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18-1211 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

18-1211 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

Tuesday, 11 December 2018

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The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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  1. Commerce/BIS Welcomes Comments Concerning Commercial Chemical, Biotechnology, and Pharmaceutical Activities Involving “Schedule 1” Chemicals 
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: Spider Camera of Lansing, NY, to Pay $8,500 to Settle Alleged Export Violations
  3. State/DDTC: “Testing for DDTC’s New Registration Application Now Closed”
  4. EU Amends Restrictive Measures Concerning Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan
  5. EU Publishes Council Decision Supporting the Universalization and Effective Implementation of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention
  6. UK ECJU Publishes Updated Training Bulletin
  7. Wassenaar Arrangement Releases Plenary Meeting Documents
  1. Bloomberg: “U.S. Presses Ahead on Plan to Limit High-Tech Exports”
  2. Expeditors News: “Canada Announces Implementation of the CPTPP”
  3. NLTimes.nl: “T-Mobile Netherlands Will Not Break Ties With Huawei Over Espionage Concerns”
  4. Out-Law.com: “Dual-Use Export Control Appeal Rules Take Effect in Ireland”
  5. ST&R Trade Report: “U.S.-UK Trade Agreement to be Focus of ITC Investigation”
  1. A. Capri: “How A Growing U.S.-China Rivalry Is Reshaping the Global Tech Landscape”
  2. The Export Compliance Journal: “Seventeen Saudi Nationals Sanctioned Under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act”
  3. J. Reeves: “ATF to Publish 2018 Annual List of Explosive Materials”
  1. CBP Chief Robert Rawls Retires, is Replaced by David Garcia
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (29 Nov 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (2 Nov 2018), FACR/OFAC (15 Nov 2018), FTR (24 Apr 2018), HTSUS (1 Nov 2018), ITAR (4 Oct 2018) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1

1. 
Commerce/BIS Welcomes Comments Concerning Commercial Chemical, Biotechnology, and Pharmaceutical Activities Involving “Schedule 1” Chemicals
(Source: 
Federal Register, 11 Dec 2018.) 
 
83 FR 63613-63615: Impact of the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Legitimate Commercial Chemical, Biotechnology, and Pharmaceutical Activities Involving “Schedule 1” Chemicals (Including Schedule 1 Chemicals Produced as Intermediates) During Calendar Year 2018
 
* AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.
* ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
* SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is seeking public comments on the impact that implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act and the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR), has had on commercial activities involving “Schedule 1” chemicals during calendar year 2018. The purpose of this notice of inquiry is to collect information to assist BIS in its preparation of the annual certification to the Congress on whether the legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms are harmed by such implementation. This certification is required under Condition 9 of Senate Resolution 75 (April 24, 1997), in which the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the CWC.
* DATES: Comments must be received by January 10, 2019.
* ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods (please refer to RIN 0694-XC051 in all comments and in the subject line of email comments):
  – Federal rulemaking portal (
http://www.regulations.gov) — you can find this notice by searching on its 
regulations.gov docket number, which is BIS-2018-0032;
  – Email: 
willard.fisher@bis.doc.gov — include the phrase “Schedule 1 Notice of Inquiry” in the subject line;
  – Fax: (202) 482-3355 (Attn: Willard Fisher);
  – By mail or delivery to Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 2099B, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20230.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions on the Chemical Weapons Convention requirements for “Schedule 1” chemicals, contact Douglas Brown, Treaty Compliance Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Phone: (202) 482-2163. For questions on the submission of comments, contact Willard Fisher, Regulatory Policy Division, Office of Exporter Services, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Phone: (202) 482-2440.
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
 
