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19-0403 Wednesday “Daily Bugle'”

19-0403 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

Wednesday, 3 April 2019

[No items of interest noted today.] 

  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions 
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. CRS Issues Report on Arms Sales
  4. State/DDTC Announces Closure of DECCS Commodity Jurisdiction Testing Period
  5. EU Publishes Correction to EU Dual-Use Regulation
  6. UK DIT/ECJU: “UK Company Fined More Than £80,000 For Illegal Exports”
  1. CNA: “South Korean Ship Detained for Violating UN Sanctions: Seoul”
  2. France 24: “Beretta Pistol Stolen at Brazil Defense Industry Expo”
  3. The Globe and Mail: “Navigating the Ever-Changing World of Sanctions is a Struggle for Canadian Businesses”
  4. The Hill: “Designate China a Strategic Adversary, and Prosecute Companies That Give It AI Technology”
  5. Reuters: “EU Would Begin Customs Controls Right After No-Deal Brexit”
  6. Spiegel Online: “Probation Sentences for Sig Sauer Manager”
  7. VOA: “Bigger Than Huawei: U.S. Broadens Scrutiny of Chinese Tech”
  1. G. Autry: “Beijing’s Fight for the Final Frontier”
  2. K.B. Contini, E.K. Shin & M. Hamilton: “U.S. – OFAC Expands Economic Sanctions on Venezuela Through Additional Venezuela-Related Designations”
  3. U. Neelakantan & D.B. Pickard: “Clarifying Export Control Internal Investigations”
  1. ECTI Presents “Five Major Lessons Compliance Professionals Can Learn from Recent Enforcement Actions” Webinar on 2 May 2019
  2. FCC Presents “An Introduction to EU / Dutch Dual-Use and Military Export Controls”, 7 May in Bruchem, the Netherlands
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: DHS/Customs (12 Mar 2019), DOC/EAR (20 Dec 2018), DOC/FTR (24 Apr 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), DOE/AFAEC (23 Feb 2015), DOE/EINEM (20 Nov 2018), DOJ/ATF (14 Mar 2018), DOS/ITAR (19 Mar 2018), DOT/FACR/OFAC (15 Mar 2018), HTSUS (2 Apr 2019) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1 
[No items of interest noted today.] 
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OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a11. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

 
[No items of interest noted today.]
 
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OGS_a22
.
Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
(Source:
Commerce/BIS)

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OGS_a33.
CRS Issues Report on Arms Sales 

(Source: CRS, 1 Apr 2019.)  
 
The full Congressional Research Service (CRS) report is available here (pdf). A summary is included below.
 
Summary
 
This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to third party states of such military items. Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration can proceed with the sale. However, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand. Commercially licensed arms sales also must be formally notified to Congress 30 calendar days before the export license is issued if they involve the sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, or defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more (Section 36(c) AECA). In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration is authorized to proceed with a given sale. As with government-to-government sales, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand. 


 
Furthermore, commercially licensed arms sales cases involving defense articles that are firearms controlled under category I of the United States Munitions List and valued at $1 million or more must also be formally notified to Congress for review 30 days prior to the license for export being approved. In the case of proposed licenses for such sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, 15 days prior notification is required.
 
In general, the executive branch, after complying with the terms of applicable U.S. law, principally contained in the AECA, is free to proceed with an arms sales proposal unless Congress passes legislation prohibiting or modifying the proposed sale. Under current law Congress faces two fundamental obstacles to block or modify a presidential sale of military equipment: it must pass legislation expressing its will on the sale, and it must be capable of overriding a presumptive presidential veto of such legislation. Congress, however, is free to pass legislation to block or modify an arms sale at any time up to the point of delivery of the items involved. This report will be updated, if notable changes in these review procedures or applicable law occur.

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OGS_a44. State/DDTC Ends DECCS Commodity Jurisdiction Testing Period

(Source: State/DDTC, 3 Apr 2019.)
 
The testing and comment period for the DDTC’s latest Defense Export Control and Compliance System (DECCS) application, Commodity Jurisdictions, has closed. The DDTC Test Support Team appreciates all of the feedback received. We will work to incorporate the comments received to continually improve the application.
 

Another announcement will be posted here when the live Commodity Jurisdiction application is released, along with instructions for access. Please contact the IT Modernization team with any questions. 

