18-0822 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

18-0822 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

Wednesday, 22 August 2018

The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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[No items of interest noted today.] 

  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. Commerce/Census: “Tips on How to Resolve AES Fatal Errors”
  4. DHS/CBP Announces Monthly Trade Drawback Calls
  5. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  6. UK ECJU Announces Cyber Export Control Seminar
  1. 112 UA: “Ukrainian to Be Judged for Attempt to Illegally Export Military Goods to France”
  2. Expeditors News: “WCO Releases 2018 Edition of the WCO AEO Compendium”
  3. The Spokesman: “Judge to Congress, Executive Branch: Face Up to Problems Of 3-D Printed Guns”
  1. A. Capobianco, B. Curran & A. Dukic: “Export Control Reform 2.0”
  2. M. Gajewski Barnhill: “Ninety-Day Wind Down Period Expires; First Wave of U.S. Secondary Sanctions Against Iran Re-Imposed”
  3. M. Volkov: “CFIUS Review: An Increasing Risk (Part I of II)”
  1. CompTIA Presents “12th Annual CompTIA Global Trade Compliance Best Practices Conference” on 18 Sep in San Diego, CA
  2. FCC to Present U.S. Export Controls Awareness Training Course for Non-U.S. Organizations, 2 Oct in Bruchem, the Netherlands
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (12 Jun 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (6 Aug 2018), FACR/OFAC (29 Jun 2018), FTR (24 Apr 2018), HTSUS (14 Aug 2018), ITAR (14 Feb 2018) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 



[No items of interest noted today.]

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OGS_a11. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

* Commerce; Bureau of Industry and Security; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Procedures for Submitting Request for Objections from the Section 232 National Security Adjustments of Imports of Aluminum and Steel [Publication Date: 23 August 2018.]
* Commerce; Bureau of Industry and Security; NOTICES; Meetings; Materials Technical Advisory Committee [Publication Date: 23 August 2018.]
* Treasury; Foreign Assets Control Office; NOTICES; Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Publication Date: 23 August 2018.]
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When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected. If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation. However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received.
To help you resolve AES Fatal Errors, here are some tips on how to correct the most frequent errors that were generated in AES for this month.
Fatal Error Response Code: 170
  – Narrative: Air Waybill Format: NNN-NNNNNNNN
  – Reason: The Transportation Reference Number reported for this Air shipment was not in the correct format.
  – Resolution: A number identifying the carrier’s master air waybill may be declared on an air shipment. When reported, a master air waybill number must be reported in the following format: ‘NNN-NNNNNNNN’ (where ‘N’ = a numeric value). Verify the Transportation Reference Number, correct the shipment and resubmit.
Fatal Error Response Code: 331
  – Narrative: Ultimate Consignee Country Unknown
  – Reason: The Ultimate Consignee Country code reported is not valid in AES.
  – Resolution: The Ultimate Consignee Country code must be a valid ISO Country code found in Appendix C – ISO Country Codes. Verify the Ultimate Consignee Country code, correct the shipment and resubmit.
For a complete list of Fatal Error Response Codes, their reasons, and resolutions, see Appendix A – Commodity Filing Response Messages.
It is important that AES filers correct Fatal Errors as soon as they are received in order to comply with the Foreign Trade Regulations. These errors must be corrected prior to export for shipments filed predeparture and as soon as possible for shipments filed postdeparture but not later than five calendar days after departure.
For further information or questions, contact the U.S. Census Bureau’s Data Collection Branch.
  – Telephone: (800) 549-0595, select option 1 for AES
  – Email: askaes@census.gov
  – Online: www.census.gov/trade

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CSMS #18-000494, 22 Aug 2018.)
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection Trade Policy & Programs Office is scheduling a series of Monthly Trade Drawback Calls to address questions related to the filing of drawback claims pursuant to the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA).
The calls will take place on the last Wednesday of each month, August 29th to February 27th from 1:00 pm – 2:00 pm Eastern Time.
Call Information: 1- 877-873-8017 Code – 6215791
For questions concerning drawback functionality, contact Randy.mitchell@cbp.dhs.gov
For questions regarding monthly call logistics, contact frank.j.korpusik@cbp.dhs.gov

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UK ECJU, Notice to Exporters 2018/20, 21 Aug 2018.) [Excerpts.]
The next cyber export control seminar from the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) and national cyber security centre (NCSC) will take place on 21 November 2018 at the Park Plaza Westminster Bridge hotel, London.
The UK Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) plans to include explanations on the following topics:
  – Category 5 part II ‘information security’ controls and decontrols based on the Wassenaar Arrangement;
  – Category 5 part I surveillance;
  – Category 4 intrusion aspects;
  – Forthcoming and recent changes to the controls; and 
  – Transfer and storage of technology/software overseas (sometimes referred to as ‘cloud computing’). …
To register for this event, please complete the event registration form attached to the latest export control training bulletin. …

