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19-0304 Monday “Daily Bugle'”

19-0304 Monday “Daily Bugle”

Monday, 4 March 2019

  1. State Rescinds Statutory Debarment of Rocky Mountain Instrument Company under the ITAR
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. DoD/DSCA Policy Memo of Interest: Assignment of Program Code “QJ” to Fiscal Year 2019/2020 Coalition Readiness Support Program
  4. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  5. Australia DoD/DEC Announces Closure on 11 Mar 2019
  6. Dutch Government Posts Historic Overview of Denied Export Authorization Request for Military Goods
  7. Hong Kong TID Circulars of Interest: Application for Delivery Verification Certificate
  1. ST&R Trade Report: “China Tariff Increase Postponed Indefinitely as Congress Moves Forward on Exclusions”
  1. J. Reeves & K. Heubert: “A Comparison of Key Terms in the ITAR and EAR”
  2. M. Volkov: “Episode 79 – Update on GDPR Enforcement”
  3. R.C. Thomsen II, A.D. Paytas & M.M. Shomali: “Changes to Export Controls in February 2019”
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 142 Openings Posted This Week, Including 22 New Openings
  1. FCC Presents U.S. Export Controls Awareness Course: “ITAR & EAR from a non-U.S. Perspective”, 9 April in Bruchem, the Netherlands
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: DHS/Customs (14 Jan 2019), DOC/EAR (20 Dec 2018), DOC/FTR (24 Apr 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), DOE/AFAEC (23 Feb 2015), DOE/EINEM (20 Nov 2018), DOJ/ATF (26 Dec 2018), DOS/ITAR (4 Oct 2018), DOT/FACR/OFAC (15 Nov 2018), HTSUS (27 Feb 2019) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

 
84 FR 7411-7412: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Rescission of Statutory Debarment of Rocky Mountain Instrument Company Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”)
* SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the Department of State has rescinded the statutory debarment of Rocky Mountain Instrument Company included in Federal Register notice of September 8, 2010.
* DATES: Rescission as of March 4, 2019.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jae Shin, Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State (202) 632-2107.
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: …
   In June 2010, Rocky Mountain Instrument Company (“RMI”) pleaded guilty to violating the AECA. On September 8, 2010, the Department notified the public of a statutory debarment imposed on RMI pursuant to ITAR Sec. 127.7(c) related to RMI’s criminal conviction via notice in the Federal Register (75 FR 54692). The notice provided that RMI was “prohibited from participating directly or indirectly in the export of defense articles, including technical data, or in the furnishing of defense services for which a license or other approval is required.” On May 9, 2016, the Department modified this statutory debarment to allow specific exceptions to the debarment of RMI without the submission of a transaction exception request as an element of the application, available to persons other than RMI but excluding persons acting for or on behalf of RMI in contravention of ITAR Sec. 127.1(d).
   In accordance with ITAR Sec. 127.7(b) of the ITAR, reinstatement may only be approved after submission of a request by the debarred party. In response to such a request from RMI for reinstatement, the Department has conducted a thorough review of the circumstances surrounding the conviction, and has determined that RMI has taken appropriate steps to address the causes of the violations to warrant rescission of the notice of statutory debarment of RMI. Therefore, pursuant to ITAR Sec. 127.7(b) the Department determines it is no longer in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States to maintain the policy as applied to RMI, and the Department hereby rescinds the notice of RMI’s statutory debarment.
   The Department notes that the Federal Register notice of debarment for RMI stated that “export privileges may be reinstated only at the request of the debarred person followed by the necessary interagency consultations, after a thorough review of the circumstances surrounding the conviction, and a finding that appropriate steps have been taken to mitigate any law enforcement concerns, as required by Section 38(g)(4) of the AECA. Unless export privileges are reinstated, however, the person remains debarred.” (75 FR 54693). The Department is no longer requiring that export privileges be reinstated pursuant to ITAR Sec. 127.11 and Sec. 38(g)(4) of the AECA prior to the rescission of statutory debarment. This change in policy recognizes that the circumstances warranting statutory debarment may be different than those warranting the revocation of export privileges. The Department may find, as it does in this instance, that the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States are not advanced by maintaining the Department-imposed ITAR Sec. 127.7(b) prohibition on persons convicted of violating or conspiring to violate the AECA from “participating directly or indirectly in any activities that are subject to [the ITAR]” and where the debarred person may not meet the requirements of ITAR Sec. 127.11(b) (implementing the restrictions of Sec. 38(g)(4) of the AECA).
   This notice rescinds the statutory debarment of RMI but does not provide notice of reinstatement of export privileges for RMI pursuant to the statutory requirements of Sec. 38(g)(4) of the AECA and ITAR Sec. 127.11. As required by the statute, the Department may not issue a license directly to RMI except as may be determined on a case-by-case basis after interagency consultations, a thorough review of the circumstances surrounding the conviction, and a finding that appropriate steps have been taken to mitigate any law enforcement concerns. Any determination by the Department regarding the reinstatement of export privileges for RMI will be made in accordance with these statutory and regulatory requirements and will be the subject of a separate notice. All otherwise eligible persons may engage in exports of RMI manufactured defense articles, incorporate RMI manufactured items into defense articles for export, or otherwise engage in transactions subject to the ITAR without providing prior written notification of RMI’s involvement as otherwise required by ITAR Sec. 127.1(d) and the transaction exception requirements of the Federal Register notice of statutory debarment (75 FR 54693).
 
   Dated: February 4, 2019.
Andrea L. Thompson, Under Secretary, Arms Control and International Security, Department of State.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a12. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

 
* President; ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS [Pub. Date: 5 Mar 2019.]:
  – Ukraine; Continuation of National Emergency (Notice of March 4, 2019)
  – Zimbabwe; Continuation of National Emergency (Notice of March 4, 2019)
 
* Trade Representative, Office of United States; NOTICES; Modification of Section 301 Action: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation [Pub. Date: 5 Mar 2019.]
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_a2
3. 
Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)

(Source: 
Commerce/BIS)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

(Source:
DoD/DSCA, 4 Mar 2019.)
 
* DSCA Policy Memo 19-02 Assignment of Program Code “QJ” to track Fiscal Year (FY) 2019/2020 Coalition Readiness Support Program (CRSP) has been posted. Effective immediately, Program Code “QJ” is assigned to track FY 2019/2020 Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide funds appropriated under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) and designated for the CRSP. CRSP is funded by CSF, appropriated in the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 (Division A of P.L. 115-245).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

 
Defence Export Controls (DEC) will be closed for the Canberra Day public holiday on Monday 11 March 2019, reopening on Tuesday 12 March 2019. Please note that applications cannot be processed during this time.

Please contact DEC as soon as possible should you urgently require a permit on 11 March 2019.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

(Source:
Rijksoverheid, 4 Mar 2019.)
 
Every year the Dutch government publishes an updated overview of denied authorization requests for the export, transfer or brokering of military goods or dual-use goods with a military end-use. In this file a historic overview can be found of such denied requests since 2004.
 
The Dutch government also posted its monthly report on the export of military goods, which can be found here.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

 
This circular informs the trade of the application procedures for Delivery Verification Certificate, and supersedes the previous Strategic Trade Controls Circular No. 7/2015.   
The Strategic Trade Control System
 
The legal basis for strategic trade control in Hong Kong is the
Import and Export Ordinance, Chapter 60 of the Laws of Hong Kong (“the Ordinance”). The Ordinance requires strategic commodities to be covered by import/export licences issued by the Trade and Industry Department (“TID”) before they are imported into/exported from Hong Kong. Under the Ordinance, no person shall import or export strategic commodities, i.e. any article specified in the four Schedules to the Import and Export (Strategic Commodities) Regulations (Cap. 60 sub. leg. G)
unless there is a valid licence issued by the Director-General of Trade and Industry.   
 
What is a DVC?
 
For the purpose of ascertaining the actual destination of specific types of strategic commodities exported, Hong Kong importers may be asked by overseas exporters (who, in turn, are required by the concerned exporting licensing authorities) to obtain aDelivery Verification Certificate (“DVC”) from the Hong Kong authorities as evidence that a certain consignment of strategic commodities has arrived in Hong Kong. DVCs for strategic commodities are issued by TID upon the request of Hong Kong importers. Traders, however, need not apply for DVCs unless they are so requested by overseas exporters.   
How to apply for a DVC?
 