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Corrigenda
* Corrigendum to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1922 of 10 October 2018 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items ( OJ L 319, 14.12.2018)

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(Source: UK ECJU, 3 Apr 2019.)
 
The UK Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) of the Department of International Trade (TID) has published notice to exporters 2019/05:
 
Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) recently issued a compound penalty of £82,152.33 to a UK exporter. This related to unlicensed exports of military goods controlled by The Export Control Order 2008.
 
Export control legislation is enforced by HMRC, working with the Crown Prosecution Service. Where appropriate, HMRC can use their powers to offer a compound penalty in lieu of prosecution. …

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NWSNEWS

NWS_a17. CNA: “South Korean Ship Detained for Violating UN Sanctions: Seoul”

(Source: Channel News Asia, 3 Apr 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
A South Korean ship has been detained for more than six months on suspicion of violating UN sanctions against the nuclear-armed North, Seoul’s foreign ministry said on Wednesday.
 
Pyongyang is sanctioned over its weapons program under multiple UN Security Council resolutions, which include curbs on shipments of oil and fuel to the isolated regime. Advertisement
 
But the North has been seeking to get around the measures, with a recent UN report saying that Pyongyang was securing deliveries of fuel through ship-to-ship transfers in international waters.
 
Seoul’s foreign ministry said a South Korean ship and three others had been detained in the country, suspected of undermining the economic measures against the North. …

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NWS_2
8
. France 24: “Beretta Pistol Stolen at Brazil Defense Industry Expo”

(Source: France 24, 2 Apr 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
A Beretta pistol was stolen from a display at a major defense industry exhibition in Rio de Janeiro on Tuesday shortly before Brazil’s Vice President Hamilton Mourao and various senior politicians arrived at the venue.
 
A search was under way for the missing weapon, which the organizers of the LAAD Defense and Security expo said had been rendered “non-functioning” before it was put on show. …
 
Some 450 Brazilian and foreign brands, ranging from makers of sniper bullets and machine guns to bullet-proof vests and drones, are on display at the four-day exhibition where amateurs and professionals can see and handle the latest technology.
 
Participants – including police officers, soldiers and gun club members – were required to leave their personal weapons and ammunition at the entrance before passing through security scanners that appeared to have been disabled. …

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NWS_3
9
. The Globe and Mail: “Navigating the Ever-Changing World of Sanctions is a Struggle for Canadian Businesses”

Source: The Globe and Mail, 3 Apr 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
Economic sanctions are a growing risk factor for Canadian companies engaged in international business, involving traps for the unwary, including, in the most serious cases, criminal charges against senior officers and against the company itself.
 
Despite these risks and the exposure to criminal penalties, the world of sanctions is not fully understood in many quarters. Here’s a short primer.
 
To start with the obvious, sanctions are unilateral prohibitions applied by governments to restrict foreign transactions in specific sectors or with individuals that have been identified as corrupt or morally reprehensible. In some cases, sanctions cover both categories.
 
Sanctions tend to go in one direction, mostly applied by Western industrialized democracies on rogue countries or regimes that behave badly and flout international law, the objective being to penalize or try to change the behavior of these nasty actors, either individuals or entire governments. Sanctions on North Korea, Syria and Somalia are examples.
 
With evolving geopolitical circumstance, the scope of sanctions can expand, in some cases rather suddenly, as in the case of Canada’s sanctions on Venezuela and Russia. …

  

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NWS_4
10. The Hill: “Designate China a Strategic Adversary, and Prosecute Companies That Give It AI Technology” 

(Source: The Hill, 3 Apr, 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 

Lists are an indelible part of our culture. Santa has his list of the nice and the naughty; the FBI has their Top 10 Most Wanted; many have “bucket lists;” and then there’s Craigslist. The United States government is especially fond of lists.
 
Terrorist groups like ISIS, HAMAS and Boko Haram are on the State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. North Korea, Iran, Sudan and Syria are included on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. The United States Department of Treasury operates the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and its list.  
 
Through OFAC, the Treasury “administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.” Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei recently ran afoul of one of these lists and was indicted for violating trade sanctions on Iran. …  

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NWS_5
11. Reuters: “EU Would Begin Customs Controls Right After No-Deal Brexit”  

(Source: Reuters, 3 Apr 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
The European Union will immediately introduce customs checks and import duties in the event of a “no deal” Brexit, erecting barriers to British exports ranging from cars to farm produce and preventing consumers bringing in British cheese or meats.
 
