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19-0613 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

19-0613 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

Thursday, 13 June 2019

TOP
The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events. Subscribe here. Contact us for advertising 

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[No items of interest noted today.]
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions 
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. DHS/CBP Announces 2019 Trade Symposium, 23-24 Jul in Chicago, IL
  4. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  5. Cubasphere, Inc. to Pay $40,320 to Settle OFAC Charges of Sanctions Regulations
  6. Expedia to Pay $325,406 to Settle OFAC Charges of Sanctions Regulations
  7. Hotelbeds USA to Pay $222,705 to Settle OFAC Charges of Sanctions Regulations
  1. Deutsche Welle: “Nord Stream 2 Builders Forge on With Gas Pipeline Despite Renewed US Sanctions Threat” 
  2. La Voix du Nord: “How France Authorizes and Controls its Arms Exports” 
  3. The Washington Post: “Canadian Accused of Lying in Case Alleging China Given Design Details Of U.S. Navy Submarine Rescue Vessel” 
  1. K. Chenney: “How to Ensure Compliance with Defence Export Regulations”
  2. QAD Precision: “Higher Education, Intellectual Property and Export Controls” 
  3. S. Besch & B. Oppenheim: “The Eu Needs an Effective Common Arms Export Policy”  
  1. FCC Presents “Designing an ICP for Export Controls & Sanctions,” 1 Oct in Bruchem, The Netherlands 
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: DHS/Customs (5 Apr 2019), DOC/EAR (23 May 2019), DOC/FTR (24 Apr 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), DOE/AFAEC (23 Feb 2015), DOE/EINEM (20 Nov 2018), DOJ/ATF (14 Mar 2018), DOS/ITAR (19 Apr 2018), DOT/FACR/OFAC (29 Apr 2018), HTSUS (4 June 2019) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

[No items of interest noted today.]
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OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a11. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

* President; ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS; Belarus; Continuation of National Emergency (Notice of June 13, 2019) [Pub. Date: 14 June 2019.]
 
* Treasury/OFAC; RULES; Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties [Pub. Date: 14 June 2019.]
 
* USTR; NOTICES; Generalized System of Preferences: 2019 GSP Annual Product Review [Pub. Date: 14 June 2019.]

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OGS_a22
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Commerce/BIS (No new postings.)

(Source:
Commerce/BIS)

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OGS_a33
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DHS/CBP Announces 2019 Trade Symposium, 23-24 Jul in Chicago, IL
(Source: CSMS# 19-000305, 13 June 2019.)
 
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2019 Trade Symposium registration is now OPEN!
 
This year’s symposium will be held on July 23-24 at the Marriott Marquis in Chicago, IL.
 
Please follow the link below to register.

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OGS_a55.
Cubasphere, Inc. to Pay $40,320 to Settle OFAC Charges of Sanctions Regulations

(Source: Treasury/OFAC, 13 June 2019.)
 
OFAC today also separately announced a $40,320 settlement with an unnamed Individual and Cubasphere, Inc. The Individual, as well as Cubasphere, on whose behalf the Individual also acted, have agreed to pay $40,320 to settle their potential civil liability for apparent violations of the CACR. Specifically, the Individual and Cubasphere dealt in property in which Cuba or Cuban nationals had an interest, in apparent violation of § 515.201(b) of the CACR, by engaging in unauthorized Cuba travel-related transactions by assisting 104 persons on four separate trips to and within Cuba, from on or about December 30, 2013 to on or about February 22, 2014. OFAC determined that the apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed to OFAC and occurred subsequent to agency notice.
 
For more information, please visit the following web notice.

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OGS_a66.
Expedia to Pay $325,406 to Settle OFAC Charges of Sanctions Regulations

(Source: Treasury/OFAC, 13 June 2019.)
 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today announced a $325,406 settlement with Expedia Group, Inc. (“Expedia”). Expedia, headquartered in Bellevue, Washington, on behalf of itself and its subsidiaries and affiliates worldwide, has agreed to pay $325,406 to settle its potential civil liability for providing Cuba-related travel services in apparent violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515 (CACR). Specifically, between on or about April 22, 2011 and on or about October 16, 2014, Expedia dealt in property or interests in property of Cuba or Cuban nationals by assisting 2,221 persons – some of whom were Cuban nationals – with travel or travel-related services for travel within Cuba or between Cuba and locations outside the United States. These transactions appear to have violated § 515.201(b) of the CACR. OFAC determined that the apparent violations were voluntarily self-disclosed to OFAC and occurred prior to agency notice.
 
