18-0906 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

18-0906 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

Thursday, 6 September 2018

The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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  1. State’s Advisory Committee on International Law to Meet on 27 Sep in Wash DC 
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. DHS/CBP Defers Production Date of ACE CQ Query Changes to Output WN1 Records for Air Waybills
  4. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  1. Breaking Defense: “In Push for Arms Exports, Top State Official Moves to DoD”
  2. Global Trade News: “EU and the UK Likely to Postpone the October Limit to Reach an Agreement with Brexit”
  3. STL News: “Owner of Defense Firm Charged with Conspiracy to Defraud Department of Defense of $7 Million, Violate Arms Export Control Act”
  1. K. Sho: “Protectionist Export Controls Could Be Bad for Nonproliferation”
  2. T. Sehested: “Why Compliance Is A Business Enabler, Not A Hindrance”
  1. ECS Presents “Boot Camp: Achieving ITAR/EAR Compliance” in Orlando, FL on 6-7 Feb 2019
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (12 Jun 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (4 Sep 2018), FACR/OFAC (29 Jun 2018), FTR (24 Apr 2018), HTSUS (14 Aug 2018), ITAR (30 Aug 2018) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 



1. State’s Advisory Committee on International Law to Meet on 27 Sep in Wash DC
(Source: Federal Register, 6 Sep 2018.)
83 FR 45298: Notice of Meeting of Advisory Committee on International Law
A meeting of the Department of State’s Advisory Committee on International Law will take place on Thursday, September 27, 2018, from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. at the George Washington University Law School, Michael K. Young Faculty Conference Center, 716 20th St. NW, 5th Floor, Washington, DC. Legal Adviser Jennifer Newstead will chair the meeting, which will be open to the public up to the capacity of the meeting room. It is anticipated that the meeting will include discussions on international law and contemporary issues in outer space, the role of economic security considerations in international and domestic trade law, international law and privacy in the context of data transfers, and the work of the International Law Commission.
   Members of the public who wish to attend should contact the Office of the Legal Adviser by September 21 at kellybm@state.gov or 202-647-0359 and provide their name, professional affiliation, address, and phone number. A valid photo ID is required for admission to the meeting. Attendees who require reasonable accommodation should make their requests by September 18. Requests received after that date will be considered but might not be possible to accommodate.
  Brian Kelly, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, Executive Director, Advisory Committee on International Law, Department of State.

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OGS_a12. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

* Commerce; Industry and Security; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Licensing Responsibilities and Enforcement [Publication Date: 7 September 2018.]
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CSMS #18-000519, 6 Sep 2018.)
CSMS# 18-000480, entitled “Updated Implementation Guides for ACE Manifest and ABI Queries”, announced implementation guide (IG) updates to the ACE CQ Query (Cargo Release, Manifest, and Entry Release Query) with a proposed Production date of 9/15/2018. Due to a reported issue with the output WN1 record not being generated properly when an air waybill has more than one in-bond, the Production date will be DEFERRED to allow a software fix. The fix is anticipated for a CERTIFICATION date of 9/29/2018; and the new Prod date is to be determined (TBD) to allow at least 60 days for Trade testing.

Again, here is the Draft CQ Query IG.

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A long-time State Department official who oversees critical security assistance programs is heading to the Pentagon, a move that may usher in another big change in the reworking of the acquisition and arms exports programs at the Defense Department (“DoD”).
The unexpected announcement was made by Ellen Lord, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, who told the ComDef conference today that Tina Kaidanow has been named director of International Cooperation at the DoD.   
Kaidanow, who has served as acting assistant secretary of State for political-military affairs since 2016, will take over the heretofore little-known office from Keith Webster, and will bring her record of strong advocacy for simplifying and increasing FMS with her.
Bringing in such a heavy-hitter – Kaidanow has been one of the most public advocates for the White House’s new arms export policy – to lead an office that has traditionally kept a low profile suggests that the Mattis Pentagon is serious about selling even more military gear to allies, while also needling those same allies to take more responsibility for their own security.
President Trump has long railed against American allies in Europe and Asia who spend relatively little – according to American standards – on their own defense, while American troops are based on their soil, ships ply their coastlines and our aircraft patrol the skies.
The president’s appointees have translated those complaints into action, with Defense Secretary James Mattis regularly traveling the globe to drive the message home. In April, the White House released a new arms sales policy, cutting red tape and affirming that American diplomats should do everything they can to encourage foreign governments to buy American. (Of course, the Trump changes are skin deep in that they do not rely on changes to law or regulation. So far, using the bully pulpit appears to be the principal tool relied on by this administration.)
  “We need to do – as the U.S. Government – a better job of strategic advocacy for some of our companies,” Kaidanow told reporters when releasing the policy. “We need to think about those areas where we can really enable sales overseas.  We need to think about how might they sell things that are a little bit harder to sell.”
Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in August, Kaidanow added that “the new policy reflects the priorities of the president’s National Security Strategy…which are, namely, to preserve peace through strength by reforming regulations to facilitate the exports of U.S. military equipment; to strengthen partners and allies; to facilitate U.S. economic security and innovation.”
The United States has already blown past the amount of weaponry it sold to foreign governments all last year – with a month to go before the fiscal year ends.
American defense companies, with the blessing of the Pentagon and State Department, have already sold $46.9 billion worth of weapons to foreign governments this year, leaving the $41 billion worth of deals in 2017 in the dust.
Kaidanow will report to Lord, after the International Cooperation office survived the complicated breakup of the  Acquisition, Technology and Logistics office into the undersecretary of Defense for acquisition and sustainment and the undersecretary of Defense for research and engineering in February.