Pierre Moscovici, the EU’s economic affairs and tax commissioner, told a news conference on Wednesday that all the remaining 27 EU members agreed that customs controls would have to be put in place for incoming goods as soon as Britain left. …
 
He said EU companies trading with the UK had to be ready for additional costs and bureaucracy as customs checks increased, while travelers would also be subject to more checks.

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NWS_6
12. Spiegel Online: “Probation Sentences for Sig Sauer Manager”   

(Source: Spiegel Online, 3 Apr 2019.) [Excerpts. Unofficial translation by Alex Witt.]
 

Almost 40,000 pistols of the German weapons manufacturer Sig Sauer have ended up in the crisis-ridden country of Colombia, several managers were convicted – and the profit from the sale flows into the treasury. …

 
The Kiel Regional Court has sentenced three current and former managing directors of the weapons manufacturer Sig Sauer to probation and fines. The trial involved the illegal export of pistols to Colombia.
 
Violation of the Foreign Trade Act
 
The Kiel judges considered it proven that the three responsible persons violated the German Foreign Trade and Payments Act. The accused ensured that more than 38,000 Sig Sauer pistols ended up in Colombia via the US, without approval.
 

According to the indictment, the weapons were delivered to the Colombian Federal Police through a Sig Sauer subsidiary in the United States between 2009 and 2011. According to the court, the three responsible persons made wrong statements to German authorities, saying that the guns were intended for the USA. A permit for the export would not have been granted given the human rights and security situation in Colombia. …  

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NWS_7
13. VOA: “Bigger Than Huawei: U.S. Broadens Scrutiny of Chinese Tech”    

(Source: Voice of America, 2 Apr 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
A flurry of seemingly disconnected actions by the U.S. government to curb the involvement of Chinese technology firms in the U.S. economy over the past year reflects the Trump administration’s intensifying concern that those firms could – now or in the future – abet espionage by Beijing’s intelligence services.
 
The actions include tightening scrutiny of foreign investors in a broad range of industries, publicly warning allies about looming vulnerabilities, and blocking China-linked companies from buying American companies involves in key industries, like semiconductor design.
 
For now, experts say it has largely been a patchwork approach to protecting industries seen as critical to U.S. national security. But there is also evidence that, behind the scenes, policymakers are racing to develop a more coherent approach to balancing commerce with China and national security interests. …

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COMMCOMMENTARY

COM_a1
14.
G. Autry: “Beijing’s Fight for the Final Frontier”

(Source:
Foreign Policy
, 2 Apr 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
* Author: Greg Autry, director, Southern California Commercial Spaceflight Initiative at the University of Southern California.
 
U.S. commercial space efforts are being undercut by aggressive Chinese plans.
 
While the eyes of the world were focused on China’s Chang’e 4 lunar lander this January, Beijing was also quietly establishing a beachhead in America’s booming commercial space sector. Chinese attempts to steal U.S. space tech go back to the
space shuttle, but their systematic efforts to infiltrate California’s commercial space firms beat anything I’ve seen in my 17 years of researching the new space industries. …
 
The countries listed under International Traffic in Arms Regulations 126.1, including China, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, are a good start for the blacklist-even as the United States recognizes that the major threat is China. The restriction must also identify any entity controlled by or possibly controlled by one of these governments through domestic or international proxies. Congress should also establish a white list of countries where investment, cooperation, and partnering is permitted. … Previous efforts to control technology transfer were often failures. Well-intentioned laws must not drive others into China’s arms in the process of strengthening U.S. resolve. Until recently, the items on the United States Munitions List have been too broadly interpreted and too slow to be updated. The inability for many countries to access U.S. satellite and launch technology in an efficient and responsive manner was credited with stimulating China’s own satellite-building business. …
   

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COM_a2
15. K.B. Contini, E.K. Shin & M. Hamilton: “U.S. – OFAC Expands Economic Sanctions on Venezuela Through Additional Venezuela-Related Designations”
(Source:
Baker McKenzie, 29 Mar 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
* Authors: Kerry B. Contini, Esq.,
kerry.contini@bakermckenzie.com; Eunkyung Kim Shin, Esq.,
eunkyung.kim.shin@bakermckenzie.com; and Meghan Hamilton, Esq.,
meghan.hamilton@bakermckenzie.com. All of Baker McKenzie.
 
