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19-0110 Thursday “Daily Bugle'”

19-0110 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

Thursday, 10 January 2019

TOP
The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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[No items of interest noted today.] 

  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  4. Treasury/OFAC Announces License Applications Not Being Processed during US Government Shutdown
  5. EU Implements Restrictive Measures Concerning Mali; Corrects Restrictive Measures Concerning Burundi
  1. NHPR: “CEO of NH Sig Sauer Plant Facing Five Years in German Prison for Alleged Arms Deal” 
  2. Reuters: “Mnuchin Defends U.S. Decision to Lift Sanctions on Russian Firms” 
  3. ST&R Trade Report: “Little Detail on Outcome of U.S.-China Trade Talks” 
  4. WorldECR News Alert, 10 Jan 
  1. B. Braverman & D.W. Yuen: “EU Companies Face Tough Choice: Violate U.S. Secondary Sanctions on Iran or Amended EU Blocking Regulations”
  2. C. Livingstone: “Brexit: The Current State of Play”
  3. M. Volkov: “OFAC Relaxes Russia Sanctions After Oligarch Ownership Changes”
  1. ECS Presents “Mastering ITAR/EAR Challenges” on 30 Apr – 1 May in Nashville, TN
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: DHS/Customs (18 Dec 2018), DOC/EAR (20 Dec 2018), DOC/FTR (24 Apr 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), DOE/AFAEC (23 Feb 2015), DOE/EINEM (20 Nov 2018), DOJ/ATF (26 Dec 2018), DOS/ITAR (4 Oct 2018), DOT/FACR/OFAC (15 Nov 2018), HTSUS (19 Dec 2018) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1
 
[No items of interest noted today.]
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OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a11. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

 

* U.S. Customs and Border Protection; RULES; Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological Material from China [Publication Date: 14 January 2019.]

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OGS_a2
2. 
Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)

(Source: 
Commerce/BIS)

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(Source:
Treasury/OFAC, 9 Jan 2019.)
 
The Federal Government is currently closed. Applications submitted through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) online License Application System during this time will NOT be processed. You may submit your application online upon the re-opening of the Federal Government, and it will be processed at that time.

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(Source:
Official Journal of the European Union, 10 Jan 2019.)
 
Regulations:
* Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2019/29 of 9 January 2019 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali
 
Corrigenda:
* Corrigendum to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1605 of 25 October 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1755 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Burundi (OJ L 268, 26.10.2018)
* Corrigendum to Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1612 of 25 October 2018 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/1763 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Burundi (OJ L 268, 26.10.2018)

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NWSNEWS

NWS_a16. NHPR: “CEO of NH Sig Sauer Plant Maker Facing Five Years in German Prison for Alleged Arms Deal”

(Source: New Hampshire Public Radio, 9 Jan 2019.) [Excerpts.]
 
High ranking members of the Colombian National Police found themselves in Exeter, N.H., in the spring of 2009. They were there to visit arms maker Sig Sauer, which had just secured a contract worth up to $306 million to provide Colombian law enforcement with nearly 100,000 pistols. 
 
After a tour, the delegation
posed for photographs, holding up an SP2022 nine-millimeter pistol for the camera.
 
A decade later, that arms deal is at the center of a court case in Germany, where Sig Sauer’s New Hampshire-based CEO faces charges that he conspired to mislead German officials about the nature of the sale.
 
Ron Cohen, Sig Sauer’s chief executive, is accused by German prosecutors of colluding with Sig Sauer’s sister-company in Germany to violate that country’s export rules. Under German law, companies are prohibited from exporting firearms or other weapons to countries in conflict. That includes Colombia, which is slowly emerging from a half-century of armed conflict.
German officials allege Sig Sauer manufactured at least 38,000 pistols in the company’s facility in the town of Eckernförde, before shipping the weapons to the New Hampshire plant, which then completed the transaction with Colombia. Sig Sauer is alleged to have covered up the shipment’s final destination by submitting false paperwork–so-called end-use certificates–to German export officials, stating that the weapons were bound solely for the United States.
 