Background
  In providing its advice and consent to the ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, commonly called the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or “the Convention”), the Senate included, in Senate Resolution 75 (S. Res. 75, April 24, 1997), several conditions to its ratification. Condition 9, titled “Protection of Advanced Biotechnology,” calls for the President to certify to Congress on an annual basis that “the legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, those chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1.” On July 8, 2004, President Bush, by Executive Order 13346, delegated his authority to make the annual certification to the Secretary of Commerce.
  The CWC is an international arms control treaty that contains certain verification provisions. In order to implement these verification provisions, the CWC established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The CWC imposes certain obligations on countries that have ratified the Convention (i.e., States Parties), among which are the enactment of legislation to prohibit the production, storage, and use of chemical weapons, and the establishment of a National Authority to serve as the national focal point for effective liaison with the OPCW and other States Parties in order to achieve the object and purpose of the Convention and the implementation of its provisions. The CWC also requires each State Party to implement a comprehensive data declaration and inspection regime to provide transparency and to verify that both the public and private sectors of the State Party are not engaged in activities prohibited under the CWC.
  “Schedule 1” chemicals consist of those toxic chemicals and precursors set forth in the CWC “Annex on Chemicals” and in “Supplement No. 1 to part 712–SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS” of the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) (15 CFR parts 710-722). The CWC identified these toxic chemicals and precursors as posing a high risk to the object and purpose of the Convention.
  The CWC (Part VI of the “Verification Annex”) restricts the production of “Schedule 1” chemicals for protective purposes to two facilities per State Party: A single small-scale facility (SSSF) and a facility for production in quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year. The CWC Article-by-Article Analysis submitted to the Senate in Treaty Doc. 103-21 defined the term “protective purposes” to mean “used for determining the adequacy of defense equipment and measures.” Consistent with this definition and as authorized by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 70 (December 17, 1999), which specifies agency and departmental responsibilities as part of the U.S. implementation of the CWC, the Department of Defense (DOD) was assigned the responsibility to operate these two facilities. Although this assignment of responsibility to DOD under PDD-70 effectively precluded commercial production of “Schedule 1” chemicals for protective purposes in the United States, it did not establish any limitations on “Schedule 1” chemical activities that are not prohibited by the CWC. However, DOD does maintain strict controls on “Schedule 1” chemicals produced at its facilities in order to ensure accountability for such chemicals, as well as their proper use, consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention.
  The provisions of the CWC that affect commercial activities involving “Schedule 1” chemicals are implemented in the CWCR (see 15 CFR 712) and in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (see 15 CFR 742.18 and 15 CFR 745), both of which are administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Pursuant to CWC requirements, the CWCR restrict commercial production of “Schedule 1” chemicals to research, medical, or pharmaceutical purposes. The CWCR prohibit commercial production of “Schedule 1” chemicals for “protective purposes” because such production is effectively precluded per PDD-70, as described above–see 15 CFR 712.2(a). The CWCR also contain other requirements and prohibitions that apply to “Schedule 1” chemicals and/or “Schedule 1” facilities. Specifically, the CWCR:
  (1) Prohibit the import of “Schedule 1” chemicals from States not Party to the Convention (15 CFR 712.2(b));
  (2) Require annual declarations by certain facilities engaged in the production of “Schedule 1” chemicals in excess of 100 grams aggregate per calendar year (i.e., declared “Schedule 1” facilities) for purposes not prohibited by the Convention (15 CFR 712.5(a)(1) and (a)(2));
  (3) Provide for government approval of “declared Schedule 1” facilities (15 CFR 712.5(f));
  (4) Provide that “declared Schedule 1” facilities are subject to initial and routine inspection by the OPCW (15 CFR 712.5(e) and 716.1(b)(1));
  (5) Require 200 days advance notification of establishment of new “Schedule 1” production facilities producing greater than 100 grams aggregate of “Schedule 1” chemicals per calendar year (15 CFR 712.4);
  (6) Require advance notification and annual reporting of all imports and exports of “Schedule 1” chemicals to, or from, other States Parties to the Convention (15 CFR 712.6, 742.18(a)(1) and 745.1); and
  (7) Prohibit the export of “Schedule 1” chemicals to States not Party to the Convention (15 CFR 742.18(a)(1) and (b)(1)(ii)).    For purposes of the CWCR (see 15 CFR 710.1), “production of a Schedule 1 chemical” means the formation of “Schedule 1” chemicals through chemical synthesis, as well as processing to extract and isolate “Schedule 1” chemicals produced by a biochemical or biologically mediated reaction. Such production is understood, for CWCR declaration purposes, to include intermediates, by-products, or waste products that are produced and consumed within a defined chemical manufacturing sequence, where such intermediates, by-products, or waste products are chemically stable and therefore exist for a sufficient time to make isolation from the manufacturing stream possible, but where, under normal or design operating conditions, isolation does not occur.
 