 
(A) Paper Applications

 
Applications for DVC should be made on a designated form SC011 (or Form TID 85)  (Rev. 2019) (at
Annex A) . This form is free of charge and available at the Customer Service Centre of the Strategic Trade Controls Branch at Room 1619, 16/F, Trade and Industry Tower, 3 Concorde Road, Kowloon City, Hong Kong. It can also be downloaded from the Strategic Commodities Control System Website (“SC Website”) at http://www.stc.tid.gov.hk.
 
To support a DVC application, applicants should provide, in addition to the application forms, a copy of each of the following supporting documents relating to the consignment in question to the Customer Service Centre of the Strategic Trade Controls Branch:
(a) bill of lading/master air waybill; and
(b) commercial invoice.
 
A numbered receipt will be issued for each DVC application.
 
 (B) Electronic Applications
 
Companies can also apply for DVCs electronically for import licences obtained previously through E-Applications. The E-Application for DVC can be made through companies’ E-Accounts in the SC Website under the programme of “Apply for Delivery Verification Certificate” provided at the
E-Application menu
Login Your E-Account > E-Applications > Delivery Verification Certificate (under Part (II) Licence-related Application) > Apply for Delivery Verification Certificate). E-Applicants should download and complete the DVC Application Form SC011 and then scan and upload the duly completed form and the documents in paragraph 5(a) and (b) above. Alternatively, these documents can be sent to the Strategic Trade Controls Branch of the TID by fax (fax no.: 2396 3070 or 3525 1526) or in person. As for all E-Applications, E-Applicant should follow the instructions to print out by themselves the numbered receipts for future collection of the approved DVCs. 

Applicants are reminded that the original signed copy of the DVC Application Form must be provided to the TID in all circumstances. Thus, after making the E-Application, applicants should ensure the delivery of the original signed DVC Application Form to the TID as soon as possible. The TID will withhold approval and issuance of the DVC unless and until the original form is received.     
 
To use and make E-Applications, companies are required to complete a special registration with the TID in advance. Details of the special registration and other requirements for the use of E-Applications can be found in the SC Website by selecting E-Accounts for Applications >
Open an E-Account

   

Issue of the DVC
 
Unless there are complications, DVC applications are normally approved within 15 working days after receipt of all supporting documents.  A processing fee will be charged for the issue of a DVC.  Please check the fee table at the website of the TID for the
updated processing fee.  Before collection, applicants are advised to check with the Strategic Trade Controls Branch (telephone no.: 2398 5575) whether the application concerned has been approved and ready for collection. If so, the applicant must pay the fee in cash or through Easy Pay System (EPS) at the Shroff and Form Sales Counter of the TID at Room 1309, 13/F, Trade and Industry Tower. By showing the payment receipt and the numbered receipt (i.e. the receipt of application mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 above), the applicant can collect the relevant approved DVC from the Customer Service Centre of the Strategic Trade Controls Branch. Please note that the TID will retain the numbered receipt after issuance of DVC. The payment receipt, however, will be returned to the applicant after verification. Specimen of an approved DVC is at Annex B.

   

Warning
 
Applicant is required to declare on the DVC application that the consignment in question has actually arrived in Hong Kong and that details of the consignment given are true and correct. In this connection, applicants are reminded that provision of false or misleading information is an offence under the Import and Export Ordinance and that offenders are liable to prosecution and/or administrative actions.
 
Enquiries
 
Enquiries on the content of this circular and other licensing matters can be made to the Strategic Trade Controls Branch at Room 1619, 16/F, Trade and Industry Tower, 3 Concorde Road, Kowloon City, Hong Kong (telephone no.: 2398 5575; email:
stc@tid.gov.hk).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWSNEWS

NWS_a19. ST&R Trade Report: “China Tariff Increase Postponed Indefinitely as Congress Moves Forward on Exclusions”
 
An additional tariff on $200 billion worth of imports from China will remain at 10 percent “until further notice,” according to a notice from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative expected to be published soon in the Federal Register. However, the delay has not stopped Congress from continuing its pursuit of a process for companies to request exclusions from this tariff.
 
The tariff on so-called List 3 goods had originally been scheduled to jump to 25 percent on Jan. 1 but the Trump administration pushed that back to March 2 while the U.S. and China held talks on a number of trade irritants. When those talks yielded what the White House called “substantial progress … on important structural issues” such as forced technology transfer, intellectual property rights, currency, and agriculture, a further delay was announced. While no new deadline has been set, it appears the tariff increase will be stayed at least until President Trump meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping later this month to resolve remaining issues.
 
(In a message to the trade community concerning the most recent delay, U.S. Customs and Border Protection noted that the Section 301 tariffs currently only apply to products of China and are based on the country of origin, not the country of export.)
 
In the meantime, lawmakers introduced Feb. 27 legislation (S. 577, introduced by Sens. Lankford, R-Okla., and Coons, D-Del.; and H.R. 1452, introduced by Reps. Kind, D-Wis., and Walorski, R-Ind.) that would require the establishment of a process for excluding goods on List 3 and any future lists from the Section 301 tariffs. As with the existing exclusion process for List 1 and List 2 goods, U.S. companies would be able to apply for a refund for duties paid on any List 3 goods granted an exclusion. 
 
According to a press release from Lankford’s office, this bill would also set the specific criteria by which product-wide exclusions must be granted. Specifically, the bill would exempt from tariff imposition those items for which there is no commercial access outside of China, items for which the tariff would increase the cost of living for low- and middle-income families in the U.S., and items that do not directly benefit from China’s non-market-based policies. 
 
Contrary to President Trump’s assertions that China is paying the Section 301 tariffs, Lankford said the burden lies on U.S. importers, who “have paid the U.S. government more than $12 billion in import taxes” since they were imposed in 2018. This “has a direct impact on our economy,” Lankford added, “since those costs are passed down to consumers in the form of price increases on food, clothing, and shelter.”
 
In addition, Walorski said, “it is clear” that USTR “does not intend to meet the deadline imposed by Congress” to establish an exclusion request process for List 3 goods. Congress gave USTR 30 days to report back on its development of such a process in an explanatory statement accompanying appropriations legislation signed into law Feb. 15. However, according to press sources, Lighthizer suggested in a congressional hearing last week that USTR still only intends to institute such a process if the tariff on List 3 goods is increased to 25 percent.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMMCOMMENTARY

(Source: 
Reeves & Dola LLP Alert, 1 Mar 2019.) [Available by subscription via 
info@reevesdola.com
.] 
 
* Authors: Johanna Reeves, Esq.,
jreeves@reevesdola.com
; and Katherine Heubert, Esq.,
kheubert@reevesdola.com
. Both of Reeves & Dola LLP.
 
As we get closer to the final rules transitioning most commercially available firearms and ammunition away from the export controls of the U.S. Department of State over to the Department of Commerce, we continue our series reviewing the key differences between the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). 
 
For firearms and ammunition businesses who so far have structured their export operations mostly or entirely under ITAR controls, the impending change over to the EAR may be overwhelming because of the vast differences between the two sets of regulations. Therefore, even though the government has not yet published the final rules amending the U.S. Munitions List, it is important that exporters of firearms and ammunition start familiarizing themselves with the EAR so they are ready to hit the ground running once the final rules come out.
 
Learning a new set of regulations requires a base understanding of the defined terms. Last week we reviewed
how the ITAR and EAR each treat publicly available information
, especially information on the Internet. In this week’s alert, we will examine the similarities and differences between key definitions in the ITAR and EAR. For ease in review, we provide a table with side-by-side comparisons.
 
We note that the Departments of State and Commerce have made great strides in harmonizing the definitions in recent years, but some important distinctions remain. In the chart below, you will see instances where the ITAR and EAR use the same term but assign slightly different meanings. In other cases, there is no direct match. Take for example the ITAR term “retransfer.” In the EAR, “retransfer” is not used because the term “transfer” encompasses the concept. Another difference is the absence of “defense service” from the EAR.
 
Practice Tip: 
The EAR indicates a defined term by putting quotation marks around the specific word or phrase. Many EAR definitions contain defined terms within the definition itself, which will require the reader to refer to other sections of the EAR to arrive at the ultimate definition of a single term or phrase. When first acquainting yourself with the EAR this may seem confusing and cumbersome (and, candidly, sometimes frustrating), but once you become comfortable with the way the EAR is drafted, you will realize that the use of defined terms helps narrow the scope of controls and pinpoint exactly that which is intended to be subject to the EAR.
 
