18-0529 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

18-0529 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

Tuesday, 29 May 2018

The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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N.B. The Daily Bugle was not released yesterday, a U.S. Federal Holiday.

[No items of interest noted today.] 

  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: “Menendez Introduces Legislation to Lift U.S. Arms Embargo on Cyprus”
  4. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  5. White House Releases Statement and Fact Sheet Concerning China’s “Discriminatory and Burdensome Trade Practices”
  6. EU Extends Restrictive Measures Against Syrian Regime Until 1 Jun 2019
  7. EU Parliament: “Foreign Investment to Be Screened to Protect EU Countries’ Strategic Interest”
  8. Dutch MIVD: “Attempts Prevented to Obtain Knowledge and Materials for Weapons of Mass Destruction”
  1. The Daily Beast: “He Said He Was Just a Plasma Scientist. They Said He Was a Chinese Spy” (Part 1 of 3 parts)
  2. Ecns.cn: “Testing Times Ahead for Chinese Investment in U.S.”
  3. The Epoch Times: “China Is Buying Up Critical Technologies from Europe, Outside American Scrutiny”
  4. The New York Times: “Trump Announces New Tariffs on Chinese Technology”
  5. Techrunch: “What President Trump Doesn’t Know About ZTE”
  1. A. Rapa: “Unmanned Systems and Export Controls: What Your Company Needs to Know”
  2. A. Allgrove, A. Petterd & S. Bridges: Update to Australian Export Controls for Tangibles”
  3. G. Husisian: “Recent Enforcement Actions Demonstrate Multinational Automotive Companies Should Conduct Risk Assessments” (Part 1 of 2)
  4. T. Bromund: “The Good and The Bad of Reforms To Firearms Export Controls”
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 133 Jobs Posted This Week, Including 11 New Jobs
  1. ECS Presents “ITAR/EAR Boot Camp (Seminar Level I)” on 10-11 Jul in Long Beach, CA
  2. FCC Presents “Summer Course U.S. Export Controls: An Introduction to the ITAR & EAR”, 12 Jun in Bruchem, the Netherlands
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (12 Apr 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (17 May 2018), FACR/OFAC (19 Mar 2018), FTR (24 Apr 2018), HTSUS (4 May 2018), ITAR (14 Feb 2018) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 




[No items of interest noted today.]

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OGS_a11. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

* Commerce; NOTICES; Hearings: Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Automobiles, including Cars, SUVs, Vans and Light Trucks, and Automotive Parts [Publication Date: 30 May 2018.]
* President; ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS; Space, Commercial Use of; Policy to Streamline Regulations (Space Policy Directive-2 of May 24, 2018) [Publication Date: 30 May 2018; included in the Daily Bugle of 25 May 2018.]
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Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: “Menendez Introduces Legislation to Lift U.S. Arms Embargo on Cyprus”
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 24 May 2018.) [Excerpts.] 
U.S. Senator Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, today introduced the End the Cyprus Embargo Act, legislation to repeal the U.S. arms embargo on Cyprus. United States policy since 1987 has been to deny licenses on transfer of articles on the United States Munitions List to the Republic of Cyprus.
  “Cyprus has proven itself a reliable ally and strategic partner to the United States, including in counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts,” said Senator Menendez. “With Cyprus seeking to deepen its strategic partnership with the United States, it is in our national security and economic interest to lift this outdated decades-long arms embargo that is no longer helping U.S. security objectives in the Mediterranean. As we continue to see, this legislation sends an important message that the United States supports Cyprus’ right to fully realize its potential as a stable and dependable democracy and key contributor to the security architecture in the eastern Mediterranean.”
Mandated by a Menendez amendment in the FY16 NDAA, a joint report by the Department of Defense and State Department in June 2016 noted that, while the Cyprus arms embargo has had “little impact” on U.S. security objectives in the region, it has “in some part” contributed to Cyprus’ building of defense sector ties with Russia – a relationship that has become all the more concerning in light of the Kremlin’s increasing aggression around the world. … 
U.S. Representatives David Cicilline (D-RI1) introduced companion legislation in the House of Representatives. 
A copy of the End the Cyprus Embargo Act can be found 

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White House Releases Statement and Fact Sheet Concerning China’s “Discriminatory and Burdensome Trade Practices”

The White House, 29 May 2018.
Statement on Steps to Protect Domestic Technology and Intellectual Property from China’s Discriminatory and Burdensome Trade Practices
On March 22, 2018, the President signed a memorandum announcing that the United States would take multiple steps to protect domestic technology and intellectual property from certain discriminatory and burdensome trade practices by China.  These actions were announced following a report of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative regarding China’s practices with respect to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. In accordance with the March 22 memorandum, the President has been updated on the progress of the announced actions as follows:
  (1) To protect our national security, the United States will implement specific investment restrictions and enhanced export controls for Chinese persons and entities related to the acquisition of industrially significant technology.  The proposed investment restrictions and enhanced export controls will be announced by June 30, 2018, and they will be implemented shortly thereafter.
  (2) The United States will continue to pursue litigation at the World Trade Organization for violations of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights based on China’s discriminatory practices for licensing intellectual property.  The United States filed the case regarding these violations on March 23, 2018.
  (3) Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States will impose a 25 percent tariff on $50 billion of goods imported from China containing industrially significant technology, including those related to the “Made in China 2025” program.  The final list of covered imports will be announced by June 15, 2018, and tariffs will be imposed on those imports shortly thereafter.
In addition, the United States will continue efforts to protect domestic technology and intellectual property, stop noneconomic transfers of industrially significant technology and intellectual property to China, and enhance access to the Chinese market.  Likewise, the United States will request that China remove all of its many trade barriers, including non-monetary trade barriers, which make it both difficult and unfair to do business there.  The United States will request that tariffs and taxes between the two countries be reciprocal in nature and value.  Discussions with China will continue on these topics, and the United States looks forward to resolving long-standing structural issues and expanding our exports by eliminating China’s severe import restrictions. 
  – The factsheet is available 

