;

19-0228 Thursday “Daily Bugle'”

19-0228 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

Thursday, 28 February 2019

  1. Commerce/BIS Welcomes Industry Feedback Concerning Procedures for Submitting Section 232 Exclusion Requests
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. DHS/CBP Publishes Updated Drawback CATAIR, 5106 CATAIR, and Error Dictionary
  4. State/DDTC: “Darling Industries, Inc. Fined $400,000 to Settle Alleged AECA and ITAR Violations, Including Failure to Appoint a Qualified Empowered Official”
  5. UK DIT/ECJU Publishes New Export Control Training Bulletin
  1. Deutsche Welle: “Trial of German Gunmaker Sig Sauer ‘Illegal Weapons Shipments’ Begins”
  2. ST&R Trade Report: “Foreign Investments Require Mandatory Declaration to CFIUS Under Pilot Program”
  3. WorldECR Survey: “Disruption Inevitable Consequence of No-Deal Brexit”
  1. A. Lamy: “Supply Chain Risks Related to U.S. Sanctions and Export Control Issues”
  2. M.G. Remiorz & A.S. Dabelstein: “Hard Brexit – Liability Risk for EU Carriers”
  1. Henk Hartman Starts Hartman Trade Compliance Consultancy
  1. ECTI Presents “U.S. Export Controls on Non-U.S. Transactions” Seminar Series in Washington, DC: How ITAR, EAR & OFAC Regulations Impact Non-U.S. Companies, Affiliates and Transactions
  2. FCC to Provide Training on Export Controls & Compliance, 2 Apr at NAG, Delft, the Netherlands
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: DHS/Customs (14 Jan 2019), DOC/EAR (20 Dec 2018), DOC/FTR (24 Apr 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), DOE/AFAEC (23 Feb 2015), DOE/EINEM (20 Nov 2018), DOJ/ATF (26 Dec 2018), DOS/ITAR (4 Oct 2018), DOT/FACR/OFAC (15 Nov 2018), HTSUS (27 Feb 2019) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a11. 
Commerce/BIS Welcomes Industry Feedback Concerning Procedures for Submitting Section 232 Exclusion Requests 

(Source: 
Federal Register, 28 Feb 2019.) [Excerpts.] 
 
84 FR 6767: Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request; Procedures for Submitting Request for Exclusions from the Section 232 National Security Adjustments of Imports of Steel and Aluminum
 
  The Department of Commerce will submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for clearance the following proposal for collection of information under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35).
 
 – Agency: Bureau of Industry and Security.
 – Title: Procedures for Submitting Request for Exclusions from the Section 232 National Security Adjustments of Imports of Steel and Aluminum.
 – Form Number(s): 0694-0139.
 – OMB Control Number: 0694-0139.
 – Type of Review: Regular submission. … 
 – Needs and Uses: This collection of information supports Presidential Proclamations 9705 Adjusting Imports of Steel Mill Articles into the United States and 9704 Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States.
  On March 8, 2018, the President issued Proclamations 9704 and 9705 concurring with the findings of the two reports and determining that adjusting imports through the imposition of duties on steel and aluminum is necessary so that imports of steel and aluminum will no longer threaten to impair the national security. … 
 
  This information collection request may be viewed at 
reginfo.gov
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/. Follow the instructions to view Department of Commerce collections currently under review by OMB.
  Written comments and recommendations for the proposed information collection should be sent within 30 days of publication of this notice to 
OIRA_Submission@omb.eop.gov.
 
Sheleen Dumas, Departmental Lead PRA Officer, Office of the Chief Information Officer, Commerce Department. 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a12. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

  

* DHS/CBP; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: 
  – Application-Permit-Special License Unlading-Lading-Overtime Services; and
  – Vessel Entrance or Clearance Statement [Pub. Dates: 28 Feb 2019.]

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a2
3. 
Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)

(Source: 
Commerce/BIS)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a34. 
DHS/CBP Publishes Updated Drawback CATAIR, 5106 CATAIR, and Error Dictionary
(Source: 
CSMS# 19-000093
CSMS# 19-000094, 28 Feb 2019.) 

