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19-0305 Tuesday “Daily Bugle'”

19-0305 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

Tuesday, 5 March 2019

  1. President Continues National Emergency with Respect to Ukraine
  2. President Continues National Emergency with Respect to Zimbabwe
  3. USTR Postpones Additional Duty Rate on Chinese Products Covered Under September 2018 Action
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  1. Middle East Eye: “Exporting American’s Gun Problem? The Proposed Rule That Has Monitors Up in Arms”
  2. Reuters: “United States and China Inch toward Limited Trade Deal: Kemp”
  3. The Washington Post: “China Accuses Two Detained Canadians of Stealing State Secrets”
  1. K.C. Georgi: “It’s Complicated: Employers Who Ignore the Interplay Between US Export Control and Anti-Discrimination Laws Risk Penalties”
  2. M. Volkov: “The Criminal Pursuit of Huawei China: DOJ Brings Two Indictments”
  1. ECS Presents “2nd Annual ECS ITAR/EAR Symposium and Boot Camp” on 17-19 Sep in Annapolis, MD
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: DHS/Customs (14 Jan 2019), DOC/EAR (20 Dec 2018), DOC/FTR (24 Apr 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), DOE/AFAEC (23 Feb 2015), DOE/EINEM (20 Nov 2018), DOJ/ATF (26 Dec 2018), DOS/ITAR (4 Oct 2018), DOT/FACR/OFAC (15 Nov 2018), HTSUS (27 Feb 2019) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

 
84 FR 7975-7976: Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Ukraine
 
On March 6, 2014, by Executive Order 13660, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the actions and policies of persons that undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threaten its peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and contribute to the misappropriation of its assets.
 
On March 16, 2014, the President issued Executive Order 13661, which expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13660, and found that the actions and policies of the Government of the Russian Federation with respect to Ukraine undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threaten its peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and contribute to the misappropriation of its assets.
 
On March 20, 2014, the President issued Executive Order 13662, which further expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13660, as expanded in scope in Executive Order 13661, and found that the actions and policies of the Government of the Russian Federation, including its purported annexation of Crimea and its use of force in Ukraine, continue to undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threaten its peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and contribute to the misappropriation of its assets.
 
On December 19, 2014, the President issued Executive Order 13685, to take additional steps to address the Russian occupation of the Crimea region of Ukraine.
 
On September 20, 2018, the President issued Executive Order 13849, to take additional steps to implement certain statutory sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation.
 
The actions and policies addressed in these Executive Orders continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared on March 6, 2014, and the measures adopted on that date, on March 16, 2014, on March 20, 2014, on December 19, 2014, and on September 20, 2018, to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond March 6, 2019. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13660.
 
(Presidential Sig.)
THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 4, 2019.
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84 FR 7977-7978: Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Zimbabwe
 
On March 6, 2003, by Executive Order 13288, the President declared a national emergency and blocked the property of certain persons, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706), to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of the United States constituted by the actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Zimbabwe and other persons to undermine Zimbabwe’s democratic processes or institutions. These actions and policies had contributed to the deliberate breakdown in the rule of law in Zimbabwe, to politically motivated violence and intimidation in that country, and to political and economic instability in the southern African region.
 
On November 22, 2005, the President issued Executive Order 13391 to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13288 by ordering the blocking of the property of additional persons undermining democratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe.
 
On July 25, 2008, the President issued Executive Order 13469, which expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13288 and authorized the blocking of the property of additional persons undermining democratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe.
 
The actions and policies of these persons continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared on March 6, 2003, and the measures adopted on that date, on November 22, 2005, and on July 25, 2008, to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond March 6, 2019. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13288.
 
