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18-0501 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

18-0501 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

Tuesday, 1 May 2018

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The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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  1. Commerce/BIS Seeks Comments Concerning Procedures for Submitting Request for Exclusions from the Section 232 National Security Adjustments of Imports of Steel and Aluminum 
  2. Commerce/BIS Seeks Comments Concerning Procedures for Submitting Requests for Objections from the Section 232 National Security Adjustments of Imports of Steel and Aluminum 
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. DHS/CBP Releases Update Concerning Additional Duty on Imports of Steel and Aluminum Articles under Section 232
  4. State/DDTC Launches Redesigned Website
  5. UK Amends 5 OGELS to Exclude Burma/Myanmar
  6. UK DIT/EJCU Publishes Policy Note on Exceptions and Licenses
  1. Defense News: “U.S. Makes it Cheaper for Foreign Nations to Buy American Weapons”
  2. Expeditors News: “CBP Advises Importers to Ensure Mailing Addresses and ACH Numbers are Up to Date for GSP Refunds”
  3. The New York Times: “White House Considers Restricting Chinese Researchers Over Espionage Fears”
  4. Reuters: “Trump Delays Metal Tariffs on Canada, EU, Mexico, Exempts Some Others”
  1. M. Volkov: “Lying and Accountability: ZTE Pays the Price”
  2. R.P. Jereski: “Advice to Exporters in Today’s Highly-Regulated Shipping Industry”
  3. R.C. Thomsen II, A.D. Paytas, & M.M. Shomali: “Changes to Export Controls in April 2018”
  1. ECS Presents “ITAR/EAR Boot Camp (Seminar Level 1)” on 10-11 Jul in Long Beach, CA
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (12 Apr 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (5 Apr 2018), FACR/OFAC (19 Mar 2018), FTR (24 Apr 2018), HTSUS (25 Apr 2018), ITAR (14 Feb 2018) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1

1.
Commerce/BIS Seeks Comments Concerning Procedures for Submitting Request for Exclusions from the Section 232 National Security Adjustments of Imports of Steel and Aluminum

(Source: 
Federal Register, 1 May 2018.) [Excerpts.] 
 
83 FR 19045: Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Procedures for Submitting Request for Exclusions from the Section 232 National Security Adjustments of Imports of Steel and Aluminum
 
* AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce.
* ACTION: Notice.
* SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork and respondent burden, invites the general public and other Federal agencies to take this opportunity to comment on proposed and/or continuing information collections, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
* DATES: To ensure consideration, written comments must be submitted on or before July 2, 2018. … 
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: … The purpose of this information collection is to allow for submission of exclusions requests from the remedies instituted in presidential proclamations adjusting imports of steel into the United States and adjusting imports of aluminum into the United States. … 
 
  – OMB Control Number: 0694-0139.
  – Form Number(s):
  – Type of Review: Regular submission. … 
  – Legal Authority: Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705. … 
 
Sheleen Dumas, Departmental Lead PRA Officer, Office of the Chief Information Officer.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

EXIM_a2

2. 
Commerce/BIS Seeks Comments Concerning Procedures for Submitting Requests for Objections from the Section 232 National Security Adjustments of Imports of Steel and Aluminum

(Source: 
Federal Register, 1 May 2018.) [Excerpts.] 
 
83 19044-19045: Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Procedures for Submitting Requests for Objections from the Section 232 National Security Adjustments of Imports of Steel and Aluminum
 
* AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce.
* ACTION: Notice.
* SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork and respondent burden, invites the general public and other Federal agencies to take this opportunity to comment on proposed and/or continuing information collections, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
* DATES: To ensure consideration, written comments must be submitted on or before July 2, 2018. … 
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: … The purpose of this information collection is to allow for submission of objections requests from the remedies instituted in presidential proclamations adjusting imports of steel into the United States and adjusting imports of aluminum into the United States. … 
 
  – OMB Control Number: 0694-0138.
  – Form Number(s):
  –  Type of Review: Regular submission. … 
  – Legal Authority: Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705. … 
 
Sheleen Dumas, Departmental Lead PRA Officer, Office of the Chief Information Officer. 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a13. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

* Justice/ATF; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals:
  – FFL Out of Business Records Request; 
  – Identification Markings Placed on Firearms; and 
  – Identification of Imported Explosives Materials [Publication Dates: 2 May 2018.]
 
* Treasury/OFAC; NOTICES; Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Publication date: 2 May 2018.]

 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

(Source: 
Commerce/BIS
)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

(Source: 
CSMS# 18-000315, 30 Apr 2018.) 

UPDATE: Additional Duty on Imports of Steel and Aluminum Articles under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962

Background

On March 8, 2018, the President issued Proclamations 9704 and 9705 on Adjusting Imports of Steel and Aluminum into the United States, under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1862), providing for additional import duties for steel mill and aluminum articles, effective March 23, 2018. See the Federal Register, 83 FR 11619 and 83 FR 11625, March 15, 2018. On March 22, 2018, the President issued Proclamations on Adjusting Imports of Steel and Aluminum into the United States. See the Federal Register, 83 FR 13355 and 83 FR 13361, March 28, 2018. On April 30, 2018, the President issued Proclamations on Adjusting Imports of Steel and Aluminum into the United States. 

  These duty requirements are effective with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on March 23, 2018.


Commodity
 
Steel mill and aluminum articles, as specified in the Presidential Proclamations. 