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112 UA, 21 Aug 2018.) [Excerpts.]
In the Lviv region, a woman will be judged for the attempt of the illegal export of the military goods from Ukraine as Lviv Prosecutor’s Office reported.
The indictment against the citizen of Kyiv region was sent to Yavorivsky district court for the consideration of the case.
It was established during the pretrial investigation that in February 2018, a Ukrainian attempted to export the night vision attachments PDS-1 for the use as a part of the night vision device of the ground artillery, night observation devices NNO-21 and theodolite RT to France for the private gain.
The mentioned goods were confiscated at the checkpoint “Krakovets”.
The prosecutor’s office finished the pretrial investigation due to the violation of the order of the international pass of the goods subjected to be under export control.
The suspect can be fined or arrested up to three years. …

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Expeditors News, 21 Aug 2018.)
The World Customs Organization (WCO) recently released the 2018 Edition of the WCO Compendium of Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) Programs, based on data available as of July 2018. The AEO Compendium provides insight into the types of supply chain Security and Customs Compliance programs that are currently available, and those that are in development globally.
The 2018 Edition of the AEO Compendium identifies:
  – 77 operational AEO programs and 17 AEO programs that are to be initiated;
  – 57 concluded Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) and 35 MRAs that are being negotiated;
  – 4 pluri-lateral MRAs that are being negotiated;
  – 31 operational customs Compliance programs and 2 customs compliance programs that are to be launched.
In addition, the Compendium includes an overview of respective AEO program accreditation procedures and benefits.
The Compendium may be found here. Additional instruments and guidelines to the WCO’s AEO program may be found here.

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The Spokesman
, 21 Aug 2018.) [Excerpts.]
Joel Williamson and other employees at Defense Distributed create a Ghost Gunner 2 machine, a desktop milling machine designed to construct firearm parts, in Austin, Texas, on Tuesday, Aug. 7, 2018. Cody Wilson, the founder of Defense Distributed, has been in a long legal dispute regarding his ability to post the instructions to create 3-D printed firearms on his website.
“Congress and the Trump administration need to face up to the potential problems of guns that can be created by 3-D printers from files off the internet,” a federal judge said Tuesday.
U.S. District Judge Robert Lasnik had tough questions for the Justice Department attorney who tried to defend a recent change in the Arms Export Control Act that would allow files to be posted on the internet by their creator, saying the undetectable and untraceable guns mean the United States “could end up with other 9-11 situations.” …

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10. A
. Capobianco, B. Curran & A. Dukic: “Export Control Reform 2.0”