Request for Comments
  In order to assist in determining whether the legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the United States are significantly harmed by the limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, “Schedule 1” chemicals as described in this notice, BIS is seeking public comments on any effects that implementation of the CWC, through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act and the CWCR, has had on commercial activities involving “Schedule 1” chemicals during calendar year 2018. To allow BIS to properly evaluate the significance of any harm to commercial activities involving “Schedule 1” chemicals, public comments submitted in response to this notice of inquiry should include both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the impact of the CWC on such activities.
 
Submission of Comments
  All comments must be submitted to one of the addresses indicated in this notice. The Department requires that all comments be submitted in written form. BIS will consider all comments received on or before January 10, 2019. All comments (including any personally identifying information or information for which a claim of confidentially is asserted either in those comments or their transmittal emails) will be made available for public inspection and copying. Parties who wish to comment anonymously may do so by submitting their comments via Regulations.gov, leaving the fields that would identify the commenter blank and including no identifying information in the comment itself.
 
  Dated: December 3, 2018.
Matthew S. Borman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a12. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

* Justice/ATF; NOTICES; Commerce in Explosives: 2018 Annual List of Explosive Materials [Pub. Date: 12 Dec 2018.]  (See related Item #16, below.)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a2
3. 
Commerce/BIS: Spider Camera of Lansing, NY, to Pay $8,500 to Settle Alleged Export Violations

(Source: 
Commerce/BIS, 11 Dec 2018.)
 
* Respondent: Shai Gear LLC, d/b/a Spider Camera Holster, d/b/a Spider Camera of Lansing, NY (“Spider Camera”)
* Charges: Engaging in Prohibited Conduct (15 CFR Part 764.2(a)), specifically the respondent exported camera accessories to Iran via the United Arab Emirates without the required U.S. Government authorization. 
* Penalty: Civil penalty of $8,500.
* Debarred: Not if penalty is paid as agreed.
* Date of Order: 10 Dec 2018.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a34.
 State/DDTC: “Testing for DDTC’s New Registration Application Now Closed”

(Source: 
State/DDTC, 11 Dec 2018.)
 
Thanks to everyone who participated in testing for DDTC’s new Registration application! The testing period is now closed. Please watch for more information in early 2019 for opportunities to test additional applications, and contact the IT Modernization team at 
PM_DDTCProjectTeam@state.gov with any questions.  

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_a45. 
EU Amends Restrictive Measures Concerning Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan

(Source: 
Official Journal of the European Union, 11 Dec 2018.)
       
Regulations

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1931 of 10 December 2018 implementing Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1932 of 10 December 2018 repealing Regulation (EU) No 667/2010 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Eritrea
Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1933 of 10 December 2018 amending Regulation (EU) No 356/2010 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, in view of the situation in Somalia

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1934 of 10 December 2018 implementing Article 20(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/735 concerning restrictive measures in respect of the situation in South Sudan
 
Decisions

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1940 of 10 December 2018 amending Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1944 of 10 December 2018 repealing Decision 2010/127/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Eritrea

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1945 of 10 December 2018 amending Decision 2010/231/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Somalia 

Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2018/1946 of 10 December 2018 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2015/740 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in South Sudan

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_a56
EU Publishes Council Decision Supporting the Universalization and Effective Implementation of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention

(Source: 
Official Journal of the European Union, 11 Dec 2018.)
 
Decisions

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 of 10 December 2018 on Union support for the universalization and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_67. 
UK ECJU Publishes Updated Training Bulletin

(Source: 
UK ECJU, 10 Dec 2018.)
 
This bulletin (available 
here) contains details of courses, seminars and workshops from the UK 
Export Control Joint Unit to increase your understanding of the UK’s strategic export controls.
 
Events are aimed at exporting and trading individuals or companies of all sizes, as well as government organizations and cater for a wide range of knowledge levels.
 
The bulletin includes all details, charges and an application form.
 
This issue covers new courses from January to March 2019.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_a78. 
Wassenaar Arrangement Releases Plenary Meeting Documents

(Source: 
Wassenaar Arrangement, 11 Dec 2018.)
 