ITAR
EAR
Defense Article
22 C.F.R. 120.6
 
Any item or technical data designated in the USML. This term includes technical data recorded or stored in any physical form, models, mockups or other items that reveal technical data directly relating to items designated in the USML. It also includes forgings, castings, and other unfinished products, such as extrusions and machined bodies, that have reached a stage in manufacturing where they are clearly identifiable by mechanical properties, material composition, geometry, or function as defense articles. It does not include basic marketing information on function or purpose or general system descriptions.
 
Item
15 C.F.R. Part 772
 
“Commodities, software, and technology.” When the EAR intends to refer specifically to commodities, software, or technology, the text will use the specific reference.
 
Commodity
15 C.F.R. Part 772
 
Any article, material, or supply except technology and software.
Technical Data
22 C.F.R. 120.10
 
(1) Information (including software) which is required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles. This includes information in the form of blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions or documentation; 
 
(2) Classified information relating to defense articles and defense services on the USML and 600-series items controlled by the CCL; or 
 
(3) Information covered by an invention secrecy order. 
 
The term does not include information concerning general scientific, mathematical, or engineering principles commonly taught in schools, colleges, and universities, or information in the public domain as defined in §120.11 of the ITAR or telemetry data as defined in note 3 to Category XV(f). It also does not include basic marketing information on function or purpose or general system descriptions of defense articles.
Technology
15 C.F.R. Part 772
Information necessary for the “development,” “production,” “use,” operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, or refurbishing (or other terms specified in ECCNs on the CCL that control “technology”) of an item.
 
N.B.: Controlled “technology” is defined in the General Technology Note and in the Commerce Control List (Supplement No. 2 to part 774 of the EAR). [Technology is controlled according to the provisions in each CCL Category].
 
NOTE 1 to definition of Technology: “technology” may be in any tangible or intangible form, such as written or oral communications, blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, computer-aided design files, manuals or documentation, electronic media or information revealed through visual inspection.
 
NOTE 2 to definition of Technology: The modification of the design of an existing item creates a new item and technology for the modified design is technology for the development or production of the new item.
Software

22 C.F.R. 120.45(f)
 
Includes but is not limited to the system functional design, logic flow, algorithms, application programs, operating systems, and support software for design, implementation, test, operation, diagnosis and repair. 
Software

15 C.F.R. Part 772
 
A collection of one or more “programs” or “microprograms” fixed in any tangible medium of expression.
Defense Service

22 C.F.R. 120.9
 
(1) The furnishing of assistance (including training) to foreign persons, whether in the United States or abroad in the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation, demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of defense articles;
 
(2) The furnishing to foreign persons of any technical data controlled under the ITAR, whether in the United States or abroad; or
 
(3) Military training of foreign units and forces, regular and irregular, including formal or informal instruction of foreign persons in the United States or abroad or by correspondence courses, technical, educational, or information publications and media of all kinds, training aid, orientation, training exercise, and military advice.

No similar concept in the EAR. BIS regulates the transfer of technology when providing assistance, not the act of providing assistance itself.

Person

22 C.F.R. 120.14
 
A natural person as well as a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other entity, organization or group, including governmental entities. If a provision in the ITAR does not refer exclusively to a foreign person (§120.16) or U.S. person (§120.15), then it refers to both.
Person

15 C.F.R. Part 772 
 
A natural person, including a citizen or national of the United States or of any foreign country; any firm; any government, government agency, government department, or government commission; any labor union; any fraternal or social organization; and any other association or organization whether or not organized for profit. This definition does not apply to part 760 of the EAR (Restrictive Trade Practices or Boycotts).
U.S. Person

22 C.F.R. 120.15
 
A person (§120.14) who is a lawful permanent resident as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20) or who is a protected individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3). It also means any corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other entity, organization or group that is incorporated to do business in the United States. It also includes any governmental (federal, state or local) entity. It does not include any foreign person (§120.16).
U.S. Person

15 C.F.R. Part 772
 
(a) For purposes of §§740.21(e)(1), 744.6, 744.10, 744.11, 744.12, 744.13, and 744.14 of the EAR, the term U.S. person includes:
 
(1) Any individual who is a citizen of the United States, a permanent resident alien of the United States, or a protected individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3);
 
(2) Any juridical person organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including foreign branches; and
 
(3) Any person in the United States.
 
(b) See also §§ 740.9, 740.14, and 740.21(f)(2) and parts 746 and 760 of the EAR for definitions of “U.S. person” that are specific to those sections and parts.
Foreign Person

22 C.F.R. 120.16
 
Any natural person who is not a lawful permanent resident as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20) or who is not a protected individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3). It also means any foreign corporation, business association, partnership, trust, society or any other entity or group that is not incorporated or organized to do business in the United States, as well as international organizations, foreign governments and any agency or subdivision of foreign governments (e.g., diplomatic missions).
Foreign Person

15 C.F.R. Part 772
 
Any natural person who is not a lawful permanent resident of the United States, citizen of the United States, or any other protected individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3). It also means any corporation, business association, partnership, trust, society or any other entity or group that is not incorporated in the United States or organized to do business in the United States, as well as international organizations, foreign governments and any agency or subdivision of a foreign government (e.g., diplomatic mission). “Foreign person” is synonymous with “foreign national,” as used in the EAR, and “foreign person” as used in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR 120.16). This definition does not apply to part 760 of the EAR (Restrictive Trade Practices or Boycotts).
Export

22 C.F.R. 120.17
 
Except as set forth in §126.16 or §126.17 an export means:
 
(1) An actual shipment or transmission out of the United States, including the sending or taking of a defense article out of the United States in any manner;
 
(2) Releasing or otherwise transferring technical data to a foreign person in the United States (a “deemed export”);
 
(3) Transferring registration, control, or ownership of any aircraft, vessel, or satellite subject to the ITAR by a U.S. person to a foreign person;
 
(4) Releasing or otherwise transferring a defense article to an embassy or to any of its agencies or subdivisions, such as a diplomatic mission or consulate, in the United States;
 
(5) Performing a defense service on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a foreign person, whether in the United States or abroad; or
 
(6) A launch vehicle or payload shall not, by reason of the launching of such vehicle, be considered an export for purposes of this subchapter. However, for certain limited purposes (see §126.1 of this subchapter), the controls of this subchapter may apply to any sale, transfer or proposal to sell or transfer defense articles or defense services.
 
(b) Any release in the United States of technical data to a foreign person is deemed to be an export to all countries in which the foreign person has held or holds citizenship or holds permanent residency.
Export

15 C.F.R. 734.13
 
(a) Except as set forth in §§ 734.17 or 734.18, Export means:
 
(1) An actual shipment or transmission out of the United States, including the sending or taking of an item out of the United States, in any manner;
 
(2) Releasing or otherwise transferring “technology” or source code (but not object code) to a foreign person in the United States (a “deemed export”);
 
(3) Transferring by a person in the United States of registration, control, or ownership of:
 
(i) A spacecraft subject to the EAR that is not eligible for export under License Exception STA (i.e., spacecraft that provide space-based logistics, assembly or servicing of any spacecraft) to a person in or a national of any other country; or
 
(ii) Any other spacecraft subject to the EAR to a person in or a national of a Country Group D:5 country.
 
(b) Any release in the United States of “technology” or source code to a foreign person is a deemed export to the foreign person’s most recent country of citizenship or permanent residency.
 
(c) The export of an item that will transit through a country or countries to a destination identified in the EAR is deemed to be an export to that destination.
Release

22 C.F.R. 120.50
 
Technical data is released through:
 
(1) Visual or other inspection by foreign persons of a defense article that reveals technical data to a foreign person; or
 
(2) Oral or written exchanges with foreign persons of technical data in the United States or abroad.
Release

15 C.F.R. 734.15
 
(a) Except as set forth in § 734.18, “technology” and “software” are “released” through:
 
(1) Visual or other inspection by a foreign person of items that reveals “technology” or source code subject to the EAR to a foreign person; or
 
(2) Oral or written exchanges with a foreign person of “technology” or source code in the United States or abroad.
 
