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19-0624 Monday “Daily Bugle'”

19-0624 Monday “Daily Bugle”

Monday, 24 June 2019

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The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events. Subscribe here. Contact us for advertising 

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  1. Commerce/BIS Adds Five Entities under the Destination of China to the Entity List 
  2. Commerce/BIS Seeks Comments on Delivery Verification Procedure for Imports 
  3. USTR Publishes Process for Product Exclusions for List 3 of the Section 301 Trade Remedies 
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions 
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. DoD/DSS Changes Name of Security Clearance Agency to Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency; Appoints New Leadership
  4. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  5. President Signs Executive Order Increasing Sanctions on Iran
  6. NASA: “Cybersecurity Management and Oversight at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory”
  7. Australia Publishes Guidelines for Data Transfers and Content Filtering
  8. Canada Imposes Sanctions on Nicaraguan Officials
  9. Dutch Government Publishes National Sanction List Terrorism
  1. Industry Week: “US Adds Chinese Technology Companies to Export Blacklist”
  2. NOS: “Failing Supervision of Chinese military Scientists in the Netherlands”
  3. ST&R Trade Report: “Ex-Im Bank Seeks New Members for Advisory Committees”
  4. Tagesschau: “Surveillance Technology for Autocrats: Germany Still Exports
  5. ZDNet: “NASA Hacked Because of Unauthorized Raspberry Pi Connected to its Network”
  1. E. Breen and A. Y. Du: “Practice Alert: New OFAC Compliance Guidelines Collide with EU Blocking Regulation”
  2. M. Volkov: “Compliance Program Evolution and Proactive Strategies (Part III of III)”
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 157 Openings Posted This Week; 9 New Openings 
  1. ECTI Presents Not Your Everyday Investigation: Authorizing, Managing and Conducting Internal Investigations into Potential Violations of U.S. Export Controls and Sanctions Laws: September 10, 2019
  2. FCC Presents “U.S. Export Controls: ITAR from a non-U.S. Perspective”, 26 Nov in Bruchem, the Netherlands
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: DHS/Customs (5 Apr 2019), DOC/EAR (5 Jun 2019), DOC/FTR (24 Apr 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), DOE/AFAEC (23 Feb 2015), DOE/EINEM (20 Nov 2018), DOJ/ATF (14 Mar 2018), DOS/ITAR (19 Apr 2018), DOT/FACR/OFAC (5 Jun 2018), HTSUS (13 Jun 2019) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a11. Commerce/BIS Adds Five Entities under the Destination of China to the Entity List

(Source: Federal Register, 24 June 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
84 FR 29371-29375: Addition of Entities to the Entity List and Revision of an Entry on the Entity List
 
* AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.
* ACTION: Final rule.
* SUMMARY: In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding five entities to the Entity List. These five entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. These entities will be listed on the Entity List under the destination of China. This rule also modifies one entry on the Entity List under the destination of China.
* DATES: This rule is effective June 24, 2019.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chair, End-User Review Committee, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Export Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, Phone: (202) 482-5991, Fax: (202) 482-3911, Email: ERC@bis.doc.gov.
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: …
 
Additions to the Entity List …
 
This final rule adds the following five entities to the Entity List in China:
 
– Chengdu Haiguang Integrated Circuit, including two aliases (Hygon and Chengdu Haiguang Jincheng Dianlu Sheji);
– Chengdu Haiguang Microelectronics Technology, including two aliases (HMC and Chengdu Haiguang Wei Dianzi Jishu);
– Higon, including five aliases (Higon Information Technology, Haiguang Xinxi Jishu Youxian Gongsi, THATIC, Tianjing Haiguang Advanced Technology Investment, and Tianjing Haiguang Xianjin Jishu Touzi Youxian Gongsi);
– Sugon, including nine aliases (Dawning, Dawning Information Industry, Sugon Information Industry, Shuguang, Shuguang Information Industry, Zhongke Dawn, Zhongke Shuguang, Dawning Company,
and Tianjin Shuguang Computer Industry);
– Wuxi Jiangnan Institute of Computing Technology, including two aliases (Jiangnan Institute of Computing Technology and JICT).
 
Modification to the Entity List
 
This final rule implements the decision of the ERC to modify one existing entry, NUDT, which was added to the Entity List under the destination of China on February 18, 2015 (80 FR 8527). BIS is modifying the existing entry National University of Defense Technology (NUDT) to add one alias (Hunan Guofang Keji University) and four locations.
 
Dated: June 18, 2019.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

EXIM_a22. Commerce/BIS Seeks Comments on Delivery Verification Procedure for Imports

(Source: Federal Register, 24 June 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
84 FR 29497: Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Delivery Verification Procedure for Imports
 
* AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security.
* ACTION: Notice.
* SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork and respondent burden, invites the general public and other Federal agencies to take this opportunity to comment on proposed and/or continuing information collections, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
* DATES: To ensure consideration, written comments must be submitted on or before August 23, 2019.
* ADDRESSES: Direct all written comments to Mark Crace, IC Liaison, Bureau of Industry and Security, 1401 Constitution Avenue, Suite 2099B, Washington, DC 20233 (or via the internet at PRAcomments@doc.gov). All comments received are part of the public record. No comments will be posted to http://www.regulations.gov for public viewing until after the comment period has closed. Comments will generally be posted without change. All Personally Identifiable Information (for example, name and address) voluntarily submitted by the commenter may be publicly accessible. Do not submit Confidential Business Information or otherwise sensitive or protected information. You may submit attachments to electronic comments in Microsoft Word, Excel, or Adobe PDF file formats.
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
 
I. Abstract
 
Foreign governments, on occasions, require U.S. importers of strategic commodities to furnish their foreign supplier with a U.S. Delivery Verification Certificate validating that the commodities shipped to the U.S. were in fact received. This procedure increases the effectiveness of controls on the international trade of strategic commodities. …
 
– OMB Control Number: 0694-0016.
– Form Number(s): BIS-647P.
– Type of Review: Regular submission.
– Affected Public: Business or other for-profit organizations. …
 
IV. Request for Comments
 
Comments are invited on: (a) Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden (including hours and cost) of the proposed collection of information; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.
 