(Presidential Sig.)
THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 4, 2019.
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(Source:
Federal Register, 5 Mar 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
84 FR 7966-7967: Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation
* AGENCY: Office of the United States Trade Representative.
* ACTION: Notice of modification of action.
* SUMMARY: In accordance with the direction of the President, the U.S. Trade Representative (Trade Representative) has determined to modify the action being taken in this Section 301 investigation by postponing the date on which the rate of the additional duties will increase to 25 percent for the products of China covered by the September 2018 Action in this investigation. The rate of additional duty for the products covered by the September 2018 action will remain at 10 percent until further notice.
* DATES: The rate of additional duty will remain at 10 percent with respect to products covered by the September 2018 action until further notice.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions about this notice, contact Associate General Counsel Arthur Tsao, Assistant General Counsel Megan Grimball, or Director of Industrial Goods Justin Hoffmann at (202) 395-5725. For questions on customs classification or implementation of additional duties on products covered by the September 2018 action, contact traderemedy@cbp.dhs.gov.
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: …
   For background on the proceedings in this investigation, please see the prior notices issued in the investigation, including 82 FR 40213 (August 23, 2017), 83 FR 14906 (April 6, 2018), 83 FR 28710 (June 20, 2018), 83 FR 33608 (July 17, 2018), 83 FR 38760 (August 7, 2018), and 83 FR 40823 (August 16, 2018).
   In a notice published on September 21, 2018 (83 FR 47974), the Trade Representative, at the direction of the President, announced a determination to modify the action being taken in the investigation by imposing additional duties on products of China with an annual trade value of approximately $200 billion. The rate of additional duties initially was 10 percent. Those additional duties were effective starting on September 24, 2018, and currently are in effect. Under Annex B of the September 21 notice, the rate of additional duty was set to increase to 25 percent on January 1, 2019. In the September 21 notice, the Trade Representative stated that he would continue to consider the actions taken in this investigation, and if further modifications were appropriate, he would take into account the extensive public comments and testimony previously provided in response to the notices published on July 17, 2018 (83 FR 33608) and August 7, 2018 (83 FR 38760).
   On September 28, 2018 (83 FR 49153), the Trade Representative issued a conforming amendment and modification of the September 21 action. The current notice refers to the September 21 action, as modified by the September 28 notice, as the “September 2018 action.”
   On December 19, 2018 (83 FR 65198), in accordance with the direction of the President, the Trade Representative determined to modify the September 2018 action by postponing until March 2, 2019, the increase in the rate of the additional duty to 25 percent. The Annex to the December 19 notice, which superseded Annex B to the September 21 notice, amended the HTSUS to reflect this postponement of the increase in the rate of duty applicable to the September 2018 action. …
   To effectuate the Trade Representative’s decision, Annex B of the September 21 notice (83 FR 47974) and the Annex to the December 19 notice (83 FR 65198), hereby are rescinded. In accordance with Annex A of the September 21 notice, the rate of duty under the September 2018 action will remain at 10 percent until further notice.
 
  Stephen P. Vaughn, General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade Representative.
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OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a14. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

 

* Commerce; Industry and Security Bureau; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: National Security and Critical Technology Assessments of the U.S. Industrial Base [Pub. Date: 6 Mar 2019.]
 
* State; NOTICES; Designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (and Other Aliases) [Pub. Date: 6 Mar 2019.]

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OGS_a2
5. 
Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)

(Source: 
Commerce/BIS)

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NWSNEWS

NWS_a17. Middle East Eye: “Exporting American’s Gun Problem? The Proposed Rule That Has Monitors Up in Arms”
(Source:
Middle East Eye, 5 Mar 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
Experts warn that changes to export regulations could flood conflict areas like the Middle East with US-made weapons used in mass shootings
 
The Trump administration is on the cusp of changing small-arms export regulations that opponents say could flood conflict zones like the Middle East with the same retail guns used in mass shootings in the US.
 
The rules, which could be finalized this month, would allow sniper rifles, semi-automatic firearms and AK-47-style assault rifles to be sold commercially without requiring US companies to register with the State Department.
 
The State Department is required under the Arms Export Control Act to inform Congress of any arms sales worth $1m or more, a process which led lawmakers to block $1.2m in handgun and ammunition sales to Turkish security forces after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s bodyguards beat up protesters in Washington DC in 2017. …

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NWS_a28. Reuters: “United States and China Inch toward Limited Trade Deal: Kemp”
(Source: Reuters, 5 Mar 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
China and the United States appear to be inching toward a trade deal, with leaders in both countries anxious to avoid a further, politically unpopular slowdown in their economies.
 
China has reportedly offered to boost its purchases of farm and energy products substantially while making more modest concessions on technology transfer, intellectual property, market access, industrial policy and subsidies (“U.S., China close in on trade deal”, Wall Street Journal, March 4).
 