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On 28 May 2018, the Council extended EU restrictive measures against the Syrian regime until 1 June 2019. Given the ongoing repression of the civilian population, the EU decided to maintain its restrictive measures against the Syrian regime and its supporters, in line with the EU strategy on Syria.
The Council also updated the information relating to certain persons and entities on the list and removed two deceased persons from the list. It now includes 259 persons and 67 entities targeted by a travel ban and an asset freeze. The persons added most recently were included for their role in the use of chemical weapons, as was the case for the 4 persons added to the sanctions list on 19 March 2018.
More broadly, sanctions currently in place against Syria include an oil embargo, restrictions on certain investments, a freeze of the assets of the Syrian central bank held in the EU, export restrictions on equipment and technology that might be used for internal repression as well as on equipment and technology for the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications. … 

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/774 of 28 May 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria 

Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/778 of 28 May 2018 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria 

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EU Parliament, 28 May 2018.)
  – New EU mechanism to screen foreign direct investment in the EU 
  – Aim is to protect strategic infrastructure, technologies, and media independence  
  – The European Parliament should be involved 
New tools to check that foreign investment in EU countries does not threaten their security or public order were approved by the Trade Committee on Monday.
Trade MEPs backed plans to set up a mechanism to screen foreign direct investment (FDI) in a transparent, predictable and non-discriminatory manner. The aim is to ensure that foreign investments do not pose a threat to critical infrastructure, key technologies or access sensitive information.
MEPs strengthened the proposal’s scope, to enable the EU member states and Commission also to check whether, inter alia:
  – a foreign investment might affect media independence or the EU’s strategic autonomy,
  – the investor has a track-record of investing in projects that might threaten security or public order, or
  – the investment could lead to the creation of a monopoly.
Better cooperation
The committee stipulated that a member state that decides to screen an FDI should inform other member states and the Commission of the fact within five working days and be open to comments. It also proposed that if a third of the member states consider an investment worrisome, the target country should engage in a dialogue to resolve the issues at stake.
To foster member states’ cooperation on inward FDI, share best practices and address possible concerns, MEPs suggested setting up an Investment Screening Coordination Group, to be chaired by the Commission and composed of member states with the European Parliament as observer.
The European Parliament could ask the Commission to issue an opinion on a foreign direct investment that is planned or has been completed in a member state.
  “Most trade partners of the EU already have a screening mechanism in place. Without succumbing to protectionism, it is time to show that Europe is not naive in these times of globalization. If it wants to preserve a favorable climate for investments – sources of growth, jobs, and innovation – it has to protect European assets. We are not against foreign investment, but against strange investment,” said Parliament’s rapporteur 
Franck Proust (EPP, France).
  “Next to the reform of the dual use export control system, FDI screening is one of the main priorities of the International Trade Committee. We hope to finalize new rules before the end of Parliament’s term and look forward to fruitful negotiations with the Council under the leadership of the Austrian Presidency,” added committee chair 
Bernd Lange (S&D, DE).
The draft rules were approved by 30 votes to 7.
Next steps
MEPs can begin talks with ministers once the draft rules have been approved by Parliament as a whole at its 11-14 June plenary session in Strasbourg and the Council of Ministers has approved its own position.
Inward foreign direct investment has been an important source of economic growth in the EU. However, it is also a growing source of concern if the investor is a state-owned enterprise, or if the investment is in critical infrastructure projects in fields such as energy or communications, or in enterprises working with key technologies, such as robotics or nuclear technology.
Currently only 12 of the 28 member states has a screening mechanism that examines FDI on grounds of security or public order. The systems vary widely, and countries do not coordinate their approaches even where investments might have an effect in multiple countries. The proposal does not seek to harmonize national screening mechanisms, but to enhance cooperation among member states and the Commission. It is part of 
a trade and investment package announced by the Commission in September 2017.

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Dutch DoD, 28 May 2018.) [Excerpts; unofficial translation by Editor.]
The Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (“MIVD”) has taken significant counterproliferation actions in recent years.  “We have prevented a substantial number of attempts to obtain knowledge and materials for weapons of mass destruction, which tells me that Dutch companies and knowledge institutes are still insufficiently aware of the risk that countries such as Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Syria are “shopping” in the Netherlands [for such knowledge and materials.]”, MIVD Director, General Major Onno Eichelsheim said during the Export Control Seminar of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague on 28 May 2018.
During this event, Dutch industry was updated about the export of goods that are used for military purposes. According to Eichelsheim, this is the area where government and the business community can make a difference. “After all, a safer world with fewer weapons of mass destruction starts with us: with a broad awareness of the risks.” …
The MIVD director said that there are sufficient reasons to be suspicious of orders received from abroad. Not only well-known institutes such as TNO are targeted, but also a small and medium-sized enterprises that make, for example, ball bearings, high-quality gyros, heat-resistant materials or advanced electronics … “Such components can be perfectly incorporated into military end products, a new military satellite from Russia or China or a ballistic missile from Iran or Syria, “said Eichelsheim. “If a customer wants to pay a large amount of money for chemicals for which you only receive a limited amount on the European market, then a red flag should be raised. Also, an unusual delivery address or difficulties contacting a buyer are indications that you are dealing with an intermediary or front company.” …

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The Daily Beast, 27 May 2018.) [Part 1 of a 3-part series.] 
In his first interview since being released from prison, J. Reece Roth insists his fight was about academic freedom, and not about giving secrets to the Chinese.
It takes a good while for J. Reece Roth to answer the door at his home on the west side of Knoxville. A former electrical engineering professor at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville, where he was also the director of the Plasma Sciences Laboratory, Roth will be 81 in September and has hip, knee, and heart problems, which have slowed him down quite a bit.  
Of course, the four years he spent in prison for violating the Arms Export Control Act didn’t do him many favors, either. 
Former students and contemporaries describe Roth as something of a pioneer in the field of plasma physics. When he was accused in 2006 of divulging sensitive technical data to two foreign nationals, Roth had been working on research for the U.S. Air Force, developing thrusters that used atmospheric plasma gas-something typically created only under highly controlled laboratory conditions-to improve the flight performance of unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones. It’s been almost 15 years, but Roth is still noticeably upset about the way things went down. 
“I was handled by the government in such a way that has basically intimidated researchers all over the country as far as carrying forward applications [of my technology],” he says.