Comments submitted in response to this notice will be summarized and/or included in the request for OMB approval of this information collection; they also will become a matter of public record.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

EXIM_a33. USTR Publishes Process for Product Exclusions for List 3 of the Section 301 Trade Remedies

(Source: Federal Register, 24 June 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
84 FR 29576-29583: Procedures for Requests to Exclude Particular Products from the September 2018 Action Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation
 
* AGENCY: Office of the United States Trade Representative.
* ACTION: Notice and request for comments.
* SUMMARY: In a notice published on May 9, 2019, the United States Trade Representative (Trade Representative) announced that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) would establish a process by which U.S. stakeholders may request exclusion of particular products classified within a tariff subheading covered by the September 2018 action in this investigation from the additional duties. This notice announces that USTR will open an electronic portal for submission of exclusion requests on June 30, 2019 and sets out the specific procedures for submitting requests.
* DATES: June 30, 2019 at noon EDT: The web portal for submitting exclusion requests–http://exclusions.USTR.gov–will open. September 30, 2019: Deadline for submitting exclusion requests. Responses to individual exclusion requests are due 14 days after the request is posted on USTR’s online portal. Any replies to responses to an exclusion request are due the later of 7 days after the close of the 14-day response period, or 7 days after the posting of a response.
* ADDRESSES: You must submit all requests, responses to requests, and replies to responses through the online portal: http://exclusions.USTR.gov.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions about the product exclusion process, contact USTR Assistant General Counsels Philip Butler or Megan Grimball at (202) 395-5725. For questions on customs classification or implementation of additional duties, contact traderemedy@cbp.dhs.gov.
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
 
A. September 2018 Action …
 
In a notice published on September 21, 2018 (83 FR 47974), the Trade Representative, at the direction of the President, announced a determination to modify the action being taken in the Section 301 investigation by imposing 10 percent additional duties on products of China with an annual trade value of approximately $200 billion. On September 28, 2018 (83 FR 65198), the Trade Representative issued a conforming amendment and modification of the September 21 action. The current notice refers to the September 21 action, as modified by September 28 notice, as the “September 2018 action.” In a notice published on May 9, 2019 (84 FR 20459), the Trade Representative, at the direction of the President, increased the rate of additional duty for the September 2018 action to 25 percent.
 
B. Procedures to Request the Exclusion of Particular Products
 
USTR invites interested persons, including trade associations, to submit requests for exclusion from the additional duties under the September 2018 action. The September 2018 action covers the products classified within the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheadings set out in Annex A of the notice published at 83 FR 47974 (September 21, 2018) as amended and modified by 83 FR 49153 (September 28, 2018). As explained in more detail below, each request must specifically identify a particular product, and provide supporting data and the rationale for the requested exclusion. USTR will evaluate each request on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the asserted rationale for the exclusion, whether the exclusion would undermine the objective of the Section 301 investigation, and whether the request defines the product with sufficient precision. Any exclusion will be effective starting from the September 24, 2018 effective date of the September 2018 action, and extending for one year after the publication of the exclusion determination in the Federal Register. USTR will periodically announce decisions on pending requests. …
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a14. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register, 24 June 2019.)

* Commerce/BIS; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals [Pub. Date: 25 Jun 2019.]
 
* Treasury/OFAC; NOTICES; Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Pub. Date: 25 Jun 2019.]

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_a25
. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
(Source: Commerce/BIS) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a36

DoD/DSS Changes Name of Security Clearance Agency to Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency; Appoints New Leadership

(Source: DoD/DSS, 24 June 2019.)
 
Consistent with Executive Order 13869, “Transferring Responsibility for Background Investigations to the Department of Defense,” the Acting Secretary of Defense has renamed the Defense Security Service to be the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA). This action became effective June 20, 2019.
 
Charles Phalen, Jr. will serve as the Acting Director of the DCSA effective July 1, 2019. Mr. Phalen will remain the Director of the National Background Investigations Bureau. Mr. Phalen’s dual-appointment will be in effect until a permanent DCSA Director is named.
 
DCSA will serve as the primary Federal entity for conducting background investigations for the Federal Government. The DCSA will also, as a continuation of the former DSS, serve as the primary Department of Defense component for the National Industrial Security Program and will execute responsibilities relating to continuous vetting, insider threat programs, and any other responsibilities assigned to it by the Secretary of Defense.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_a58.
President Signs Executive Order on Increasing Sanctions on Iran
(Source: The White House, 24 June 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
 
I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, in order to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, in light of the actions of the Government of Iran and Iranian-backed proxies, particularly those taken to destabilize the Middle East, promote international terrorism, and advance Iran’s ballistic missile program, and Iran’s irresponsible and provocative actions in and over international waters, including the targeting of United States military assets and civilian vessels, hereby order:
 
Section 1. (a) All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:
 
(i)   the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Supreme Leader’s Office (SLO); or
 
(ii) any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State:
 
(A) to be a person appointed by the Supreme Leader of Iran or the SLO to a position as a state official of Iran, or as the head of any entity located in Iran or any entity located outside of Iran that is owned or controlled by one or more entities in Iran;
 
(B) to be a person appointed to a position as a state official of Iran, or as the head of any entity located in Iran or any entity located outside of Iran that is owned or controlled by one or more entities in Iran, by any person appointed by the Supreme Leader of Iran or the SLO;
 
(C) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section;
 
(D) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section; or
 
(E) to be a member of the board of directors or a senior executive officer of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section.
 
(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the date of this order. …
 
DONALD J. TRUMP
 
THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 24, 2019.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_a69.
NASA Inspector General: “Cybersecurity Management and Oversight at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory”
(Source: NASA Office of Inspector General, Office of Audits, 18 June, 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
Why We Performed This Audit
 
NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is a federally funded research and development center in Pasadena, California. Since 1959, the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) has been under contract with NASA to manage JPL, most prominently its research and development activities, but also its network security controls. Under the contract, NASA retains responsibility for ensuring Agency data and systems at JPL are secure from hackers or other forms of unauthorized access.  JPL’s information technology (IT) systems maintain a wide public internet presence while supporting missions and networks that control spacecraft, collect and process scientific data, and perform critical operations. Over the past 10 years, JPL has experienced several notable cybersecurity incidents that have compromised major segments of its IT network. For example, in 2011 cyber intruders gained full access to 18 servers supporting key JPL missions and stole 87 gigabytes of data. More recently, in April 2018 JPL discovered an account belonging to an external user had been compromised and used to steal approximately 500 megabytes of data from one of its major mission systems. In this audit, we assessed the effectiveness of JPL’s network security controls for externally facing applications and systems. We also examined elements of JPL’s Cybersecurity Program and NASA’s interaction with and oversight of the IT security control responsibilities assigned to Caltech under its contract to manage JPL. To complete this work, we interviewed NASA and JPL IT officials and reviewed JPL’s IT network mapping, system inventory, and security management tools. We also reviewed federal, NASA, JPL, and Caltech criteria, policies, procedures, supporting documentation, agreements, prior audit reports, external reviews, and other documents related to cybersecurity.
 
What We Found
 
Multiple IT security control weaknesses reduce JPL’s ability to prevent, detect, and mitigate attacks targeting its systems and networks, thereby exposing NASA systems and data to exploitation by cyber criminals. JPL uses its Information Technology Security Database (ITSDB) to track and manage physical assets and applications on its network; however, we found the database inventory incomplete and inaccurate, placing at risk JPL’s ability to effectively monitor, report, and respond to security incidents. Moreover, reduced visibility into devices connected to its networks hinders JPL’s ability to properly secure those networks. Further, we found that JPL’s network gateway that controls partner access to a shared IT environment for specific missions and data had not been properly segmented to limit users only to those systems and applications for which they had approved access. This shortcoming enabled an attacker to gain unauthorized access to JPL’s mission network through a compromised external user system. Additionally, NASA failed to establish Interconnection Security Agreements (ISA) to document the requirements partners must meet to connect to NASA’s IT systems and describe the security controls that will be used to protect the systems and data.
 