(Source: Hogan Lovells, 21 Aug 2018.) 
* Authors: Anthony V. Capobianco, Esq.; Brian P. Curran, Esq.; and Z. Aleksandar Dukic, Esq. All of Hogan Lovells. Contact details available here.
With a focus on advanced technologies, U.S. Congress mandates permanent statutory basis for U.S. export control regime.
After nearly 20 years of promulgation by executive orders, bipartisan export control reform legislation has re-established a permanent statutory basis for the control of commercial and dual-use items licensed by the Department of Commerce (DOC). The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) is part of the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which was signed into law by the president on 13 August 2018. Senator John Cornyn, the bill’s sponsor in the Senate, stated that the ECRA’s language “maintains the changes to export control laws which address concerns about the transfer of technology through joint ventures . . . and . . . strengthens enforcement of export controls.” 
The ECRA repeals most of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), which lapsed in 2001, and provides a permanent statutory basis for the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The EAR regulate the export, re-export, and in-country transfer of most commercial and dual-use items. Since the EAA lapsed, the EAR have been kept in effect through a series of executive orders under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 
Specifically, the ECRA expands the ways in which items subject to export controls are identified, which will enable additional restrictions on emerging and foundational technologies essential to U.S. national security, such as potentially artificial intelligence, robotics, and other technology. The ECRA also requires a review of existing licensing requirements for countries subject to a comprehensive arms embargo and requires the DOC to consider the impacts of export licensing on the U.S. defense industrial base. 
Establishment Of Interagency Process To Identify Emerging And Foundational Technologies 
In one of its most significant changes, the ECRA establishes a regular, ongoing interagency process intended to “identify emerging and foundational technologies” that:  
  i) “are essential to the national security of the United States”; and  
  ii) do not include critical technologies described in the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended by section 1703 of the NDAA.  
These “emerging and foundational” technologies are not defined in the text of the ECRA and must be identified by an interagency process. 
Critically, the interagency process will review publicly available information, classified information, information from advisory committees, and information provided by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which reviews certain acquisitions of U.S. businesses by foreign investors for national security risks. Importantly, the CFIUS’s jurisdiction recently expanded to cover a broader range of transactions, including certain minority investments. For more information, please see our client alerts on the recent expansion of the CFIUS’s jurisdiction, available here and here.
In its identification of these emerging and foundational technologies, the interagency process established by the ECRA must take into account:
  (i) the development of emerging and foundational technologies in foreign countries; 
  (ii) the effect export controls may have on the development of such technologies in the United States; and 
  (iii) the effectiveness of export controls on limiting the proliferation of emerging and foundational technologies to foreign countries.
The process includes a notice and comment period for input on the inclusion of the items as emerging and foundational technologies.  
Relatedly, once the interagency process has identified these emerging and foundational technologies, the ECRA authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to establish controls (including interim controls) under the EAR on the export, re-export, or in-country transfer of such technologies, including informing a person that a license is required for export of such technology or by publishing additional regulations. Although the Secretary of Commerce has discretion as to the level of control applied to such technologies, the ECRA mandates that, at minimum, the Secretary of Commerce require a license for the export, re-export, or in-country transfer of emerging and foundational technology identified through the process described above or in a country subject to an embargo, including an arms embargo, imposed by the United States. Countries such as China and Venezuela, among others, are subject to arms embargoes by the United States. 
This process is intended to enable the U.S. government to identify and control sensitive and innovative U.S. technologies, possibly restricting outbound transfers of certain technologies that the interagency process deems important for commercial and economic security. Given the discretion granted to the executive branch to define and control the transfer of “emerging and foundational technologies,” the legislation is also a leap into the unknown regarding new restrictions on the ability of U.S. companies to transfer key technologies to overseas joint ventures or through licensing agreements with foreign customers and business partners. 
Mandated Review Of Export Controls On Countries Subject To Arms Embargoes 
The ECRA also mandates a review by the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and Energy and other federal agencies of licensing requirements for exports, re-exports, and in-country transfers of items to countries subject to a comprehensive U.S. arms embargo, including of 
  – the scope of controls that apply to exports, re-exports, and in-country transfers for military end uses and military end users in countries subject to a comprehensive U.S. arms embargo and countries subject to a United Nations (U.N.) arms embargo; and 
  – entries on the Commerce Control List (CCL) that are not subject to a license requirement for the export, re-export, or in-country transfer of items to countries subject to a comprehensive U.S. arms embargo. 
The Secretary of Commerce will have no more than 270 days after the enactment of the ECRA (13 August 2018) to implement the results of this review, and this process could result in more export control restrictions related to countries subject to arms embargoes. 
Review Of Impacts Of Export Licensing On U.S. Defense Industrial Base 
Additionally, the ECRA mandates that the Secretary of Commerce establish a procedure to license or otherwise authorize exports, re-exports, and in-country transfers. The procedure must ensure that license applications and requests for authorization are considered, appropriate federal agencies participate, and that licensing decisions are made in an expeditious manner, with transparency to applicants on the status of the application and the reason for denying any license or request for authorization. 
Moreover, the Secretary of Commerce must assess the impact of a proposed export of an item on the U.S. defense industrial base and must deny any application for a license or a request for authorization of any export that would have a significant negative impact on such defense industrial base. The ECRA defines a significant negative impact on the U.S. defense industrial base as 
  – a reduction in the availability of an item produced in the United States that is likely to be acquired by the Department of Defense (DOD) or other federal department or agency for the advancement of U.S. national security or for the production of an item in the United States for the DOD or other agency for the advancement of U.S. national security; 
  – a reduction in the production in the United States of an item that is the result of research and development carried out, or funded by, the DOD or other federal department or agency to advance the national security of the United States, or a federally-funded research and development center; or 
  – a reduction in the employment of U.S. persons whose knowledge and skills are necessary for the continued production in the United States of an item that is likely to be acquired by the DOD or other federal department or agency for the advancement of U.S. national security. 
Effective Period And Recommendations 
The ECRA does not establish a blanket effective date for its various provisions. Rather, the ECRA extends export controls, licenses, authorizations, and other administrative actions in effect 13 August 2018 until they are modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked under the authority granted by the ECRA. Further, as noted above, the ECRA does not define “emerging and foundational technologies.” Instead, the identification by the interagency process will result in a notice and comment period. 
As such, we recommend that companies: 
  (i) carefully monitor the items that are identified by the interagency process as “emerging and foundational,” 
  (ii) consider participating in the comment process if any items dealt with by the company are identified as “emerging and foundational,” and 
  (iii) monitor the implementation of undefined aspects of the ECRA. 
As this export licensing regime could hit certain industries harder than others, it will be important for companies to track and submit comments on the administration’s efforts to identify and control the export of these technologies. The administration and Congress have highlighted links between U.S. national security and emerging technologies, which include the semiconductor, robotics, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and biotechnology sectors, among others. In particular, startup companies that traditionally are not used to dealing with items subject to export controls and are interested in investments from foreign sources should especially pay close attention.