China is already the world’s largest net importer of oil and is set to become the largest importer of liquefied natural gas within the next few years, so the purchases allow the country to source supplies it will need anyway.
 
By agreeing to buy LNG and crude from the United States, China is not making much of a concession; the only losers are rival suppliers such as Australia, Canada, Russia and around the Middle East Gulf.
 
Similar logic applies to farm products, where China is a major net importer; any bilateral trade deal will come mostly at the expense of third-country exporters such as Russia, Argentina and Brazil.
 
China’s import requirements could also be used to justify including major capital equipment purchases in any eventual deal, including aircraft and semiconductor manufacturing kit.
 
Major purchases of farm and energy products would give a boost to the White House, shoring up support in farm and energy-producing states critical to President Donald Trump’s re-election campaign in 2020.
 
By focusing on farm and energy products, both countries can reach a politically and economically necessary accord, while making limited progress on more difficult issues. …

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NWS_a39. The Washington Post: “China Accuses Two Detained Canadians of Stealing State Secrets”
(Source: The Washington Post, 4 Mar 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
China on Monday accused two detained Canadians of stealing state secrets, a serious allegation that comes just days after Canada said it would proceed with the extradition case against a top Chinese executive. 
 
The charges will only intensify concerns that Beijing is exacting revenge against Canada for detaining Meng Wanzhou, the chief financial officer of telecommunications giant Huawei Technologies.
 
Michael Kovrig, a former Canadian diplomat who had been working as a China analyst for the International Crisis Group think tank, “had spied on and stolen sensitive information and intelligence through contacts in China,” according to a statement from the Communist Party’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. …

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COMMCOMMENTARY

(Source:
Arent Fox
, 1 Mar 2019.)
 
* Author: Kay C. Georgi, Esq. Arent Fox,
kay.georgi@arentfox.com.
 
Three recent settlements between very different employers and the US Department of Justice have highlighted the need for employers to be mindful of the complex interplay between export control laws and anti-discrimination provisions in US immigration laws.
 
In all three cases, the DOJ’s Immigrant and Employee Rights Section (IER) settled claims against employers alleged to have violated the anti-discrimination provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by limiting positions involving sensitive data governed by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) only to US citizens and/or lawful permanent residents, and failing to open such positions to US nationals, asylees and refugees, as is required by law.
 
This alert explains that employers – including law firms – may not limit positions where the employee will have access to ITAR and EAR controlled technology only to US citizens, but rather must also open such positions to US nationals, lawful permanent residents, asylees and refugees. Further, an employer may also choose to hire a foreign national who is authorized to work in the United States and then apply for the appropriate export control license to allow that foreign national to hold the position in question. It’s not easy or intuitive to comply with both sets of laws!
 
DOJ Settles Discrimination Claims Against A Manufacturing Company, a Law Firm and an Engineering Firm for Failing to Open Positions to US nationals, Asylees and Refugees.
 
In three recent settlements, the DOJ settled claims against employers who had restricted positions governed by the EAR or ITAR to US citizens or lawful permanent residents, and had failed to open these positions to US nationals, asylees and refugees, as is required by law.
 
Last summer, a US subsidiary of a British law firm reached a settlement after the DOJ had determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that from March 30, 2017 until at least July 7, 2017, the law firm had restricted its staffing for 36 positions on a limited-duration document review project based on citizenship status. The DOJ determined that the law firm had excluded otherwise qualified non-US citizens and dual US citizens from document reviewer positions, based on the law firm’s good faith efforts to comply with the ITAR’s data restrictions. The Department also found that the law firm had improperly terminated or removed three individuals from their positions based on their citizenship status. Under the settlement, the law firm:
 
  – Was ordered to pay lost wages to three individuals who were removed from the project;
  – Agreed to pay a $132,000 civil penalty to the United States;
  – Agreed to train relevant employees about the requirements of the INA’s discrimination provision, inform clients who request citizenship status restrictions for staff of the INA’s requirements;
  – Agreed to review its policies for hiring and firing based on citizenship status and national origin; and
  – Is subject to departmental monitoring and reporting requirements for two years.
 
Notably, the DOJ rejected the law firm’s good faith argument, observing that “8 U.S.C. § 1324b does not provide, nor does the jurisprudence under the law recognize, a good faith exception to the general prohibition against discrimination on the basis of citizenship status or national origin[.]”
 