The twist is, none of what Roth revealed was classified. And the foreign nationals weren’t spies, they were grad students. But as is typical with sensitive DoD research, foreign citizens were explicitly forbidden from working on the project without a special license from the federal government. By allowing Ph.D. candidates Xin Dai, from China, and Sirous Nourgostar, from Iran, to participate, a once-obscure corner of U.S. export law that considers describing, demonstrating, or explaining certain things to a foreign citizen, even one that’s standing next to you in Tennessee, to be an illegal “export.”

Another of Roth’s violations resulted from a trip he took to China with a laptop containing files from the Air Force project, even though forensic tests later showed those files were never opened while he was there. During that same trip, he asked a student to email him some files. Roth said he was having trouble connecting to the internet, and told the student to send them to the account of a Chinese professor at the university he was visiting.

As a former associate of Roth’s told The Daily Beast: “It’s simple. Because this was a military contract, it was a contractual designation [to restrict participation to U.S. citizens only] and that’s what screwed everything into the ground. Because even a blank sheet of paper from that research was export-controlled.”

American counterintelligence officials have long warned about spies on campus, and according to recent congressional testimony by U.S. counterintelligence officials, foreign intelligence services are more active than ever within the academic community. 

There is a “small but significant percentage” of international students and faculty sent to the U.S. to steal military and civilian research, as journalist and author Daniel Golden testified before the House Science Committee in April, citing a DoD finding that the use of academics by foreign intelligence agencies has tripled over the past two decades.  
“Without going into details that I cannot divulge, I can reinforce the fact it is a longstanding issue,” retired CIA operations officer Charles Goslin told The Daily Beast. “Typically, universities get full compensation from the governments sending those students to the U.S. to study and then return with cutting edge research and IP. So, the incentive to keep the cash coming in outweighs the incentive to closely monitor the students from those countries.”  . . . .

[Parts 2 and 3 of this article will be posted in the Daily Bugle tomorrow and Thursday.]

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Ecns.cn, 29 May 2018.) [Excerpts.] 
The road for Chinese companies to invest in the United States could still be bumpy this year even though the two countries sought to ease their economic disputes and agreed not to engage in a trade war, experts said.
Chinese companies could face much lengthier and more complex procedures to have their merger and acquisition deals reviewed and approved by the U.S. government and the increasing uncertainty could prompt them to look away from the U.S. as an investment destination in the short term, according to lawyers who offer legal advice and services to Chinese companies.
  “There’s been great concern expressed by Chinese companies about whether or not it’s worth the effort (investing in the U.S.) … If it’s not going to be seen favorably from the beginning then they’ll look elsewhere to figure out another place to invest,” said Wendy Wysong, a partner of London-based law firm Clifford Chance, who practices in Hong Kong.
Factors such as growing U.S. regulatory scrutiny, uncertainties in China-U.S. trade discussions and the controversy involving Chinese telecommunication equipment maker ZTE Corp have cast a shadow on the outlook of the Chinese investment in the U.S. … 
Wysong at Clifford Chance said that Chinese companies that are looking to invest in the U.S. need to consider what their obligations are. Clifford Chance has been representing ZTE Corp from 2012 till now.
  “Putting aside the ZTE case, I think that any company that is dependent on U.S. origin goods needs to consider the implications of the U.S. export control laws and U.S. economic sanctions, and the enforcement tools that the United States will bring to bear if they become concerned about a particular company’s conduct,” Wysong said.
  “They must be aware that there are certain interests that the United States has. For example, with the recent withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), there are going to be secondary sanctions on particular industry sectors in Iran and non-U.S. companies need to be aware of those,” she pointed out. …. 

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The Epoch Times, 27 May 2018.) [Excerpts.] 
As United States ramps up scrutiny over Chinese investments in America to protect critical industries and national security, experts are now sounding the alarm about investments in Europe that extend Beijing’s political influence and vacuum up cutting-edge technologies. Less than half of the European Union states have mechanisms for screening incoming Chinese investments, a potential security loophole highlighted by a recent U.S. Congressional hearing. … 
an investigative report in December 2017, The Epoch Times revealed how the Chinese regime achieved a critical breakthrough in its aircraft carrier program by incorporating key technology from a semiconductor company in the United Kingdom it discretely acquired in 2008. The acquisition was not hindered by British regulators at the time, although the key semiconductor device in question has been specifically listed as subject to export control by European Union regulations.
The same breakthrough in the semiconductor component was later thought to have also contributed to China’s 
advances in developing an electromagnetic railgun, a prototype weapon that could become a game-changer in future naval warfare.

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The New York Times, 29 May 2018.) 
The U.S. is announcing that it will impose a 25 percent tariff on $50 billion worth of Chinese goods containing “industrially significant technology.”
The White House said Tuesday that the tariff will cover goods related to the “Made in China 2025” program. The full list of imports that will be covered will be announced by June 15.
Trump has bemoaned the massive U.S. trade deficit with China – $337 billion last year – as evidence that Beijing has been complicit in abusive trading practices.
The White House also says the U.S. is planning new investment restrictions and export controls.
The announcement comes as the administration negotiates with China on a broad trade dispute. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross is expected to travel to China later in the week for more talks.