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M. Gajewski Barnhill: “Ninety-Day Wind Down Period Expires; First Wave of U.S. Secondary Sanctions Against Iran Re-Imposed”

(Source: World Trade Controls Blog, 21 Aug 2018.)
* Author: Megan A. Gajewski Barnhill, Esq., Bryan Cave, megan.gajewskibarnhill@bryancave.com, +1 202-508-6302. 
As reported in our earlier post, as part of the US Government’s announcement that the United States was exiting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”), the US set out separate 90-day and 180-day time frames for the wind down of activities consistent with the sanctions relief in the JCPOA, following which the secondary sanctions lifted pursuant to the JCPOA would be re-imposed.  The first of these time frames – 90 days after the May 8 announcement – expired on August 6, 2018.
In connection with the expiration of the initial wind down period, President Trump issued Executive Order 13846, effective as of August 7, 2018, which re-imposes sanctions that were revoked in connection with the implementation of the JCPOA.  As of August 7, the following sanctions were re-imposed:
  – Sanctions on the purchase or acquisition of US dollar banknotes by the Government of Iran;
  – Sanctions on Iran’s trade in gold or precious metals;
  – Sanctions on the direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of graphite, raw, or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;
  – Sanctions on significant transactions related to the purchase or sale of Iranian rials, or the maintenance of significant funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran denominated in the Iranian rial;
  – Sanctions on the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt; and
Sanctions on Iran’s automotive sector.
As of August 7, 2018, non-US persons engaging in these types of activities are at risk of the imposition of secondary sanctions by the US government.
Secondary sanctions do not apply to all activities by non-US persons involving Iran.  For example, non-US, non-Iranian persons may collect payment owed for goods or services fully provided or delivered prior to August 6, 2018, pursuant to a written contract or agreement entered into prior to May 8, 2018.  In addition, the authorizations allowing for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medical devices, and medicine remain in effect.
Further, the US government has indicated that transactions by non-US persons related to the export of consumer goods to Iran that are not targeted by US sanctions and do not involve persons on the SDN List, US persons or the US financial system would not give rise to the imposition of secondary sanctions.  The extent to which a particular transaction by a non-US person will give rise to US secondary sanctions risks will depend on the particulars of the transaction.

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M. Volkov: “CFIUS Review: An Increasing Risk (Part I of II)”

(Source: Volkov Law Group Blog, 22 Aug 2018. Reprinted by permission.) 
* Author: Michael Volkov, Esq., Volkov Law Group, 
mvolkov@volkovlaw.com, 240-505-1992. 
Washington, D.C. is more than just the nation’s capital. Companies have to pay attention and develop contacts and relationships in Washington, D.C. given the importance of federal agencies, Congress and of course, the White House.  I often inform clients that Washington, D.C. provides a second round of due process for disputes that may occur in domestic or foreign markets.
One of the more important institutions in Washington, D.C. is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”), which is an inter-agency committee of the US Government that reviews foreign investments for national security implications. CFIUS is a part of the US Department of Treasury.  It is chaired by the Treasury Department and includes 16 members, including representatives from the Defense, State, Homeland Security and Commerce departments.  CFIUS was established in 1988 by an executive order.
CFIUS’ role was recently expanded by bi-partisan legislation passed by Congress and approved by the president as part of the National Defense Authorization Act.  I will examine these changes in tomorrow’s posting.
CFIUS scrutiny has been increasing, and with the current administration’s focus on global trade and promoting US interests to the detriment of foreign trade partners, CFIUS is expected to play a great role.
CFIUS has taken on greater importance with increased foreign investment in the United States.  CFIUS has considerable power and has exercised it in several high-profile situations.  It is authorized to block deals or insist on modifications to mitigate national security risks.
In January 2018, CFIUS blocked the acquisition of Moneygram, a US money-transfer firm, by Ant Financial, an online payments company, affiliated with Alibaba, the Chinese e-commerce giant.  In 2017, CFIUS blocked the takeover of Lattice Semiconductor by a group of Chinese investors.
CFIUS also intervened in the attempted takeover of Qualcomm by Broadcom based on concerns that Broadcom would obtain control of Qualcomm’s 5G technology. Broadcom is not a Chinese company but CFIUS was concerned that its relationship with third-party entities, including Huawei, the Chinese telecom giant could raise national security issues. Additionally, CFIUS was concerned that Broadcom is a private-equity owned company and may cut-back on investment in Qualcomm’s 5G technology and associated research and development.  Interestingly, CFIUS intervened in the Qualcomm-Broadcom deal before a final deal occurred.
Qualcomm sought CFIUS intervention as a way to derail Broadcom’s attempted takeover. In the end, Qualcomm was able to block Broadcom’s attempted takeover.
In many situations, CFIUS negotiates mitigating conditions to perceived national security risks. Mitigation measures can include assurance letters between CFIUS and the parties, complex agreements with operational restrictions or even restructuring parts of the transaction itself. These restrictions are usually designed to limit access to facilities or information to US citizens; ensure that US citizens handle certain functions; create governance mechanisms to require US citizens to make certain decisions; impose auditing requirements and guidelines for handling future government contracts, customer information and other sensitive information; and providing government access to review business decisions and object to such decisions because of national security concerns.