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Integration Point Blog, 6 Sep 2018.)
The European Union and United Kingdom continue affirming that they want to reach an agreement for Brexit in the next few weeks. “We’re working to the October deadline,” Prime Minister May’s spokesman, Greg Swift, told reporters in London on Tuesday. “Both sides have agreed to increase the pace of negotiations. That’s what we’re doing.”
But behind the scenes, they recognize that it is highly improbable with the negotiations progressing slower than they hoped. Now the EU and U.K. are considering granting a few more days until mid-November at the latest.
The EU summit, which begins on October 18, was set as the deadline after the initial goal of June 2017 came and went without an agreement. This longer term is another indication that negotiators are experiencing difficulties moving forward. The risk is that the closer the negotiations approach the exit from the U.K. on March 29, 2019, the greater the possibility that there will be no agreement.
The November deadline would require the EU to convene an emergency summit during that month, but according to an EU official, there is no firm plan to do so.
For more on the Brexit deadline, visit 
Bloomberg and
Sky News.

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NWS_a28. STL News: “Owner of Defense Firm Charged with Conspiracy to Defraud Department of Defense of $7 Million, Violate Arms Export Control Act”
(Source: STL News, 6 Sep 2018.) [Excerpts.]
A Turkish man who owns a New Jersey defense contracting business has been charged in a scheme to fraudulently acquire lucrative manufacturing contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and for conspiring to export military technical drawings to Turkey without a license from the State Department, U.S. Attorney Craig Carpenito announced today.
Ferdi Murat Gul, a/k/a “Fred Gul,” 42, of Turkey, was indicted by a federal grand jury on Sept. 5, 2018, on one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, six counts of wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act, and one substantive count of violating the Act. He is believed to be currently at large in Turkey.
According to the indictment:
Gul is the principal owner, chief executive officer, and general manager of two companies located in the United States: Bright Machinery Manufacturing Group Inc. (BMM), a defense contracting company located in Paterson, New Jersey; and FMG Machinery Group (FMG), a purported manufacturing company in Paterson and Long Island City, New York. Gul also maintains an ownership interest in HFMG Insaat (HFMG), a manufacturing company in Turkey.
Over approximately five years, BMM fraudulently obtained hundreds of contracts with the DoD by falsely claiming that the military parts it contracted to produce would be manufactured in the United States. From October 2010 through June 2015, the value of the contracts fraudulently awarded to BMM was approximately $7 million.
Gul routinely submitted electronic bids for DoD contracts that contained false representations about BMM’s purported domestic manufacturing operations. He falsely submitted quotes claiming that BMM would provide military goods manufactured in the United States, when in fact the company relied almost exclusively on Gul’s Turkish-based production facilities.
In acquiring contracts, Gul routinely and unlawfully exported drawings and technical data, some of which was subject to U.S. export control laws, in order to secretly manufacture military parts in Turkey. Gul and his conspirators then fraudulently supplied those foreign-made parts to unwitting DoD customers in the United States.
Gul and his conspirators concealed their illicit manufacturing activities and ongoing fraud by routinely submitting forged certifications and fabricated information by e-mail to DoD representatives in New Jersey. They falsely represented that BMM and its U.S.-based subcontractors performed necessary quality control procedures in their purported domestic manufacture of military parts.
BMM fraudulently acquired 346 contracts from the DoD to domestically manufacture military parts, including parts for torpedoes for the U.S. Navy, bomb ejector racks and armament utilized in U.S. Air Force aircraft, and firearms and mine clearance systems used by U.S. military personnel abroad. Testing by the DoD revealed that some parts had numerous design flaws and non-conformities and were unusable.
The wire fraud counts each carry a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a fine of $250,000. The Arms Export Control Act violations each carry a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a $1 million fine.
The Arms Export Control Act prohibits the export of defense articles and defense services without first obtaining a license from the U.S. Department of States. …