Countries Covered by Section 232 Import Duties

Please note that the Section 232 measures are based on the country of origin, not the country of export.

Steel

May 1, 2018 through May 31, 2018: All countries of origin except Canada, Mexico, Australia, Argentina, South Korea, Brazil and member countries of the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom).

  As of June 1, 2018: All countries of origin except Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and South Korea.

Quota for Steel Imports from South Korea


A separate CSMS will be issued with details on the quota on steel imports from South Korea.

Aluminum

May 1, 2018 through May 31, 2018: All countries of origin except Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Australia, Brazil and member countries of the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom).

  As of June 1, 2018: All countries of origin except Argentina, Australia, and Brazil. 

  Note: As of May 1, 2018, aluminum articles from South Korea are subject to the Section 232 import duties. Importers may receive a quota hold message for imports of such articles; however, a quota is not in effect for imports of aluminum from South Korea.

For both steel and aluminum, imports of United States origin are not covered by the Section 232 measures.

Entry Summary Filing Instructions


Steel Products 


In addition to reporting the regular Chapters 72 & 73 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) classification for the imported merchandise, importers shall report the following HTS classification for imported merchandise subject to the additional duty:

  – 9903.80.01 (25 percent ad valorem additional duty for steel mill products)

Aluminum Products 


In addition to reporting the regular Chapter 76 of the HTS classification for the imported merchandise, importers shall report the following HTS classification for imported merchandise subject to the additional duty: 

  – 9903.85.01 (10 percent ad valorem additional duty for aluminum products)


Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)


GSP and AGOA-eligible goods that are subject to Section 232 duties may not receive GSP or AGOA duty preference in accordance with 19 USC 2463(b)(2).

On imports subject to Section 232 duties, in addition to the Section 232 duties, importers should pay the normal trade relations (column 1) duty rates and not submit the GSP Special Program Indicator (SPI) “A” or the AGOA SPI “D”

Although Brazil and Argentina are GSP countries, they are exempt from Section 232 per the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) Chapter 99, Subchapter III, U.S. Notes 16(a) and 19(a); therefore they may claim GSP.

Other Trade Preference Programs and Free Trade Agreements


Trade preference may be claimed for all preference programs with the exception of GSP and AGOA, as stated above. Importers making a trade preference claim under a program other than GSP or AGOA may continue to receive the preferential duty rate and any MPF exemption that may apply in accordance with 19 CFR 24.23(c). Section 232 duties must be paid on imports subject to Section 232 even if trade preferences apply.

Additional Information


Chapter 98


Imports subject to Section 232 duties imported under subheading 9802.00.60 shall be assessed Section 232 duties based upon the full value of the imported article.

Foreign Trade Zones


Any steel or aluminum article, except those eligible for admission under “domestic status” as defined in 19 CFR 146.43, subject to the Section 232 duties, that is admitted into U.S. foreign trade zones on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on March 23, 2018, must be admitted as “privileged foreign status” as defined in 19 CFR 146.41, and will be subject upon entry for consumption to any ad valorem rates of duty related to the classification under the applicable HTSUS subheading.

  Any steel or aluminum article, except those eligible for admission under “domestic status” as defined in 19 CFR 146.43, subject to the 232 duties, that was admitted into U.S. foreign trade zones under “privileged foreign status” as defined in 19 CFR 146.41, prior to 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on March 23, 2018, will likewise be subject upon entry for consumption to any ad valorem rates of duty related to the classification under applicable HTSUS subheadings imposed by the Proclamations.

  Aluminum or steel articles shall not be subject upon entry for consumption to Section 232 duties, merely by reason of manufacture in a U.S. foreign trade zone. However, articles admitted to a U.S. foreign trade zone in “privileged foreign status,” shall retain that status consistent with 19 CFR 146.41(e).

  The merchandise covered by the additional duties and quota may also be subject to antidumping and countervailing duties.

Drawback


No drawback shall be available with respect to the Section 232 duties imposed on any aluminum or steel article. 

 
For Further Information

For more information, please refer to the Presidential Proclamations on Adjusting Imports of Steel and Aluminum into the United States, Federal Register, 83 FR 11619 and 83 FR 11625, March 15, 2018; the March 22, 2018 Presidential Proclamations on Adjusting Imports of Steel and Aluminum into the United States. 83 FR 13355 and 83 FR 13361, March 28, 2018; and the April 30, 2018 Proclamations on Adjusting Imports of Steel and Aluminum into the United States. Also see Frequently Asked Questions 
here.

  Questions related to Section 232 entry filing requirements should be emailed to 
traderemedyunit@cbp.dhs.gov. Questions from the importing community concerning ACE rejections should be referred to their Client Representative.  

  – Related CSMS No. 18-000257, 18-000258, 18-000296

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a36
State/DDTC Launches Redesigned Website 

(Source: Editor, 30 Apr 2018.) 
 
The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) has launched a 
redesigned website. The updated website features a number of improvements including navigation, searchability, and accessibility, with a consistent, full-featured experience across mobile devices. Updates to DDTC’s website will continue. DDTC staff is available at (202) 663-1282 or
 
DDTCResponseTeam@state.gov
 for assistance.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

(Source: 
UK DIT/ECJU, Notice to Exporters 2018/11, 1 May 2018.)
 
On 27 April the EU amended its Burma sanctions regime to extend and strengthen its measures.
 