The stakes for Cohen are serious: if convicted, he faces up to five years in prison and millions of dollars in fines.  
Many details of the case are murky, in part because German prosecutors have kept documents related to the charges against Cohen under seal.  
 
The corporate relationship between the German and U.S.-based Sig Sauer companies is also not completely clear. L&O Holding, a conglomerate based in Germany,
owns both the German and U.S.-based Sig Sauer companies, as well as a third firm, Swiss Arms. The companies appear to operate as independent entities, though it isn’t clear how closely they may collaborate.
 
But prosecutors allege that officials at the two companies worked closely to hide the nature of the Colombia arms sale. Emails leaked to the German media show employees at the German and New Hampshire entities discussing the “USA/Kolumbien” transaction, and
images of Sig Sauer weapons bearing a “Made in Germany” imprint have surfaced in Colombia.
 
In addition to Cohen, two German executives have also been charged in the alleged plot: Michael Luke, who co-owns L&O Holding, and a man identified by the courts as “Robert L.” The company, separately, is also facing substantial fines. A trial is scheduled to begin in Kiel, Germany, in late February.
 
Sig Sauer’s New Hampshire operations didn’t respond to multiple requests for comment, but the company did
release a statement to a firearms blog in October saying that its actions were in “compliance with U.S. law.” The company doesn’t deny that it may have violated German law, however. …

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NWS_a27. Reuters: “Mnuchin Defends U.S. Decision to Lift Sanctions on Russian Firms”

(Source: Reuters, 10 Jan 2019.)
 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin on Thursday sought to allay Democratic lawmakers’ concerns about a Trump administration decision to remove companies tied to Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska from the U.S. sanctions list ahead of a congressional meeting over the issue.
 
  “Treasury will be vigilant in ensuring that En+ and Rusal meet these commitments. If these companies fail to comply with the terms, they will face very real and swift consequences, including the reimposition of sanctions,” Mnuchin said in a statement before his closed-door briefing with U.S. lawmakers.

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NWS_a38. ST&R Trade Report: “Little Detail on Outcome of U.S.-China Trade Talks”
 
The U.S. and China met in Beijing Jan. 7-9 to hold their first talks since agreeing to a trade ceasefire in December. The negotiations were extended an extra day but reports have offered scant information on any results.
 
An increase in the Section 301 additional tariff on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods from 10 percent to 25 percent had been scheduled to take effect Jan. 1, 2019 (
click here for more details on this and other developments in the U.S. Section 301 case against China) but was postponed to March 1 to give the two sides time to resolve longstanding trade irritants. The recent negotiations involved mid-level officials and were broadly seen as a precursor to higher-level discussions, which have not yet been scheduled.
 
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative issued a statement indicating that the talks focused on the Trump administration’s longstanding efforts to “achieve fairness, reciprocity, and balance in trade relations between our two countries.” In part this refers to the U.S. interest in reducing its growing trade deficit with China, which could be achieved if Beijing honors a “pledge to purchase a substantial amount of agricultural, energy, manufactured goods, and other products and services from the United States.” Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross said this issue is “probably the easiest one to solve.”
 
However, USTR made clear that it also remains focused on “achieving needed structural changes in China with respect to forced technology transfer, intellectual property protection, non-tariff barriers, cyber intrusions and cyber theft of trade secrets for commercial purposes, services, and agriculture.” These are among the 142 items on which the U.S. reportedly notified China last year it wants to see progress, and while China has indicated in recent months a willingness to pursue reform on some it has resisted changes on others.
 
USTR states that the two sides also discussed “the need for any agreement to provide for complete implementation subject to ongoing verification and effective enforcement.” USTR Robert Lighthizer and other U.S. officials believe China has often failed to follow through on previous trade commitments and want to ensure it does so in the future, including by not implementing other policies or practices that would negate the beneficial effect of any changes agreed. Press sources note that enforcement options could include keeping current tariffs on Chinese goods in place until Beijing carries out its pledges and reimposing them if China goes back on its word.