(b) Any act causing the “release” of “technology” or “software,” through use of “access information” or otherwise, to yourself or another person requires an authorization to the same extent an authorization would be required to export or reexport such “technology” or “software” to that person.
Retransfer

22 C.F.R. 120.51
 
Except as set forth in § 126.16 or §126.17, Retransfer means:
 
(1) A change in end use or end user, or a temporary transfer to a third party, of a defense article within the same foreign country; or
 
(2) A release of technical data to a foreign person who is a citizen or permanent resident of the country where the release or transfer takes place.
Transfer
15 C.F.R. 734.16
 
Except as set forth in §734.18(a)(3), a Transfer (in-country) is a change in end use or end user of an item within the same foreign country. Transfer (in-country) is synonymous with In-country transfer.
Reexport

22 C.F.R. 120.19
 
Except as set forth in §126.16 or §126.17, Reexport means:
(1) An actual shipment or transmission of a defense article from one foreign country to another foreign country, including the sending or taking of a defense article to or from such countries in any manner;
 
(2) Releasing or otherwise transferring technical data to a foreign person who is a citizen or permanent resident of a country other than the foreign country where the release or transfer takes place (a “deemed reexport”); or
 
(3) Transferring registration, control, or ownership of any aircraft, vessel, or satellite subject to the ITAR between foreign persons.
 
(b) Any release outside the United States of technical data to a foreign person is deemed to be a reexport to all countries in which the foreign person has held or holds citizenship or holds permanent residency.
Reexport

15 C.F.R. 734.14
 
(a) Except as set forth in §734.18 and 734.20, Reexport means:
 
(1) An actual shipment or transmission of an item subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign country, including the sending or taking of an item to or from such countries in any manner;
 
(2) Releasing or otherwise transferring “technology” or source code subject to the EAR to a foreign person of a country other than the foreign country where the release or transfer takes place (a deemed reexport);
 
(3) Transferring by a person outside the United States of registration, control, or ownership of:
 
(i) A spacecraft subject to the EAR that is not eligible for reexport under License Exception STA (i.e., spacecraft that provide space-based logistics, assembly or servicing of any spacecraft) to a person in or a national of any other country; or
 
(ii) Any other spacecraft subject to the EAR to a person in or a national of a Country Group D:5 country.
 
(b) Any release outside of the United States of “technology” or source code subject to the EAR to a foreign person of another country is a deemed reexport to the foreign person’s most recent country of citizenship or permanent residency, except as described in § 734.20.
 
(c) The reexport of an item subject to the EAR that will transit through a country or countries to a destination identified in the EAR is deemed to be a reexport to that destination.
See Through
An unwritten concept in the ITAR. When a non-ITAR item (U.S.-origin or foreign) incorporates an ITAR-controlled item, then that item becomes ITAR-controlled itself. In other words, the ITAR always “sees through” to the ITAR-controlled component, no matter how small the component may be.
De Minimis U.S. Content

15 C.F.R. 734.4
 
The de minimis rules in the EAR are used to establish the point at which a foreign-made item that incorporates U.S.-origin EAR-controlled content is no longer subject to the EAR. The de minimis calculation is made based on the percentage of the dollar value of the U.S. content compared to the total dollar value of the non-U.S.-made item. If the U.S.-origin content falls below a set percentage (found in § 734.4), the foreign-made item will not be subject to EAR controls. 
 
NOTE: Certain Items, as outlined in § 734.4 have a zero de minimis level, so be sure to check this section before performing the de minimis calculation.
 
Never fear! There’s always more to learn. Stay tuned for an upcoming alert where we will delve into the differences between export authorizations under the ITAR and EAR.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

(Source:
Volkov Law Group Blog, 3 Mar 2019. Reprinted by permission.)
 
* Author: Michael Volkov, Esq., Volkov Law Group, mvolkov@volkovlaw.com, 240-505-1992.
 
The General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (“GDPR”) was a watershed moment in data and privacy compliance. The new law applies to all companies and persons within the European Union and the European Economic Area.
 
Since its effective date, May 25, 2018, enforcement of the new law has begun. In the first year, compliance and enforcement practitioners have identified important issues and trends for companies and compliance professionals.
 
Join Michael Volkov, CEO of The Volkov Law Group, as he reviews important enforcement and compliance trends in this important area.

 
back to top
 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

* Authors: Roszel C. Thomsen II, Esq., +1 410-539-2596, 
roz@t-b.com; Antoinette D. Paytas, Esq., +1 410-539-2655, toni@t-b.com; and Maher M. Shomali, Esq., +1 410-539-6336, maher@t-b.com
All of Thomsen and Burke LLP.  

 

This memo summarizes the regulatory and enforcement developments with respect to U.S. and multilateral export controls during the month of February 2019. Because of the partial U.S. Government Shutdown, we do not have any updates from the Commerce, State and Treasury Departments in our Regulatory Summary for this month.  
 
Regulatory Updates
 
OFAC Sanctions Governors of Venezuelan States Aligned with Maduro
 
OFAC designated four officials aligned with the illegitimate regime of former President Nicolas Maduro. This action, taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, targets the Governors of four Venezuelan states involved in endemic corruption and in blocking the delivery of critical humanitarian aid, thereby exacerbating the ongoing humanitarian crisis caused by the illegitimate Maduro regime.
 
As a result of this action, all property and interests in property of these individuals, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by these individuals, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.
 
The following four individuals designated have been determined to be current or former officials of the Government of Venezuela:
 
  – Omar Jose Prieto Fernandez (Prieto) is the Governor of Zulia State, Venezuela, a position he has held since December 2017. Zulia, located in northwestern Venezuela on the border with Colombia, is known as a hub for organized crime, where narcotics trafficking and murder-for-hire is commonplace. Sophisticated and prolific criminal structures exist throughout Zulia State, penetrating even the border police force under Prieto’s governorship, as several border police officers and the local Zulia police unit have come under investigation for their roles in drug and illegal weapons trafficking. As the Venezuelan people suffer from a lack of access to daily essentials, on February 12, 2019, Prieto threatened to visit the homes of opposition leaders who permitted access to humanitarian aid in Venezuela. Additionally, in response to mass protests, Prieto recently threatened to declare Venezuela’s “oil state” of Zulia independent should a new transition government take power in Venezuela. Known for its massive oil fields below Lake Maracaibo, Zulia is amongst the highest energy-consuming states in Venezuela, but has been experiencing severe electricity shortages, leading to electricity rationing in the midst of the ever-worsening humanitarian crisis.
 
  – Ramon Alonso Carrizalez Rengifo (Carrizalez) is the Governor of Apure State, Venezuela, a state along Venezuela’s border with Colombia. Carrizalez was the Vice President of Venezuela from 2008 to early January 2010, as well as the Minister of Defense from 2009 to early January 2010. As of January 2019, there have been growing, massive presences of military and police forces in the streets throughout Apure State, threatening violence and attacking protestors. Carrizalez is accused of endorsing this blatant repression of democratic actors. In 2014, Carrizalez said that Apure State is infested with drug gangs, and that he believed that ranches along the border of Apure were involved in money laundering.
 
  – Jorge Luis Garcia Carneiro (Garcia) is the Governor of Vargas State, Venezuela, a position he has held since 2008. Garcia was previously the head of the Venezuelan Army from January 2003 to January 2004, then became the Minister of Defense and held that position until December 2006. Additionally, Garcia was a former Minister for Social Development and Popular Participation. As of January 2019, Garcia rejected Juan Guaidó’s position as the Interim President of Venezuela. Garcia said that the people of Vargas State will continue the fight and stay in the streets to show support for former-President Maduro.
 
 – Rafael Alejandro Lacava Evangelista (Lacava) is the Governor of Carabobo State, Venezuela, a position he has held since October 2017. Lacava formerly served as Mayor of Puerto Cabello, the municipality that is home to Venezuela’s largest port, and was previously the Venezuelan Ambassador to Italy, a position he was appointed to in February 2007. Lacava has long been a friend and significant intermediary of former-President Maduro, and continues to act on his behalf. In early 2018, Lacava was accused of hiding funds in Switzerland and Andorra.
 
A summary of prior sanctions related to Venezuela and related information (FAQs) can be found on OFAC’s Venezuela-related Sanctions page.
 
Enforcement Actions
 
 
Kollmorgen Corporation (Kollmorgen), a company based in Radford, Virginia, on behalf of its Turkish affiliate, Elsim Elektroteknik Sistemler Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi (“Elsim”), has paid $13,381 to settle potential civil liability for six apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (ITSR). Specifically, between July 2013 and July 2015, Elsim appears to have violated § 560.215 of the ITSR when, on six occasions, Elsim serviced machines containing Elsim products located in Iran and provided products, parts, or services valued at $14,867 with knowledge they were destined for Iranian end-users.
 