We also found that security problem log tickets, created in the ITSDB when a potential or actual IT system security vulnerability is identified, were not resolved for extended periods of time-sometimes longer than 180 days. While system administrators may request a waiver when they cannot resolve such tickets within 6 months, we found waivers were not reviewed annually as required, resulting in unnecessary waivers and potentially outdated compensating security controls that expose the JPL network to exploitation by cyberattacks. Further, JPL system administrators misunderstood their responsibilities regarding management and review of logs for identifying malicious activity occurring on a particular system or network. We also found that while cybersecurity monitoring tools employed by JPL defend against routine intrusions and misuse of computer assets, JPL had not implemented a threat hunting program recommended by IT security experts to aggressively pursue abnormal activity on its systems for signs of compromise, and instead rely on an ad hoc process to search for intruders. In addition, JPL had not provided role-based security training or funded IT security certifications for its system administrators. security controls that expose the JPL network to exploitation by cyberattacks. Further, JPL system administrators misunderstood their responsibilities regarding management and review of logs for identifying malicious activity occurring on a particular system or network. We also found that while cybersecurity monitoring tools employed by JPL defend against routine intrusions and misuse of computer assets, JPL had not implemented a threat hunting program recommended by IT security experts to aggressively pursue abnormal activity on its systems for signs of compromise, and instead rely on an ad hoc process to search for intruders. In addition, JPL had not provided role-based security training or funded IT security certifications for its system administrators.
 
Further, we found that multiple JPL incident management and response practices deviate from NASA and recommended industry practices. For example, unlike NASA’s Security Operations Center (SOC), JPL’s SOC does not maintain round-the-clock availability of IT security incident responders and JPL’s incident response plan does not include all federally-recommended elements. In addition, team coordination issues delayed completion of incident containment and eradication steps for the April 2018 incident. Moreover, while documenting and sharing cyber threat information across JPL to help prevent future incidents is a critical component of an effective incident response program, we found JPL’s current initiatives fall short.
 
Finally, while the contract between NASA and Caltech requires JPL to report certain types of IT security incidents to the Agency through the NASA SOC incident management system, no controls were in place to ensure JPL compliance with this requirement nor did NASA officials have access to JPL’s incident management system. Collectively, these weaknesses leave NASA data and systems at risk. Despite these significant concerns, the contract NASA signed with Caltech in October 2018 to manage JPL for at least the next 5 years left important IT security requirements unresolved and instead both sides agreed to continue negotiating these issues. As of March 2019, the Agency had not approved JPL’s plans to implement new IT security policies and requirements NASA included in its October 2018 contract.
 
What We Recommended
 
To improve JPL network security controls, we recommended the Director of the NASA Management Office instruct the JPL Chief Information Officer (CIO) to: (1) require system administrators to review and update the ITSDB and ensure system components are properly registered and the JPL Cybersecurity/Identity Technologies and Operations Group (CITO) periodically review compliance with this requirement; (2) segregate shared environments connected to the network gateway and monitor partners accessing the JPL network; (3) review and update ISAs for all partners connected to the gateway; (4) require the JPL CITO to identify and remediate weaknesses in the security problem log ticket process and provide periodic aging reports to the JPL CIO; (5) require the JPL CITO to validate, update, and perform annual reviews of all open waivers; (6) clarify the division of responsibility between the JPL Office of the Chief Information Officer and system administrators for conducting routine log reviews and monitor compliance on a more frequent basis; (7) implement the planned role-based training program by July 2019; (8) establish a formal, documented threat-hunting process; and (9) develop and implement a comprehensive strategy for institutional IT knowledge and incident management that includes dissemination of lessons learned. We also recommended the NASA CIO include requirements in the pending IT Transition Plan that provide the NASA SOC with sufficient control and visibility into JPL network security practices.
 
We provided a draft of this report to NASA management who concurred with 9 of our 10 recommendations and described corrective actions it has taken or will take. We consider management’s comments to those recommendations responsive and therefore the recommendations are resolved and will be closed upon completion and verification of the proposed corrective actions. Management did not concur with Recommendation 8 related to establishing a cybersecurity threat-hunting capability and this recommendation will remain unresolved pending further discussion with the Agency.  …
 
For more information on the NASA Office of Inspector General and to view this and other reports visit http://oig.nasa.gov/.

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OGS_a710.
Australia Publishes Guidelines for Data Transfers and Content Filtering
(Source: Australia ASCE, June 2019.)
 
The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) within the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) produces the Australian Government Information Security Manual (ISM).
 
Purpose
 
The ISM helps organisations use their risk management framework to protect information and systems from cyber threats. The cyber security guidelines within the ISM are based on the experience of the ACSC within ASD.
 
Intended audience
 
These guidelines are intended for Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs), Chief Information Officers (CIOs), cyber security professionals and information technology managers. As such, these guidelines discuss both governance and technical concepts in order to support the protection of organisations’ information and systems.
 
The Guidelines for Data Transfers and Content Filtering can be found on page 151.
 
Download the complete ISM
 
Microsoft Word document:
 
PDF:

 

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OGS_a811.
Canada Imposes Sanctions on Nicaraguan Officials
 

(Source: Canada TID, 21 June 2019.)
 
In coordination with the United States, Canada is announcing sanctions in response to gross and systematic human rights violations that have been committed in Nicaragua. Canada is imposing sanctions against key members of the Government of Nicaragua under the Special Economic Measures Act. These sanctions send a clear message that the Government of Nicaragua’s ongoing human rights violations against its people will not be tolerated.
 
Since April 2018, the Government of Nicaragua has conducted a systematic campaign of repression and state-sponsored violence against public protests and the activities of opposition groups.
 
The Government of Nicaragua’s unacceptable conduct has been well-documented by international human rights organizations, including the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, as well as local human rights organizations.
 
Despite progress on the release of political prisoners, Canada remains concerned by reports of human rights violations. These include: violating the right to life, security, free speech, and free assembly. There have also been well-documented reports of extrajudicial killings, torture, and abuse of protestors. To date, those responsible for human rights violations have not been held accountable

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OGS_a912.
Dutch Government Publishes National Sanction List on Terrorism

(Source: Rijksoverheid, 24 June 2019.)
 
The national sanction list terrorism contains the names of individuals and organisations who are involved in terrorist activities. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) their assets have been frozen, causing them to amongst other things no longer being able to withdraw money from their bank accounts, nor use their credit cards. Since terrorist acts require funding this measure thus makes it significantly more difficult to commit or be (financially) involved with them.
 
Download the national sanctions list terrorism here. 