The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) continues to escalate the use of sanctions against the Maduro regime as well as entities that support the Maduro regime through the designation of high-profile parties as Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”). These designations increase the compliance risks for both US and non-US parties attempting to do business with Venezuela. Companies should watch out for additional designations under the Venezuelan sanctions, including possible designations of companies in the financial sector, gold sector, or other key sectors of the Venezuelan economy.
 
As a result of these SDN designations, all of the property and interests in property within US jurisdiction of the designated individuals and entities are blocked. “US Persons” are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with SDNs and any entities 50% or more owned by SDNs. “US Persons” include (i) entities organized under US laws and their non-US branches, (ii) individuals or entities in the United States, or (iii) US citizens or permanent resident aliens (“Green Card” holders) wherever located or employed. Non-US Persons may be liable under the sanctions if they “cause” SDN-related transactions to occur in whole or in part in the United States.
 
Designation of a Russian Bank for Attempting to Circumvent US Sanctions on Venezuela
 
On March 11, 2019, OFAC designated Evrofinance Mosnarbank (“Evrofinance”), a Moscow-based bank jointly owned by Russian and Venezuelan state-owned companies, as an SDN. OFAC designated Evrofinance under Executive Order (“EO”) 13850 of November 1, 2018, as amended by EO 13857 of January 25, 2019, based on a determination that Evrofinance was a foreign financial institution that had “materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.” In its press release, the US Treasury Department described Evrofinance’s role in financing the Venezuelan government’s cryptocurrency, the Petro, which is the target of US sanctions under EO 13827 of March 19, 2018. The US government views the Petro as a tool of the Maduro regime to circumvent US financial sanctions. The US Treasury Department advised that this designation was to demonstrate that the US government will take action against foreign financial institutions that sustain the Maduro regime.
 
Designation of Parties for Operating in Venezuelan Gold Sector
 
On March 19, 2019, OFAC designated CVG Compania General de Minera de Venezuela CA (“Minerven”), Venezuela’s state gold mining company, and its President Adrian Antonio Perdomo Mata as SDNs under EO 13850, as amended by EO 13857, for operating in the Venezuelan gold sector. EO 13850 provides OFAC with the authority to designate parties determined “to operate in the gold sector of the Venezuelan economy or in any other sector of the Venezuelan economy as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State.” In its press release, the US Treasury Department stated that these designations targeted “the illicit gold operations that have continued to prop up the illegitimate regime of former President Nicolas Maduro.”
 
Designation of Venezuelan Financial Institutions
 
Most recently, on March 22, 2019, OFAC designated state-owned and controlled bank Banco de Desarrollo Economico y Social de Venezuela (“BANDES”), as well as four additional financial institutions that BANDES owns or controls, as SDNs under EO 13850, as amended by EO 13857, for operating in the Venezuelan financial sector of the Venezuelan economy. This followed a determination that persons operating in Venezuela’s financial sector may be subject to sanctions pursuant to EO 13850, as amended by EO 13857. The US Treasury Department’s press release stated that these designations were made in response to the illegal arrest of an aide to Juan Guaido, who the US government recognizes as the President of Venezuela.
 
The four financial institutions designated for being owned or controlled by BANDES are:
 
  (1) Banco Bandes Uruguay S.A. (“Bandes Uruguay”),
  (2) Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo, de la Clase Obrera, Mujer ye Comunias, Banco Universal C.A. (“Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo”),
  (3) Banco de Venezuela SA Banco Universal (“Banco de Venezuela”), and
  (4) Banco Prodem S.A. (“Banco Prodem”)
 
OFAC issued a new FAQ 663 confirming that only the entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and any entity 50% or more owned by SDNs are blocked. That said, in light of the determination that persons operating in Venezuela’s financial sector may be subject to sanctions pursuant to EO 13850, as amended by EO 13857, additional Venezuelan financial institutions could be designated in the future.
 
Concurrently with these designations, OFAC re-issued one general license (“GL”) and issued four new GLs authorizing certain transactions related to certain of the four Venezuelan financial institutions designated for being owned or controlled by BANDES. The authorizations in these general licenses only extend to the SDNs named therein, and none of these authorizations extend to transactions involving BANDES itself. These descriptions are not exhaustive; each GL should be reviewed in detail before relying on the authorizations contained therein. …

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COM_a3
16. U. Neelakantan & D.B. Pickard: “Clarifying Export Control Internal Investigations”
(Source:
National Defense Magazine, 2 Apr 2019.)
 