Kollmorgen acquired control of Elsim in early 2013, thereby making Elsim subject to the ITSR’s prohibitions for any activity or conduct engaged in by Elsim, including conduct or activity occurring outside of the United States. Prior to the acquisition, Kollmorgen hired an external law firm and an external auditing and consulting company to perform sanctions due diligence on Elsim. The due diligence results demonstrated that Elsim made sales to, and had customers in, Iran prior to its acquisition by Kollmorgen. Based on these results, Kollmorgen determined it would need to take steps to prevent such sales from occurring in the future and educate Elsim on the applicability of U.S. sanctions.
 
Kollmorgen subsequently implemented a wide range of pre- and post-acquisition compliance measures designed to ensure Elsim complied with U.S. sanctions, which included but were not limited to the following:
 
  (1) conducting a comprehensive review of Elsim’s customer database in order to identify any sales or customers located in, or with connections to, countries or regions subject to U.S. economic and trade sanctions;
  (2) identifying Elsim’s Iran-related customers and applying controls to block those customers from making future orders;
  (3) drafting and circulating a memorandum to all Elsim employees notifying them of U.S. sanctions against Iran, the legal requirement for Elsim to comply with the ITSR, and Elsim’s obligation to not sell products or services to Iran;
  (4) conducting in-person trainings for Elsim’s employees regarding Kollmorgen’s trade compliance policies (specifically including Iran), which included a requirement that employees promptly report any and all violations of the law;
  (5) on a proactive and continuing basis, performing additional manual reviews of Elsim’s customer database to identify any sanctions-related customers;
  (6) requiring Elsim customers to agree to modified terms and conditions of sale prohibiting the resale of any Elsim products, directly or indirectly, to Iran;
  (7) requiring Elsim’s senior management to certify, on a quarterly basis, that no Elsim products or services were being sent or provided to Iran;
  (8) ordering Elsim’s senior management to immediately cease transactions with Iran, including any technical support; and
  (9) implementing an ethics hotline for reporting violations of law.
 
In spite of Kollmorgen’s extensive efforts to ensure Elsim complied with the ITSR, for two years after acquisition, Elsim willfully, and with full knowledge of the applicable prohibitions, dispatched employees to Iran to fulfill service agreements and engaged in other transactions related to Iran. Elsim management threatened to fire employees if they refused to travel to Iran. Upon returning from the service trips in Iran, Elsim employees were directed by Elsim management to falsify corporate records by listing the travel as vacation rather than business related.
 
Over the two years the transactions took place, Elsim management regularly and fraudulently certified to Kollmorgen that no Elsim products or services were being sent to Iran. It was only after an Elsim employee filed an internal complaint with Kollmorgen via the company’s ethics hotline in late October 2015 that the violative conduct came to light. Kollmorgen then retained outside counsel to investigate the matter.
 
Upon being notified of Kollmorgen’s investigation, Elsim managers attempted to obstruct the investigation by instructing Elsim employees to delete references to Iran in company records and misleading Kollmorgen’s attorneys. Finally, Elsim managers also attempted to delete emails
related to Iran. Despite this obstruction, Kollmorgen uncovered the Apparent Violations, conducted a full investigation, and disclosed its findings to OFAC in a comprehensive report.
 
After the Apparent Violations were uncovered, Kollmorgen took a series of remedial actions designed to rectify the situation and discourage ongoing violative conduct, which included:
 
  (1) terminating the Elsim managers responsible for, and involved in, the Apparent Violations;
  (2) implementing new procedures to educate Elsim employees on compliance with U.S. economic and trade sanctions;
  (3) requiring Elsim to seek pre-approval from an officer based outside of Turkey for all foreign after-sales service trips; and
  (4) requiring Elsim to inform its major Turkish customers that Elsim cannot provide goods or services to Iran.
 
Notwithstanding Kollmorgen’s extensive compliance efforts, OFAC determined a penalty was the appropriate administrative response to the Apparent Violations due to Elsim’s egregious conduct and specific risk profile, including that Elsim had previously engaged in business with
Iran. Additionally, as described in detail below, the conduct of Elsim management and their subsequent attempts to impede Kollmorgen’s internal investigation warranted further action by OFAC.
 
OFAC determined that Kollmorgen voluntarily self-disclosed the Apparent Violations and that the Apparent Violations constitute a non-egregious case. The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty applicable in this matter is $1,500,000. The base civil monetary penalty amount for the Apparent Violations is $7,434.
 
The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s consideration of the General Factors under OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. part 501, app. A. OFAC determined the following to be aggravating factors: (1) Elsim willfully provided goods and services to Iran in violation of the ITSR; (2) Elsim management knew its employees were traveling to Iran to provide services and directed them to do so; (3) Elsim management concealed the Apparent Violations from Kollmorgen and others by deleting and falsifying records as well as directing their subordinates to do so; and (4) the Apparent Violations conferred economic benefit to Iran. OFAC determined the following to be mitigating factors: (1) neither Kollmorgen nor Elsim have received a penalty notice or finding of violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the earliest apparent violation; (2) Kollmorgen cooperated with OFAC by conducting an effective and extensive internal investigation and submitting a comprehensive voluntary self-disclosure to OFAC; and, as described in detail above, (3) Kollmorgen’s extensive preventative and remedial conduct. If OFAC had determined this case was egregious, the base civil monetary penalty amount for the Apparent Violations would have been $750,000.
 
This case highlights the importance of: (1) performing heightened due diligence, particularly with regard to affiliates, subsidiaries, or counter-parties known to transact with OFAC sanctioned countries or persons, or that otherwise pose high-risks due to their geographic location, customers and/or suppliers, or products and services they offer; and (2) implementing proactive controls when U.S. persons, directly or indirectly, acquire companies with preexisting relationships with sanctioned persons and jurisdictions.
 
 
ZAG IP, LLC (formerly known as ZAG International, LLC) (ZAG), a U.S. company with its business address in Newtown, Connecticut, has agreed to pay $506,250 to settle its potential civil liability for five apparent violations of the ITSR. Specifically, between on or about July 11, 2014 and on or about January 15, 2015, through five separate transactions, ZAG purchased a total of 263,563 metric tons of Iranian-origin clinker from a company located in the United Arab Emirates, with knowledge that the cement clinker was sourced from Iran, and then resold and transported it to a company in Tanzania. The aggregate value of the five transactions was $14,495,961.
 
OFAC determined that ZAG voluntarily self-disclosed the apparent violations to OFAC, and that the apparent violations constitute a non-egregious case. The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty amount for the apparent violations was $28,991,922, and the base civil monetary penalty amount was $625,000.
 
During the time period in which the apparent violations occurred, ZAG’s business focused on global sourcing and marketing of cement raw materials and providing strategic advisory services related to raw material selection for companies in the construction industry. On April 11, 2014, ZAG signed a supply contract with a company based in Tanzania (the “Purchaser”) and agreed to supply about 400,000 metric tons of cement clinker manufactured by a company based in India (the “Supplier”). Under the terms of the contract, ZAG was required to supply the Purchaser with a minimum of three shipments of cement clinker in 2014 and a minimum of five shipments in 2015 (about 50,000 metric tons per each shipment).
 
On or about June 26, 2014, the Supplier sent an email to ZAG’s Managing Director of the Asia Pacific, Middle East, and East Africa Regions (“ZAG Managing Director”) that, due to a technical problem at its production plant, it would not have sufficient cement clinker to load onto ZAG’s vessel on or about July 5, 2014. ZAG attempted to reschedule the date of its first shipment to the Purchaser but was unable to do so after the Purchaser objected to any delays and threatened to cancel the entire contract. The ZAG Managing Director subsequently identified a business contact and trading company located in the United Arab Emirates (the “Alternative Supplier”) capable of providing alternative Iranian-origin cement clinker. Relying on the Alternative Supplier’s misrepresentation that the cement clinker was not subject to U.S. economic sanctions on Iran, ZAG purchased the alternative cement clinker from the Alternative Supplier despite its knowledge that the goods were produced by an Iranian manufacturer and
shipped from a port in Iran.
 