For more information, please visit the following web notice.

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OGS_a77.
Hotelbeds USA to Pay $222,705 to Settle OFAC Charges of Sanctions Regulations

(Source: Treasury/OFAC, 13 June 2019.)
 
OFAC today separately announced a $222,705 settlement with Hotelbeds USA, Inc. (“Hotelbeds USA”). Hotelbeds USA, incorporated in Florida, is a U.S. subsidiary of Hotelbeds Group, headquartered in Mallorca, Spain. Hotelbeds USA has agreed to pay $222,705 to settle its potential civil liability for assisting persons with unauthorized Cuba-related travel services in apparent violation of the CACR. Specifically, between the approximate dates of December 2011 and June 2014, Hotelbeds USA provided Cuba-related travel services to 703 non-U.S. persons in apparent violation of § 515.201(b) of the CACR. OFAC determined that the apparent violations were not voluntarily disclosed to OFAC and occurred before agency notice.
 
For more information, please visit the following web notice.

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NWSNEWS

NWS_a18
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Deutsche Welle: “Nord Stream 2 Builders Forge on With Gas Pipeline Despite Renewed US Sanctions Threat”

(Source: Deutsche Welle, 13 June 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
Despite a new US sanctions threat, companies involved in the Baltic Sea pipeline are ploughing ahead with plans to finish the project by the end of the year. But are Trump’s latest remarks more serious this time around? …
 
In his attempt to shield Germany from Putin’s influence, Trump is even considering to impose sanctions on companies to block Nord Stream 2, the undersea pipeline which is expected to deliver the Russian gas to Germany and other parts of Europe. ..
 
Last month, a bipartisan initiative in the US Congress filed a bill that would impose sanctions on vessels used to build Nord Stream 2. Moreover, a 2017 US law called Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions ACT (CAATSA) offers the Trump administration the opportunity to impose sanctions against persons and companies investing in Nord Stream 2. …

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NWS_a29
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La Voix du Nord: “How France Authorizes and Controls its Arms Exports”

(Source: La Voix du Nord, 13 June 2019.) (In French) [Unofficial translation by A.Witt, Associate, Full Circle Compliance.]
 
In the field of arms and dual-use goods (civil and military), it is impossible to conclude an external contract without government agreement. Licenses for transfers (within the European Union) or exports of war and related materials (to a third country) shall be signed by the Prime Minister.
 
To reach the magic formula, three ministries (Europe and Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Economy and Finance) give their opinions on a case-by-case basis, then the General Secretariat of Defence and National Security …

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NWS_a310
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The Washington Post: “Canadian Accused of Lying in Case Alleging China Given Design Details Of U.S. Navy Submarine Rescue Vessel”

(Source: The Washington Post, 13 June 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
A Canadian executive has been indicted on a charge of making a false statement in connection with the transfer to China of technical details of a U.S. Navy undersea submarine rescue vehicle in an alleged attempt to sell versions to the Chinese Navy. …
 
In a Jan. 8 indictment, prosecutors with the national security section of the U.S. attorney’s office of the District allege that Viau’s company transferred data related to the Navy’s Pressurized Rescue Module, a remotely operated rescue vehicle capable of docking with a sunken sub 2,000 feet underwater and carrying up to 18 people. …
 
According to prosecutors, only then did Viau make voluntary disclosures about the unauthorized export of a hard drive containing controlled Navy technical data as part of the company’s sale, while allegedly omitting significant details about his role to the U.S. Commerce Department’s export enforcement office. …

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COMMCOMMENTARY

COM_a111
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K. Chenney: “How to Ensure Compliance with Defence Export Regulations”

(Source: Australian Defense Magazine, 13 June 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
* Author: Kevin Chenney, Senior Consultant, goal@goalgroup.com.au, of Goal Professional Services.
 