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Techrunch: “What President Trump Doesn’t Know About ZTE”
Techrunch, 27 May 2018.) [Excerpts.]
Although top senators, including Democrat Chuck Schumer and Republican Marco Rubio, are urging the administration not to bend on ZTE, President Trump is planning to ease penalties on the Chinese telecommunications giant for violating sanctions against Iran and North Korea.
But what Mr. Trump may not realize is that ZTE is also one of the world’s most notorious intellectual property thieves – perhaps even the most notorious of all. And since stopping Chinese theft of U.S intellectual property is supposed to be one of the President’s top trade objectives, he should not ease up on ZTE until it stops its high-tech banditry and starts playing by the rules in intellectual property (IP) matters.
A search of PACER reveals that in the U.S. alone, ZTE has been sued for patent infringement an astonishing 126 times just in the last five years. This number is even more shocking when you consider that only a subset of companies who believe their IP rights have been violated by ZTE has the means or the will to spend the millions of dollars needed to wage a multi-year lawsuit in federal courts. …

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A. Rapa: “Unmanned Systems and Export Controls: What Your Company Needs to Know” 

Unmanned Systems Magazine, May Edition.) [Excerpts.] 
* Author: Anthony Rapa, Esq., 
arapa@steptoe.com, Steptoe & Johnson LLP.
Companies that export unmanned systems or related components to customers abroad; who collaborate with overseas companies in the development or production process; or who share technical data with foreign nationals in the United States need to be aware of the potential impact of export control laws and regulations.
Export controls restrict the cross-border flow of strategic technologies and can even restrict the release of certain technical information within the United States. These restrictions can apply to unmanned systems and their related components and technical data.
This article provides an overview of U.S. commercial and military export controls, assesses how export controls apply to unmanned systems and provides compliance tips. … 
[Editor’s Note: due to copyright restrictions, we are not authorized to include the entire item. To read the remaining sections, please click on the source link below the item title.]

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A. Allgrove, A. Petterd & S. Bridges: Update to Australian Export Controls for Tangibles”

Global Compliance News, 24 May 2018.) 
* Authors: Anne-Marie Allgrove, Esq.; Anne Petterd, Esq.; and Simone Bridges, Esq. All of Baker McKenzie, Sydney and Singapore, respectively. Contact details available 
Australia’s export control rules for tangibles have been amended to more closely align with the regime for intangible supplies.
Australia’s export control rules for tangibles have been amended to more closely align with the regime for intangible supplies. 
As of 21 April 2018, changes to the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 (Cth) came into force. The amendments are intended, so far as possible, to treat transfer of the same controlled subject-matter outside of Australia in a physical form consistently with intangible transfers (such as via email or allowing access by another intangible means).
The Regulations set the rules for export of controlled goods. The rules for controlled intangible supplies are contained in the Defense Trade Controls Act 2012 (Cth). Prior to amending the Regulations, the separate tangible and intangible regimes in some instances treated the same controlled subject-matter differently. For example, a person who brought goods containing controlled subject-matter into Australia on a temporary basis might have been required to obtain a permit to export the goods back out of Australia. In contrast, a person would not have been subject to controls for accessing the same content via their emails or from a server when the person was physically outside of Australia.
The changes to the Regulations impacting when permits to export goods are required include:
  – A new prohibition on exporting controlled technology and software stored on an uncontrolled good without a permit. Such items should be treated as controlled goods for export.
  – An exemption to the need for a permit to export controlled goods when exported temporarily from Australia, but not transferred to another person.
  – An exemption to the need for a permit to export controlled goods to the origin of import after it was temporarily imported into Australia.
The Regulations also contain changes to the basis on which controlled goods export permits will be issued or revoked. The changes largely enhance the transparency of the permit process. 
The main changes are the following:
  – A new Ministerial power to revoke a permit where it is determined that the export would prejudice Australia’s national security, defense or international relations.
  – New criteria that the Defense Minister may have regard to in determining whether or not to grant a permit.
  – New requirements around attaching or varying conditions for a permit.
  – A new requirement for the Minister to notify and give reasons if a permit is refused.
  – A new review mechanism for permit decisions.
The changes bring the control rules for tangible exports better in line with those for intangible supplies providing the opportunity for businesses to streamline their controlled supplies compliance process.
The changes to the Regulations come into effect just as an independent review into the operation of the Defense Trade Controls Act 2012 commences. The Review aims to identify if there are any gaps in the Act’s controls or any unintended consequences arising from the current operation of the Act. Stakeholders are invited to make submissions 
here until 31 May 2018.

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G. Husisian: “Recent Enforcement Actions Demonstrate Multinational Automotive Companies Should Conduct Risk Assessments” (Part 1 of 2) 