OFAC considered the following to be aggravating factors:  
  (1) although ZAG did exercise limited due diligence, it acted with reckless disregard for sanctions requirements by failing to substantively address the U.S. sanctions prohibitions in place with respect to Iran despite contemporaneous risk indicators;  
  (2) ZAG’s senior management was aware that ZAG was purchasing and reselling goods of Iranian origin at the time of the conduct at issue;  
  (3) the transactions giving rise to the apparent violations conferred significant economic benefits to Iran;
  (4) ZAG is a commercially sophisticated company operating globally with experience and expertise in international transactions; and (5) ZAG did not have an effective OFAC compliance program in place at the time of the transactions commensurate with its level of risk.
 
OFAC considered the following to be mitigating factors:  
  (1) ZAG has not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the date of the transactions giving rise to the apparent violations;  
  (2) ZAG was a small business entity as defined by the U.S. Small Business Administration’s standards;  
  (3) ZAG undertook significant remedial measures by conducting a thorough internal investigation to determine the causes of the compliance failures associated with the apparent violations and enhancing its sanctions compliance policy and procedures, including by developing and implementing a U.S. Export Controls and Economic Compliance Manual and appointing a sanctions compliance officer; and  
  (4) ZAG cooperated with OFAC’s investigation by providing all relevant information regarding the apparent violations in an organized fashion and by responding to OFAC’s requests for information in a timely and efficient manner.
 
This case demonstrates the importance for companies operating in high-risk industries (e.g., international trading) to implement risk-based compliance measures, especially when engaging in transactions involving exposure to jurisdictions or persons implicated by U.S. sanctions. It is essential that companies engaging in international transactions consider and respond to sanctions-related warning signs, such as information that goods originating from, being loaded or unloaded at ports located in, or trans-shipping through, countries or regions subject to comprehensive U.S. economic and trade sanctions.
 
 
Two Malaysian nationals were indicted this month for conspiring to illegally export firearm parts from the United States to Hong Kong. Lionel Chan, 35, a resident of Brighton, and Muhammad Mohd Radzi, 26, who resides in Brooklyn, N.Y., were each indicted on one count of conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act. Chan was also indicted for obstruction of justice. On Jan. 31, 2019, Chan and Radzi were arrested and charged by criminal complaint.
 
According to the indictment, beginning in or around March 2018, Chan began purchasing a variety of U.S.-origin firearm parts online, including parts used to assemble AR-15 assault rifles and 9MM semi-automatic handguns, for a buyer located in Hong Kong. Many of the firearm parts that Chan purchased and exported to Hong Kong are defense articles that are designated on the United States Munitions List and therefore cannot be exported from the United States without first obtaining an export license or written authorization from the U.S. Department of State. Nonetheless, Chan allegedly shipped the firearm parts via Federal Express to the buyer in Hong Kong without first obtaining the necessary export licenses. Chan intentionally concealed the contents of the shipments by providing Federal Express with false information about the shipments, and by concealing the parts inside of each package. Between March and May 2018, Chan allegedly shipped at least 12 packages containing firearm parts from Brighton to the buyer in Hong Kong.
 
In or around April 2018, Radzi allegedly joined the conspiracy and began illegally exporting firearm parts to Hong Kong as well. Between May and October 2018, Radzi allegedly shipped 21 packages from Brooklyn, N.Y., to the buyer in Hong Kong. In October 2018, two of those packages were interdicted by Hong Kong authorities and found to contain numerous firearms parts, including a firing pin and gun sight, which are defense articles and controlled under Category I of the United States Munitions List. Like Chan, Radzi failed to obtain an export license for any of these shipments.
 
In addition to the conspiracy charge, Chan was also indicted for obstructing justice. According to the indictment, during a flight from Dublin, Ireland to Boston on January 2, 2019, Chan deleted text messages between himself and the buyer in Hong Kong regarding the illegal export of firearm parts from the United States to Hong Kong without the necessary export licenses.
 
The charge of conspiring to illegally export firearms provides for a sentence of no greater than five years in prison, one year of supervised release and a $250,000 fine. The charge of obstructing justice provides for a sentence of no greater than 20 years in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $250,000 fine. Sentences are imposed by a federal district court judge based upon the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.
 
Settlement Agreement between DDTC and Darling Industries, Inc.
 
Darling Industries, Inc. settled allegations that it violated the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in connection with unauthorized exports of defense articles, including technical data; the unauthorized provision of defense services; and the failure to appoint a qualified Empowered Official. The charges include six violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), for unauthorized exports; unauthorized defense services; and failure to appoint a qualified Empowered Official (EO), between 9 Feb 2012 and 3 Mar 2014. A self-initiated compliance review described decades of systematic, reoccurring violations involving R.E. Darling’s manufacture and sale of ethylene propylenediene monomer compound (EPDM), a Kevlar-filled, raw material used as a missile case insulator and missile motor insulator, controlled under USML IV(h) and breathing hoses, controlled under USML VIII(h). EPDM is also designated on MTCR Annex, Category II- Item 3.
 
Online information:
  – Order
 
Personnel Changes
 
Nazak Nikakhtaris is the new Acting Under Secretary for Industry and Security
 
Nazak Nikakhtaris has replaced Daniel Hill as the Acting Under Secretary for Industry and Security. According to her bio, Ms. Nikakhtar was nominated by President Donald J. Trump to become the Assistant Secretary for Industry and Analysis and was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on March 19, 2018. Ms. Nikakhtar served as the Department’s primary liaison with U.S. industry and trade associations to help address industry concerns and support American competitiveness. She advised the Under Secretary and the Secretary on trade and investment policy and issues impacting the global competitiveness of U.S. businesses. She also headed the division that conducts research and analysis on manufacturing, services, travel and tourism, textiles and apparel, global trade, investment, and economic trends that impact the International Trade Administration’s mission.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

MSEX/IM MOVERS & SHAKERS

MS_a113. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 142 Openings Posted This Week, Including 22 New Openings

(Source: Events & Jobs Editor) 
 

Published every Monday or first business day of the week. Please, send job openings in the following format to 
jobs@fullcirclecompliance.eu
.

 
* COMPANY; LOCATION; POSITION TITLE (WEBLINK); CONTACT INFORMATION; REQUISITION ID
 

#
” New or amended listing this week

 

#
* Adient; Plymouth, MI;
Director Americas Regional Compliance
; Requisition ID: R-03478
*
 
AeroVironment; Simi Valley, CA; Trade Compliance Specialist II; Requisition ID: 333;

* Agility; Charlotte, NC;
Import Manager/Licensed Customs Broker
;

Agility; Dallas, TX; 
Ocean Export Coordinator
;

* Agility; Houston, TX;
Ocean Export Coordinator
;
*
Agility; Houston, TX; Ocean Export Team Leader;

* Airbus; Getafe, Spain; Technology Control Officer; Requisition ID: 10445139 LM EN EXT 1

* Airbus; Manching, Germany; 
Internship within Procurement Compliance, Regulations & Risks
; Requisition ID: 10438469 NU EN EXT 1;

* Ajilon; High Point, NC; Director of Trade and Compliance (Supply Chain); Requisition ID: US_EN_7_849133_2637004

*
 
AM General; Auburn Hills, MI; 
International Compliance Analyst
*
 
Amazon Web Services; Seattle, WA; Trade Compliance Manager, Export Controls & Classification; Requisition ID: 787194;

#
* Ambaflex; Zwaag, the Netherlands;
International Trade Compliance Specialist 

*
 
Analog Devices; Chelmsford, MA; 
Import-Export Analyst
;

#
* Analog Devices, Inc.; Singapore; 
Asia Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 12456
#
* Ansys; Pittsburgh, PA;
Paralegal – Compliance and Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 7535

* Ascent Aerospace; Lake Orion and Macomb Township, MI; 
ITAR/EAR/Export Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 1399;

#
* Autodesk; San
Rafael, CA (SF Bay Area) or Portland, OR; 
Export Compliance Officer
; Requisition ID: 19WD31812
#
* Avalara; Seattle, WA or Toronto, Canada;
HS Classification Product Manager 

* BAE Systems; Minneapolis, MN; Export Compliance Officer/Empowered Official 


*
 
BAE Systems; Nashua, NH; 
Procurement Compliance
; Requisition ID: 44996BR

* BAE Systems; Poznan, Poland; 
Export Control Officer
; Requisition ID: 68780

*
 
BAE Systems; Sterling Heights, MI; 
Senior Procurement Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 4BR
* Baker Hughes; Aberdeen, UK; Trade Compliance Classification Analyst; Requisition ID: 1902478; 