Updated Drawback CATAIR

An updated version of the Drawback CATAIR (DE/DX) is now posted 
here
. The updated CATAIR now includes a max loop repeat of 10,000 records for the Imports Grouping, Manufactured/Produced Articles Grouping, Export/Destroy Articles Grouping, and TFTEA Export/Destroy Articles Grouping. This change is currently available in the CERTIFICATION environment and will be deployed to the PRODUCTION environment on 3/2/19. 
  For any policy related issues please email the OT Drawback inbox at 
OTDRAWBACK@cbp.dhs.gov.
 
Updated 5106 CATAIR and Error Dictionary

An updated version of the Importer/Consignee Create/Update (TP/TT) CATAIR is now posted at the following location: 
here.

  Additionally, an updated version of the Importer/Consignee Create/Update Error Dictionary is now posted 
here.

  Any additional questions should be directed to 
5106@cbp.dhs.gov.

  – Related CSMS No. 19-000060

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_a45
State/DDTC: “Darling Industries, Inc. Fined $400,000 to Settle Alleged AECA and ITAR Violations, Including Failure to Appoint a Qualified Empowered Official”

(Source: 
State/DDTC, 28 Feb 2019.)
 
Darling Industries, Inc., of 3749 N. Romero Road, Tucson, AZ, settled allegations that it violated the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in connection with unauthorized exports of defense articles; provision of defense services; and failure to appoint a qualified Empowered Official.
 
Summary
* Respondent: Darling Industries Inc., 3749 N. Romero Rd., Tucson, AZ 85705

* Charges: Six violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), for unauthorized exports; unauthorized defense services; and failure to appoint a qualified Empowered Official (EO), between 9 Feb 2012 and 3 Mar 2014.  A self-initiated compliance review described decades of systematic, reoccurring violations involving R.E. Darling’s manufacture and sale of ethylene propylene diene monomer compound (EPDM), a Kevlar-filled, raw material used as a missile case insulator and missile motor insulator, controlled under USML IV(h) and breathing hoses, controlled under USML VIII(h). EPDM is also designated on MTCR Annex, Category II- Item 3.  Specifically:

   – Violation of ITAR § 127.1(a)(1) by unauthorized exports of defense articles and furnishing of defense services to Canada for the production of Black Brant rocket motors.

   – Violation of ITAR § 127.1(a)(1) by unauthorized exports of Cat VIII(h) breathing hoses to the UK and Italy.
   – Violation of ITAR § 127.1(b)(1) by appointing an unqualified EO who did not meet § 120.25 requirements. “R.E. Darling’s Empowered Official was not in a position of having authority for policy or management within R.E. Darling’s organization, as required by 22 CFR 120.25(a)(1).  Also, the Empowered Official did not understand the provisions and requirements of the various export statutes and regulations, as described in 22 CFR 120.25(a)(3).” Charging Letter, pp. 3-4.

* Civil Settlement: $400,000 ($200,000 will be suspended if penalty is paid and corrective actions are undertaken as agreed).

* Result of Voluntary Disclosure: Yes. 

* Date of Order: 26 Feb 2019.

* Available documents: 
Proposed Charging Letter

Consent Agreement

Order

* Mitigating Factors: 

  – Respondent submitted a Voluntary Disclosure. 

  – Respondent entered into an agreement with DDTC.

  – Respondent instituted a number of self-initiated compliance program improvements.

* Aggravating Factors:

  – Delayed disclosure (22 months after discovery of the violation).

* Corrective Actions (CAs) include:

  – Incorporate CAs into any of future business acquisitions that are involved in AECA and ITAR-regulated activities. 

  – Notify DDTC 60 days before sale of any entity engaged in ITAR-regulated activities and inform purchaser of CA requirements.

  – Ensure adequate resources are dedicated to ITAR compliance, including lines of authority, staffing increases, performance evaluations, and career paths.

  – Appoint Internal Special Compliance Officer (ISCO) who will:

     (1) Report directly to DDTC and to VP/GM;

     (2) Conduct ITAR compliance review throughout ITAR-regulated business units;

     (3) Oversee implementation of all compliance measures; 

     (4) Have authority to hire staff and outside consultants to assist. 