Foley & Lardner LLP, 24 May 2018.) 
* Gregory Husisian, Esq., 
ghusisian@foley.com, Foley & Lardner LLP, Washington DC. 
[Editor’s Note: due to space limitations, this article has been divided into two parts. Part 2 will be included in tomorrow’s Daily Bugle.]
Regulators within the Trump administration have sent a loud message that should concern all multinational automotive companies: laws governing international activities continue to be the subject of intense enforcement activity, leading to record fines in such areas as U.S. economic sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), export controls (the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)), and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
Many multinational companies maintain operations in China and Mexico, and these countries present issues under the FCPA (frequent bribery requests), OFAC sanctions (limitations on dealings with Iran, Syria, Russia), and export controls (controls on shipments of U.S.-origin goods to embargoed countries as well as restrictions on products that have dual-use capabilities, such as being useful in chemical and biological weapons production). Further, now that President Trump has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which eased the sanctions on Iran, the specialty sanctions that targeted the Iranian automotive industry have “snapped back” and now once again pose compliance challenges for the automotive industry.
In light of these developments, this blog entry summarizes the most recent enforcement activity of concern to automotive-sector companies, as well as the steps that these companies can take to identify and mitigate the risk of costly enforcement actions under these international regulatory regimes.
Recent Enforcement Activity Shows U.S. Government Willingness to Impose Record Penalties for Violations of International Regulations
Under the Obama administration, enforcement of the FCPA, export controls, economic sanctions, AML, and FCPA regulations was steady and strong. Although the numbers varied year by year – mostly due to timing issues related to when large matters were settled – it was not uncommon to see large enforcement settlement that individually surpassed the $100 million level, with total penalties in many years reaching into the billions.
Any thought that the Trump administration might take a more lenient approach toward these international regulations has been laid to rest by the strong record of enforcement under the current administration, as underscored by two recent enforcement actions.
First, Panasonic agreed to pay $280 million to resolve FCPA offenses for payments to consultants of its U.S. inflight entertainment unit in the Middle East and Asia, including the payment of $143 million in disgorgement to the Securities and Exchange Commission. In both cases, the resolutions were related to activities of Panasonic’s U.S.-based subsidiary, Panasonic Avionics Corporation. According to the U.S. government, senior management of Panasonic Avionics established a bribery scheme to pay a Middle Eastern government official more than $900,000 for a “purported consulting position, which required little to no work,” allowing Panasonic Avionics to help gain over $700 million in business from a state-owned airline. The U.S. government further stated that Panasonic Avionics concealed the payment “through a third-party vendor that provided unrelated services” to Panasonic Avionics and then allegedly falsely recorded these (and other) payments in its books and records. Other payments related to Asian sales.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) gave Panasonic Avionics a 20 percent discount off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range because of the cooperation of the company and what the DOJ characterized as strong remediation efforts, including the severing of several senior executives who were either involved in or aware of the misconduct by Panasonic Avionics or Panasonic. Nonetheless, because the remediation efforts only recently had been instated, the deferred prosecution agreement provides for a two-year independent monitor, followed by an additional year of self-reporting.
Independently, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) took the unusual step of suspending an export control settlement deal with Chinese telecom equipment maker ZTE Corporation, while at the same time revoking the export privileges of the company. ZTE Corporation was operating under a settlement of claims that it had violated U.S. export control and economic sanctions regulations by engaging in 251 transactions with persons in Iran or with the Iranian government. These transactions had last year resulted in the largest-ever export controls penalty – nearly $1.2 billion, with $300 million of it being suspended during a seven-year probationary period. As a result of the export ban, the ability of ZTE to export any goods or technical data from its 14 offices and six research centers in the United States will be virtually eliminated until March 13, 2025, thereby endangering the ability of ZTE to take a leading role in the rollout of next-generation 5G wireless technology.
These settlement actions illustrate the ability of U.S. regulators to discover and punish violations of U.S. international regulations, as well as the willingness of the Trump administration to impose groundbreaking penalties. In light of the aggressive enforcement mentality of the U.S. government, this blog entry provides practical guidance to help multinational automotive companies to identify their risk and determine whether they are putting sufficient resources into dealing with those identified risks. For any multinational automotive-sector company that has not gone through such an exercise in the last few years, systematically working through the 12 steps is likely to lead to a significant payoff for ameliorating the organization’s risk profile through an effective compliance system.
Identifying International Regulatory Risk
As illustrated by the record export controls penalty against ZTE (almost $1.2 billion, followed by a denial of export privileges) and the Panasonic FCPA settlements, the risk of severe enforcement actions under the Trump administration for violations of international regulations continues to be high. Yet many multinational automotive-sector companies find themselves in a quandary regarding how best to identify their international regulatory risk. This section summarizes the typical steps that most multinational companies should consider when determining their unique risk profile and evaluating whether they are devoting sufficient resources to managing that risk.
Step 1: Secure Buy-In at the Top
Many automotive-sector companies looking to implement an international regulatory compliance program start by drafting a written compliance policy. But long before it comes time to draft the policy, a well-thought-out compliance strategy will look to put in place the underpinnings of the compliance program. Chief among these is the need for consistent management support for compliance initiatives.
Although the phrase “tone at the top” encapsulates management support, the concept requires more than just support from the CEO and other top management officials. When properly executed, the idea of tone at the top is a pyramid, with the concept of “doing the right thing” and respect for compliance flowing down from the CEO to personnel at all levels. Senior management ensures it is known that compliance has full support at the top, and that compliance has the resources to function properly, while also trying to ensure that respect for compliance with legal and company mandates flows through the company.
Management support is especially important for companies with international operations. The connection between the sales and operational activities of international subsidiaries, on the one hand, and regulatory risk management and adhering to the requirements of U.S. law, on the other, can appear tenuous when viewed by far-flung actors. The reality, however, is these far-off operations often represent the highest regulatory risk. This may mean that the organization must pay special attention to these foreign subsidiaries, so it can reinforce the compliance message and its importance to the overall organization.
Senior management must set a strong example. It should be common knowledge that compliance rules apply across the entire organization, including for senior personnel; that the company promptly follows up on credible red flags; and that the company is willing to walk away from business that requires stepping too close to the risk threshold. People throughout the organization, whether in the United States or elsewhere, should realize there are consequences for compliance missteps. Through these means, senior management can communicate its respect for compliance throughout the organization.
Step 2: Perform a Risk Assessment
The compliance obligations of multinational corporations are more complicated than for domestic organization.  A corporation that operates internationally automatically takes on additional compliance responsibilities under laws and regulations that target international conduct, as well as new sets of foreign laws, all while shedding none of its domestic compliance obligations.  Multinational automotive companies tend to be larger, which increases the importance of establishing systematic compliance procedures.  Multinational automotive corporations often have magnified logistical difficulties, such as coordinating compliance standards and training across disparate divisions and affiliates, dealing with employees with cultural and language differences, and dealing with general skepticism regarding the application of U.S. law outside the United States. These and other factors can increase the difficulty of creating and maintaining multinational compliance standards.
To help control these issues, the second step for multinational automotive companies should be to perform a risk assessment to determine how these factors impact their compliance obligations. A risk assessment is a survey of the company’s operations to determine the exposure of the organization to various forms of regulatory risk, considering both the likelihood and the severity of possible violations and the current enforcement priorities of the relevant authority.
The importance of the risk assessment lies in the recognition that it is not possible to eliminate all regulatory risk. Since organizations need to minimize the risk of violations, while coping with the reality that they have limited resources to put into risk mitigation, they need guidelines for allocating their scarce compliance resources. The risk assessment provides this guidance by assembling data needed to create an organization-wide risk profile.
Compliance at international organizations should be tailored to the organization, taking into account all factors that bear on the risk profile of the organization.  For automotive-sector companies, items to consider include U.S. government enforcement priorities, prior compliance issues within the organization, risks and trends in the industry, and recent changes in the scope of operations of the organization. If the company is engaged in automotive extraction, all contacts with the government – whether as part of the approval process, procuring extraction rights, negotiating leases, dealing with Customs, and so forth – all need special scrutiny.  Areas of the world that If the company needs to deal with foreign state-owned entities, it needs to realize that even though these companies operate in a commercial fashion, the FCPA still treats all employees of these companies as foreign officials.  Such changes are frequent sources of weakness if they are not mirrored by changes in compliance oversight.
A typical way for automotive-sector companies to proceed with a risk assessment is to survey business units that represent areas of high regulatory risk. Questions for an anti-corruption survey, for example, might examine whether the relevant stakeholders often deal with state-owned automotive companies, whether they have frequent interactions with government regulators, whether there is significant entertaining of non-U.S. persons, whether the organization does significant business in countries known to have a reputation for corruption, and whether the company does significant business in the United Kingdom (which can draw the UK Bribery Act into play). For export controls, the relevant topics to explore would include whether the organization deals with controlled items or controlled technologies; whether the company deals with items on the U.S. Munitions List (USML) or modifies commercial items for military use or to meet military specifications; whether the company has recently conducted a classification review; the degree to which non-U.S. nationals potentially have access to controlled technical data; whether the organization sells products that rely on encryption; and whether there are sales to known diversion points (the Middle East, Mexico, Russia, Pakistan, and so forth). For economic sanctions, relevant topics to cover would include whether there are sales by non-U.S. subsidiaries to sanctioned countries or specially designated nationals, whether there are sales to known diversion points, and whether the organization as a whole maintains adequate screening for SDNs (Specially Designated Nationals, or persons who have been sanctioned under U.S. law as being off-limits for business transactions and financial dealings). Finally, an anti-boycott risk assessment would examine the extent of dealings with Middle Eastern countries and with firms operating out of that region.
One thing to remember is that the conduct of a risk assessment can lead to the discovery of potential regulatory violations. The company accordingly should have the risk assessment process conducted in a way that stresses confidentiality with the exercise, if possible, being overseen by an attorney. This is so the exercise can be conducted under the rubric of attorney-client privilege. Doing so could be important if the investigation uncovers evidence of apparent violations.
Once the risk assessment is complete, the results should be carefully evaluated to determine where the areas of greatest compliance concern lie. The results can be distilled down to a company-wide risk profile, which can guide the allocation of compliance resources. The results can then be used for such useful exercises as determining which areas merit the greatest attention, which areas likely need additional internal controls, whether there are patterns of deficient compliance (based on geography, product lines, subsidiaries/divisions, etc.), and whether the basic knowledge of the relevant legal requirements appears to be in place. By formalizing the results in a risk profile, the corporation can determine the appropriate way to manage the identified risk. … 