On 5-6 December, the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) plenary meeting took place.
Below are the documents that the WA published on its website:
 
 
The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established on the basis of the Initial Elements adopted in July 1996. Meetings are normally held in Vienna, Austria, where the Arrangement is based. The current Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
 

[Editor’s Note: The UK had the honor of taking on the Plenary Chair role for 2018, culminating in the Plenary meeting on 5-6 December. To read the UK’s Plenary Chair statement, click 
here.]

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWSNEWS

NWS_a0
9

Bloomberg: “U.S. Presses Ahead on Plan to Limit High-Tech Exports”

(Source: 
Bloomberg, 11 Dec 2018.) [Excerpts.] 
 
The U.S. is pressing ahead with plans to tighten restrictions on technology exports that some American companies fear could hurt research and development, even as President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping agreed to a 90-day truce aimed at alleviating a trade war.
 
The White House has embarked on a long-term strategy to ensure the U.S. maintains its technological lead over China, with Trump’s trade advisers tying the U.S.’s economic interests to protecting national security. Central to that effort are wider controls on a broad range of American exports including artificial-intelligence components, microprocessors and robotics. … 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a1
10
Expeditors News: “Canada Announces Implementation of the CPTPP” 

(Source: 
Expeditors News, 10 Dec 2018.)
 
On December 5, 2018, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) published Customs Notice 18-22, announcing the implementation date of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) of December 30, 2018.
CBSA’s notice outlines key provisions of the CPTPP, such as:
 
 – Tariff provisions – new preferential tariff treatment code for Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore, with Vietnam to be added on January 14, 2019;
 – Proof of origin – a requirement for a certification of origin for imports;
 – Refunds – application for refunds may be made within four years for Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand or Singapore on or after December 30, 2018, or from Vietnam on or after January 14, 2019.
 
Importers seeking additional information are instructed to call 1-800-461-9999 from within Canada, or 204-983-3500 or 506-636-5064 from outside of Canada.
 
Customs Notice 18-22 may be found 
here.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a311

NLTimes.nl: “T-Mobile Netherlands Will Not Break Ties With Huawei Over Espionage Concerns”

(Source: 
NLTimes.nl, 7 Dec 2018.) [Excerpts.] 
 
For the time being, Dutch provider T-Mobile will not stop using Huawei equipment in its telecom networks, [notwithstanding] concerns that the Chinese company’s equipment is being used for espionage. . . . 
 
In the United States, Australia and New Zealand, the authorities are concerned that China is using Huawei’s equipment for espionage. The countries are therefore barring the Chinese company from tendering for the 5G network, the successor of 4G.
 
The Netherlands also has Huawei equipment in its telecom networks. The 
Tweede Kamer, the lower house of Dutch parliament, recently requested an investigation into the risks.
 
Huawei is the global market leader when it comes to equipment for telecom networks. There has been no public evidence that China is using Huawei to spy in other countries. The company itself also denies being an extension of the Chinese government.
 
According to 
RTL Z, T-Mobile makes relatively large use of Huawei equipment. KPN and VodafoneZiggo rely more on equipment from Swedish company Ericsson.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a412

Out-Law.com: “Dual-Use Export Control Appeal Rules Take Effect in Ireland”

(Source: 
Out-Law.com, 11 Dec 2018.) [Excerpts.] 
 
New regulations on export licensing appeals came into law on 13 November, ending a wait of 10 years for such rules to be enacted. … 
 
In Ireland, the EU export control rules are implemented by the Control of Exports Act 2008 (Control of Exports Act).
 
Under the EU regime, the export of dual-use items is regulated and dual-use items may not leave the EU customs territory without an export authorization. A limited number of dual-use products that are particularly sensitive require an export license when exporting them within the EU customs territory. … 
 
The Control of Exports Act provides for new regulations to be introduced to give dual-use export license applicants a right to appeal against decisions by the ELU to refuse their applications. However, only now, through the new Control of Exports (Appeals) Regulations 2018, have those appeals rules been introduced. … 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a513

ST&R Trade Report: “U.S.-UK Trade Agreement to be Focus of ITC Investigation” 

(Source: 
Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg Trade Report, 11 Dec 2018.)
 
The International Trade Commission has initiated an investigation of the probable economic effect of the proposed U.S.-United Kingdom Trade Agreement. A hearing will be held Jan. 31, requests to appear at the hearing are due Jan. 10, pre-hearing briefs are due Jan. 14, and post-hearing briefs and all other written comments are due by Feb. 11. The ITC expects to submit its report to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative by May 8.
 