     (5) Review and verify export control jurisdictions and classifications.

     (6) Perform, under supervision of ISCO, one audit by an outside consultant during the term of the Consent Agreement.
 

[Read the related State Media Note 
here.]

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_a56
UK DIT/ECJU Publishes New Export Control Training Bulletin

(Source: 
UK DIT/ECJU, 28 Feb 2019.)
 
The UK Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) of the Department of International Trade (DIT) has published a new 
export control training bulletin on its website. 
 
This bulletin contains details of courses, seminars and workshops from the Export Control Joint Unit to increase your understanding of the UK’s strategic export controls.
 
Events are aimed at exporting and trading individuals or companies of all sizes, as well as government organizations and cater for a wide range of knowledge levels. This issue includes all details, charges, and an application form. It covers new courses from March to July 2019.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWSNEWS

NWS_a17.
 
Deutsche Welle: “Trial of German Gunmaker Sig Sauer ‘Illegal Weapons Shipments’ Begins”

(Source: 
Deutsche Welle, 26 Feb 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
German gunmaker Sig Sauer has been accused of illegally exporting 36,000 pistols to Colombia in violation of export regulations. Prosecutors have demanded the weapons manufacturer pays a €12-million ($14.8 million) fine.
 
The trial of German arms producer Sig Sauer began at the Kiel District Court in northern Germany on Tuesday. Three former executives are accused of being involved with the delivery of guns worth €270 million ($306 million) to Colombia without the necessary authorizations.
 
The accused face up to five years in prison if convicted and the prosecution is also demanding the company pay a €12-million fine.  
 
Prosecutors said Sig Sauer manufactured at least 38,000 pistols in the company’s facility in the town of Eckernforde between 2009 and 2011. It then shipped the weapons to its US company in New Hampshire, which then completed the transaction with Colombia. …

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a28
ST&R Trade Report: “Foreign Investments Require Mandatory Declaration to CFIUS Under Pilot Program” 

(Source: 
Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg Trade Report, 26 Feb 2019.) [Excerpts.] 
 
Parties to specified types of transactions involving foreign investment in the U.S. must submit mandatory declarations to the federal government under a pilot program implementing a law enacted in 2018. Parties to foreign investment transactions not subject to the new program should consider submitting such declarations voluntarily.
 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, an interagency committee created in 1975, has the authority to review, block, and even unwind certain transactions involving foreign investments in U.S. companies or operations that may jeopardize U.S. national security. It is chaired by the Treasury secretary and includes 16 other members representing the departments of Defense, Homeland Security, State, and Commerce as well as other agencies.
 
CFIUS’ powers were greatly expanded by the 2018 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, which among other things broadened the committee’s jurisdiction to include emerging and foundational technologies, added new national security factors for CFIUS to consider, and strengthened CFIUS’ ability to protect critical infrastructure from foreign government disruption.
 
FIRMMA also created a requirement for parties to submit a mandatory declaration (essentially a prior notification filing) to CFIUS for certain investments by non-U.S. individuals in any U.S. business that (1) owns, operates, manufactures, supplies, or services critical infrastructure, (2) produces, designs, tests, manufactures, fabricates, or develops one or more critical technologies, or (3) maintains or collects sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens that may be exploited in a manner that threatens national security.
 
In November 2018 the Treasury Department initiated a pilot program to implement this mandatory declaration requirement. Under this pilot, mandatory declarations are required for any investment in a U.S. business that will result in any of the following.
  – access by the foreign individual to material nonpublic technical information related to a critical technology that is in the possession of the U.S. business
  – the foreign individual receiving membership or observer rights (including rights of nomination) on the board of directors or equivalent governing body of the U.S. business
  – any involvement by the foreign individual in substantive decision making of the U.S. business regarding the use, development, acquisition, or release of a critical technology
For purposes of this requirement, “critical technology” is defined as any of the following.
  – an export-controlled defense article or defense service (as defined under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations) or an item subject to export control under Nuclear Energy Commission rules
  – an export-controlled commercial or dual-use item controlled under the Export Administration Regulations for reasons of regional stability or surreptitious listening as well as under multilateral regimes (including for reasons of national security; nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons; or missile technology)
  – a select agent or toxin
  – an emerging and foundational technology as defined in forthcoming Department of Commerce regulations and controlled under the EAR
 
In addition, this pilot program applies only to 27 industries (specified by North American Industry Classification System code) specifically designated by Treasury. Examples include aircraft manufacturing, computer manufacturing, and guided missile and space vehicle manufacturing (see below for a full list).
 