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T. Bromund: “The Good and The Bad of Reforms To Firearms Export Controls”

(Source: Forbes, 29 May 2018.) [Excerpts.] 
* Author: Ted Bromund, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, staff@heritage.org, 202-675-1761.
In my last column, I summarized the origin of the proposed changes to the export controls on firearms, ammunition, and related materials, and dismissed some of the criticisms of these reforms as based on ignorance of how the system will work — or on the presumption that if the Trump administration is doing it, it must be bad. In this column, I’ll look at the up- and downsides of the proposed reforms.
The government itself gets a clear upside. The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) processes about 39,000 export license applications annually. Of these, about 10,000 are in the firearms and related items categories. And of these, about 6,000 are for items that will move to the Commerce Control List (CCL) – including the vast majority of non-automatic and semi-automatic firearms under .50 caliber, and their ammunition. … 

[Editor’s Note: due to copyright restrictions, we are not authorised to include the entire article. To read the remaining sections, click on the source link above.]

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MS_a218. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings; 144 Jobs Posted This Week, Including 12 New Jobs

(Source: Editor) 

Published every Monday or first business day of the week. Please, send job openings in the following format to 


” New or amended listing this week

* ACCO Brands; Lake Zurich, IL; Foreign Trade Zone Specialist;
* Aerovironment; Simi Valley, CA; Trade Compliance Specialist II; Job ID: 18-017

* Aerovironment; Simi Valley, CA;
Trade Compliance Director
; Job ID: 18-018

AJC Logistics; Atlanta, GA; NVOCC Export Specialist;

# AMD; Austin, TX;
Manager, Import/Export; Requisition ID: 24061

* Arent Fox LLP; Washington, D.C.; International Trade Associate;

* Arent Fox LLP; Los Angeles, CA;
International Trade Associate

# AutoNation; Fort Lauderdale, FL; Trade Compliance Manager
 BAE Systems; Los Angeles, CA; 
Program Manager, International and Offset
; Requisition ID: 33778BR

* BAE Systems; Huntsville, AL; Facility Security Officer, Security Manager; Requisition ID: 36821BR
* BAE Systems; Burlington, MA; Facility Security Officer (“FSO”); Requisition ID: 35499BR
* BAE Systems; Rockville, MD; Compliance Specialist Senior; Requisition ID: 35809 BR
* BAE Systems; Sterling, VA; Compliance Specialist Senior; Requisition ID: 36370BR

# BAE Systems; Greenlawn, NY;
International Trade Compliance Analyst I; Requisition ID: 

# BAE Systems; San Diego, CA; International Trade Compliance Analyst II; Requisition ID: 38548BR 

* Boeing; Zoushan, China;
Trade Compliance Manager;
* Boeing; Mesa, AR;
Trade Control Specialist;
* Boeing; Ridley Park, PA;  
Trade Control Specialist

 BMW North America; Woodcliff Lake, NJ;
Senior Analyst, Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 170004RD
# Brownells, Inc.; Grinnell, IA; International Trade Compliance Manager II;
# Brownells, Inc.; Grinnell, IA; Product Classification Specialist I;
* Buehler; Lake Bluff, IL;
Manager, Compliance and Logistics
; Requisition ID: 2018-004

# Cree, Inc.; Durham, NC; Export Compliance Specialist
Contact asignorelli@cree.com;
Requisition ID: 2018-6300
* Danaher Science and Technology; United States; Senior Global Trade Compliance ManagerJob ID: COR000942

* DHL; Newark, NJ;
Director, Export Control & Compliance – USA
; Requisition ID: ref57592