More recently, on February 1, the US Department of Justice reached a settlement with a manufacturing company regarding a claim that the company had restricted certain jobs to US citizens and lawful permanent residents in violation of the INA’s anti-discrimination in 8 U.S.C. § 132b. The DOJ had determined that it had reasonable cause to believe that between August 2015 and December 2016, the company had posted at least 25 job announcements that required applicants to be either lawful permanent residents and/or US citizens based on an apparent misunderstanding of the ITAR and EAR’s requirements. The jobs had been posted on the
company’s website and several third-party websites.
 
Under the terms of the settlement, the company agreed:
  – To pay a civil penalty of $44,626;
  – Not to discriminate on the basis of citizenship, immigration status or national origin in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1324b; and
  – To review its hiring and firing requirements based on citizenship or foreign national status.
 
Furthermore, the agreement required employees who had any role in hiring or recruiting processes to attend training on the INA’s anti-discrimination provision and ensure that trained personnel review future job advertisements. Finally, the company is subject to ongoing monitoring by the DOJ to determine its compliance with the settlement agreement during the term of the agreement.

Finally, in June 2018, the DOJ settled an immigration-related discrimination claim against an engineering company. The DOJ found that from August 2015 to June 2017, the company had had an unlawful policy of hiring only US citizens for professional positions and refusing to consider otherwise qualified non-US citizens based on the company’s erroneous understanding of the ITAR’s requirements. Under the settlement, the company agreed:

  – Not to discriminate based on citizenship or immigration status and should review its hiring and firing policies based on citizenship status and national origin;
  – To pay a $17,475 civil penalty;
  – To train its employees who have any role in recruiting or hiring on the requirements of the INA’s anti-discrimination provision;
  – To review its hiring and firing policies based on citizenship status and national origin; and
  – To be subject to departmental monitoring and reporting requirements.
 
The ITAR and EAR Limit Access to Certain Sensitive Information to “US Persons”
 
The ITAR regulates specific exports of defense articles and services, and limits access to certain sensitive information to “US persons” unless the State Department has issued a license or other authorization. In turn, the EAR regulates commercial goods and technology that could have military or other sensitive applications and, depending on the export classification of the technology in question, may require a license or other authorization from the Department of Commerce to employ a non-US person or (in most cases) not Canadian. The term “US person” in the ITAR or EAR means:
 
  (1) US citizen;
  (2) A US lawful permanent resident as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20); or
  (3) A certain class of “protected individuals” as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3) (e.g., US nationals, refugees and asylees).
 
The term “US person” is thus not limited to US citizens, and the ITAR and EAR consequently do not require employers to hire only US citizens.
 
In addition, an employer may choose to hire a non-US person who is authorized to work, and obtain State or Commerce Department license or other authorization when one is required under the applicable law. However, the State and Commerce Departments do have a policy of denying licenses for the release of certain technology to persons who are citizens of certain countries. For example, both agencies typically do not grant licenses to release defense technology in the United States to citizens of US arms-embargoed countries such as Iran and China absent additional circumstances indicating that the citizenship has been terminated and the person has acquired a different citizenship. The advice of counsel should be sought before asking citizenship questions in order to avoid any claims of national origin discrimination by the applicant.
 
The INA Prohibits Discrimination Based on National Origin, Citizenship, and Immigration Status
 
The INA’s anti-discrimination provision prohibits, among other things, discrimination based on (1) national origin, (2) citizenship, and (3) immigration status. Federal immigration laws also prohibit employers from requiring or suggesting a particular document from an employee during the I-9 or E-Verify process, and from intimidating or retaliating against someone for making a complaint about unlawful or discriminatory practices.
 
Typically, discriminatory acts occur during the recruiting, hiring, promotion, and termination process. For example, employers may run afoul of the INA’s anti-discrimination laws by:
  – Restricting job candidates only to US citizens or lawful permanent residents; and
  – By asking candidates detailed questions about their immigration status during the interview process, or by requiring an employee to show a green card or other specific document to complete I-9 requirements. 
 