Parties to foreign investment transactions should have a clear understanding of whether their transactions involve a critical technology and whether the U.S. company or operations being sold fall under one of the 27 NAICS codes. If so, a mandatory declaration to CFIUS may be required.
 
If not, parties should weigh the advisability of submitting a voluntary declaration. If there is any possibility that CFIUS may be interested in a transaction, a voluntary declaration will protect the filing parties against CFIUS later reviewing and possibly unwinding the transaction. …
 
[Click 
here 
for a list of Pilot Program Industries and NAICS codes.] 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a39
WorldECR Survey: “
Disruption Inevitable Consequence Of No-Deal Brexit”

(Source: 
WorldECR
, 28 Feb 2019.)
 
All survey respondents believe that export compliance will become more burdensome for UK companies.
 

WorldECRsurvey suggests that the prospect of a no-deal Brexit is already filling the European trade compliance world with a degree of trepidation. 
WorldECRpolled the views of 50 of its UK/European readers asking them for their views on a range of Brexit-related issues. Amongst our findings are:
 
  – Of those who responded, all predict some degree of disruption to supply chains involving dual-use or military goods.
  – Companies in the controlled goods sector have already begun contingency planning for a no-deal Brexit.
  – Over half of respondents (57%) agree that in the event of a no-deal Brexit it will be necessary for companies in the controlled goods supply chain to move some operations out of the United Kingdom.
  – All respondents believe that export compliance will become more burdensome for UK companies. 75% believe the same for EU companies.
 
On the positive side, more respondents believe that the UK government has given clear advice about export controls in the event of a no-deal Brexit than those who think that it hasn’t.
 
The survey also suggests that if the UK government is able to agree ‘a deal’ with the European Union, disruption, to both dual-use and military supply chains, will be minimal.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMMCOMMENTARY

COM_a110
A. Lamy: “Supply Chain Risks Related to U.S. Sanctions and Export Control Issues”

(Source: 
Sanctions & Export Controls Update, 27 Feb 2019.) 
 
* Author: Alexander (Alex) Lamy, Esq., 
Alexandre.Lamy@BakerMcKenzie.com.
 
When companies and compliance departments think about US sanctions and export control risks, they often focus on sales to customers and exports/reexports from one country to another.  In that context, the compliance focus is typically on confirming that a customer and other parties involved in a sale and shipment are not restricted parties and that the transfer of a product is authorized under applicable export-control regulations.  This is only half the story.  Companies can have similar risks in their supply chain, which can be disruptive to a company’s operations beyond one transaction or customer relationship if not property managed.
 
Suppliers and vendors present many of the same risks as customers under US sanctions.  Failure to properly screen suppliers and vendors used by a company could lead to repeated dealings with a Specially Designated National (“SDN”), for example.  Given the comprehensive prohibitions targeting SDNs, a US company would likely have significant liability if it had obtained goods or services over a long period from an SDN.  When an SDN customer is identified and business terminated, a company may suffer financial losses in the immediate and medium term but new, non-SDN customers can be found to keep up sales.  By contrast, identifying a supplier that is an SDN can be disruptive to a company’s supply chain over a long period, particularly if that supplier was a crucial or only source in the manufacturing process and is no longer available.  This risk underscores the need for companies and their compliance teams to consider frequent screening of suppliers and vendors to mitigate such risks.
 