*
 
Beiersdorf; Hamburg, Germany; International Trade Expert;

* Bell Flight; Fort Worth, TX;
Trade Classification Specialist I
; Requisition ID: 270536;

#
* Boeing; Bellevue, WA;
Experienced Compliance Professional
; Requisition ID: 3AQ5N2
#
*
Boeing; Brisbane or Melbourne or Sydney, Australia;
Global Trade Controls Leader for Asia Pacific, Australia & China
; Requisition ID: 1900034401
#
* Boeing; Dubai, UAE;
Global Trade Controls Leader for MENAT and India
; Requisition ID: 1900028623

* Bosch USA; Owatonna, MN; Import/Export Compliance Analyst

* Bristol-Myers Squibb; New Brunswick, NJ; 
Director Global Customs & Trade
; Requisition ID: R1509390_EN

* Carnegie Mellon University; Pittsburgh, PA; Export Compliance Manager;

* DB Schenker; Düsseldorf, Germany; Head of Ocean Freight Import; Requisition ID: 201811140002;

*
 
DuPont; Neu-Isenburg, Germany; 
Logistics Specialist Customs & Trade Compliance EMEA
; Requisition ID: SOU00001629;

* Eaton; Cuautitlan, Mexico; 
Import and Export Analyst
; Requisition ID: 064734
* Eaton; Titchfield, United Kingdom; 
UK Export Licensing Officer
; Requisition ID: 056506


EDCO; Eindhoven, the Netherlands; Customs & Trade Compliance Coordinator

*
 
ELTA North America; Baltimore, MD; 
Compliance Officer
;

* Energy Resourcing Group; Houston, TX; 
Trade Compliance Analyst

#
* Engenium; Orlando, FL;
Import/Export Compliance Specialist 

* ENSCO Plc; Houston, TX; Analyst II – Export & Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 13136;

*
 
Erickson Inc.; Portland or Central Point, OR; 
Import Specialist

Susan Colletto
; Requisition ID 927130;

* Esri; Redlands, CA; Export Compliance Specialist;

* European Central Bank; Frankfurt, Germany; 
Principal Supervisor (Enforcement & Sanctions)
; Requisition ID: 2019-035-EXT

*
 Expeditors; Krefeld, Germany; 
Clerk Import / Export
;
*
 Expeditors; Bedfont, United Kingdom; 
Customs Brokerage Clerk
;

* Expeditors; Sunnyvale, CA, USA; Customs Compliance Specialist;

* Export Compliance Solutions/ECScreening; Remote; Sales Representative

* Flexport; Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Customs Director Europe;
* Flexport; San Francisco, CA; Customs Compliance Manager;

* FLIR; Arlington, VA or Billerica, MA; Senior Director, Global Export Compliance; Requisition ID: REQ11409;

* FLIR; multiple locations in the U.S.; 
Project Coordinator OCR EASE Global Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: REQ11768
* FLIR; Richmond, BC, Canada; 
Global Trade Compliance – Site Trade Compliance Operations Leader
; Requisition ID: REQ11591

* Forcepoint; Herndon, Virginia; 
Sr. Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: JR460234

* Fortive – Tektronix; Beaverton, OR; Chief Compliance Counsel;
* Fortive – HealthNewCo; Irvine, CA; Global Trade Compliance Manager;


GCP Applied Technologies; Cambridge, MA; 
Trade Compliance Manager

* General Atomics; San Diego, CA; 
Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 22119BR

* General Atomics; San Diego, CA; 
Trade Compliance Classification Leader
; Requisition ID: 22671BR

* General Atomics; San Diego, CA; 
Export Controls Leader – Technology
; Requisition ID: 22644BR

*
Google; Mountain View, CA; Trade Specialist, Export Compliance;  
* GSK; Research Triangle Park, NC; Trade Compliance COE Manager; Requisition ID: WD184670; 

* Gulfstream Aerospace; Savannah, GA;
Trade Compliance Project Manager II
; Requisition ID: 143118

* Gulfstream Aerospace; Savannah, GA;
Trade Compliance Project Manager Sr
; Requisition ID: 142611 

# * Harley-Davidson; Milwaukee, WI; Logistics Lead – Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 826 
* Henderson Group Unlimited, Inc; State Dept, DDTC; Washington, DC; 
Defense Trade Control Compliance Analyst
;
* Henderson Group Unlimited, Inc; State Dept, DDTC; Washington, DC; 
Commodities Jurisdiction Analyst
;

* Honeywell; multiple locations, United States; Export Compliance Manager (North America); Requisition ID: HRD45798;
* Honeywell; Kansas City, MO; Import/Export Compliance Leader; Requisition ID: req177780;
* Honeywell; Prague, Czech Republic; Export Compliance Officer; Requisition ID: req179383;

* Honeywell International Inc.; Sunnyvale, CA or Lincolnshire, IL; Sr. Import/Export Analyst; HRD32371
 

*
 Infineon; El Segundo, CA; 
Manager, Export Control
; Requisition ID: 33841

* Infineon Technologies; Tijuana, Mexico; Import-Export Manager;

*
 InteliTrac Global Solutions; Herndon, VA; 
ITAR Compliance Official / Deputy Facility Security Officer
;

*
 InteliTrac Global Solutions; Herndon, VA;
ITAR Compliance Official
;

* Invista; Wichita, KS; 
International Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 060999

*
 
IPG Photonics; Oxford, MA; 
Global Director Trade Compliance
;
*
 IPG Photonics; Oxford, MA;
 
Global Director Trade Compliance 

* John Crane; Slough, United Kingdom; Senior Manager International Trade Compliance EMEA; Requisition ID: JCRANE01688; 

* Johnson Controls; Milwaukee, WI; Director, Global Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: WD30055791295;

*
 
Keeco Home; Hayward, CA; Director Customs and Compliance

* Kellogg’s; Bucharest, Romania; Export Documents & Customs Coordinator; Requisition ID: LOG003008;

* Kohler Co; Kohler, WI; Analyst, International Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 18105; 
*
 
Leidos; Columbia, MD; International Trade Manager / Export Compliance; Requisition ID: R-00005745;

* Leonardo DRS; Melbourne, FL; 
Senior Supply Chain Analyst – Small Business Compliance
; Requisition ID: 91669

* Lockheed Martin; Arlington, VA; International Licensing Analyst; Requisition ID: 468160BR;

* Lockheed Martin; Bethesda, MD; 
Regulatory Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 449353BR


*
 
Lockheed Martin; 
Grand Prairie, TX; 
International Trade Compliance Specialist / International Licensing Analyst
; Requisition ID: 469631BR

* Lockheed Martin; Orlando, FL; 
International Trade Compliance Specialist / International Licensing Analyst
; Requisition ID: 467458BR

#
* Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Controls; Orlando, FL;
International Trade Compliance Staff
; Contact: Marjorie Alquist, +1 407-356-9061; Requisition ID: 473481BR
#
* Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Controls; Orlando, FL or Dallas, TX;
International Trade Compliance Engineer Staff
; Contact: Brian Taylor, +1 407-356-3833; Requisition ID: 462509BR

* Lumentum; Milpitas, CA; 
Legal Trade Compliance Intern
; Requisition ID: 2018221

* Lutron Electronics Co; Lehigh Valley, PA; Trade Compliance Coordinator; Requisition ID: 4025;

* Meggitt; Erlanger, KY; Trade Compliance Officer;
 
Requisition ID: 37476;

Meggitt; San Diego, CA; Trade Compliance Officer;
 
Requisition ID: 36402;

#
* Metso; Waukesha, WI or York, PA or Columbia, SC;
Logistics Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 83793

*
 
Mohawk Global Trade Advisors; Chicago, IL; 
Vice President and General Manager of Consulting Division
; Contact: CSardella@mohawkglobal.com;  
* Moog Aircraft Group; Torrance, CA; Senior Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 190620;    

*
 Newell Brands; Norwalk, CT; 
Manager of Trade Operations

* Norma Group; Maintal, Germany; Manager Global Trade Compliance and Forwarding; Requisition ID: 8843; 

* Northrop Grumman; Chester, United Kingdom; International Trade Compliance (ITC) Professional;
* Northrop Grumman; London, United Kingdom; Regional Trade Compliance Manager;

