to “The Export/Import Daily Bugle of (date)”. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.  If you would to submit material for inclusion in the The Export/Import Daily Update (“Daily Bugle”), please find instructions here.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.


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