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NWSNEWS

NWS_a113
.
Industry Week: “US Adds Chinese Technology Companies to Export Blacklist”
(Source:
Industry Week, 21 June 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
The U.S. Commerce Department barred five additional Chinese entities from buying American-made products, in a move that risks inflaming tensions ahead of President Donald Trump’s planned meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping to restart trade talks.
 
The move follows the similar blacklisting of Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei Technologies Co. last month, blocking it from buying U.S. software and components that it needs to make its products.
 
In a statement on Friday, the Commerce Department said the entities were part of China’s efforts to develop supercomputers. It said they raised national security concerns because the computers were being developed for military uses or in cooperation with the Chinese military. …

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NWS_a214
.
NOS: “Failing Supervision of Chinese military Scientists in the Netherlands”
(Source:
NOS, 23 June 2019.) (In Dutch) [Excerpts. Unofficial translation by Alexander Witt of Full Circle Compliance.]
 
China can train top military scientists in the Netherlands without the Dutch government doing anything about it. This is the conclusion of research by Nieuwsuur. A majority in the Lower House now wants the government to take action. The government must provide the House of Representatives with a legal assessment framework, so that universities can use it to exclude high-risk PhD students.
 
In the recently presented China strategy, the government itself warns against an “unwanted transfer of knowledge” via universities to China, which would even pose a risk to national security. However, so far the government has done nothing to prevent this transfer of knowledge from taking place. As a result, military-educated Chinese scientists can, for example, obtain a doctorate here at TU Delft in favor of the Chinese defense apparatus. …

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NWS_a315
.
ST&R Trade Report: “Ex-Im Bank Seeks New Members for Advisory Committees”
(Source: Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg Trade Report, 24 June 2019.)
 
The Export-Import Bank of the United States is accepting nominations for its Advisory Committee as well as its Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee. The nomination period will be open through July 24.
 
Advisory Committee. The congressionally-established Advisory Committee holds quarterly meetings in which its primary task is to advise the Bank concerning its policy and programs, in particular on the extent to which the Bank is meeting its mandate to provide competitive financing that equips U.S. exporters to compete for business in the global marketplace. Pending approval by Ex-Im’s board of directors, the first meeting of the 2019 Advisory Committee is scheduled to be held in September.
 
Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee. The congressionally-established Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee holds biannual meetings in which its primary task is to advise the Bank concerning its policy and programs, in particular on the extent to which the Bank is supporting the expansion of its financial commitments in sub-Saharan Africa under its loan, guarantee, and insurance programs. Pending approval by Ex-Im’s board of directors, the first meeting of the 2019 Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee is scheduled to be held in October.

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NWS_a416
.
Tagesschau: “Surveillance Technology for Autocrats: Germany Still Exports
(Source: Tagesschau, 20 June 2019.) (In German) [Excerpts. Unofficial translation by Alexander Witt of Full Circle Compliance.]
 
Countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are accused of human rights violations. A letter from the German government now shows the extent to which Germany nevertheless authorizes exports of surveillance technology.
 
In recent years, the federal government has approved the export of surveillance technology worth more than 26 million euros. Among the target countries were Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar, where human rights violations regularly occur.
 

According to the answer to an individual written request from the FDP, the German government has allowed the export of technology for telecommunications surveillance in 13 cases and the export of equipment for surveillance centers and so-called data retention in 15 cases. The answer, which is available to NDR in advance, covers the period from early 2015 to June 2019. …

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NWS_a517
.
ZDNet: “NASA Hacked Because of Unauthorized Raspberry Pi Connected to its Network”

(Source: ZDNet, 21 June 2019.) [Excerpts. See related Item #9, above.]
 
A report published this week by the NASA Office of Inspector General reveals that in April 2018 hackers breached the agency’s network and stole approximately 500 MB of data related to Mars missions.
 
The point of entry was a Raspberry Pi device that was connected to the IT network of the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) without authorization or going through the proper security review. …

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COMMCOMMENTARY

COM_a118.
E. Breen and A. Y. Du: “Practice Alert: New OFAC Compliance Guidelines Collide with EU Blocking Regulation” 
(Source:
The FCPA Blog, 24 June 2019.)
 
* Authors: Emmanuel Breen,
Esq., emmanuel.breen@cohen-tanugi.com, + 33 (0) 1 47 05 38 00; and Ann Y. Du, Esq., ann.du@cohen-tanugi.com, + 33 (0) 1 47 05 38 00, both of Laurent Cohen-Tanugi Avocats.
 
In the context of the Trump Administration’s “maximal pressure” approach to the U.S. sanctions against Iran, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued on May 3, 2019 its Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments or OFAC Guidelines.
 
The OFAC Guidelines are a welcomed resource as they clarify OFAC’s expectations of companies’ compliance behavior and offer insight into the authority’s enforcement strategy and concerns. In particular, the OFAC Guidelines offer advice on how companies should develop the five “essential components” of their sanctions compliance program, namely: commitment from management, risk assessment, internal controls, testing and auditing, and training.
 
The specific guidelines offered for each element follows well-established and well-accepted compliance practices in other domains, such as anti-corruption.
 
The OFAC Guidelines will be considered all over the world, and in particular in Europe, as the U.S. sanctions regime includes secondary sanctions whereby non-U.S. entities that do not comply with U.S. policies may be excluded from the U.S. market and financial systems.
 
However, the OFAC Guidelines provide no insight into how European Union companies should respond to their recommendations. Such companies find themselves in a difficult position, particularly in light of the EU Blocking Regulation.
 
First promulgated in 1996, the EU Blocking Regulation was the EU’s response to U.S. unilateral sanctions imposed on certain countries, including Cuba. The Blocking Regulation prohibited any EU person or entity from complying with certain U.S. sanctions in order to limit the United State’s extraterritorial application of its law, which was viewed by some as a breach of European sovereignty.
 
After President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA and a snapback to the pre-JCPOA version of the U.S. sanctions regime in May 2018, the EU reinvigorated its Blocking Regulation by including the new U.S. sanctions on Iran as a regime to which EU entities are prohibited from adhering. The result is that EU companies currently conducting business transactions with Iranian entities cannot cease to do so in order to comply with the U.S. sanctions regime without risking a breach of EU law.
 
This is why, thus far, EU companies may be tempted to favor “informal compliance” with U.S. sanctions over “formal compliance,” that is complying without expressly referring to a formal compliance program and invoking an economic reason for their refusal to transact with Iran. This approach is logical because, currently, designing a formal compliance program that follows the OFAC Guidelines may be used in a European court as proof of an intention to comply with U.S. sanctions, and therefore to breach EU law.
 