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NWS_a49. WorldECR News Alert, 10 Jan
(Source: WorldECR, 10 Jan 2019.)
 
  (1) US government shutdown hampering export licensing and SDN list removals
  (2) End in sight for US sanctions on EN+, RUSAL and JSE
  (3) UK export licences updated to reflect changes to EU dual-use control list
  (4) Russia adds to its Ukraine sanctions list
  (5) EU responds to Iranian terror threat with sanctions
 

[Editor’s Note: To subscribe to WorldECR, the journal of export controls and sanctions, please visit
http://worldecr.com/.]

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COMMCOMMENTARY

(Source:
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 8 Jan 2019.)
 
* Authors: Burt Braverman, Esq.,
burtbraverman@dwt.com, +1 202-973-4210; and Dsu-Wei Yuen, Esq.,
dsuweiyuen@dwt.com, +1 206-757-8095. Both of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP.
 
2018 brought with it President Trump’s decision that the United States would withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”). That signaled the U.S.’s intention not only to reimpose trade sanctions on Iran but also, in many instances, to impose “secondary sanctions” on non-U.S. persons – including EU businesses – that continue to trade with Iran. Hoping to mute the impact of the U.S. action, the European Commission amended a 22 year-old “blocking” regulation, which was promulgated in 1996 to discourage EU companies from complying with U.S. secondary sanctions. The original blocking regulation proved largely ineffective in freeing European companies from the burden of U.S. secondary sanctions, and it remains to be seen whether the 2018 amendments will be any more potent. With the 180 day wind-down period on dealing with Iran having ended on November 5, 2018, EU companies, like Odysseus on his treacherous voyage between Scylla and Charybdis, were left to choose which demon – U.S. trade sanctions or EU blocking regulations — is more perilous, and manage their risks accordingly. Early indications are that U.S. secondary sanctions remain the greater perceived peril, a fact that will take on increasing significance as the United States seeks to contain Iranian influence at the same time that it is withdrawing troops from Middle East battlegrounds.
 
The United States applies its economic and trade sanctions against targeted nations on an extra-territorial basis, requiring compliance not only by U.S. persons wherever located, but also, in many circumstances, by foreign persons as well. Application of these “secondary sanctions” to foreign persons may be triggered by, for example, engagement in U.S. dollar-denominated transactions, involvement of the U.S. financial system, or inclusion of more than de minimus amounts of U.S. goods or technology.
 
Regulation (EC) 2271/96, enacted by the EU Council in 1996, sought to block the application of certain U.S. secondary sanctions to EU persons, including businesses and financial institutions. The so-called “Blocking Regulation” prohibited EU persons from:
 
  – Complying with any requirement or prohibition under listed U.S. sanctions against Cuba, Libya and Iran (the “Blocked Sanctions”)
  – Recognizing or enforcing any judgment or decision of a judicial or administrative authority outside the European Community giving effect to the Blocked Sanctions
 
The Blocking Regulation provided that EU persons could recover any damages caused by application of Blocked Sanctions from the person or other entity causing such injury, e.g., from a person who refused to complete a transaction due to the applicability of U.S. sanctions. Alternatively, EU persons whose economic or financial interests were affected, directly or indirectly, by the Blocked Sanctions or any actions based thereon could be authorized, based on criteria to be established by the European Commission, to comply fully or partially with the Blocked Sanctions to the extent that non-compliance would seriously damage their interests or those of the European Community. EU member states were authorized to enact certain implementing regulations, and although some did (e.g., Germany), some declined to do so (e.g., France, Belgium). Significantly, the Blocking Regulation applied to EU subsidiaries and affiliates of U.S. companies, and to U.S. persons resident in the EU.
 