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* Author: Kenshin Cho is an intern at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, where he conducts research on nonproliferation issues with a focus on the U.S. export control system.
On August 13, President Donald Trump signed the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, a spending bill that includes a dense anthology of budgetary policies. In addition to funding the usual guns, missiles, and planes, this year’s bill updated export controls-an obscure tool of American foreign policy that limits exports of sensitive technologies, from pressure sensors used in centrifuges to rocket engines for nuclear missiles. The changes expand the regulations’ policy objectives to include an explicitly economic agenda and establish a mandate to explore further controls on emerging technologies, marking a renewed interest in a tool with significant implications for nonproliferation.
As discussions leading up to the spending bill revealed, influential voices misunderstand the nature of export controls, and key stakeholders increasingly disagree on their proper role. Policy makers and industry professionals are struggling to regulate disruptive technologies that defy conventional controls; to manage China as both friend and foe; and to accommodate a president who wants to use export controls as a protectionist tool.
Understanding these conversations will be critical in analyzing the ever-changing threat of weapons of mass destruction. Thoughtful debates contribute to effective policies that can mitigate proliferation and respond to China, all while minimizing economic impacts. But mismanaged, export control reforms can jeopardize American national security and spread dangerous technologies.
How export controls work. 
Export controls are laws and regulations designed to limit proliferation, restricting the outward flow of sensitive (military) and dual-use (civilian, but with military applications) goods and technologies. Most countries follow a similar model for regulating exports: Governments identify sensitive or dual-use goods, often relying on lists disseminated by international regimes like the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Companies apply for licenses when they want to export listed items. Countries can also implement “catch-all” controls, which define certain end uses instead of specific items, requiring companies to apply for licenses when exporting anything that may be used for such purposes.
Traditionally, industry and government have agreed that export controls are necessary but should be limited. Controls are effective for national security objectives, like avoiding incidents such as the 1983 sale of sensitive Japanese machine tools to a Soviet submarine program. But export controls can be costly. Companies can lose business to competitors based in countries with looser restrictions or leaner bureaucracies. Export controls force companies to invest in compliance. Research and development, if it involves any foreign citizen or international cooperation, can be hindered.
Nevertheless, companies have generally complied with controls, recognizing their importance in preventing bad actors from acquiring dangerous technology. To its credit, the US government has also demonstrated restraint, applying controls only when necessary to meet its objectives of national security and foreign policy (including nonproliferation). Until recently, when the two stakeholders debated, they did so under a common framework, with revenue on one side and security on the other-and export controls as the valve between the two sides.
A changing framework. 
In the past several years, however, industry and government have begun to disagree on how best to apply export controls. Industry professionals continue to point out that exports bring in profits. But unlike before, many also believe that national security relies on innovative technologies facilitated by global trade. They argue that limiting the export of technologies will not stop their proliferation, because of China’s technological parity; and that wealth created by trade can fuel innovation that maintains the United States’ leadership, bolstering its national security. In the industry view, loosening export controls-or at least not arbitrarily tightening them-is good for both economics and security.
Government officials have also changed course, but in the opposite direction. They now believe that exports of key technologies not only aid proliferation and the transfer of critical military capabilities to adversaries, but also hurt the private sector. Competition, in their view, harms the domestic economy-an opinion that goes beyond mere security concerns. Their primary worry isn’t that American goods might go to China’s military, exposing the United States to better-equipped enemies; rather, they are worried that Chinese companies are using American innovation to win global market share, displacing American companies in the consumer technology market and eventually leading to job losses. In this framework, export controls simultaneously bolster America’s national security and its economy.
These fundamentally diverging views are leading to incohesive policy making. In the era of emerging threats to proliferation, that is an alarming prospect.
Protectionism and “national security.”
 The trend away from economic liberalism and toward a protectionist worldview flows from the top, with President Trump pushing the limits of traditional ideas of national security. In June, he imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum after commissioning two investigations under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act to justify his actions. The reports were designed to analyze the national security impacts of steel and aluminum, but Trump’s rhetoric, tweets, and administrative priorities suggested that the tariffs were largely driven by economic concerns. The tariffs exceeded the report’s recommendations and departed from the usual procedures of international negotiation and non-aggressive settlements. Trump’s use of tariffs to further the economic security of the United States signaled an unprecedented shift in thinking about security.