The US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are export control regulations administered by the US Government and enforceable extra-territorially. Australian businesses in areas spanning high tech military to dual use technologies must ensure their compliance with these regulations and standards.
 
In September 2018 we wrote an article explaining the regulations to readers. This was followed in February 2019 with an article that detailed the specifics around controlled technical data and what the Australian and US governments alike are introducing in order to protect this data. We continue this series with an article detailing some of the initial steps Australian companies can take to ensure compliance in this area.
 
The following are a list of compliance steps every business should adopt if they are currently handling, or forecast to handle, US-controlled technology. Using the US regulations as an exemplar, the following steps should be applicable to any business handling controlled technology – no matter the origin.
 
The Technology Control Plan (TCP) acts as the guiding process document for all aspects of managing controlled technology.

First, assign a Technology Control Officer. The appointment of a Technology Control Officer (TCO) is essential to ensure one staff member is responsible for the management of day to day operations related to controlled technology and information. The ITAR describes an Empowered Official and the importance of the TCO’s role.
 
Second, develop a Technology Control Plan (TCP). The TCP acts as the guiding process document for all aspects of managing controlled technology and information, whether it is related to ITAR or EAR. It is the only compliance measure mentioned within the regulations and as such should be considered as the key measure. The application of project specific TCPs should also be considered for larger companies where different requirements are applied between projects.
 
Third, educate your team through training. Ignorance is no excuse when you are handling controlled technology, so a level of awareness is essential for all staff with even the smallest of access to controlled technology. Training should be conducted on an annual basis as a minimum, and be sure to inform staff when changes to regulations impact their roles.
 
Ignorance is no excuse when you are handling controlled technology
Fourth, establish safeguards and security controls. The protection of Technical Data is a key priority, with the US Department of State and the Department of Commerce likely to treat any such breach very seriously.
 
It is the responsibility of the Australian company in possession of controlled technology to safeguard the data in their possession.
 
Fifth, higher management should be 100 percent committed to compliance in this area, and this should extend to a written commitment.
 
Sixth, audit. Internal and external auditing can ensure ongoing compliance. A comprehensive audit plan should be developed which is adaptable to change at short notice, predominantly to cater for unexpected requirements such as a suspected breach.
 
Seventh, put a process to detect and report suspected violations in place. The voluntary disclosure of a breach is highly recommended by US regulators and is proven to aid in mitigating any penalties that may be imposed. Should there be any doubt, assume it is the case and disclose the breach.
 
Finally, maintain accurate and complete records for all export control transactions, including permits, licences and destruction. A well-maintained record system will allow greater traceability and is a key indicator of an organised and structured export control process.
 
While the above compliance steps are comparatively simple to establish and maintain, they require a commitment by a business to comply with the relevant Export Control regulations they are exposed to. …

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COM_a2
12

QAD Precision: “Higher Education, Intellectual Property and Export Controls”
(Source: QAD Precision, 12 June 2019.) (Part I of II)
 
Universities, like commercial enterprises, need systems to prevent the loss of intellectual property and compliance missteps. In this QAD Precision Report we look at how universities can address these critical issues.
 
This April, the Japanese government announced plans to formulate guidelines for universities that collaborate with foreign companies on joint research projects. Japan’s government will ask institutes of higher education to develop legal compliance systems to prevent technology drain.
 
Technology drain can happen when an organization – or a university – does not protect their intellectual property (IP). This can occur because an organization fails to patent research, as well as through theft, negligence or by accident. University IP can include research papers, computer code, samples, living tissues and cells, prototypes, teaching materials and so forth.
 
Furthermore, if a university works with a foreign partner and violates compliance regulations, the institution could face penalties by the domestic government and the government of its partner. A university research project that uses materials or technologies supplied by overseas researchers, institutions, companies or government bodies, must comply with foreign as well as domestic export controls and licensing requirements.
 
Japan – like many countries and political entities, including the United States, China and the European Union – already has export controls in place for military applications, sensitive technologies and dual-use goods. These laws apply to universities as well as private enterprises. However, while companies and government bodies have systems in place to mitigate compliance violations, universities often lack integrated and institute-wide controls.
 