The ITC will examine the probable economic effect of providing duty-free treatment for imports of currently dutiable products from the UK on (i) industries in the U.S. producing like or directly competitive products and (ii) consumers. USTR asked that the ITC’s analysis consider each article in HTSUS chapters 1 through 97 for which U.S. tariffs will remain, taking into account implementation of U.S. commitments in the WTO.
 
USTR also asked the ITC to assess the probable economic effects of eliminating tariffs on imports from the UK of specified agricultural products on (i) industries in the U.S. producing the products concerned and (ii) the U.S. economy as a whole.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMMCOMMENTARY

COMM_a00
14. 
A. Capri: “How A Growing U.S.-China Rivalry Is Reshaping the Global Tech Landscape”

(Source: 
Forbes, 9 Dec 2018.) [Excerpts.] 
 
* Author: Alex Capri, Forbes contributor. 
 
For observers of the U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry, the arrest of Huawei’s CFO, Meng Wanzhou, in Canada, should serve as a wakeup call for the rest of the tech sector. The allegations against China’s telecom giant for breaching U.S. sanctions highlights the escalating technology race and 
hybrid cold war between the world’s two superpowers.
 
Washington and Beijing are now at a historical tipping point, and national security priorities are driving policies that will lead to further decoupling of American and Chinese interests. This, in turn, will lead to further fragmentation of global value chains in the tech sector.
 
Tech companies-or any firms that depend on cutting edge technology-will need to gauge their risk environment around two key factors: First, how to react to a wave of disruptive policy measures such as export controls, sanctions, blocked acquisitions and blocked technology transfers. Second, how to minimize the damage that will come as a result of disentanglement from existing technology ecosystems. … 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a01
15
The Export Compliance Journal: “Seventeen Saudi Nationals Sanctioned Under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act”

(Source: 
The Export Compliance Journal, 10 Dec 2018.) 
 
* Written by staff Export Compliance specialist. 
 
The death of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi sent shock waves across the globe leading several governments to condemn the incident with a number of sanctions and special investigations. In the United States, the activation of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act has resulted in the imposition of sanctions on 17 Saudi Arabian individuals.
 
All 17 individuals have been named in connection to the death of Jamal Khashoggi at the Consulate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Turkey on October 2nd, 2018. At the time the sanctions were first enforced in November, the 
list of individuals included members of the Saudi Royal Court and other high-ranking Government of Saudi Arabia positions.
 
In an 
official press statement regarding the sanctions, the U.S. Department of State reaffirmed its commitment to justice on the international stage.
 
  “Our action today is an important step in responding to Khashoggi’s killing. The State Department will continue to seek all relevant facts, consult Congress, and work with other nations to hold accountable those involved in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi,” said U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo.
 
What Is the Magnitsky Act?
 
The Global Magnitsky Act is the latest in a series of laws named after Russian whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky, who died while in detention in Russia. The first of the Magnitsky laws, formally known as the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, was first enacted in 2012. The law then mandated that State and Treasury departments could impose various sanctions on any individuals who are deemed to have committed gross violations of human rights in Russia.
 
The second of the Magnitsky laws, the Global Magnitsky Act, extends these provisions to include human rights violations anywhere on the globe. Unlike the first act, the Global Magnitsky Act gives the president the discretion to determine the appropriate sanctions to impose.
 
Why This Matters to Exporters
 
The recent sanctions by the U.S. State Department reflect an increased propensity for western governments to react to crimes and human rights violations committed across the globe. Sanctions like those applied under the Global Magnitsky Act are becoming more common. Companies must be proactive in recognizing offending actors and avoid them at all costs.
 
A notable example of this includes the U.S. Commerce Department’s decision to 
impose sanctions on Chinese chipmaker 
Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit Co. in late October. According to a statement released by the department, the company “poses a significant risk of becoming involved in activities that are contrary to the national security interests of the United States.”
 
In this new era of international enforcement, it’s important for companies to do proper due diligence and verify they’ve chosen to conduct business with the right individuals, organizations, and countries, especially when the reputation of your business depends on it.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COM_a3
16
J. Reeves: “ATF to Publish 2018 Annual List of Explosive Materials”

(Source: Reeves & Dola LLP, 11 Dec 2018.  Available by subscription via 
jreeves@reevesdola.com.  See related Item #2, above.] 
 