*Authors: Usha Neelakantan, Esq.,
UNeelakantan@wileyrein.com; and Daniel B. Pickard, Esq.,
DPickard@wileyrein.com. Both of Wiley Rein LLP.
 
U.S. government contractors operating in the defense sector compete in a highly regulated and scrutinized market that is subject to investigation by federal enforcement agencies.
 
With respect to U.S. export controls, contractors must ensure compliance with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations – which prohibit the unlicensed transfer of defense articles, defense services and technical data through training, software and other technology transfers – as well as the Export Administration Regulations, which control the export, reexport and transfer of commercial and dual-use commodities, software and technology, as well as certain less sensitive military items.
 
Internal investigations of potential violations have grown increasingly commonplace, both in the United States and globally. Contractors must carefully consider and establish the contours of any internal investigation to maximize benefits while simultaneously avoiding potentially serious, negative consequences.
 
Many situations demand an internal investigation to address both business and potential liability concerns. Such investigations are often a crucial part of an effective overall compliance program, aiding companies to not only identify potential issues that have already occurred but also to identify and rectify compliance program vulnerabilities. While internal investigations are often tailored to the specific needs of the business/issue at play, there are at least five key components to success.
 
A clearly defined, mutually agreed upon scope is perhaps the most important but often overlooked component. While many high profile, high stakes internal investigations have grown exceedingly expensive and time-consuming, this does not always need to be the case.
 
The investigation mandate should clearly define the nature of the potential violations to be investigated. For example, the scope can be limited to one particular realm of export controls (e.g. ITAR) or can be broader to include, for example, export controls, anti-corruption and economic sanctions concerns. An appropriately targeted investigation will alleviate concerns of “mission creep.”
 
It should also define the period of time being examined. Such investigations generally focus on a five-year “look back” period, coinciding with the statute of limitations for most non-capital offenses.
 
Additionally, the business should determine whether an internal investigation will cover a single country, an entire region, or an examination of global operations. Particularly for contractors with multinational operations, this is a key factor, and companies will be well-served when geographical limitations are provided at the outset.
 
The maintenance of privilege is a critical element to any successful internal investigation. One important consideration is the privilege afforded to communications with in-house versus outside counsel, both within the United States and in other countries. While the law continues to evolve, U.S. courts have generally applied strict standards for in-house counsel when determining the applicability of privilege. Several foreign courts have also held that in-house counsel are not afforded the same attorney-client and work-product privilege protections as they are in the United States.
 
Standard practice in an internal investigation is to issue a document hold notice as soon as possible to ensure the preservation of all potentially relevant documents. The notice should clearly identify the relevant parties and the importance of preserving all potentially relevant documents and communications related to the investigation.
 
The notice typically states the applicable time period, type of documents covered, and confirms that the terms “documents” and “communications” should be broadly interpreted to include information stored in any medium. It should also confirm that the company’s normal document retention schedule is suspended and should provide relevant contact information for any questions. Importantly, the notice will generally highlight the importance of preserving attorney-client privilege and will advise that the notice, itself a privileged communication, is not to be forwarded to anyone else, particularly anyone outside the organization.
 
Witness interviews are a key component of the internal investigation process and are generally conducted once all relevant documents have been reviewed and analyzed. Once again, attorney-client privilege is particularly important in this context, as is the need to provide the witness with the “Upjohn” warning at the start of the interview. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court held that communications between company counsel and employees are privileged, but noted that that privilege belongs to the company, not the employee. This warning makes clear that the interviewing counsel represents only the company, and that any claim of privilege rests with the company, not the employee.
 
Finally, at the conclusion of an investigation, the company may request a written report summarizing the findings. Such a report generally summarizes the circumstances that gave rise to the investigation, the findings and suggested remedial measures to ensure that circumstances that gave rise to the investigation do not recur. It may also discuss the appropriateness of submitting a voluntary self-disclosure to the appropriate government agency.
 
While internal investigations necessarily vary across businesses and industries, these five key components are essential to ensuring that they proceed efficiently and successfully.

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TEEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

TE_a117.
ECTI Presents “Five Major Lessons Compliance Professionals Can Learn from Recent Enforcement Actions” Webinar on 2 May 2019 
(Source: D. Hatch, 
danielle@learnexportcompliance.com.)
 