Separate laboratories, schools, faculties and departments at universities are often responsible for managing their own research information. If they lack knowledge around confidentiality and export rules – and if the university does not have clear processes in place – researchers may violate export controls or fail to protect valuable IP.
 
Intellectual Property and Export Controls
 
Partnerships between universities and companies, government bodies or foreign academics can be fruitful. Nonetheless, these collaborations also bring challenges and risks. Therefore, universities must put systems in place to prevent compliance missteps and protect IP.
 
Japan is certainly not the only country that wishes to protect the IP resulting from university research projects. The US and China have both increased regulation for universities engaging in research with foreign partners, particularly on dual use and military technologies.
 
It is unsurprising that governments wish to prevent military and dual use goods falling into the hands of criminals, terrorists or foreign governments. However, there are other goods, technologies and research that universities may wish to restrict in order to protect IP and prevent technology drain. Lack of clear processes, institute-wide controls, and knowledge around export controls can all contribute to technology drain.
 
What is an Export?
 
When most of us think of an “export” we imagine the physical shipment of goods from one country to another, generally for commercial purposes. This is an export, but the term is broader than that. The following five examples are all exports.
 
(1) The shipment or transfer of physical items overseas
(2) Carrying information to a foreign country on a laptop, external drive, USB device or similar
(3) Electronic transfer of information via email or text message, or by uploading data to a foreign server and so forth
(4) Providing access to software, databases and so forth to foreign nationals
(5) Telephone or other communications
 
As you can see from the above, sharing information across borders is legally the same as transferring physical goods. In the United States, a “deemed export” is the sharing of information or technology with a foreign national who is also in the US. In such a case, the information or goods may not have left US soil, but since the recipient is a foreign national, US authorities regard this as an export. As a result, publishing sensitive university research or discussing it at a conference could also be a violation of export controls.
 
Dual Use Goods
 
Laws regarding dual use goods restrict the export of items or technologies that have both commercial and military applications. Examples include chemicals, electronics, navigation or propulsion systems, lasers, sensors and nuclear power technologies. Exporters – including universities – may need authorization or a license before they can ship certain dual use goods. By issuing licences, governments are able to track the movement of these goods.
 
Depending on where they are, who they collaborate with, and the nature of their research, universities may need to comply with dual use restrictions set out by a number of different government bodies.
 
For example, in the US, the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) controls the export of commercial and dual use items. In addition to EAR, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) control the manufacture, export, import and so forth of military goods and technologies.
 
The European Union has similar controls. Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 governs the EU’s export controls. The regulation creates a common list of technologies that are subject to control. EU member states may control additional items in certain circumstances, subject to European Parliament approval. Similarly, Japan’s Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act oversees Japanese import and export controls, including dual use items.
 
Violations of these laws can result in significant penalties. A university based in the EU and collaborating with a US company would therefore be subject to both EU and US export controls.
 
Fundamental Research vs Proprietary Research
 
Most fundamental research is not subject to export controls. In the US, this is known as the Fundamental Research Exclusion (FRE). Fundamental research is basic and applied research, the results of which are to be published and shared in the public domain with the scientific community. Technical data that is the result of fundamental research is not subject to export controls. For FRE to apply, the researcher must:
 
– Be undertaking fundamental research
– Intend to publish
– Is not subject to publication or other access restrictions (such as by signing a non-disclosure agreement or requiring approval by sponsors
 
FRE only applies to publishable results – not to inventions or equipment. However, certain research, such as in STEM fields (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) may overlap with export controlled technologies.
 
FRE does not apply if a university or a research signs a non-disclosure agreement or accepts other restrictions from a sponsor, such a government body or commercial enterprise. This is proprietary research. Proprietary research is generally restricted for commercial or national security reasons.
 

[Part II will be published tomorrow]

 
back to top
 

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COM_a3
13

S. Besch & B. Oppenheim: “The EU Needs an Effective Common Arms Export Policy”
(Source: Centre for European Reform, 4 June 2019.)
 
* Authors: Sophia Besch, Research Fellow; and Beth Oppenheim, Researcher, both of the Centre for European Reform.
 
The EU’s strategic interests and credibility are harmed by its ineffective and incoherent approach to arms export policy.
 