As part of a screening risk assessment, compliance functions should, at a minimum, focus their efforts on regions that include US comprehensively sanctioned territories (i.e., Crimea, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria) because of the higher prevalence of restricted parties in those areas.  US comprehensive sanctions prohibit imports into the United States, and/or US Persons dealing in products, from such territories.  US companies that directly or indirectly procure parts, components, or other items from comprehensively sanctioned territories can face liability under US sanctions.  A January 2019 
enforcement case from the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control exemplifies this risk.  In that case, a US-based company settled an enforcement case with this agency and paid almost $1 million in civil penalties for having materials of North Korea origin in goods from Chinese suppliers.
 
US export controls can also pose risks in the supply chain, particularly for non-US companies.  The US Government applies its export controls on an extraterritorial basis in which US and non-US persons may have liability if they violate US export controls in their dealings with items (i.e., goods, software, technology) subject to US jurisdiction, wherever such items are located.  To the extent a non-US company procures items from a US supplier (whether for re-sale or to incorporate into a product manufactured outside the United States), failure to appreciate applicable US export-control restrictions can lead to liability for that company and potentially being cut off from such suppliers if they do not have faith in the non-US company’s US export-control compliance program.  This risk is acute where non-US companies procure controlled items under the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations and/or 
Export Administration Regulations.  Companies with supply chains that incorporate this risk should have adequate compliance controls to ensure that the use of items subject to US jurisdiction complies with US export controls.
 
Beyond the practical consequences that can arise from not properly addressing US sanctions and export-control risks in their supply chain, companies should keep in mind that potential penalties are significant and can add up quickly.  The maximum civil penalties for US sanctions violations are generally the greater of $295,141 or twice the value of the transaction, while the maximum civil penalties for US export-control violations are the greater of $300,000 or twice the value of the transaction.  These civil penalties can be imposed for each violation on a strict liability basis, and the maximum amounts are adjusted each year to account for inflation.  Beyond civil penalties, the US Government has also increasingly designated companies on one of its restricted parties lists (e.g., 
Entity List
Denied Parties List
Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, etc.) to penalize parties that do not comply with US sanctions or export controls and may not cooperate with US Government investigations. Designation on one of these US restricted-parties list can be devastating to a company’s operations, if they are later lifted by the US Government.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

(Source: 
International Law Office, 27 Feb 2019.) [Excerpts. Subscription required.] 
 
* Authors: Marco G. Remiorz, Esq., 
m.remiorz@asd-law.com; and Steffen Maelicke, Esq., 
s.maelicke@asd-law.com. Both of Arnecke Sibeth Dabelstein. 
 
Introduction
 
On 29 March 2017 the United Kingdom submitted its 
Article 50 withdrawal notification to the European Union. This gave the United Kingdom and the European Union until 29 March 2019 to negotiate a withdrawal agreement. Although the 
European Court of Justice ruled that the United Kingdom could revoke its Brexit application unilaterally, EU-based companies must be prepared for a ‘hard’ Brexit (ie, without any trade agreements) from 30 March 2019.
 
Following a hard Brexit:
  • the United Kingdom’s tariff-free trade status with EU members would be eliminated;
  • custom declarations would be required; and
  • tariffs would be imposed.
 

Ultimately, this would increase costs and import and export customs clearance delays between the United Kingdom and the European Union. It would also affect sales contracts between buyers and sellers, as well as the contract of carriage between senders, carriers and freight forwarders. … 

 
back to top
 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

MSEX/IM MOVERS & SHAKERS

MS_a112. 
Henk Hartman Starts Hartman Trade Compliance Consultancy

(Source: Editor)
 
Henk Hartman has started his own advisory firm: 
Hartman Trade Compliance Consultancy.  Henk worked for 10 years in Dutch Customs, and 25+ years in various multinational companies in Global & EMEA Trade Compliance roles, including 20+ years in Pharma. Contact Henk at 
henk@hartmantcc.com, +31 6 15 63 82 41.  

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


TEEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

TE_a113. 
ECTI Presents “U.S. Export Controls on Non-U.S. Transactions” Seminar Series in Washington, DC: How ITAR, EAR & OFAC Regulations Impact Non-U.S. Companies, Affiliates and Transactions

(Source: J. Kincaid; 
jill@learnexportcompliance.com.)
 