Council Decision 
2013/184/CFSP recognized positive developments in Burma and lifted all restrictive measures with the exception of the arms embargo and the embargo on equipment which might be used for internal repression.
 
Council Decision 2018/655/CFSP of 26 April 2018 amended Decision 2013/184/CFSP to impose further restrictive measures on Burma. These include prohibiting the export of dual-use goods for military and Border Guard Police end users, and restrictions on the export of equipment for monitoring communications that might be used for internal repression.
 
The restrictive measures came into force on 27 April 2018. As a result, the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) has amended and republished the following open general export licenses (OGELs):
 
  – 
X
 
These OGELs have been updated to remove Burma as a permitted destination from Schedule 2.
 
The ECJU is currently reviewing all extant export and trade control licenses for Burma because of the amendment to EU sanctions. Any license holders affected by these new measures will be contacted directly. We will provide further information in the next few days.
 
Arms embargo
 
The UK interprets the arms embargo as applying to all items on the UK military list. There are related prohibitions on the provision of technical assistance, financing and financial assistance, brokering services, and other related services.
 
Prohibition on the supply of dual-use goods for military use, military end-users or the Border Guard Police
 
There is a prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods included in Annex I to Council Regulation No 428/2009 (The Dual-Use Regulation), if those items are intended for military use, military end-users or the Border Guard Police. There are related prohibitions on the provision of technical assistance, financing and financial assistance, brokering services and other services. These items already require licenses for export outside of the EU, and the licensing process will take this prohibition into account.
 
This prohibition does not apply to the execution of contracts concluded before 27 April 2018 or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. License applicants wishing to rely on these exemptions must notify ECJU of the contract within 5 working days from the entry into force of the regulation and provide a copy of the relevant contract or agreement in support of their license application.
 
The existence of a relevant contract does not guarantee that a license will be granted. License applications for military and dual-use items not prohibited by the new sanctions will continue to be assessed against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria in the usual way.
 
Prohibition on the supply of equipment which might be used for internal repression
 
There is an existing prohibition on the supply of equipment which might be used for internal repression. There are related prohibitions on the provision of technical assistance, financing and financial assistance, brokering services, and other related services.
 
There are changes to the grounds under which Member States may authorize the export of such equipment for humanitarian or protective use, as well as for de-mining operations.
 
Equipment for monitoring communications
 
A license will be required for the supply of equipment, technology or software intended primarily for use in the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications on mobile or fixed networks in Burma. The goods and technologies affected are listed in Annex III to Council Regulation 401/2013 as amended.
 
There is a prohibition on the provision of telecommunications or internet monitoring or interception services to Burma’s government or associated bodies. There are related prohibitions on the provision of technical assistance, financing and financial assistance and brokering services.
 
Provision of telecommunication or internet monitoring or interception services
 
There is a prohibition on the provision of any kind of telecommunication or internet monitoring or interception services to, or for the benefit of the Government of Burma, and related bodies.
 
Financial sanctions
 
There are also financial sanctions against Burma. Further information is available from the 
Office for Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI).
 
Where can I find the list of restricted goods, technologies and services related to the monitoring or interception of Internet and telephone communications?
 
The technologies concerned are defined in Article 3b and 3c and Annex III of Council Regulation No 2013/401 as amended.
 
What form do the restrictions on goods, technologies and services related to the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications take?
 
A license is required for:
 
  – sale, supply, transfer or export of the listed technologies to Burma, or for any other country if the technologies are for use in Burma
  – provision of technical assistance, brokering services, financing and financial assistance related to the sale, supply, transfer or export of these technologies to Burma or for use in Burma
  – provision of telecommunication or internet monitoring or interception services to Burma’s government or associated entities.
 
A license will not be granted for the above if there are reasonable grounds to determine that the equipment, technology, software or services would be used primarily for internal repression monitoring or interception, by Burma’s government, public bodies, corporations and agencies or any person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction.
 
What date do the new restrictions come into force?
 
The restrictions came into force on 27 April 2018. … 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

(Source: 
UK DIT/EJCU, 1 May 2018.)
 
The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill is passing through Parliament. When it receives Royal Assent, it will enable the UK to impose and implement sanctions to comply with our international obligations. It will also support wider foreign policy and national security goals.
 
Currently, both UN and EU sanctions regimes include various exceptions to the prohibitions within those regimes and enable the provision of licenses so that valid actors, such as non-government organizations (NGOs), can carry out humanitarian activity in countries affected by sanctions. This enables the NGOs to continue their work without fear of breaching prohibitions. The UK government intends to continue to provide for exceptions and licenses once we leave the European Union and we become responsible for implementing our own sanctions regimes.
 
The document sets out the government’s intended approach in this area, and indicates how this will be used in relation to the most frequent types of sanctions. It looks at our intended policy in relation to asset freezes, counter terrorism, restrictions on financial activity, the export of goods and services, transport and travel bans.
 
The policy note is available 
here.

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NWSNEWS

NWS_a1
9
Defense News: “U.S. Makes it Cheaper for Foreign Nations to Buy American Weapons”

(Source: 
Defense News, 28 Apr 2018.)  
 
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced this week that it is reducing a surcharge on American defense goods sold abroad from 3.5 percent to 3.2 percent, effectively dropping the price foreign nations have to pay when buying weapons through the 
Foreign Military Sales system.
 