* What: Five Major Lessons Compliance Professionals Can Learn from Recent Enforcement Actions
* When: May 2, 2019 1:00 p.m. (EDT)
* Where: Webinar
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker: Timothy P. O’Toole
* Register: 
here or contact Danielle Hatch, 540-433-3977,
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TE_a218.
FCC Presents “An Introduction to EU / Dutch Dual-Use and Military Export Controls”, 7 May in Bruchem, the Netherlands
 
This 1-day training course is ideally suited for compliance professionals and those in a similar role who aim to gain a better understanding of EU and Dutch export control laws and regulations and industry’s best practices to ensure compliance.
  The course will cover multiple topics relevant for organizations subject to EU and Dutch dual-use and/or military export controls, including: the EU and Dutch regulatory framework; key concepts and definitions; practical tips regarding classification and licensing, and for ensuring a compliant shipment; identifying red flag situations and handling (potential) non-compliance issues; and the latest developments regarding Internal Compliance Program requirements in the EU an the Netherlands.
 
* Training Event: “An Introduction to EU / Dutch Dual-Use and Military Export Controls” (in Dutch)
* Date: Tuesday, 7 May 2019
* Location: Full Circle Compliance, Landgoed Groenhoven, Dorpsstraat 6, Bruchem, The Netherlands
* Times:
  – Registration and welcome: 9.00 am – 9.30 am
  – Training course hours: 9.30 am – 4.00 pm
* Level: Awareness / Beginner.
* Target Audience: Compliance professionals or those in a similar role in any industry affected by EU/Dutch export controls (
e.g., manufacturing, logistics, research & development, aerospace & defense, government, etc.).
* Instructors: Marco F.N. Crombach MSc (Senior Manager) & Vincent J.A. Goossen MA (Senior Associate). 

* Information & Registration: click here or contact us at events@fullcirclecompliance.eu or 31 (0)23 – 844 – 9046. 

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ENEDITOR’S NOTES

* Washington Irving (3 Apr 1783 – 28 Nov 1859; was an American short story writer, essayist, biographer, historian, and diplomat of the early 19th century. He is best known for his short stories “Rip Van Winkle” and “The Legend of Sleepy Hollow”, both of which appear in his collection, The Sketch Book of Geoffrey Crayon, Gent.)
 – “There is certain relief in change, even though it be from bad to worse! As I have often found in traveling in a stagecoach, that it is often a comfort to shift one’s position, and be bruised in a new place.”
  – “One of the greatest and simplest tools for learning more and growing is doing more.”

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EN_a320
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

 

*
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.  Implemented by Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs & Border Protection.

  – Last Amendment: 12 Mar 2019: 84 FR 8807-8809: Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological and Ecclesiastical Ethnological Material From Honduras
 

DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Dec 2018: 83 FR 65292-65294: Control of Military Electronic Equipment and Other Items the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions List (USML); Correction [Concerning ECCN 7A005 and ECCN 7A105.]
 
* DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.  Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau.
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.
  – The latest edition (1 Jan 2019) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.   

 

DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense.
  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)
 
 
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359, comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. This rule also identifies destinations with respect to which most assistance would be generally authorized and destinations that would require a specific authorization by the Secretary of Energy.
 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Nov 2018, 10 CFR 110.6, Re-transfers.
 

* DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War.  Implemented by Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives.
  – Last Amendment: 14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239-9240: Bump-Stock-Type Devices 

 

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. Implemented by Dep’t of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
  – Last Amendment: 19 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9957-9959: Department of State 2019 Civil Monetary Penalties Inflationary Adjustment. 
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 19 Mar 2019) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment. The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website. BAFTR subscribers receive a $25 discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.
 
* DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders. 

Implemented by Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

  – Last Amendment: 15 Mar 2019: 84 FR: 9456-9458: List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account Sanctions (CAPTA List) 
  
* USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), 1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex. Implemented by U.S. International Trade Commission. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)

   – Last Amendment: 2 Apr 2019: Harmonized System Update (HSU) 1905 [contains 792 ABI records and 176 harmonized tariff records]. 

  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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EN_a0321
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 
here

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EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Vincent J.A. Goossen and Alexander Witt; and Events & Jobs Editor, Sven Goor. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 7,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. 
We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

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