* NXP Semiconductors; Eindhoven, The Netherlands; (Senior) Manager Customs Compliance; Requisition ID: R-10013630;


*
 
Palomar Products; Rancho Santa Margarita, CA; Contracts & Compliance Manager;


* Panasonic Avionics; Houston, TX; Import/Export Analyst;

#
* PCC Forged Products – Wyman-Gordon; Houston, TX;
Division Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 20961
#
* PerkinElmer; Shelton, CT or Boston, MA or Hopkinton, MA or Waltham, MA;
Senior Director Global Transportation and Logistics
; Requisition ID: JR-004907

* Pinpoint Pharma; Lincolnshire,IL; Export Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 351;

* Polaris; Minneapolis, MN; Mgr, Export Compliance; Requisition ID: 12882BR;

#
* Praxair; Tonawanda, NY;
International Trade & Government Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 19000512

* PwC; Houston, TX; Customs and International Trade Director; Requisition ID: 38150WD;

*
 
Ralph Lauren; New York, NY; Director, Trade Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 5567761;


* Raytheon; Tuscon, AZ; Senior Export Licensing and Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 129588BR;

* Raytheon; Tucson, AZ; 
Trade Compliance Empowered Official

ryan.murphy@raytheon.com
; Requisition ID: 
121105BR
;  

* Richemont; Fort Worth, TX; Import/Export Manager; Requisition ID: 8837;

* Rohde & Schwarz; Columbia, MD; Import/Export Compliance Specialist;

*
 
Rohde Schwarz; Munich, Germany; 
Spezialist Exportkontrolle (m/w) 

*
 SABIC; Houston TX; 
Senior Analyst, Trade Compliance
;
Danielle.Cannata@sabic.com
; Requisition ID: 8411BR
*
 
SC Johnson; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Senior Analyst, Global Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 1525;

* Shell; Krakow, Poland; Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 100384BR;

* Shell; London, United Kingdom; 
Trade Compliance Manager – Trading
; Requisition ID: 96669BR

#
* Sierra Nevada Corporation; Arlington, VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst II
; Requisition ID: R0007508
#
* Signify; Eindhoven or Amsterdam, the Netherlands;
Legal Export Control Officer
; Requisition ID: 289784
#
* Spirit AeroSystems Inc; Wichita, KS;
Import/Export Administration
; Requisition ID: 2019-3798
* StanleyBlack&Decker; Southington, CT; 
Trade Compliance Specialist/Analyst
; Requisition ID: 58390BR


*
 
Symantec; Tempe, AZ; 
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 47108;
TE Connectivity; El Cajon, CA or Middletown, PA; Licensing Specialisttbaker@te.com; Requisition 40514 

*
 
Thales; Brest, France; Export Control Manager (H/F); Requisition ID: R0052876

* Teledyne Semiconductors; Saint-Egrève/Grenoble, France; Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 2019-8459;

* Textron Aviation; Wichita, KS; 
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 269127

*
 
Thales; New Delhi, India; 
Manager – Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID:
R0038060

*
 TLR Inc.; Portland, OR; 
Export Compliance Specialist;

* Trek Bicycle; Waterloo, WI;
Trade Compliance Manager 

* United Technologies – Collins Aerospace; Cedar Rapids; Compliance Specialist-Government; Requisition ID: 01271793;

* United Technologies – Pratt & Whitney; East Hartford, CT; 
ITC Licensing Specialist
; Requisition ID: 01289652

*
 
University of California; San Francisco, CA; 
Export Control Officer
; Requisition ID: 51010;

#
* University of Michigan; Ann Arbor, MI;
Export Controls Research Compliance Specialist Associate
; Requisition ID: 169019

* Velocity Electronics; Austin, TX; 
Director of Global Trade Compliance 

* Wealth Ocean; Newport Beach, CA; Marketing & International Trade Specialist;

* Wellesley Asset Management; Wellesley, MA; Chief Compliance Officer;

* Xilinx; San Jose, CA;
 
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 155901

* Xpand Group: Hong Kong, China; 
Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: G-REQ-00169936
* Xpand Group: Hong Kong, China; 
Trade Compliance Manager;

* YETI Coolers; Austin, TX;

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

TEEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

TE_a214FCC Presents U.S. Export Controls Awareness Course: “ITAR & EAR from a non-U.S. Perspective”, 9 April in Bruchem, the Netherlands

 
Our next academy course is specifically designed for beginning compliance professionals and those in a similar role who aim to stay up-to-date with the latest U.S. export control requirements that apply to non-U.S. transactions, and industry’s best practices.
 
The course will cover multiple topics relevant for organizations outside the U.S. that are subject to U.S. export controls, including: the U.S. regulatory framework, key concepts and definitions, tips regarding classification and licensing, essential steps to ensure a U.S. export control compliant shipment, how to handle a (potential) non-compliance issue, recent enforcement trends, and the latest and anticipated regulatory amendments.  Participants will receive a certification upon completion of the training.
 
* What: Awareness Course U.S. Export Controls: ITAR & EAR from a Non-U.S. Perspective 
* When: Tuesday, 9 Apr 2010, 9.30 am – 4.30 pm (CET)
* Where: Landgoed Groenhoven, Bruchem, the Netherlands
* Sponsor: Full Circle Compliance (FCC)
* Instructors: drs. Ghislaine C.Y. Gillessen, Michael E. Farrell (ITAR), and drs. Alexander P. Bosch (EAR)
* Information & Registration: HERE, or contact us at 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ENEDITOR’S NOTES

* Alexander Graham Bell (3 Mar 1847 – 2 Aug 1922; was a Scottish-born American scientist, inventor, engineer, and innovator who is credited with inventing and patenting the first practical telephone. He also founded the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) in 1885.)
  – “Before anything else, preparation is the key to success.”
  – “When one door closes, another opens; but we often look so long and so regretfully upon the closed door that we do not see the one which has opened for us.”
 
* Knute Rockne (Knute Kenneth Rockne (/kə
ˈ
nu
ː
t/ kə-NOOT; March 4, 1888 – March 31, 1931) was a Norwegian-American football player and coach at the University of Notre Dame.
Rockne is regarded as one of the greatest coaches in college football history. His biography at the College Football Hall of Fame identifies him as “without question, American football’s most-renowned coach”.
  – “Drink the first one. Sip the second slowly. Skip the third.”
 
Monday is pun day:
* Have you heard about corduroy pillows?  They’re making headlines.
* Q. What is Cole’s Law?  
   A. Thinly sliced cabbage.
* I’m terrified of elevators and escalators, and taking steps to avoid them.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a316
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

 

*
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.  Implemented by Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs & Border Protection.

  – Last Amendment: 14 Jan 2019: 84 FR 112-116: Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological and Ecclesiastical Ethnological Material from Bulgaria; and 84 FR 107-112: Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological Material From China 
 

DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Dec 2018: 83 FR 65292-65294: Control of Military Electronic Equipment and Other Items the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions List (USML); Correction [Concerning ECCN 7A005 and ECCN 7A105.]
 
* DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.  Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau.
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.
  – The latest edition (1 Jan 2019) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.   

 

DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense.
  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)
 
 
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359, comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. This rule also identifies destinations with respect to which most assistance would be generally authorized and destinations that would require a specific authorization by the Secretary of Energy.
 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Nov 2018, 10 CFR 110.6, Re-transfers.
 

* DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War.  Implemented by Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives.
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm.  

 

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. Implemented by Dep’t of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
  – Last Amendment: 4 Oct 2018: 83 FR 50003-50007: Regulatory Reform Revisions to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 1 Jan 2019) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment. The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website. BAFTR subscribers receive a $25 discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.
 
* DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders. 

Implemented by Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

  – Last Amendment: 15 Nov 2018: 83 FR 57308-57318: Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Regulations
  
* USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), 1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex. Implemented by U.S. International Trade Commission. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)

  – Last Amendment:
27 Feb 2019: Harmonized System Update 1902 [contains 40 ABI records and 11 harmonized tariff records.]

  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a0317
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 
here

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, Alex Witt. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 6,500 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission, provided attribution is given to “The Export/Import Daily Bugle of (date)”. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.  If you would to submit material for inclusion in the The Export/Import Daily Update (“Daily Bugle”), please find instructions here.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.


* SUBSCRIPTIONS: Subscriptions are free.  Subscribe by completing the request form on the Full Circle Compliance website

* BACK ISSUES: An archive of Daily Bugle publications from 2005 to present is available HERE.

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