The change will go into effect June 1. The funding from the surcharge is used to support the FMS process, by which the U.S. government acts as the go-between for industry and a foreign customer, using the American acquisition system.
 
The announcement comes days after the Trump administration rolled out 
a new set of guidelines for conventional arms transfers and unmanned systems as part of a broader push to increase American weapon sales abroad.
 
The U.S. sold $41.9 billion in arms 
through the FMS process in fiscal 2017, per a DSCA statement. Based on that figure, the U.S. took in roughly $1.46 billion through the 3.5 percent surcharge. Reducing it to 3.2 percent would drop that number to around $1.34 billion.
 
DSCA head Lt. Gen. Charles Hooper tied the surcharge cut directly to that broader goal, saying in the announcement that the change “will immediately reduce the cost of doing business for our international partners.”
 
  “It demonstrates the Department of Defense’s commitment to charge only what is needed in order to support the administration of the FMS program which includes the sale of defense articles, defense services, and military training,” Hooper added.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a210

Expeditors News: “CBP Advises Importers to Ensure Mailing Addresses and ACH Numbers are Up to Date for GSP Refunds” 

(Source: 
Expeditors News, 30 Apr 2018.) 
 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has advised the trade via its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) informational web page that importers should ensure their mailing addresses and ACH numbers are up to date in order to facilitate GSP refunds.
 
On March 23, 2018, the President signed into law the Omnibus Spending Bill to fund the federal government, which contains provisions to renew GSP until December 31, 2020. CBP will apply GSP retroactively to entries filed after December 31, 2017. CBP will issue refunds on GSP-eligible merchandise on past entries, provided they were filed using Special Program Indicator (SPI) code “A,” or a request is filed with CBP within 180 days after the Spending Bill was enacted.
 
CBP’s information on GSP may be found 
here.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a3
11
The New York Times: “White House Considers Restricting Chinese Researchers Over Espionage Fears”

(Source: 
The New York Times, 30 Apr 2018.) [Excerpts.] 
 
It sounds like something out of a science fiction movie: In April, China is said to have tested an invisibility cloak that would allow ordinary fighter jets to suddenly vanish from radar screens.
 
This advancement, which could prove to be a critical intelligence breakthrough, is one that American officials fear China may have gained in part from a Chinese researcher who roused suspicions while working on a similar technology at a Duke University laboratory in 2008. The researcher, who was investigated by the F.B.I. but never charged with a crime, ultimately returned to China, became a billionaire and opened a thriving research institute that worked on some projects related to those he studied at Duke. … 
 

The United States already restricts who can work on sensitive technology. Researchers on projects deemed classified are carefully vetted and must obtain security clearances. The next level down are research projects that are subject to so-called export controls – including many with potential military applications, such as computer programs and hardware that might be used to model nuclear explosions. Universities and companies working on this material need to obtain a special license from the government to employ foreign researchers. … 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a4
12
Reuters: “Trump Delays Metal Tariffs on Canada, EU, Mexico, Exempts Some Others”

(Source: 
Reuters, 30 Apr 2018.) [Excerpts.] 
 
U.S. President Donald Trump has postponed the imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada, the European Union and Mexico until June 1, and has reached agreements for permanent exemptions for Argentina, Australia and Brazil, the White House said on Monday.
 
The decisions came just hours before temporary exemptions from the tariffs on these countries were set to expire at 12:01 a.m. (0401 GMT) on Tuesday.
 
In a statement, the White House said the details of the deals with Brazil, Argentina and Australia would be finalized shortly, and it did not disclose terms.
 
  “The administration is also extending negotiations with Canada, Mexico, and the European Union for a final 30 days. In all of these negotiations, the administration is focused on quotas that will restrain imports, prevent transshipment, and protect the national security,” the White House added.
 
A source familiar with the decision said there would be no further extensions beyond June 1 to stave off tariffs.
 
Trump on March 23 imposed a 25 percent tariff on steel imports and a 10 percent tariff on aluminum, but granted temporary exemptions to Canada, Mexico, Brazil, the EU, Australia and Argentina. Trump has also granted a permanent exemption on steel tariffs to South Korea as part of a revision of a free trade pact that he sharply criticized.
 
Trump has invoked a 1962 trade law to erect protections for U.S. steel and aluminum producers on national security grounds, amid a worldwide glut of both metals that is largely blamed on excess production in China.
 
The tariffs, which have increased frictions with U.S. trading partners worldwide and have prompted several challenges before the World Trade Organization, are aimed at allowing the two U.S. metals industries to increase their capacity utilization rates above 80 percent for the first time in years.
 
Trump administration officials have said that in lieu of tariffs, steel- and aluminum-exporting countries would have to agree to quotas designed to achieve similar protections for U.S. producers. … 
 

The White House said the agreements reflect administration efforts “to reach fair outcomes with allies to protect our national security and address global challenges to the steel and aluminum industries.” … 

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COMMCOMMENTARY

COMM_a0
13.
M. Volkov: “Lying and Accountability: ZTE Pays the Price”

(Source: 
Volkov Law Group Blog, 30 Apr 2018. Reprinted by permission.) 
 
* Author: Michael Volkov, Esq., Volkov Law Group, 
mvolkov@volkovlaw.com, 240-505-1992. 
 
Despite our political dialogue and the often-heard charges of fake news and lying, telling the truth still matters in a variety of contexts.  For example, Special Counsel Mueller has made various characters in the Russia investigation plead guilty to the crime of making false statements.
 