 DynCorp International; Tampa, FL; Foreign Disclosure Officer; Requisition ID: PR1701977

 Eaton; Syracuse, NY;
Global Logistics Manager
; Requisition ID: 036620

 Eaton; Shanghai Shi, China;
Global Ethics and Compliance Director, APAC
; Requisition ID: 039260

* Elbit Systems of America; Fort Worth, TX or Merrimack, NH;
Trade Compliance Manager
; 2018-5916

* Elbit Systems of America; Fort Worth, TX or Merrimack, NH;
Trade Compliance Officer
; 2018-5917

* EoTech Technologies; Ann Arbor, MI; Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 092335 
* Erickson, Inc.; Central Point, OR; Import Specialist; Requisition ID: 756803

* Esterline; Hong Kong;
Regional ITC Manager
* Esterline; Singapore; Regional ITC Manager; 

 Expeditors; Sunnyvale, CA;
Customs Compliance Supervisor

 Expeditors; Krefeld, Germany; 
Clerk Import / Export
 Expeditors; Bedfont, United Kingdom;
Customs Brokerage Clerk
 Expeditors; Dusseldorf, Germany;
Clerk, Airfreight Import

* Export Solutions Inc.; Melbourne FL; 
Trade Compliance Specialist

 EY; Belgium; 
Senior Consultant, Global Trade
; Requisition ID: BEL000PT

* FLIR; Billerica, MA; US Customs Analyst

* FLIR; Meer, Belgium; GTC EMEA Customs Analyst;
* FLIR; Irving, CA; 
Sr. Manager Export Compliance;

 FLIR; Billerica, MA;
Global Trade Compliance Analyst, Traffic
 FLIR; Wilsonville, OR; 
Global Trade Compliance Analyst, Traffic

 FLIR; Elkridge, MD; 
Global Trade Compliance Analyst, Traffic

* FLIR; Nashua, NH; 
Global Trade Compliance Analyst, Traffic

 FLIR; Billerica, MA;
Global Trade Compliance Analyst, Licensing
* Floor and Decor; Smyrna, GA; Customs Compliance Manager;
* Full Circle Compliance; Bruchem, Netherlands;
Legal Analyst, Manager

* FusionStorm; Newark, CA; Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 2018-2350

* General Dynamics; Fairfax, VA; Export Policy Analyst; Job ID: 2018-36089 

* General Dynamics; Falls Church, VA;
Director, Trade Compliance
; Job ID: 2018-1122

* GHY International; Pembina, ND (or remote); Ocean & Air Import Coordinator
* Gilead Sciences; Foster City, CA; Manager, Global Trade Compliance; R0001742

* Harris Corporation; Beaverton, OR;
Manager, International Government Relations;

* Henderson Group Unlimited; Inc; Washington, DC; 
Process Improvement Mgr

* Henderson Group Unlimited; Inc; Washington, DC; 
Defense Control Analyst

* Henkel Corp.; Rocky Hill, CT;
Global Trade Defense Information Manager; Requisition ID: 

* Henkel Corp.; Rocky Hill, CT; Senior Global Trade ManagerRequisition ID: 18000307

* Huntington Ingalls Industries; Virginia Beach, VA; 
 AMSEC-Import/Export Administrator 2
; Requisition ID: 23979BR

* Hussman; Bridgeton, MO; 
Trade Compliance Specialist;

 Infineon Technologies; Munich, Germany;
Experte Export Control (w/m)
; Requisition ID: 22825
* Infineon Technologies; Melaka, Malaysia; Export Control Executive; Requisition ID: 26833
* Infineon Technologies; Porto (Maia) Portugal;  Trade Compliance Administrator; Requisition ID: 25550

* Infineon Technologies; Milpitas, CA;
Export Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 26988

* Infineon Technologies; El Segundo, CA;  Export Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 26826

 InteliTrac Global Solutions; Herndon, VA; 
ITAR Compliance Official / Deputy Facility Security Officer

 InteliTrac Global Solutions; Herndon, VA;
ITAR Compliance Official

* Johns Hopkins University; Baltimore, MD;
Assistant Director, Export Control and Facility Security;

# Johnson Controls; Milwaukee, WI;
Trade Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 
# Johnson Controls; Lithia Springs;
Trade Compliance Specialist I; Requisition ID: 
* Lam Research Corp.; Singapore;
Foreign Trade Analyst 3;

* Lam Research Corp.; Fremont, CA;  Foreign Trade Intern;

* Lam Research Corp.; Shanghai, China; 
Foreign Trade (FT) Analyst;

* Lam Research Corp.; Fremont, CA; 
Foreign Trade Data Analyst;

* Leonardo DRS; Arlington, VA;
Senior Customs & Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 87488 

* Leonardo DRS; St. Louis;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 88127, or contact 

# Lockheed Martin; Manassass, VA; International Licensing; Requisition ID: 423306BR
* Lockheed Martin; Fort Worth, TX; Import Export Compliance Coordinator; Job ID: 397600BR
* Lockheed Martin; Fort Worth, TX; Export and Import Compliance Investigations Lead; Job ID: 427872BR

* Lockheed Martin; Fort Worth, TX; Licensing Integration and Support; Job ID: 433056BR

* Lockheed Martin; Fort Worth, TX; Regulatory Compliance Analyst Senior; Job ID: 433405BR

 Lockheed Martin; Orlando, FL; 
Senior International Licensing Analyst
; Requisition ID: 

* Lockheed Martin; Orlando, FL; International Licensing Analyst Sr; Job ID: 424151BR
* Lockheed Martin; Oswego, NY; Licensing Analyst; Job ID: 415717BR
* Lockheed Martin; Oswego, NY; Licensing Analyst; Job ID: 415708BR

* Luminar Technologies; Orlando, FL;
Import/Export Trade Compliance Specialist

 L-3 ALST; Orlando, FL;
Contracts Manager / Empowered Official
; Requisition ID: 093069
* L-3 Warrior Sensor Systems; Londonderry, NH; Purchasing & Compliance Manager; Requisition ID:096596
 L-3 Warrior Sensor Systems; Middle East;
International Business Development Manager – Middle East Region
; Requisition ID: 093343
* L-3; Ann Arbor, MI; Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 092335