U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the resulting snap-back of U.S. sanctions against Iran prompted the European Commission, in June 2018, to adopt Regulation (EU) 2018/1100. The amendment significantly broadened the range of U.S. sanctions with whose secondary application EU companies are not to comply. These include U.S. prohibitions on:
 
  – Trade with Iran’s petroleum industry under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
  – Trade and financial transactions with Iran’s ports, energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012
  – Financial transactions with the Central Bank of Iran or designated Iranian financial institutions under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012
  – Certain financial transactions with designated Iranian persons, the Government of Iran and the Central Bank of Iran under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
  – Reexport of U.S.-origin goods to Iran under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations
 
Based on the instruction in the Blocking Regulation, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1101, which established criteria for authorizing EU persons to comply with U.S. sanctions, and establishes procedures for submission of authorization requests to the Commission by persons subject to the Blocking Regulation.
 
The effectiveness of the Blocking Regulation as a mechanism to offset the impact of the Blocked Sanctions has been widely questioned, and there have been very few instances of the Blocking Regulation being used in practice in its 22 year history. Indeed, it does not appear that any EU person has been subject to penalties for noncompliance since the adoption of the initial Blocking Regulation in 1996. This reflects the reality that concern over potential EU penalties pales in comparison to fear of possibly being cut off from access to the U.S. financial system or U.S. goods and technology.
 
It remains to be seen whether EU or country-level regulators will step up enforcement practices under the amended Blocking Regulation in an attempt to dissuade EU companies from terminating their business dealings with Iranian counter-parties, and whether any such measures will provide sufficient comfort to cause EU persons to act in disregard of U.S. sanctions. If the early response of major EU companies, and some EU member nations, to reimposition of U.S. secondary sanctions is an accurate indicator, they will not. In the meantime, like Odysseus, EU businesses (including foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies) will need to chart their course with care as they attempt to navigate the treacherous path between U.S. sanctions and EU blocking regulations.

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(Source:
Brodies LLP, 9 Jan 2019.)
 
* Author: Charles Livingstone, Esq., Brodies LLP,
charles.livingstone@brodies.com, +44 (0)141-248-4672.
 
The UK is scheduled to leave the EU on 29 March 2019 at 11pm GMT, which is now less than 12 weeks away.
 
The UK and EU have agreed a
Withdrawal Agreement at government level, which would provide for a post-Brexit transition period to 31 December 2020. The intention during that period would be to continue on a ‘business as usual’ basis: free movement rights would continue, and EU law would continue to apply in and to the UK. The short-term impact of withdrawing on the agreed terms would therefore be limited, with businesses and others gaining extra time to consider and prepare for whatever new arrangement would then take effect in 2021. That might be the ‘backstop’ set out in the Withdrawal Agreement: this would see the UK remain in a modified customs union with the EU, with Northern Ireland also remaining subject to some of the EU’s single market rules, unless and until agreement could be reached on a new and ongoing UK-EU trade arrangement.
 
However, the Withdrawal Agreement remains subject to approval by the UK and European Parliaments. The House of Commons is set to vote on the Withdrawal Agreement in the near future, with the debate commencing
today (take this
link to our blog post on the ‘meaningful vote’, which was posted in December before the original vote was postponed). The consensus among political commentators still appears to be that MPs will reject the Agreement.
 
Considering the limited time remaining until exit day, and that there appears to be no obvious consensus in Parliament for any other option, businesses should be viewing a ‘no-deal’ Brexit as very much a live prospect. This would mean Brexit would take place on 29 March 2019, with no transition period. Even if a deal is ultimately agreed following an initial rejection, this might potentially only be confirmed very late in the process, with a no-deal Brexit remaining possible right up to that point.
 
The UK Government has produced dozens of ‘
technical notices‘ setting out what it would propose to do in various areas in the event of a no-deal Brexit, and identifying issues for businesses and others to consider. You can find discussion of a number of these notices on our
Brexit Hub. The Commission has published equivalent Brexit
preparedness notices on how the EU would respond to a no-deal Brexit.
 