The US Department of Commerce recently announced that Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation of Shenzen China and ZTE Kangxun Telecommunications Ltd. (collectively referred to as “ZTE”) have been denied export privileges – because of its false statements made to Commerce Department officials. (Copy 
HERE).
 
In March 2017, ZTE agreed to pay civil and criminal penalties and forfeiture of $1.19 billion for illegally shipping telecommunications equipment to Iran and north Korea, making false statements and obstructing justice and affirmatively misleading the US Government.  As part of this settlement, ZTE agreed to a seven-year suspended denial of export privileges, which could be activated if ZTE violated the terms of the settlement agreement or violated Export Administration Regulations.
 
For some reason, ZTE is unable to provide truthful information to the US Government.  Despite its record of lies and deceit, after the settlement, ZTE continued to lie to the Commerce Department during its probationary period by claiming that it had imposed specific disciplinary punishments to various senior officials when, in fact, they had not been disciplined.  In fact, the ZTE employees were paid bonuses instead of being disciplined.  ZTE only acknowledged that it had made these false statements when asked to provide documents and information to confirm that the employees had been disciplined.
 
ZTE’s records of lies is discouraging to say the least.  ZTE made false statements when it was originally caught and put on the Commerce Department’s prohibited Entity List, made false statements during the settlement discussions and then again after its settlement.  ZTE’s culture of deceit is undeniable and calls into question whether the organization can ever be trusted.
 
Under the Commerce Department’s Denial Order, ZTE now cannot export any of its products – a death sentence for a global telecommunications company – for seven years.
 
Unfortunately, a number of recent enforcement actions involving banks and telecommunications companies have highlighted blatant misrepresentations made by company officials to US Government regulatory and enforcement agencies.  Everyone knows the importance of responding truthfully to government inquiries but these recent enforcement actions have highlighted specific lies and misrepresentations made to US Government officials.
 
While the facts in the ZTE case are disturbing, there still is a question that needs to be answered – what measures did in-house and outside counsel take to ensure that ZTE’s representations to the government were accurate?  Given ZTE’s track record, what level of due diligence did outside counsel conduct to verify the accuracy of any representation made to the government concerning the employees who were allegedly disciplined?  My rhetorical questions beg the answer – lawyers need to step up and demand more than just representing a client’s questionable representation.  In my view, any attorney should have demanded the same confirmation that the government ultimately requested from ZTE.
 
I know it is easy to second guess ZTE’s actions, but the legal profession has to stand up – it is one thing to zealously represent a client – it is another to fail to prevent or investigate false statements by a client that has a record of lying to the government.
 
ZTE now has to fight for its life.  The seven-year suspension is not the end of the story.  ZTE is continuing to meet with government officials in an effort to have the suspension lifted.  I suspect ZTE will present the government with an elaborate internal procedure governing statements made to government representatives to ensure accuracy and appropriate sign offs by corporate officials.  Frankly, this is something that ZTE and every company should already have in place.  Eventually, ZTE will pay more money, make more commitments of compliance and resume business as usual – the question is not whether they can restore any reputation for truthfulness, but whether ZTE can ever be trusted again.

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COMM_a01
14.
R.P. Jereski: “Advice to Exporters in Today’s Highly-Regulated Shipping Industry”

(Source: 
Guidepost Solutions Insights, 27 Apr 2018.) 
 
* Author: Richard P. Jereski, Managing Director, Guidepost Solutions, Washington DC. 
 
If there is any doubt that export control should be a major concern for exporters, re-exporters, and anyone else in the exporting community, one only has to look at 
recent civil settlement, and the increase in 
prison time individuals are receiving for violating export control regulations.
The U.S. Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control will consider mitigating factors and assess penalties below the maximum. However, the damage to the company’s reputation can have a long-lasting impact.
 
As a former Special Agent with the U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Export Enforcement, I have seen several issues arise indicating a company will likely have export related problems.
 
What can companies involved in the exporting, re-exporting, freight forwarding, or other related businesses do to protect themselves before Special Agents or other government regulators and investigators come knocking on their door? The government’s strategy and its immediate implementation should be considered clear notice for companies to 
conduct a self-assessment of their export compliance program. 
 
This includes:
 
(1) Targeted Training
 
A company’s export training program should focus on two high risk areas, sales and customer service. Employees in these two areas deal directly with the customers. They know their customers’ needs; where the goods are going; where the goods will be used; and how customers intend to use the goods.
 
Salespeople need to be trained in export compliance regulations and include export compliance in their sales pitches. They can utilize the 
Red Flag Indicators as a checklist to discover possible violations before they occur. They can also reference the questions found in the 
Know Your Customer Guidance to determine whether or not customers are buying the most efficient or beneficial product for their needs. Export compliance needs to be as important a part of a salesperson’s performance plan as making the numbers. In the long run, an informed and knowledgeable salesperson can save a company money from fines and loss of its good name.
 
A well-informed customer service representative (CSR) can also play a crucial part in a company’s ability to self-police. CSRs are a company’s connection to the product’s end user. If an end user contacts the CSR for assistance with trouble shooting, or installing and maintaining a controlled commodity, the CSR should engage the customer/end user in conversation. Employing techniques similar to those the salesperson uses from the Know Your Customer Guidance, the CSR can determine whether the end user is the same person listed on the 
BIS-711, export license, sales contract, invoice, or other export-related record. If he or she is not the appropriate end user, the educated CSR will alert the export compliance officer
 
Training material containing the latest guidance and document versions, should be disseminated to all employees dealing with customers. They are the first to know if a transaction does not “feel right” or if a commodity scheduled to be shipped to Singapore is being used by an end user in Iran. Some 
training materials can be found on the BIS website.
 