* Author: Johanna Reeves, Esq., 
jreeves@reevesdola.com
 
(1) 2018 Annual List of Explosive Materials to be Published
 
Tomorrow, December 12, 2018, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) will publish the Annual List of Explosive Materials in the Federal Register. The list covers explosives, blasting agents and detonators, all of which are included in the statutory definition of “explosive materials” (see 
18 U.S.C 841(c)). According to ATF, this year’s list is substantively unchanged from last year’s list. However, the 2018 list corrects the accidental omission of the letter “A” from “ANFO,” the acronym for ammonium nitrate-fuel oil. The effective date for the 2018 list will be specified in the official notice (FR Doc. 2018-26856).
 
It is important to remember that although the list is comprehensive, it is not all-inclusive. Therefore, be sure to regularly consult the statutory definitions in 
18 U.S.C. 841 to determine whether your activities are subject to ATF’s regulations governing commerce in explosives, 
27 C.F.R. Part 555.
 
The 2018 Annual List of Explosive Materials is available now on the Federal Register website as a public inspection document (
Docket No. 2018R-03).
 
(2) ATF Announces Discontinuance of Accessory Classifications
 
Effective immediately, the Firearms Technology Industry Services Branch will no longer issue determinations on how an accessory affects the classification of a firearm under the Gun Control Act or the National Firearms Act, unless the accessory is attached to the submitted firearm. Sample accessory classification requests that are currently pending will be returned without action. It is important to note that this policy does NOT apply to conditional import determinations. For more information, view the full announcement 
here.

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TEEX/IM MOVERS & SHAKERS

TE_a117CBP Chief Robert Rawls Retires, is Replaced by David Garcia

(Source: Editor)
 
Robert C. Rawls, Branch Chief, Outbound Programs, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, retires from CBP this week.  New contact information for Robert Rawls will be provided in January after he begins his new job with the Caterpillar Company.  Mr. Rawls has been replaced at CBP Outbound Programs by CBP Officer David Garcia, who may be reached at 
David.USCS.Garcia@cbp.dhs.gov
. 

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ENEDITOR’S NOTES


Alfred de Musset (Alfred Louis Charles de Musset-Pathay; 11 Dec 1810 – 2 May 1857; was a French dramatist, poet, and novelist.)
  – 
“The return makes one love the farewell.” 
 

Ellen Key (Ellen Karolina Sofia Key; 11 Dec 1849 – 25 Apr 1926; was a Swedish feminist writer on many subjects in the fields of family life, ethics, and education. She is best known for her book on education, 
Barnets Arhundrade (1900), which was translated in English in 1909 as 
The Century of the Child.)

 – “At every step the child should be allowed to meet the real experience of life; the thorns should never be plucked from his roses.”

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a319
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments to applicable regulations are listed below.
 
*
ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
 
*
CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 19 Sep 2018: 83 FR 47283-47284: Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material From Cambodia  

 
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 
here
.)


EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR)
: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  – Last Amendment: 2 Nov 2018: 
83 FR 55099: Wassenaar Arrangement 2017 Plenary Agreements Implementation [Correction to 24 Oct EAR Amendment Concerning Supplement No. 1 to Part 774, Category 3.]


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FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR)
: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

  – Last Amendment: 15 Nov 2018: 83 FR 57308-57318: Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Regulations

 
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FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR)
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 3 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
  – The latest edition (30 Apr 2018) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance websiteBITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.  
 
*
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA)
, 1 Jan 2018: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)

  – Last Amendment: 1 Nov 2018: 
Harmonized System Update 1819, containing 1,200 ABI records and 245 harmonized tariff records.

  – HTS codes for AES are available 
here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 
here.
 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130.
  – Last Amendment:
4 Oct 2018: 83 FR 50003-50007: Regulatory Reform Revisions to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 4 Oct 2018) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.
The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
 
website
. BAFTR subscribers receive a $25 discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please
contact us
to receive your discount code.

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EN_a0320
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 
here

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, Alex Witt. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 6,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission, provided attribution is given to “The Export/Import Daily Bugle of (date)”. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.  If you would to submit material for inclusion in the The Export/Import Daily Update (“Daily Bugle”), please find instructions here.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.


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