That said, the enforcement record of the EU Blocking Regulation has been limited thus far. The EU Blocking Regulation leaves the determination of sanctions and enforcement to each member state. Certain governments have proven to be more aggressive than others in this respect. For example, the UK adopted the Extraterritorial U.S. Legislation (Sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya) (Protection of Trading Interests) Order in February 2019, which provides for an unlimited fine. Other countries have introduced maximum fines, including the Republic of Ireland (€500,000), Germany (€500,000) and Spain (10,000,000 Pesetas (approximately €60,000)). Notably, the Republic of Ireland’s 2018 amendment to its national law even allows for a three-year prison sentence for breach of the EU Blocking Regulation.
 
At the other extreme, countries like France and Luxembourg have yet to introduce any national legislation on this issue and are not yet in a position to prosecute violations of the EU Blocking Regulation. Belgium only recently in May 2019 promulgated the Belgian Act implementing the EU Blocking Regulation which can impose an administrative fine on both companies and individuals, including a company’s Board or committee members and effective managers.
 
No European country has demonstrated that it is seeking to aggressively enforce national laws related to this issue. However, the fact that certain countries — notably the UK and the Republic of Ireland — have adopted new or amended existing laws related to the Blocking Regulation indicate a renewed interest in this topic, particularly given the severity of the potential sanctions that can be incurred. In addition, the Czech Republic, which already has in place a relevant law, is seeking to supplement it and is currently drafting legislation to specifically implement the EU Blocking Regulation.
 
Unlike the FCPA, for example, U.S. economic sanctions are not sustained by an international legal and ethical consensus, but are motivated by U.S. policy goals. Their extraterritoriality is all the more difficult to accept in Europe. When advocating compliance to these sanctions internally, European compliance officers in many cases will rely on a cost/benefit analysis rather than on shared values. Corporate policy debates within EU companies may thus be expected to revolve often around three key questions:
 
– Do the benefits of conducting business with Iran outweigh the risks of potential sanctions on the company and/or its officers?
 
– Can our company afford to be cut off from the U.S. market and financial system?
 
– Is there a way around U.S. sanctions that would allow us to continue trading with Iran in compliance with both U.S. and EU law?
 
The third question refers to creative attempts by various institutions to find a mechanism through which an EU entity can bypass U.S. sanctions in order to continue doing business with Iranian entities.
 
For example, at the start of this year, the European signatories to the JCPOA, (France, Germany and the UK) developed INSTEX, a special purpose vehicle through which a European entity exporting a good to Iran could receive payment for this exchange from a European entity importing a good from Iran through a European institution; this would effectively allow the companies to bypass using an Iranian institution, the Iranian Rial or the U.S. Dollar. However, INSTEX is not yet fully operational, and nobody to our knowledge has publicly certified that it will be compliant with both U.S. and EU law. (For other creative alternatives, see a report written by Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Axel Hellman for the European Leadership Network).
 
In this regard, further guidance from OFAC on what differentiates, in its view, trade with Iranian entities that is outside the scope of U.S. sanctions from trade that illegitimately circumvents the sanctions in breach of U.S. law would be most welcome. This, along with specific consideration to the situation created by the EU Blocking Statute, would make OFAC guidance even more useful to companies this side of the Atlantic.

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COM_a2
19
.
M. Volkov: “Compliance Program Evolution and Proactive Strategies (Part III of III)”

(Source: Volkov Law Group Blog, 20 June, 2019. Reprinted by permission.)
 
* Author: Michael Volkov, Esq., Volkov Law Group, mvolkov@volkovlaw.com, 240-505-1992.
 
Sometimes what folks label a “new idea” is not so much of a new idea as the application of an old solution to a new discipline. I do not mean to be cryptic, but I am going to explain my point by referring to an area where I have had lots of experience – criminal law enforcement.
 
In the wake of the terrible tragedy of 9-11, law enforcement (and in particular the FBI) had to recalibrate to a new mission: investigate and infiltrate terrorist organizations and develop proactive strategies to intervene and prevent another terrorist attack. This was a fundamental change in the FBI’s mission.
 
Traditionally, law enforcement operated in a “reactive” mode. In response to a crime, the FBI investigated the crime and prosecutors sought to convict and punish the criminal. Of course, part of this mission was to prevent a criminal from committing more crimes and the FBI acted to “prevent” future crimes.
 
But the change in the FBI’s mission was two-fold – it required the organization to merge together its intelligence and investigative functions to develop proactive strategies. While the FBI uses traditional tools (e.g. search warrants, wiretaps, FISA surveillance), its mission is to intervene prior to a terrorist attack and prevent the crime from occurring in the first instance.
 
In an analogous context, compliance is undergoing a change from reactive to proactive strategies. In response to misconduct, companies aggressively investigate the conduct and seek government leniency for its efforts. companies continue to rely on “historical” conduct by testing and auditing employee compliance with internal rules and controls (e.g. third-party on-boarding, gifts and hospitality). Audits and reviews are designed to identify past failures to adhere to compliance and financial controls.
 
New compliance technologies, data analytics and real-time (or close in time) monitoring is quickly transforming the monitoring function to permit earlier identification of potential misconduct and intervention to remediate. Usually, this does not mean catching a bad actor before he or she steals money, but it can result in earlier identification of an ongoing scheme. Just as important, however, compliance monitoring, if implemented properly, may be able to identify poor employee moral or other conditions that might result in higher risks of misconduct.
 
The future of compliance, therefore, is premised on proactive solutions that do not depend on reactive investigations and findings of misconduct. A traditional historical look at rule and control compliance is one thing but imagine if a compliance officer and auditor is able to sift through data to identify potential problems, i.e. anomalies, before they ripen into a more costly problem.
 
The same principles apply with even greater force when measuring and monitoring a company’s culture. As new strategies develop to monitor and “remediate” deficiencies in a company’s culture, whether it is in a business office or division, or specific operation, a company’s ability to monitor and measure its culture can provide important leads on remediation strategies to improve a company’s culture and thereby reduce the risk of misconduct.
 
These proactive strategies also have to incorporate new ideas in behavioral sciences and individual motivations. It is too simplistic to characterize these efforts as analyzing what makes people tick – instead, behavioral science provides important insights into using incentives and deterrence to improve overall corporate behavior.
 
This does not mean that compliance rules and financial controls are not important. To the contrary, proactive strategies are an effective way to prevent serious misconduct and harm to the organization. Compliance programs have the capability to develop new data monitoring strategies – the trick is to develop reliable indicators of compliance program performance, apply monitoring strategies, gain business acceptance and understanding of the importance of data and monitoring activities, and fully commit to a proactive compliance program strategy.
 
Some basic procedures have to be established.
 
First, a company has to identify and agree on a set of performance indicators.
 
Second, it has to commit to measure these performance indicators to develop trend analysis. A baseline measurement has to be conducted so that future measurements can be compared.
 
Third, a company has to commit to addressing potential gaps in performance, meaning indications that the compliance program performance is falling according to performance indicators.
 