Monthly or quarterly training sessions with export compliance as a focal point, can alert employees of new potential schemes to avoid EAR requirements or share lessons learned from near misses or mistakes competitors have made.
 
These training sessions will help ensure the company is implementing best practices for export compliance. While the EAR requires some mandatory actions, such as maintaining records and complying with license conditions and riders, there are several other best practices to further enhance export compliance programs. These include:
 
  – Screening third parties;
  – Conducting due diligence on transaction partners;
  – Training;
  – Accurate and complete record keeping; and
  – Periodic compliance reviews.
 
(2) Dedicated Full-time Employees
 
Employees dedicated to export compliance, familiar with the 
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and other export-related regulations, knowledgeable of terms of art related to export compliance, able to educate employees, and who can monitor export activity and ensure accurate and complete record keeping, are sure-fire signs a company’s management takes export compliance seriously.
 
The world of export compliance is complicated. Where a company conducts a substantial amount of business through exporting, is exporting to high-risk countries, or dealing with sensitive commodities or technologies, export compliance cannot generally be handled on a part-time basis. For example: a manufacturer of controlled commodities whose export compliance manager is also the shipping manager or is handling export compliance as a collateral duty. A dual role often suggests that the company:
 
  (a) Does not take export compliance seriously; and
  (b) Is looking to save money by overloading its employees.
 
By having the shipping manager also serve as the export compliance officer, the company could be perceived by regulators as having an “I don’t care” attitude with regard to where their products are sold, who is buying their goods, or how their goods are being used.
 
(3) Periodic Auditing 
 
Reviewing export compliance records is critical. A yearly independent third-party review helps ensure the appropriate records are being maintained; allows for a review of the classification of the commodities, software, technology, or services being exported; and presents an opportunity to file a voluntary self-disclosure if a violation is found. Timely and diligent reviews of these records on a regular basis may give the investigative agency the sense that the company takes its export compliance issues seriously. Not being timely and/or diligent may give rise to the implication of “willful blindness”, which can be an aggravating factor in civil cases or prove the intent element of a criminal case.
 
By not implementing these strategies to address export control issues proactively, businesses will face serious consequences. The reputational and brand damage a company may suffer from failing to comply with any export control regime can be detrimental and costly. In addition to the hefty civil fines and/or criminal penalties incurred, companies may lose their export privileges completely.
 
This prophylactic approach can be done using an external consulting firm, law firm, or internal subject matter experts. Conducting an annual review or 
self-assessment may identify common errors. Focus on training staff, engaging full-time export compliance personnel, and maintaining all documentation required by law. In addition, engaging an independent third-party to conduct these reviews on a regular basis is the best way to ensure internal experts are fully trained and do not inadvertently overlook errors.

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COMM_a2
15. 
R.C. Thomsen II, A.D. Paytas, & M.M. Shomali: “Changes to Export Controls in April 2018”

(Source: 
alerts@t-b.com, 30 Apr 2018.) 
 
* Authors: Roszel C. Thomsen II, Esq., 
roz@t-b.com; Antoinette D. Paytas, Esq., 
toni@t-b.com; and Maher M. Shomali, Esq., 
maher@t-b.com. All of Thomsen & Burke LLP.
 
This memo summarizes the regulatory, legislative, enforcement and personnel developments with respect to U.S. and multilateral export controls during the month of April 2018. …   
 
Regulatory Updates
 
BIS Activates ZTE’s Denial Order
 
We are continuing to monitor the announcement from the Commerce Department this month that BIS has imposed a denial of export privileges against Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation, of Shenzhen, China (ZTE Corporation) and ZTE Kangxun Telecommunications Ltd. of Hi-New Shenzhen, China (ZTE Kangxun) (collectively, ZTE). 
 
The Denial Order prohibits ZTE from participating in any way in any transaction subject to the EAR. However, it also restricts U.S. companies from:
 
  (1) Exporting or re-exporting to or on behalf of ZTE any item subject to the EAR; or
  (2) Engaging in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by ZTE.
 
Additional restrictions are set forth below:
 
As way of background, in March 2017, after a five-year U.S. Government investigation, ZTE Corporation and the Departments of Justice, Commerce and Treasury announced a global settlement of charges that ZTE violated the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Regulations. ZTE agreed to a combined civil and criminal penalty and forfeiture of $1.19 billion after illegally shipping telecommunications equipment to Iran and North Korea, making false statements, and obstructing justice including through preventing disclosure to and affirmatively misleading the U.S. Government. 
 
In addition to these monetary penalties, ZTE also agreed a seven-year suspended denial of export privileges, which could be activated if any aspect of the agreement was not met and/or if the company committed additional violations of the EAR.
 
The Department of Commerce has now determined ZTE made false statements to BIS in 2016, during settlement negotiations, and in 2017, during the probationary period, related to senior employee disciplinary actions the company said it was taking or had already taken. ZTE’s false statements only were reported to the U.S. Government after BIS requested information and documentation showing that employee discipline had occurred. 
 