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* What: 12th Annual CompTIA Global Trade Compliance Best Practices Conference
* When: Tuesday, September 18, 2018
* Where: Qualcomm, 10155 Pacific Heights Boulevard, San Diego, California 92121
* Sponsor: CompTIA
* Contact: Ken Montgomery, 

* Information & Registration: 


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FCC to Present U.S. Export Controls Awareness Training Course for Non-U.S. Organizations, 2 Oct in Bruchem, the Netherlands

(Source: Full Circle Compliance, events@fullcirclecompliance.eu.)
Our next academy course is specifically designed for beginning compliance officers and professionals who want to enhance their knowledge on the latest ITAR/EAR requirements and best practices.  The course will cover multiple topics regarding U.S. export controls that apply to organisations outside the U.S., such as: the regulatory framework, including the latest and anticipated regulatory amendments, key concepts and definitions, classification and licensing requirements, handling (potential) non-compliance issues, and practice tips to ensure compliance with the ITAR and EAR.
* What: Awareness Course U.S. Export Controls: ITAR & EAR From a Non-U.S. Perspective 
* When: Tuesday, 2 Oct 2018, 9 AM – 5 PM (CEST)
* Where: Landgoed Groenhoven, Bruchem, the Netherlands
* Sponsor: Full Circle Compliance (FCC)
* Instructors: Ghislaine Gillessen, Mike Farrell, and Alexander P. Bosch 
* Information & Registration: HERE or via events@fullcirclecompliance.eu
Register today and get a 10% Early Bird discount on the course fee!

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Charles Fillmore (Charles Sherlock Fillmore; 22 Aug 1854 – 5 Jul 1948; founded the religious denomination Unity in 1889. He became known as an American mystic for his contributions to spiritualist interpretations of biblical Scripture.)
  – “We increase whatever we praise. The whole creation responds to praise, and is glad.”  

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. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments to applicable regulations are listed below.
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 12 Jun 2018: 83 FR 27380-27407: Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS)

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 

: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  – Last Amendments: 3 Aug 2018: 83 FR 38021-38023: Revision of Export and Reexport License Requirements for Republic of South Sudan Under the Export Administration Regulations; and 83 FR 38018-38021: U.S.-India Major Defense Partners: Implementation Under the Export Administration Regulations of India’s Membership in the Wassenaar Arrangement and Addition of India to Country Group A:5

: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

  – Last Amendment: 29 June 2018: 83 FR 30541-30548: Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations; and 83 FR 30539-30541: Removal of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations and Amendment of the Terrorism List Government Sanctions Regulations 

: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 3 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – The latest edition (30 Apr 2018) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance websiteBITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.  
, 1 Jan 2018: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment:
14 Aug 2018: Harmonized System Update 1812, containing 27 ABI records and 6 harmonized tariff records. 

  – HTS codes for AES are available 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 

  – Last Amendment: 14 Feb 2018: 83 FR 6457-6458: Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Addition of South Sudan [Amends ITAR Part 126.] 

  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 25 Apr 2018) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated 

, by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.
 The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
. BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please
contact us
to receive your discount code. 

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Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 

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* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, Alex Witt. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission, provided attribution is given to “The Export/Import Daily Bugle of (date)”. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.  If you would to submit material for inclusion in the The Export/Import Daily Update (“Daily Bugle”), please find instructions here.

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