Fourth, companies have to hold managers and employees accountable for performance. 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 


MSEX/IM MOVERS & SHAKERS

MS_a120. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 157 Openings Posted This Week, Including 9 New Openings 

(Source: Events & Jobs Editor) 
 

Published every Monday or first business day of the week. Please, send job openings in the following format to 
jobs@fullcirclecompliance.eu
.
 
* COMPANY; LOCATION; POSITION TITLE (WEBLINK); CONTACT INFORMATION; REQUISITION ID
 

#
” New or amended listing this week
 
* Abbott; Orlando, FL;
Senior Compliance Analyst 
* Abbott; Sylmar, CA;
Compliance Director 
* Accenture; Buenos Aires, Argentina;
Contract Analyst – Trade Compliance 
* Agility; Basel, Switzerland;
Zolldeklarant/in Export
*
Agility; Houston, TX;
Ocean Export Team Leader  
* Airbus; Manching, Germany; Export Compliance Officer (d/m/f); Requisition ID: 10456762 CV EN EXT 1
* Airbus; Manching, Germany; Export Compliance Officer (d/m/w); Requisition ID: 10456762 CV DE EXT 1
* Airbus; Munich, Germany; Sachbearbeiter Compliance Analysis (d/m/w); Requisition ID: 10450087 VL DE EXT 1
* Airbus; Toulouse, France; Export Control Manager (m/f); Requisition ID: 10435666 CP EN EXT 1

* Alumeco; Odense, Denmark;
Trade Compliance Manager 

* AM General; Auburn Hills, MI; International Compliance Analyst 

* AMAG Pharmaceuticals; Waltham, MA;
Associate, Logistics & Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 1386

* AMAG Pharmaceuticals; Waltham, MA; Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 1397

* American Showa, Inc.; Columbus, OH;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; LoAnn Burt, 
lburt@amshowa.com  
* Arrowhead Products; Los Alamitos, CA; Trade Compliance Specialist

* Ascend Materials; Houston, TX; Principal International Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: R0000954 
* ASML; San Diego, CA; 
Customs & Export Control Classification Specialist
;
 
Requisition ID: req9558
* Belk; Charlotte, NC;
Sr Manager – Global Trade & Customs Compliance
;
Skyler Evans
; Requisition ID: JR-20062

* BlackRock; Gurgaon, India; Analyst – Regulatory Reporting & Compliance
* BlackRock Institutional Trust Company; San Francisco, CA; Chief Compliance Officer; Requisition ID: R184478

* BMW Manufacturing; Spartanburg, SC;
SECT MGR Customs Compliance
; Requisition ID: 190001DP

* Boeing; Bellevue, WA, St. Louis, MO; Associate Compliance Professional; Requisition ID: 00000117417

* Boeing; Dallas, TX; Regulatory and Compliance Specialist IV; Requisition ID: 00000116554

* Bose; Framingham, MA; Senior Customs & Trade Compliance Lead; Requisition ID: R12731

* Brooks; Chelmsford, MA;
Senior Import / Export Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: R0822

* Cargill; Schiphol, the Netherlands; Regional Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: SCH02604

* Cisco Systems, Inc.; Charlotte, NC;
Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 1261937
* Cisco Systems, Inc.; San Jose, CA or Research Triangle Park, NC; Customs Project Manager / Business Analyst; Requisition ID: 1263171
* Cloudflare; Austin, TX, San Francisco, CA, Washington D.C.; International Trade Compliance Manager 

#
* Cobham Advanced Electronic Solutions; Hauppauge, NY or Plainview, NY; Export Compliance Administrator; Requisition ID: req2484

* Crane Aerospace & Electronics; Burbank, CA; Sr. Export Compliance Analystmichelle.domingo@craneae.com; Requisition ID: 7908
* Cruise; San Francisco, CA; Program Manager – Trade and Compliance; sherry.horowitz@getcruise.com; Requisition ID: 1276

#
* Danaher Corporation; Brea, CA;
Global Export Compliance Manager

* Danaher – Leica Microsystems; Wetzlar, Germany; Chief Compliance Officer; Requisition ID: LEI004530
* DHL; Hong Kong, China;
Regional Compliance Officer, APEC
; Requisition ID: req78306

* Elbit Systems of America; Merrimack, NH; Audit and Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 2019-7095

#
* Emerson; Costa Rica; Trade Compliance Analyst I

* Engenium; Orlando, FL;
Import/Export Compliance Specialist 

* ePlus; Herndon, VA; Senior Manager Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: SENIOo2880

* Expeditors; Bedfont, United Kingdom;
Customs Brokerage Clerk 
* Expeditors; Romulus, MI; US Export Compliance Consultant

* Flexport; Amsterdam, the Netherlands;
Regional Compliance Manager 

* FLIR; Arlington, VA; Global Trade Compliance (GTC) Program Manager; Requisition ID: REQ12249

* FLIR; Wilsonville, OR; Lead Import/Export Analyst, Global Trade Compliance (GTC), Traffic; Requisition ID: REQ12531
* General Atomics; San Diego, CA;
Government Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 23607BR
* General Atomics; San Diego, CA;
Government Regulatory Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 23576BR

* Gulfstream Aerospace; Savannah, GA; Global Risk & Compliance Lead; Requisition ID: 141763

* Gulfstream Aerospace; Savannah, GA; Global Risk & Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 144738

# * Harris Corporation; Van Nuys, CA; Trade Compliance Senior Specialist; Ramone Mellis; Requisition ID: ES20192103-30606

* Henderson Group Unlimited, Inc; State Dept, DDTC; Washington, DC; 
Commodities Jurisdiction Analyst
 
* Henkel; Rocky Hill, CT;
Global Trade Manager
; Requisition ID: 190001EB
* Hitachi Vantara; Singapore;
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 1003050 (026187)
* Honeywell; Paris, France;
Export Compliance Lead
; Requisition ID: HRD60078
* Huntington Ingalls Industries; Centreville, VA;
Import Export Administrator
; Requisition ID: 2019-1943
* Hypertherm; Hanover, NH;
Export & Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: R41
* Illumina; Woodlands, Singapore;
Manager, Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 16361-JOB
*
Infineon Technologies, El Segundo, CA;
Senior Export Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 31215;
* Integra LifeSciences; Plainsboro, NJ;
Import/Export Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 2019-29346
* Integrated DNA Technologies; Coralville, IA; Global Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 2019-4688