The UK Government has also been publishing orders under the
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (the “EUWA”), to adapt EU legislation so it works as UK law post-Brexit. If there is a transition then these orders will not be needed until 2021, if at all, but in a no-deal situation they will come into effect at the point of Brexit. The Government estimates 800 to 1,000 such orders will be needed, with some still to be published. All businesses that deal with EU legislation should understand how the rules applying to them might change in the event of a hard Brexit. Read
our update for more information on these EUWA orders.
 
Scottish businesses should also keep in mind that various areas currently dealt with by the EU will (at least in principle) be the Scottish Parliament’s responsibility post-Brexit. As yet the Scottish Government has not published any orders adapting EU legislation in those areas, possibly because the legal dispute over its intended equivalent to the EUWA was only
decided by the Supreme Court in December. It remains unclear how they will proceed, but time will be tight to get all the required orders published, approved (where necessary) and in force pre-Brexit. Negotiations are also still ongoing between the UK and devolved governments about the introduction of new UK-wide frameworks in key areas – including agriculture, fisheries and the environment – to ensure the harmonisation that currently flows from the common EU rules is not replaced by different regulatory regimes in the various UK nations, which would create new barriers to intra-UK trade. Read our
update on those negotiations.
 
While some of the effects of a ‘hard’ Brexit might be managed through limited-scope agreements between the UK and EU, or unilateral actions from either side, the overall impact would likely be significant. Every business should therefore be taking steps to understand its exposure to the risks of a no-deal Brexit.

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(Source:
Volkov Law Group Blog, 9 Jan 2019. Reprinted by permission.)
 
* Author: Michael Volkov, Esq., Volkov Law Group,
mvolkov@volkovlaw.com, 240-505-1992.
 
The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) rarely backs down.  Recently, in response to significant ownership and governance changes, OFAC removed three Russian companies, EN+ Group (EN+), UC Rusal plc (Rusal), and JSC EuroSibEnergo (ESE) from the sectoral sanctions list. (
Here).
 
OFAC’s decision to remove the three companies capped the efforts of Russian oligarch, Oleg Daripaska, to modify his ownership and control of these companies to satisfy OFAC regulators that he no longer exercised ownership or management control of the companies.
 
To secure removal of these entities, the companies agreed:
  – To reduce Daripaska’s ownership interest below fifty (50) percent;
  – To change the composition of the boards of directors’ of each of the three entities;
  – To a robust schedule of auditing, certifying and reporting requirements.
 
As part of the agreement, half of EN+’s board will be comprised of US and UK citizens, and Rusal’s Chairman of the Board will resign.
 
Deripaska will remain sanctioned, and companies or individuals that conduct business with Deripaska or any company he owns 50 percent or more will be subject to secondary sanctions.
 
OFAC’s original Oligarch Sanctions were announced on April 6, 2018. Rusal is the second largest aluminum manufacturer in the world, and OFAC’s sanctions had a significant impact on aluminum prices and supplies.
 
Shortly after the April 6, 2018 designation, Deripaska and the three companies petitioned OFAC to delist the designations. After extensive negotiations, OFAC and Deripaska reached an agreement. Deripaska’s ownership interests are conducted through EN+. Originally Deripaska owned 70 percent of EN+. He agreed to reduce his ownership interest to 44.95 percent. In addition, Deripaska agreed not to earn any money from the corporate restructuring and reduction of his assets and control. EN+ will retain control and ownership of two subsidiaries, Rusal and ESE.
 
As part of the restructuring agreement, Deripaska agreed to vote no more than 35 percent of his shares in EN+. The balance of his shares will be voted by an independent third party with no ties to Deripaska.
 
EN+ agreed to create a new board of directors, consisting of 12 directors, over half of whom are designated independent directors. OFAC vetted the entire board, and half of the board will consist of US and UK nationals. Deripaska will have the right to nominate no more than 4 directors.
 