Under Trump, the Department of Commerce is also pushing the boundaries of traditional export control mechanisms. When the Chinese telecommunications company ZTE violated US sanctions, it was subjected to a “denial order” that almost guaranteed its bankruptcy. The message was clear: American laws are strong enough to cripple any Chinese firm. It was a raw display of power that went far beyond what is necessary to resolve export violations, which typically consists of dialogue and development of compliance infrastructure to guarantee better future behavior.
The ZTE case’s unintended consequences may be severe. The decision could antagonize businesses, breed mistrust, and push companies away from voluntarily disclosing export control violations. Countering proliferation relies on cooperation between government and business; any action to damage the relationship is dangerous.
Lawmakers are also adopting a protectionist view of export controls. At a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing for the new law in March, Congressional representatives questioned officials from past administrations on the use of controls to protect civilian technologies, items that typically fall outside regulatory jurisdiction. For example, a congressman asked about protecting American pharmaceutical research from Chinese theft, repeatedly rebuffing experts’ attempts to explain the limited scope of export controls. The visible lack of understanding is concerning.
Regulating emerging technologies: a collaborative approach.
 A departure from the traditional notion of national security is somewhat inevitable, thanks to a growth in disruptive technologies. Tools like cybersecurity software, artificial intelligence, and 3D printing are no longer developed by the military for its sole use. During the Cold War, defense technologies such as radar and GPS “spun off” to the civilian world. Today, governments take technologies developed by engineers at civilian companies and customize them for the military. Maintaining technological leadership, a national security issue, has become a problem of regulating civilian exports. But there’s another dimension to the shift: Chinese firms are within striking distance of the latest Internet and communication technologies-unlike with missile components or nuclear technology, where the United States enjoys a big lead. Policymakers fear the threat of China’s technological parity, but their solution-to impose onerous controls on civilian technologies-can be just as threatening.
The technology sector’s reaction to rules introduced by the Wassenaar Arrangement in 2013 for “intrusion software,” which is designed to defend computer networks but could also be used by oppressive regimes to spy on their own citizens, highlights the challenges of regulating emerging technologies. It also provides a blueprint for industry-government collaboration to design effective polices. At first, policy makers at the US Bureau of Industry and Security inadvertently confused the business community by adopting the Wassenaar Arrangement’s broad technical parameters for cybersecurity tools. They faced immediate backlash, accused of disrupting any hope of innovation and ignoring the realities of modern technological development. Software companies depend on engineering teams around the world to collaboratively build programs and to identify and fix vulnerabilities as they arise. Applying for licenses on such a broad swath of technologies would have posed unsurmountable obstacles to development. But because software constantly evolves, regulators couldn’t define items too narrowly either. Speed, fluidity, and international cooperation underpin the growth of emerging technologies, challenging export controls that rely on clear technical parameters and long processing times to work.
Fortunately, the intrusion software case demonstrated that a solution to the challenges of disruptive technologies exists: collaboration. Facing criticism, the US Bureau of Industry and Security published proposed legislation, inviting comments from the technology sector. Eventually, they went back to the Wassenaar Arrangement and tweaked the rules, setting a precedent for healthy communication and compromise.
Risks for nonproliferation.
 For the most part, the new export control legislation is uncontroversial, designed primarily to replace the current statue that expired in 2001 but was held together through executive orders. Measures that have traditionally been effective at countering proliferation largely remain in place; dual-use components like those used in centrifuges, engines, and other traditionally sensitive items are still robustly regulated.
However, if arguments over the role of export controls continue, they could undermine current nonproliferation efforts by distracting government officials and diverting attention away from tried and true tools. Protectionist goals cannot be realized through current mechanisms, and the Bureau of Industry and Security cannot afford to devote resources to developing and enforcing an industrial strategy for the United States.
Hits to the legitimacy and effectiveness of export control institutions can also foster noncompliance by companies unsure of how best to deal with the Department of Commerce and other government agencies. Already, lawyers and compliance officers voice concerns about the administration’s protectionist tendencies. They question the defense bill’s expanded objectives for export control regulations, which include a goal to “protect the US industrial base,” an explicitly economic agenda.
The bill’s mandate to explore an interagency process to regulate “emerging technologies” is an important step in the right direction, so long as it moves forward in a transparent and nonpolitical manner. As the intrusion software incident showed, industry input remains key to addressing the challenges of new technologies.
The public should follow these conversations. Protecting American innovation is important. Chinese theft of intellectual property damages competitiveness and security, and lawmakers should be concerned. But to address these issues by expanding the scope of export controls can have serious ramifications for nonproliferation. It compromises the very foundation of America’s export control regime-a measured approach to mitigating the risks of global trade.