The EU is the world’s second largest arms exporter, behind the US. Member-states’ combined arms exports made up 27 per cent of the global total in 2014-18, compared with 36 per cent for the US. On paper the Union has a common arms export policy. EU member-states have agreed to uphold “high common standards” for transfers of conventional arms, through the international Arms Trade Treaty and the EU Common Position on Arms Export Controls. The legally binding Common Position sets out eight criteria against which member-states must test export licences, including respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the destination country.
 
Member-states are free to decide how they implement the Common Position, however, and there is no EU mechanism to sanction non-compliance. In practice, therefore, member-states operate their own, conflicting, national policies, and misapply the criteria in their export decisions, which are often political, or industry-driven.
 
Inconsistent implementation of the Common Position stops the EU using arms exports to pursue its foreign and security policy objectives. A genuinely common policy would stop EU weapons being used to undermine regional stability or violate international humanitarian and human rights law; promote regional stability; protect allies and friendly states; and strengthen Europe’s defence industry.
 
By supplying arms, the EU can help its allies and partners maintain technological parity with, or superiority over, shared adversaries; and make it easier to conduct joint operations with its partners. Europeans sometimes export to strategic partners or allies in crisis-prone regions in the hope of contributing to regional stability – though this is a risky strategy that should always form part of a comprehensive support programme, including training and educating security forces about how to use the arms in line with international law.
 
By restricting arms supplies, the EU can attempt to change a state’s behaviour. Arms embargoes can constrain aggressive behaviour by depriving a country of military resources. Arms export restrictions can also signal condemnation of human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law. But the impact of arms embargoes should not be overstated. On their own, they are ineffective in changing state behaviour, and are particularly poor at preventing human rights abuses and crackdowns on democracy. The most effective arms embargoes are usually accompanied by additional economic sanctions, which hit countries far harder.
 
EU arms export policy is also closely linked to efforts to build up the EU’s defence industrial base. Because of the low level of defence spending in Europe, European defence firms rely heavily on exports to sustain themselves. As a result, European industries sometimes prioritise the capability needs of export customers over those of EU states. Between 2014 and 2018, 90 per cent of France’s arms exports and 73 per cent of Germany’s went to buyers outside the EU, while in 2017, 89 per cent of UK arms exports went outside Europe.
 
The EU’s solution, through initiatives like the European Defence Fund, is to create greater economies of scale in European production. The idea is not to encourage EU member-states only to ‘buy European’, but to help them be more selective about whom they export to. At the same time, joining forces to develop a new capability, like the next European fighter jet, requires countries and their defence industries to trust each other to provide components. Arms export policies need to be predictable and consistent.
 
In order to force countries to adhere to the Common Position, the EU would have to introduce a sanctions mechanism. The EU could establish a supervisory arms export body under the control of the Commission or the High Representative, which could report on violations of the Common Position by member-states. If the infringement continued, the Commission could refer it to the European Court of Justice. But creating a sanctions mechanism would require treaty change.
 
The biggest obstacle to a common arms policy however, is that EU member-states often disagree on their analysis of a conflict and the EU’s interests in it. For instance, member-states diverge on whether supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia will help stabilise or destabilise the Gulf region and what the impact on European security would be. Ultimately, there is no consensus on threat perception and strategic assessment.
 
At present member-states have little appetite for surrendering decision-making power over arms exports. But in future the EU’s institutions may try to exert more control. After years of staying out of the defence realm, long considered a bastion of national sovereignty, the European Commission is progressively carving out a role for itself.
 
Even before that, the EU could improve transparency to aid decision-making. The Council’s Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) produces an annual report compiling member-states’ statistics on conventional arms licences and exports. The report should become a searchable online database. Many member-states, including France, the UK and Germany, still fail to submit full reports on their export licences on time. The EU should establish strict reporting deadlines and standardise the format of reports. Some countries struggle to provide the required data due to lack of resources or know-how. COARM should arrange peer review meetings, where governments can exchange best practices on how to gather such data from industry.
 
The EU should implement stronger end-use controls at the European level. Exported weapons can and do end up in the wrong hands. A 2017 report found that more than 30 per cent of the arms used by IS fighters in Syria and Iraq came from Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Germany. The EU could encourage and support member-states in implementing post-shipment controls. EU resources, such as expert teams made up of Commission or European External Action Service staff, dispatched to EU delegations in the buying country, could be employed to help with controls.
 