* What: “United States Export Controls (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) on Non-U.S. Transactions” Seminar Series in Washington, DC
* When: ITAR Seminar:  May 13-14, 2019; EAR/OFAC Seminar: May 15-16, 2019
* Where: Alexandria, VA: Embassy Suites Old Town Alexandria
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker Panel: Scott Gearity, Melissa Proctor, John Boscariol, James Bartlett, Stephan Müller, Christopher Tafe, and Kevin Wolf
* Register: 
here, or contact Jessica Lemon, 540-433-3977,

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

TE_a214. 
FCC to Provide Training on Export Controls & Compliance, 2 Apr at NAG, Delft, the Netherlands 

(Source: Editor) 
 
* What: Export Compliance Training, including the following topics:
  – International relations and developments in the export control arena
  – Export control regulations overview (U.S. and EU/Dutch)
  – Recent developments concerning Internal Compliance Programs (ICPs) requirements.
* When: Tuesday, 2 Apr 2019, 9.30 am – 1.30 pm (CET)
* Where: Netherlands Aerospace Group (“NAG”), Molengraaffsingel 10, Delft, the Netherlands. 
* Sponsor: NAG and Full Circle Compliance (“FCC”)
* Instructors: Drs. Ghislaine C.Y. Gillessen RA & Drs. Vincent Goossen (both of FCC)
* Registration & Information: 
here or send an email to
events@fullcirclecompliance.eu.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ENEDITOR’S NOTES


Michel de Montaigne (Michel Eyquem de Montaigne; 28 Feb 1533 – 13 Sep 1592; was one of the most significant philosophers of the French Renaissance, known for popularizing the essay as a literary genre. His work is noted for its merging of casual anecdotes and autobiography with intellectual insight. His massive volume 
Essais (Essays) contains some of the most influential essays ever written.)
  – “The most certain sign of wisdom is cheerfulness.” 
  – “He who establishes his argument by noise and command shows that his reason is weak.”
  – “A good marriage would be between a blind wife and a deaf husband.”

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a316
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

 

*
DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.  Implemented by Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs & Border Protection.

  – Last Amendment: 14 Jan 2019: 84 FR 112-116: Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological and Ecclesiastical Ethnological Material from Bulgaria; and 84 FR 107-112: Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological Material From China 
 

DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Dec 2018: 83 FR 65292-65294: Control of Military Electronic Equipment and Other Items the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions List (USML); Correction [Concerning ECCN 7A005 and ECCN 7A105.]
 
* DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.  Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau.
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.
  – The latest edition (1 Jan 2019) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.   

 

DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense.
  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)
 
 
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359, comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. This rule also identifies destinations with respect to which most assistance would be generally authorized and destinations that would require a specific authorization by the Secretary of Energy.
 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Nov 2018, 10 CFR 110.6, Re-transfers.
 

* DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War.  Implemented by Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives.
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm.  

 

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. Implemented by Dep’t of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
  – Last Amendment: 4 Oct 2018: 83 FR 50003-50007: Regulatory Reform Revisions to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 1 Jan 2019) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment. The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website. BAFTR subscribers receive a $25 discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.
 
* DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders. 

Implemented by Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

  – Last Amendment: 15 Nov 2018: 83 FR 57308-57318: Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Regulations
  
* USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), 1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex. Implemented by U.S. International Trade Commission. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)

  – 
Last Amendment: 27 Feb 2019: 
Harmonized System Update 1902 
[contains 40 ABI records and 11 harmonized tariff records.]

  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a0317
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 
here

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, Alex Witt. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 6,500 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission, provided attribution is given to “The Export/Import Daily Bugle of (date)”. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.  If you would to submit material for inclusion in the The Export/Import Daily Update (“Daily Bugle”), please find instructions here.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.


* SUBSCRIPTIONS: Subscriptions are free.  Subscribe by completing the request form on the Full Circle Compliance website

* BACK ISSUES: An archive of Daily Bugle publications from 2005 to present is available HERE.

* TO UNSUBSCRIBE: Use the Safe Unsubscribe link below.

Scroll to Top