Deripaska agreed to a comprehensive letter to restrict his ability to exercise or influence control of EN+. Deripaska explicitly agreed not to directly or indirectly exercise controlling influence over management or policies of EN+.
 
EN+ also agreed to a comprehensive auditing, certifying and reporting regime, including: auditing EN+’s and Rusal’s engagements with Deripaska; providing monthly certifications of compliance with OFAC terms of the agreement; providing quarterly reports to OFAC from EN+ and Rusal; and notifying OFAC of any changes to board composition, ownership or compliance with terms of the settlement.

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TEEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

TE_a113. ECS Presents “Mastering ITAR/EAR Challenges” on 30 Apr – 1 May in Nashville, TN

(Source: Suzanne Palmer, spalmer@exportcompliancesolutions.com)
 
* What: Mastering ITAR/EAR Challenges; Nashville, TN
* When: 30 April – 1 May 2019
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Solutions (ECS)
* ECS Speaker Panel:  Suzanne Palmer; Lisa Bencivenga; Mal Zerden; Commerce BIS TBD; Scott Jackson
* Register here or by calling  866-238-4018 or email spalmer@exportcompliancesolutions.com
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ENEDITOR’S NOTES

 
* John Dalberg-Acton (John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, 1st Baron Acton; 10 Jan 1834 – 19 Jun 1902; was an English Catholic historian, politician, and writer, perhaps best known for the remark, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”)
  – “Socialism means slavery.”
  – “The one pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority, or rather of that party, not always the majority, that succeeds, by force or fraud, in carrying elections.”
 
* George Washington Carver (circa 1860 – 5 Jan 1943, was an American botanist and inventor, born into slavery in Missouri, at an unknown date in the early 1860s. Carver received his Master of Science degree in botany in 1896, and was the first black faculty member at Iowa State University. While a professor at Tuskegee Institute, Carver developed techniques to improve soils depleted by repeated plantings of cotton. He wanted poor farmers to grow alternative crops, such as peanuts and sweet potatoes, as a source of their own food and to improve their quality of life. The most popular of his 44 practical bulletins for farmers contained 105 food recipes using peanuts.
  – “I would never allow anyone to give me money, no difference how badly I needed it. I wanted literally to earn my living.”
  – “Ninety-nine percent of the failures come from people who have the habit of making excuses.”
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EN_a315
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

 
* DHS CUSTOMS REGULATIONS: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199.  Implemented by Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs & Border Protection.
  – Last Amendment: 18 Dec 2018: 83 FR 64942-65067: Modernized Drawback  
 

DOC EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774. Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Dec 2018: 83 FR 65292-65294: Control of Military Electronic Equipment and Other Items the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions List (USML); Correction [Concerning ECCN 7A005 and ECCN 7A105.]
 
* DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.  Implemented by Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau.
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.
  – The latest edition (1 Jan 2019) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.   

 

DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense.
  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)
 
 
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359, comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. This rule also identifies destinations with respect to which most assistance would be generally authorized and destinations that would require a specific authorization by the Secretary of Energy.
 
DOE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL; 10 CFR Part 110; Implemented by Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
  – Last Amendment: 20 Nov 2018, 10 CFR 110.6, Re-transfers.
 

* DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War.  Implemented by Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives.
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm.  

 

DOS INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130. Implemented by Dep’t of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
  – Last Amendment: 4 Oct 2018: 83 FR 50003-50007: Regulatory Reform Revisions to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 1 Jan 2019) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment. The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website. BAFTR subscribers receive a $25 discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.
 
* DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders. 

Implemented by Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

  – Last Amendment: 15 Nov 2018: 83 FR 57308-57318: Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Regulations
  
* USITC HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), 1 Jan 2018: 19 USC 1202 Annex. Implemented by U.S. International Trade Commission. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 19 Dec 2018: Harmonized System Update (HSU) 1820, containing 19,061 ABI records and 3,393 harmonized tariff records.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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EN_a0316
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 
here

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EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, Alex Witt. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 6,500 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

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* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.


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