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Forbes, 30 Aug 2018.)
* Author: Thomas Sehested, CEO and Co-Founder of 
GAN Integrity
Compliance isn’t just a bureaucratic nuisance. When done properly, it can contribute greatly to the strategic governance of the overall organization. It also provides protection from white-collar crime prosecutions, unflattering headlines and massive fines. And above all, it gives your current and future customers – as well as investors – confidence in your company. Let’s look at three key ways that compliance can ultimately boost your company from a business perspective.
  (1) Improving Overall Operations
Many people think of compliance in terms of what you aren’t allowed to do, but let’s consider what compliance is capable of doing. As a Deloitte 
points out: “Organizations will integrate compliance programs from across their enterprise to drive efficiencies … Facilitating integration of compliance programs through greater knowledge sharing, leveraging of common systems and controls and coordination between teams will drive synergies through harmonizing processes and approaches” to the various aspects of a compliance program. …
[Editor’s Note: we are not authorized to include the entire item. To read the remaining sections, please click on the source link below the item title.]

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TE_a111. ECS Presents “Boot Camp: Achieving ITAR/EAR Compliance” in Orlando, FL on 6-7 Feb 2019

(Source: Suzanne Palmer, spalmer@exportcompliancesolutions.com)
* What: Boot Camp: Achieving ITAR/EAR Compliance; Orlando, FL
* When: February 6-7, 2019
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Solutions (ECS)
* ECS Instructors:  Suzanne Palmer; Mal Zerden
* Register here or by calling 866-238-4018 or e-mail spalmer@exportcompliancesolutions.com
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(Source: Editor)
Joseph P. Kennedy (6 Sep 1888 – 18 Nov 1969; was an American businessman, investor, and politician known for his high-profile positions in United States politics. Kennedy was married to Rose Kennedy, and three of their nine children attained distinguished political positions: President John F. Kennedy (1917-1963), Attorney General and Senator Robert F. Kennedy (1925-1968), and longtime Senator Edward M. “Ted” Kennedy (1932-2009). Kennedy served as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom from 1938 until late 1940.)
  – “Don’t buy a single vote more than necessary. I’ll be damned if I’m going to pay for a landslide.”
John Dalton (6 Sep 1766 – 27 July 1844; was an English chemist, physicist, and meteorologist. He is best known for introducing the atomic theory into chemistry, and for his research into color blindness, sometimes referred to as Daltonism in his honor.)
 – “It’s the right idea, but not the right time.”

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. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments to applicable regulations are listed below.
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 12 Jun 2018: 83 FR 27380-27407: Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS)

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 

: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  – Last Amendment: 4 Sep 2018: 83 FR 44821-44828: Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List, Revision of Entries on the Entity List and Removal of Certain Entities From the Entity List

: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

  – Last Amendment: 29 June 2018: 83 FR 30541-30548: Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations; and 83 FR 30539-30541: Removal of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations and Amendment of the Terrorism List Government Sanctions Regulations 

: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 3 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – The latest edition (30 Apr 2018) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance websiteBITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.  
, 1 Jan 2018: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
Last Amendment: 14 Aug 2018: Harmonized System Update 1812, containing 27 ABI records and 6 harmonized tariff records.

  – HTS codes for AES are available 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 
  – Last Amendment: 30 Aug 2018:
83 FR 44228-44229
, USML Chapter XI(c).

  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 30 Aug 2018) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.
The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
. BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please
contact us
to receive your discount code.

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Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 

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* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, Alex Witt. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission, provided attribution is given to “The Export/Import Daily Bugle of (date)”. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.  If you would to submit material for inclusion in the The Export/Import Daily Update (“Daily Bugle”), please find instructions here.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

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