* Itron; Austin, TX;
Compliance & Regulatory Counsel
; Requisition ID: 1900030
* Izpal Corporation; Bangkok, Thailand; Assistant Import/Export Manager
* Johnson Controls; Milwaukee, WI;
Director, Global Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: WD30055791295;
* Kelley Drye & Warren LLP; Washington DC;
Junior Export Controls/Sanctions Associate 
* Kirkland’s; Brentwood, TN;
Customs Compliance Program Manager
; Requisition ID: 2019-8158
* Koch Chem Tech; Tulsa, OK;
Import/Export Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 052017
* KPMG; Chicago, IL or New York, NY or Washington D.C.;
Export and Sanctions Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 41146
* Kubota; Grapevine, TX;
Manager, Import & Export Compliance
; Requisition ID: 228
* Leidos; Columbia, MD;
International Trade Manager / Export Compliance
; Requisition ID: R-00005745;
* Lennox International; Shanghai, China;
Trade Compliance Lead 
* Lenovo; Bratislava, Slovakia; Customs Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 73198
* Lenovo; Guandong, China; AP Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 73183
* Leonardo DRS; Arlington, VA;
Trade Compliance Import Manager
; Requisition ID: 93515
* Leonardo DRS; Dayton, OH; Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 94613 
*
Leonardo DRS; Melbourne, FL;
Senior Supply Chain Analyst – Small Business Compliance
; Requisition ID: 91669
* Leonardo DRS; St Louis, MO;
Export/Trade Compliance Specialist

brandy.mormino@drs.com
; Requisition ID: 94325
* Lockheed Martin; Arlington, VA; Global Trade Compliance Analyst 
* Lockheed Martin; Arlington, VA;
 
International Licensing Analyst Staff
; Requisition ID: 480803BR
* Lockheed Martin Aeronautics; Palmdale, CA;
Export Compliance Site Lead
; Requisition ID: 477630BR
* Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems; Liverpool, NY, Moorestown, NJ, Owego, NY, Stratford, CT;
Intl Licensing Analyst Stf
; Requisition ID: 483502BR
* Lutron Electronics Co; Lehigh Valley, PA;
Trade Compliance Coordinator
; Requisition ID: 4025;
* ManTech; Hanover, MD; Process & Training – ITAR Specialist; Requisition ID: R00435
* Meggitt; Rockmart, GA;
Trade Compliance Coordinator
; Requisition ID: 37846
* Mercury Systems; multiple locations;
Manager, Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 19-349

* Micron Technology; Hyderabad, India; India Import/Export and Traffic Supervisor; Requisition ID: 131838
* Micron Technology; Penang, Malaysia; Import/Export Analyst; Requisition ID: 128443
* Micron Technology; Xi’an, China; Logistics Import/Export Specialist I; Requisition ID: 135498

* Microsoft; Redmond, WA;
Export Control Manager
; Requisition ID: 609856

* Morson Group; Glasgow, UK; Export Control Officer Investigations

* National Oilwell Varco; Houston, TX; Trade Compliance Attorney 
* NCR Corporation; Atlanta, GA; Export Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: R0083245

* Nestlé; Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
Trade Investment & Compliance Supervisor 
* Netflix; Los Angeles, CA;
Specialist, Trade Compliance
 
* Norsk Hydro; Chicago, IL;
Senior Manager Trade Compliance  
* Northrop Grumman, Falls Church, VA, Int’l Trade Compliance Analyst 4, Requisition ID: 19010228

* Northrop Grumman; Falls Church, VA; USG International Policy Manager; Requisition ID: 19015251 
* Northrop Grumman; Redondo Beach, CA, San Diego, CA or Melbourne, FL; 
Sr. International Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 19013440
* Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems; Dulles, VA;
Sr. Principal International Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 19015953

#
* PDS Tech; Vance, AL; Trade Compliance Specialist

* Philips; Best, the Netherlands;
Head of Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 308818
* Pinpoint Pharma; Lincolnshire, IL;
Export Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 351

#
* PolyOne, Avon Lake, OH; Trade Compliance Analyst

* Qorvo; Richardson, TX;
Import/Export Analyst
; Requisition ID: 0008593
* Qualcomm; Bangalore, India;
Export Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: N1969832

* Raytheon, Cambridge, MA; Manager – Global Trade Licensing; Requisition ID: 142549BR
* Raytheon, Cambridge, MA; Principal Global Trade Licensing Analyst; Requisition ID: 139430BR
* Raytheon, Cambridge, MA; Sr Global Trade Licensing Analyst; Requisition ID: 139427BR

* Raytheon; El Segundo, CA;
Import Ctl&Compliance Advisor
; Requisition ID:136269BR

* Raytheon, McKinney, TX; Global Trade Licensing Analyst I; Requisition ID: 138819BR

* Raytheon; Tuscon, AZ; Empowered Official; Requisition ID: 141725BR

* Raytheon; Tuscon, AZ;
Manager Export-Import Control
; Requisition ID: 134614BR
* Rockwell Automation; Mayfield Heights, OH and Milwaukee, WI;
Senior Analyst, Import/Export Compliance
; Requisition ID: 85004BR
* SABIC; Houston TX; 
Senior Analyst, Trade Compliance
;
Danielle.Cannata@sabic.com
; Requisition ID: 8411BR

#
* Sandvik; Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Process Support Specialist Trade Compliance And Freight

* Sarepta Therapeutics; Cambridge, MA;
Director, Logistics & Global Trade Compliance  
* Siemens; Munich, Germany; Intern Regulatory Compliance; Requisition ID: 116687

* Siemens; Sacramento, CA;  
Custom Trade & Compliance Professional
; Requisition ID: 244347

* Sierra Nevada Corporation; Arlington, VA; Director, International Trade Compliance; Requisition ID; R0008327

* Sierra Nevada Corporation; Arlington, VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst II
; Requisition ID: R0007508
* Sierra Nevada Corporation; Arlington, VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst II
; Requisition ID: R0007996
* Sierra Nevada Corporation; Louisville, CO; International Trade Compliance Analyst Senior; Requisition ID: R0008390 
* SIG SAUER, Inc.; Newington, NH;
Director of Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 1114
* Spin Master; Bratislava, Slovakia;
Logistics Coordinator – Trade Compliance Analyst 
* Sun Chemical; Cincinnati, OH, Northlake, IL, Parsippany, NJ;
Global Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 2019-2733
* Synopsys Inc.; Remote, U.S.;
Director, Global Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 20358BR

* Teledyne Technologies; Camarillo, CA; Sr. Accounting and Government Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 2019-9547
* Teledyne Technologies; Chestnut Ridge; Import/Export Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 2019-8779
* Teledyne Technologies; Englewood, CO, Lincoln, NE, Omaha, NE; Customs Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 2018-8144

* Tesla, Inc.; Fremont, CA; 
Program Manager, Tariff Strategy
; Requisition ID: 46503
* Textron Aviation; Wichita, KS;
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 269127
* Thales; Stuttgart, Germany;
Trade Compliance Spezialist (M/W/D)
; Requisition ID: R0054290
* Thermo Fisher Scientific; Boulder, CO or Atlanta, GA or Boston, MA or Remote, NY; Compliance Specialist III; Requisition ID: 91186BR
* Thermo Fisher Scientific; Franklin, MA; Sr. Trade Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 90074BR

#
* Thermo Fisher Scientific; Fremont, CA; Manager, Global Trade Compliance

* Torres Law, PLLC; Dallas, TX; 
Import/Export Consultant-Legal

info@torrestradelaw.com 
* Trek Bicycle; Waterloo, WI;
Trade Compliance Manager 

* U.S. Department of Agriculture; Queens, NY; Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance Officer
* U.S. Department of the Treasury; Washington DC; Senior Sanctions Coordinator