As a result, BIS has activated ZTE’s Denial Order and placed the following restrictions on the company: 
 
ZTE may not directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to:
 
  – Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license exception, or export control document;
  – Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the Regulations; or
  – Benefiting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or from any other activity subject to the Regulations.
 
No person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:
 
  – Export or reexport to or on behalf of ZTE any item subject to the Regulations; 
  – Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by ZTE of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby ZTE acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
  – Take any item subject to the Regulations that has been exported from the United States;
  – Obtain from ZTE in the United States any item subject to the Regulations with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
  – Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by ZTE, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by ZTE if such service involves the use of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing.
 
The Denial Order also noted that after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in Section 766.23 of the Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to ZTE by affiliation, ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of trade or related services may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.
 
Additional information can be found at:
 
  – 
ZTE Denial Order
  – 
Reuters Article … 
 
BIS Implements the February 2017 Australia Group (AG) Intersessional Decisions and the June 2017 AG Plenary Understandings
 
BIS issued a final rule amending the EAR to implement the recommendations presented at the February 2017 Australia Group (AG) Intersessional Implementation Meeting and the June 2017 AG Plenary Implementation Meeting that were adopted by the AG. The following ECCNs are amended to reflect changes to the AG common control lists based on the 2017 AG Intersessional Implementation Meeting:
 
  – ECCN 2B350 (by adding certain prefabricated repair assemblies, and specially designed components therefor, that are designed for attachment to glass-lined reaction vessels, reactors, storage tanks, containers or receivers controlled by this entry);
  – ECCN 2B351 (by clarifying that toxic gas monitoring equipment includes toxic gas monitors and monitoring systems, as well as their dedicated detecting components); and
  – ECCN 2B352 (by adding certain nucleic acid assemblers and synthesizers to this entry and clarifying how the capacity of certain fermenters should be measured for purposes of determining whether they are controlled under this entry).
 
The following ECCNs are amended to reflect changes to the AG common control lists based on the 2017 AG Plenary Implementation Meeting:
 
  – ECCN 1C353 (to clarify that genetically modified organisms include organisms in which the nucleic acid sequences have been created or altered by deliberate molecular manipulation and that inactivated organisms containing recoverable nucleic acids are considered to be genetic elements); and
  – ECCN 1C350 (by adding N,N-Diisopropylaminoethanethiol hydrochloride).
 
In addition, this rule corrects several typographical errors in a note to ECCN 1C351 and updates the advance notification requirements in the EAR that apply to certain exports of saxitoxin.
 
Finally, this rule amends the EAR to reflect the addition of India as a participating country in the AG
 
BIS Imposes License Requirements on Transfers of Specified Target Assemblies and Components for the Production of Tritium, and Related “Development” and “Production” Technology
 
BIS has implemented a final rule amending the EAR to to impose a license requirement on exports and reexports of specified target assemblies and components for the production of tritium under new Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 1A231, and for the related “production” technology for 1A231 commodities covered under ECCNs 1E001 and 1E201. The items identified in this rule are controlled for nuclear nonproliferation (NP) Column 1 and anti-terrorism (AT) Column 1 reasons. These new classifications are the result of a U.S. Government proposal submitted and agreed to by members of the relevant multilateral regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), in June 2017. This final rule, as required under the 0Y521 procedure and in fulfillment of multilateral commitments, implements the multilateral control for the items adopted by the NSG.
 
OFAC Posts Update Concerning Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions
 
OFAC designated certain persons to the Specially Designated National’s List pursuant to the Ukraine-/Russia-related authorities, and the following Ukraine-/Russia-related general licenses in connection with these designations: 
 
  – General License 12 “Authorizing Certain Activities Necessary to Maintenance or Wind down of Operations or Existing Contracts”;
  – General License 13 “Authorizing Certain Transactions Necessary to Divest or Transfer Debt, Equity, or other Holdings in Certain Blocked Persons”; and
  – General License 14 “Authorizing Certain Activities Necessary to Maintenance or Wind Down of Operations or Existing Contracts with United Company RUSAL PLC”.
 
OFAC is also updating its 
FAQ’s related to these actions.
 
Enforcement Actions
 
 
A Morristown, New Jersey, woman appeared in federal court this month to face charges for her alleged role in an international procurement network that smuggled over $2 million worth of aircraft components from the United States to Iran in violation of export control laws.
 
Joyce Eliabachus is charged in a three-count criminal complaint with conspiracy to violate the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), conspiracy to commit money laundering, and conspiracy to smuggle goods from the United States.
 
According to the complaint, Eliabachus – the principal officer and operator of Edsun Equipments LLC, a purported New Jersey-based aviation parts trading company run out of her Morristown residence – is allegedly part of a sophisticated procurement network that has secretly acquired large quantities of license-controlled aircraft components from U.S. manufacturers and vendors, and exported those parts to Iran through freight-forwarding companies located in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey, in violation of U.S. export control laws.
 
From May 2015 through October 2017, Eliabachus and her conspirators facilitated at least 49 shipments containing a total of approximately 23,554 license-controlled aircraft parts from the U.S. to Iran, all of which were exported without the required licenses. Eliabachus conspired with the owner of an Iranian-based procurement firm, identified in the complaint as “CC-1,” whose international network helped initiate the purchase of U.S.-origin aircraft components on behalf of CC-1’s clients in Iran. The network’s client list was comprised of Iranian airline companies, several of which have been officially designated by the U.S. government as posing a threat to the country’s national security, foreign policy, or economic interests, including Mahan Air Co., Caspian Airlines, and Kish Air, among others.
 