Finally, export-specific agreements between small groups of member-states that want to work together on a capability project could slowly build trust and contribute to greater convergence. But in order to strengthen rather than erode EU foreign policy objectives, these agreements would have to include a binding commitment to abide by the EU’s export criteria.
 
Without a common and enforceable EU arms export regime, divergence – and therefore weakened EU power and legitimacy – is inevitable. But conversations with EU officials and industry figures make it clear that a supervisory arms export body backed up by a compliance mechanism is at best a long-term possibility, for which there is no consensus at present.
 

For now, EU member-states should attempt to reach consensus on the threat environment in which arms exports are taking place, improve reporting by member-states, tighten end-use controls and reach inter-governmental export agreements. New EU defence initiatives and the increasing role of the Commission suggest the relationship between national sovereignty and defence is shifting. Europe will benefit if it can keep moving towards convergence on arms export policy.

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TEEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

TE_a014. FCC Presents “Designing an ICP for Export Controls & Sanctions”, 1 Oct in Bruchem, The Netherlands


 
* What: Designing an Internal Compliance Program (ICP) for Export Controls & Sanctions
* Date: Tuesday, 1 Oct 2019
* Location: Full Circle Compliance, Landgoed Groenhoven, Dorpsstraat 6, Bruchem, The Netherlands
* Times:
  – Registration and welcome: 9.00 am – 9.30 am
  – Training course hours: 9.30 am – 4.30 pm
* Level: Intermediate
* Target Audience:  the course provides valuable insights for both compliance professionals, employees and (senior / middle) management working in any industry subject to U.S. and/or EU (member state) export control laws and sanctions regulations.
* Instructors: Drs. Ghislaine C.Y. Gillessen RA and Marco M. Crombach MSc.

* Information & Registration: click here or contact us at events@fullcirclecompliance.eu or 31 (0)23 – 844 – 9046. 

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ENEDITOR’S NOTES

William Butler Yeats (13 Jun 1865 – 28 Jan 1939; was an Irish poet and one of the foremost figures of 20th-century literature. A pillar of the Irish literary establishment, he helped to found the Abbey Theatre, and in his later years served two terms as a Senator of the Irish Free State. He was a driving force behind the Irish Literary Revival along with Lady Gregory, Edward Martyn, and others.)
  – “All empty souls tend toward extreme opinions.” 
  – “To be born woman is to know – although they do not speak of it at school – women must labor to be beautiful.”

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EN_a316
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

 

*
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.  Implemented by Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs & Border Protection.

  – Last Amendment: 5 Apr 2019:
84 FR 13499-13513: Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation
 


DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR)
: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security.
  – Last Amendment: 5 June 2019: 
84 FR 25986-25989
: Restricting the Temporary Sojourn of Aircraft and Vessels to Cuba
 
* DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.  Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau.
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.
  – The latest edition (1 Jan 2019) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.   

 

DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense.
  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)
 
 
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359, comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. This rule also identifies destinations with respect to which most assistance would be generally authorized and destinations that would require a specific authorization by the Secretary of Energy.
 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Nov 2018, 10 CFR 110.6, Re-transfers.
 

* DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War.  Implemented by Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives.
  – Last Amendment: 14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239-9240: Bump-Stock-Type Devices 

 

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. Implemented by Dep’t of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
  – Last Amendment: 19 Apr 2019: 84 FR 16398-16402: International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Transfers Made by or for a Department or Agency of the U.S. Government   
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 19 Apr 2019) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment. The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website. BAFTR subscribers receive a $25 discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.
 

*
 
DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR)
 
: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders.
Implemented by Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control.
 
Last Amendment: 5 June 2019:
84 FR 25992 – June 2019 Amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations [amendment of 31 CFR Part 515]
 


USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA)
, 1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex. Implemented by U.S. International Trade Commission. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 4 June 2019: 
Harmonized System Update (HSU) 1910
 
  – HTS codes for AES are available 
here
.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 
here
.

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EN_a0317
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published  
here

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EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; and Assistant Editors, Alexander Witt and Sven Goor. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 7,500 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

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