* Uber; Amsterdam, the Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Analyst 
* United Technologies – Collins Aerospace; Cedar Rapids, IA;
Export Licensing Specialist (ITC)
; Requisition ID: 01311691
* United Technologies – Collins Aerospace; Windsor Locks, CT;
Associate Director Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 01308017
*
University of California; San Francisco, CA;
Export Control Officer
; Requisition ID: 51010;

* University of North Texas; Fort Worth, TX; Compliance Director

* Van Oord; Rotterdam, the Netherlands;
Trade & Customs Compliance Specialist 
* Veridos GmbH; München, Germany;
Ausfuhrbeauftragter (Export Control Officer m/w/d
; Requisition ID: 1677
* Viasat; Carlsbad, CA;
Global Trade Analyst
; Requisition ID: 2824
* Vigilant GTS; Remote Position, U.S.;
Global Trade Compliance Account Manager 
* Walt Disney; Kissimmee, FL;
Trade Compliance Analyst (Project Hire)
; Requisition ID: 654599BR
* Wealth Ocean; Newport Beach, CA;
Marketing & International Trade Specialist 
* World Wide Technology; Oude Meer, the Netherlands;
Logistics and Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 19-0415
* XPO Logistics; Greenwich, CT;
Compliance Paralegal 
* XPO Logistics; Greenwich, CT;
Director, Trade Compliance Counsel 
  
 
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

TEEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

TE_a121. ECTI Presents Not Your Everyday Investigation: Authorizing, Managing and Conducting Internal Investigations into Potential Violations of U.S. Export Controls and Sanctions Laws: September 10, 2019

(Source: Danielle Hatch, danielle@learnexportcompliance.com)
 
* WhatNot Your Everyday Investigation: Authorizing, Managing and Conducting Internal Investigations into Potential Violations of U.S. Export Controls and Sanctions Laws
* When: September 10, 2019 1:00 p.m. (EDT)
* Where: Webinar
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker: Timothy O’Toole
* Register here or Danielle Hatch, 540-433-3977, danielle@learnexportcompliance.com.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

TE_a222. FCC Presents “U.S. Export Controls: The ITAR from a non-U.S. Perspective”, 26 Nov in Bruchem, the Netherlands

 
This intermediate-level training course is specifically designed for compliance professionals and those in a similar role who aim to stay up-to-date with the latest International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) requirements that apply to non-U.S. transactions.
 
The course will cover multiple topics relevant for organizations outside the U.S. that are subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, including but not limited to: the U.S. regulatory framework, key ITAR concepts and definitions, tips regarding classification and licensing, essential steps to ensure an ITAR compliant shipment, how to handle a (potential) non-compliance issue, recent enforcement trends, and the latest regulatory amendments, including the latest U.S. Export Control Reform developments. Participants will receive a certification upon completion of the training.
 
Details
* What: U.S. Export Controls: The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) from a non-U.S. Perspective
* When: Tuesday, 26 Nov 2019
 – Welcome and Registration: 9.00 am – 9.30 am
 – Training hours: 9.30 am – 4.30 pm
* Where: Full Circle Compliance, Landgoed Groenhoven, Dorpsstraat 6, Bruchem, the Netherlands
* Information & Registration: via the
event page or contact FCC at
events@fullcirclecompliance.eu or + 31 (0)23 – 844 – 9046
* This course can be followed in combination with “U.S. Export Controls: The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) from a non-U.S. Perspective” (27 Nov 2019), and/or “The ABC of Foreign Military Sales” (29 Nov 2019). Please, see the event page for our combo deals.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ENEDITOR’S NOTES

* Ambrose Bierce (Ambrose Gwinnett Bierce; 24 Jun 1842 – circa 1914; was an American short story writer, journalist, poet, and Civil War veteran. Bierce’s book The Devil’s Dictionary was named as one of “The 100 Greatest Masterpieces of American Literature” by the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration. His story An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge has been described as “one of the most famous and frequently anthologized stories in American literature”; and his book Tales of Soldiers and Civilians was named by the Grolier Club as one of the 100 most influential American books printed before 1900.)
– “Love: A temporary insanity curable by marriage.”
– “Quotation: The act of repeating erroneously the words of another.
 
Monday is pun day:
* Q. What do you call a Spanish pig?
   A. Porque.
* Q. What do you call a line of rabbits marching backwards?
   A. A receding hairline.
* Q. A cabbage and celery walk into a bar. Why did the cabbage get served first?
   A. Because he was a head.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a324
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

 

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments to applicable regulations are listed below.
 

* 
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.  Implemented by Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs & Border Protection.
  – Last Amendment: 5 Apr 2019: 
 
5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499-13513: Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation
 

DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR)
: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security.
  – Last Amendment: 5 June 2019: 
84 FR 25986-25989
: Restricting the Temporary Sojourn of Aircraft and Vessels to Cuba

     

* 
DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR)
: 15 CFR Part 30.  Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau.
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 
83 FR 17749-17751
: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 
here
.
  – The latest edition (1 Jan 2019) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance 
website
.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at 
www.FullCircleCompiance.eu
.  
 

DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM)
: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense.
  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: 

Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 
here
.) 
 

DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES
: 10 CFR Part 810; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 23 Feb 2015: 

80 FR 9359
, comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. This rule also identifies destinations with respect to which most assistance would be generally authorized and destinations that would require a specific authorization by the Secretary of Energy.
 

DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL
; 10 CFR Part 110; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Nov 2018, 10 CFR 110.6, Re-transfers.
 
* 
DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War.  Implemented by Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives.
  – Last Amendment: 14 Mar 2019:
 
84 FR 9239-9240
: Bump-Stock-Type Devices
 

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR)
: 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. Implemented by Dep’t of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
  – Last Amendment: 19 Apr 2019: 84 FR 16398-16402: International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Transfers Made by or for a Department or Agency of the U.S. Government 
  – 
The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 19 Apr 2019) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in 
Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR 
(“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR is a 361-page Word document containing all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by download, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment. The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance 
website
. BAFTR subscribers receive a $25 discount on subscriptions to the BITAR. Please 
contact us
 to receive your discount code.
 
*
 
DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR)
 
: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders.
Implemented by Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control.
  – Last Amendment: 5 June 2019:
84 FR 25992
 
– June 2019 Amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations [amendment of 31 CFR Part 515]
  
*
 
USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), 1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex. Implemented by U.S. International Trade Commission. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment:
13 June 2019: Harmonized System Update (HSU) 1911

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EN_a0325
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published  
here

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; and Assistant Editors, Alexander Witt and Sven Goor. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 7,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. 

We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission, provided attribution is given to “The Export/Import Daily Bugle of (date)”. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.  If you would to submit material for inclusion in the The Export/Import Daily Update (“Daily Bugle”), please find instructions here.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.


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