* L-3; Grand Rapids, MI;
Sr. Trade Compliance Administrator; Requisition ID: 097197

* L-3; Arlington, TX;
Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 098246

* Mattson Technology; Fremont, California;
Import/Export Compliance Analyst;

* Maersk/DAMCO; Agent de transit IMPORT – EXPORT; Job Ref.: DC-164022
* Mattson Technology; Fremont, California; Import/Export Compliance Analyst;
* Medtronic; Heerlen, The Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 16000DYY
* Medtronic; Wash DC;
Global Trade Lawyer
; Requisition ID: 170002ON

* Meggit; Akron, OH; Manager, Trade Compliance;
* Meggit; Los Angeles, CA; Trade Compliance Officer;
* Meggit; Miami, FL;
Trade Compliance Officer;
* Meggit; Tucson, AZ; 
Trade Compliance Specialist;
* Mitchell Martin, Inc.; Dallas, Texas; Export Regulatory Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 104405

* Moog; East Aurora, NY;
Manager, Group Trade Compliance Manager
; Amy Hanavan,   
; Requisition ID: 182102

* MTS Systems; Eden Prairie, MN;
Global Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 37841
* Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
Manager, International Trade Compliance 2

Requisition ID

 Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
Manager, International Trade Compliance 2
; Requisition ID: 17022805

* Office of the Director of National Intelligence; McLean, VA;
Associate General Counsel

* Oracle; Unspecified, United States; Customs Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 18000H0N
* Oracle; Hong Kong;
Compliance Counsel; Requisition ID: 

* Orbital ATK, Inc.; Dulles, VA; Principal Import/Export Analyst
; Job ID:  JAY20182304-45242.

* Pentair; Illinois, USA; Import/Export Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 115774
* Pentair; Illinois, USA; Import/Export Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 115926

* PerkinElmer, Inc.; Shelton, CT;
Systems Analyst, Trade Compliance Solutions;

* Raytheon Company; McKinney, TX; Global Trade Licensing Analyst;

* REDCOM Laboratories; Victor NY;  
Director of Trade Compliance
; Contact 
Chad Boehly 

 Rolls-Royce; Indianapolis, IN;Export Control Specialist; Req ID:


 SABIC; Houston TX; 
Senior Analyst, Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 8411BR

* SABIC; Houston, TX; Senior Analyst, International Trade Compliance

Requisition ID 8655; OR Contact: Jason Washington
* SABIC; Houston, TX;
Senior Analyst, Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 8644BR

* Spirent; San Jose, CA;
Global Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 4088

* Teledyne Benthos; Falmouth, MA; Export Compliance Manager

TLR; San Fransisco, CA;
Import CSR
 ; Requisition ID: 1040

* Trek; Waterloo, WI; Global Trade & Logistics Specialist;

* United Technologies – Pratt & Whitney; East Hartford, CT; 
International Trade Compliance IT Systems & Integration Mgr.
; Requisition ID: 62310BR

* United Technologies – Pratt & Whitney; East Hartford, CT;
International Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID:  62176BR

* United Technologies – Pratt & Whitney; East Hartford, CT;
International Trade Compliance Authorizations Manager; Requisition ID: 63222BR

* United Technologies – Pratt & Whitney, East Hartford, CT;
International Trade Compliance Technology Senior Manager; Requisition ID: 55944BR

* Varian; Belgium, Switzerland, Netherlands, or UK; EMEIA Trade Lead – Senior Manager Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 12301BR; Contact 
Gavin Tickner at 
* Varian; Paolo Alto, CA; Senior Trade Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 12735BR; Contact 
Uyen Tran at
* Vigilant; Negotiable Location, USA;
Global Trade Compliance Analyst

* Virgin Galactic; Las Cruces, NM; Export Compliance Officer; Requisition ID: 2018-3558
* Williams International; Pontiac, MI; Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 17-0275

 Xylem, Inc.; Remote, United States;
Manager, Global Ethics & Compliance

* Xylem, Inc; Morton Grove, IL;
Trade Compliance Specialist;
# YETI; Austin, TX;
Global Trade Compliance Manager
# Zebra Technologies; Bourne End, UK; 
Trade Compliance Manager, NALA; Requisition ID: 46144
# Zebra Technologies; Lincolnshire, IL; Holtsville, NY; Mcallen, TX; Miramar, FL; Agoura Hills, CA; 
Trade Compliance Manager, EMEA; Requisition ID: 46146

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* What: ITAR/EAR Boot Camp (Seminar Level I), Long Beach, CA
* When: 10-11 Jul 
* Where: 
Hilton Long Beach
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Solutions (ECS)
* ECS Speaker Panel:  Suzanne Palmer, Mal Zerden
* Register: 
 or by calling 866-238-4018 or e-mail Suzanne Palmer at 

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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments to applicable regulations are listed below.
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 12 Apr 2018: 83 FR 15736-15740: CBP Decision No. 18-04; Definition of Importer Security Filing Importer (ISF Importer)

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 

: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  – Last Amendment: 17 May 2018: 83 FR 22842-22846: Revisions to the Unverified List (UVL)

: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

  – Last Amendment: 19 Mar 2018:
83 FR 11876-11881: Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties 

: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 3 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – The latest edition (30 Apr 2018) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance websiteBITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.  
, 1 Jan 2018: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
Last Amendment: 4 May 2018: Harmonized System Update 1807, containing 289 ABI records and 60 harmonized tariff records.
  – HTS codes for AES are available 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 


  – Last Amendment: 14 Feb 2018: 83 FR 6457-6458: Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Addition of South Sudan [Amends ITAR Part 126.] 

  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 25 Apr 2018) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated 

, by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.
 The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
. BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please
contact us

to receive your discount code. 

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Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 

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* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission, provided attribution is given to “The Export/Import Daily Bugle of (date)”. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

* SUBSCRIPTIONS: Subscriptions are free.  Subscribe by completing the request form on the Full Circle Compliance website

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