Using Edsun Equipment in New Jersey, Eliabachus finalized the purchase and acquisition of the requested components from the various U.S.-based distributors. She then re-packaged and shipped the components to shipping companies in the UAE and Turkey, including Parthia Cargo and Reibel Tasimacilik Ve Tic A.S., where her Iranian conspirators directed trans-shipment of the components to locations in Iran.
 
In order to obscure the extent of the network’s procurement activities, Eliabachus routinely falsified the true destination and end-user of the aircraft components she acquired. She also falsified the true value of the components being exported in order to evade the necessity of filing export control forms, which further obscured the network’s illegal activities from law enforcement. The funds for the illicit transactions were obtained from the various Iranian purchasers, funneled through Turkish bank accounts held in the names of various shell companies controlled by the Iranian conspirators, and ultimately transferred into one of Edsun Equipments’ U.S.-based accounts. The network’s creation and use of multiple bank accounts and shell companies abroad was intended to conceal the true sources of funds in Iran, as well as the identities of the various Iranian entities who were receiving U.S. aircraft components.
 
The charge of conspiracy to violate the ITSR carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a $1 million fine. The charge of conspiracy to commit money laundering carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a $500,000 fine. The charge of conspiracy to smuggle goods carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine.
 
 
Zhelyaz Andreev, a Bulgarian national, was arrested pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice based on an Indictment charging him with: conspiracy to defraud the U.S. Government and substantive violations of the Syria Trade Embargo as enforced through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA); and the U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) designation of Syrian Arab Airlines, aka Syrian Air, as a Specially Designated National (SDN) whose assets are blocked and with whom U.S. nationals are prohibited from transacting business.
 
Andreev was charged with conspiracy to violate IEEPA and the OFAC regulations by exporting dual-use goods, that is, articles that have both civilian and military application, to Syrian Arab Airlines, the Syrian government’s airline, which is an entity designated and blocked by OFAC for transporting weapons and ammunition to Syria in conjunction with Hizballah, a terrorist organization, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. 
 
According to court documents, Andreev worked in the Bulgaria office of AW-Tronics, a Miami export company, which shipped and exported various aircraft parts and equipment to Syrian Arab Airlines. Andreev dealt directly with the Syrian Air principals who procured the parts.
 
 

Iulian Petre, a/k/a “Julian Petre,” 51, of Waterville, Maine, was sentenced this month in U.S. District Court by Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. to two years in prison and three years of supervised release for illegally receiving and shipping firearms. He was convicted of these charges on August 28, 2017, following a six-day jury trial. Court records and trial evidence revealed that in 2012 and 2013, Petre purchased and received firearms from out-of-state sellers intending to unlawfully export them. He shipped some of these firearms to Romania. The export of these firearms required authorization from the U.S. Department of State, which the defendant knowingly failed to obtain. … 

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MSEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

MS_a216. ECS Presents “ITAR/EAR Boot Camp (Seminar Level I)” on 10-11 Jul in Long Beach, CA

(Source: Suzanne Palmer, 
spalmer@exportcompliancesolutions.com.)
 
* What: ITAR/EAR Boot Camp (Seminar Level I), Long Beach, CA
* When: July 
10-11, 2018
* Where: 
Hilton Long Beach
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Solutions (ECS)
* ECS Speaker Panel:  Suzanne Palmer, Mal Zerden
* Register: 
Here 
or by calling 866-238-4018 or email 

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ENEDITOR’S NOTES


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EN_a318
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments to applicable regulations are listed below.
 
*
ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
 
*
CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 12 Apr 2018: 83 FR 15736-15740: CBP Decision No. 18-04; Definition of Importer Security Filing Importer (ISF Importer)
 
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 
here
.)


EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR)
: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  – Last Amendment: 
2 Apr 2018:
83 FR 13849-13862
: Implementation of the February 2017 Australia Group (AG) Intersessional Decisions and the June 2017 AG Plenary Understandings; Addition of India to the AG [Amendment of EAR Parts 738, 740, 745, and 774.]; and 5 Apr 2018: 83 FR 14580-14583: Reclassification of Targets for the Production of Tritium and Related Development and Production Technology Initially Classified Under the 0Y521 Series [Imposes License Requirements on Transfers of Specified Target Assemblies and Components for the Production of Tritium, and Related “Development” and “Production” Technology.]

  
*
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR)
: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

  – Last Amendment: 19 Mar 2018:
83 FR 11876-11881: Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties 

 
*
FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR)
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 24 Apr 2018: 3 FR 17749-17751: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
  – The latest edition (30 Apr 2018) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance websiteBITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.  
 
*
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA)
, 1 Jan 2018: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – 
Last Amendment: 25 Apr 2018: Harmonized System Update 1806
[contains 5,993 ABI records and 1,287 harmonized tariff records.]
  – HTS codes for AES are available 
here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 
here.

 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130.

  – Last Amendment: 14 Feb 2018: 83 FR 6457-6458: Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Addition of South Sudan [Amends ITAR Part 126.] 

  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 25 Apr 2018) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated 
ITAR

(“BITAR”)
, by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.
 The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
 
website
. BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please
contact us
to receive your discount code.

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EN_a0319
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 
here

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EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission, provided attribution is given to “The Export/Import Daily Bugle of (date)”. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.


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