In sum, since the ITAR and EAR’s definition of “US persons” incorporates the definition of “protected individuals” under the INA, employers may not restrict hiring for export-controlled positions to US citizens and lawful permanent residents to the exclusion of “protected individuals” such as asylees or refugees. And again, an employer may also choose to hire a foreign national who is authorized to work in the United States and then apply for the appropriate export control license to allow that foreign national to hold the position in question.
 
Employers Should Exercise Caution When Advertising for Positions Subject to the ITAR or EAR
 
In the DOJ press release announcing its most recent settlement, Assistant Attorney General Eric Dreiband of the DOJ Civil Rights Division stated that “[t]he Department of Justice is committed to ensuring that employers do not unlawfully exclude non-US citizens because of their citizenship status… Employers who are subject to the ITAR or the EAR should carefully review their responsibilities under anti-discrimination statutes.”
 
The main takeaways for employers are:
  (1) The DOJ will not accept an employer’s good faith interpretation of the ITAR and EAR’s data restriction requirements to justify discrimination in hiring individuals protected under the INA.
  (2) Employers may not adopt ITAR or EAR compliance policies which restrict export-controlled positions to only US citizens and exclude any class of “protected individuals” under the INA.
  (3) Employers should review their hiring and contracting processes to make sure that they do not limit hiring or outsourcing to only US citizens and lawful permanent residents, or otherwise limit candidates based on their citizenship, immigration status, or national origin. In case of doubt, employers should contact counsel to review their hiring policies.
  (4) Employers must use caution when advertising for open positions. Employers may ask candidates for positions governed by the ITAR or EAR:
    (a) Answer yes or no. Are you a US citizen, US national, legal permanent resident, asylee or refugee?
 If the answer is yes, the employer will most likely not need to apply for a license for the employee. If the answer is no, the employer may still consider such candidates and extend an offer of employment for ITAR or EAR positions, but the employer may need to apply for a license depending on the classification of the technology and the nationality of the employee. Counsel should be consulted.
     (b) Answer yes or no. Will you now or in the future require sponsorship for employment visa status?
 If the answer is yes, the employer may still consider such candidates and extend an offer of employment for ITAR or EAR positions, but the employer may need to apply for a license depending on the classification of the technology and the nationality of the employee. Employers should also know that they are not obligated to sponsor anyone for an employment visa. Counsel should be consulted.
(5) I-9 audits have increased under the current Administration. Employers should be careful to properly complete, document, and retain their I-9 forms, while also being careful not to require the employee to produce any particular work authorization or identity document (i.e., US passport or green card).
(6) Employers should ask only the questions needed to determine compliance with the INA and export control regulations when applying export control screening procedures for export-controlled positions.
 
The Department of Justice has published a bulletin on how employers can avoid unlawful citizenship status discrimination here, and has posted additional FAQ’s regarding citizenship status discrimination here.

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(Source:
Volkov Law Group Blog, 4 Mar 2019. Reprinted by permission.)
 
* Author: Michael Volkov, Esq., Volkov Law Group, mvolkov@volkovlaw.com, 240-505-1992.
 
The Department of Justice has launched two separate criminal cases against Huawei China, the controversial Chinese telecommunications equipment provider. For years, US government officials have questioned the ownership, control and practices of Huawei, claiming that it is owned by the Chinese government and acting as an agent for Chinese interests.
 
At the end of January, the Justice Department announced two separate indictments against Huawei, and sought the extradition of Huawei’s CFO, Wanzhou Meng, from Canada. Recent reports have indicated that Canada intends to grant the US government’s request for extradition.
 
The first indictment, which was returned in the Eastern District of New York, charged Huawei and Meng with violating the US sanctions against Iran. The thirteen-count indictment includes bank fraud, conspiracy to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to obstruct justice.
 
The charges center on Huawei’s disguised ownership of Skycom, an unofficial subsidiary, which was used to secure otherwise prohibited U.S.-origin goods, technology and services, including banking services. Meng specifically misrepresented Huawei’s relationship with Skycom. To avoid investigation and prosecution relating to Huawei’s Iran operations, Huawei allegedly transferred key witnesses back to China and destroyed and concealed evidence.
 
In a second criminal case, the US Attorney for the Western District of Washington returned an indictment charging Huawei with wire fraud and obstruction of justice related to the theft of trade secrets from T-Mobile. According to the indictment, Huawei implemented a scheme to steal the Tappy robot system, T-Mobile’s phone-testing robot. A Huawei engineer stole of the Tappy arms and put the device in his briefcase. Huawei rewarded employees who were able to steal information related to the Tappy Robot.
 
The criminal case based on the violations of Iran sanctions is the more significant of the two criminal cases. The charges against Huawei and its CFO, Meng, focus on Huawei’s misrepresentations to several global financial institutions regarding Huawei’s business activities in Iran. Huawei misrepresented its ownership of Skycom by falsely asserting it was not affiliated with Huawei, that Huawei had limited business in Iran and that Huawei fully complied with US sanctions against Iran.
 
Huawei relied on a number of global banks to process US-dollar transactions. Under the Iran sanctions program, US banks are prohibited from conducting financial transactions related to Iran. Huawei repeatedly misrepresented its operations in Iran and global banks continued to process these transactions in reliance on Huawei’s false representations. One bank cleared more than $100 million worth of Skycom related transactions over a four-year period.
 
Huawei also made numerous false representations to the US government and US Congress. Huawei’s founder specifically lied to FBI agents concerning Huawei’s interactions with Iran companies and whether Huawei was in compliance with US trade sanctions and export controls.
 
In 2012 and 2013, press reports suggested that Huawei operated Skycom as an unofficial affiliate in Iran and that Meng served on the Skycom board of directors. Huawei and Meng repeatedly lied to various financial institutions about its relationship to Skycom and falsely claimed Huawei had divested its ownership interest in 2007.
 
In fact, Skycom was Huawei’s longtime affiliate and Huawei actually controlled the third-party company that allegedly purchased Skycom as a result of an orchestrated fake arms-length transaction. Meng specifically lied on several occasions to four financial institutions as a way to continue dollar-clearing, Euro-clearing and other related financial services.

 
back to top
 

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TEEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

TE_a212. ECS Presents “2nd Annual ECS ITAR/EAR Symposium and Boot Camp” on 17-19 Sep in Annapolis, MD

 
*What: The 2nd Annual ECS ITAR/EAR Symposium and Boot Camp; Annapolis, MD
* When: 17-19 September 2019
* Where: Chart House
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Solutions & Consulting (ECS)
* ECS Speaker Panel: Suzanne Palmer, Mal Zerden, Lisa Bencivenga, Timothy Mooney, Matthew McGrath, Matt Doyle
* Register here or by calling 866-238-4018 or e-mail spalmer@exportcompliancesolutions.com

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ENEDITOR’S NOTES

* Lucy Larcom (5 Mar 1824 – 17 Apr 1893; was an American teacher, poet, and author.)
  – “A drop of water, if it could write out its own history, would explain the universe to us.”

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EN_a314
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

 

*
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.  Implemented by Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs & Border Protection.

  – Last Amendment: 14 Jan 2019: 84 FR 112-116: Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological and Ecclesiastical Ethnological Material from Bulgaria; and 84 FR 107-112: Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological Material From China 
 

DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Dec 2018: 83 FR 65292-65294: Control of Military Electronic Equipment and Other Items the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions List (USML); Correction [Concerning ECCN 7A005 and ECCN 7A105.]
 
* DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.  Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau.
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.
  – The latest edition (1 Jan 2019) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.   

 

DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense.
  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)
 
 
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359, comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. This rule also identifies destinations with respect to which most assistance would be generally authorized and destinations that would require a specific authorization by the Secretary of Energy.
 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Nov 2018, 10 CFR 110.6, Re-transfers.
 

* DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War.  Implemented by Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives.
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm.  

 

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. Implemented by Dep’t of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
  – Last Amendment: 4 Oct 2018: 83 FR 50003-50007: Regulatory Reform Revisions to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 1 Jan 2019) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment. The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website. BAFTR subscribers receive a $25 discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.
 
* DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders. 

Implemented by Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

  – Last Amendment: 15 Nov 2018: 83 FR 57308-57318: Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Regulations
  
* USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), 1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex. Implemented by U.S. International Trade Commission. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)

  – Last Amendment:
27 Feb 2019: Harmonized System Update 1902 [contains 40 ABI records and 11 harmonized tariff records.]

  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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EN_a0315
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 
here

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EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, Alex Witt. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 6,500 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

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* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.


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