18-0403 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

18-0403 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

Tuesday, 3 April 2018

The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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  1. Commerce/BIS Announces ISTAC Meeting on 25-26 Apr in Washington DC
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. DoD/DSCA Releases Policy Memo 18-15
  4. State/DDTC Posts Name Change Announcements for 2 Entities
  5. State/DDTC Posts DTAG Documents and Presentations
  6. Dutch Government Publishes Guide Concerning Cloud Exports
  7. UK DIT/EJCU Publishes Guidance on “Cryptography Note” in EC Council Regulation 428/2009
  1. The Maritime Executive: “U.N. Blacklists 27 Ships for Sanctions-Busting”
  2. ST&R Trade Report: “Chinese Policies, IPR, Tariffs, Import Restrictions Highlighted in Annual Trade Barriers Report”
  1. M. Bromley & G. Maletta: “The Conflict in Yemen and EU’s Arms Export Controls: Highlighting the Flaws of the Current Regime”
  2. O. Torres, D. Kyle & J. Creek: “Non-U.S. Companies Beware: U.S. Export Laws May Apply to You”
  3. Gary Stanley’s EC Tip of the Day
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (22 Feb 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (2 Apr 2018), FACR/OFAC (19 Mar 2018), FTR (20 Sep 2017), HTSUS (30 Mar 2018), ITAR (14 Feb 2018) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 



Commerce/BIS Announces ISTAC Meeting on 25-26 Apr in Washington DC

Federal Register, 3 Apr 2018.)  
83 FR 14252: Technical Advisory Committee; Notice of Partially Closed Meeting
  The Information Systems Technical Advisory Committee (ISTAC) will meet on April 25 and 26, 2018, 9:00 a.m., in the Herbert C. Hoover Building, Room 3884, 14th Street between Constitution and Pennsylvania Avenues NW, Washington, DC. The Committee advises the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Export Administration on technical questions that affect the level of export controls applicable to information systems equipment and technology.
Wednesday, April 25, 2018 – Open Session
  (1) Welcome and Introductions
  (2) Working Group Reports
  (3) Old Business
  (4) Learnings from Semiconductor and Device Roadmaps: 10, 7, 5nm and beyond
  (5) Industry Wassenaar Proposals for 2019
Thursday, April 26, 2018 – Closed Session
  (6) Discussion of matters determined to be exempt from the provisions relating to public meetings found in 5 U.S.C. app. 2 Sec. Sec.  10(a)(1) and 10(a)(3).
  The open sessions will be accessible via teleconference to 25 participants on a first come, first serve basis. To join the conference, submit inquiries to Ms. Joanna M. Lewis at
Joanna.Lewis@bis.doc.gov no later than, April 18, 2018.
  A limited number of seats will be available for the public session. Reservations are not accepted. To the extent that time permits, members of the public may present oral statements to the Committee. The public may submit written statements at any time before or after the meeting. However, to facilitate the distribution of public presentation materials to the Committee members, the Committee suggests that presenters forward the public presentation materials prior to the meeting to Ms. Lewis via email.
  The Assistant Secretary for Administration, with the concurrence of the delegate of the General Counsel, formally determined on January 4, 2018, pursuant to Section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. app. 2 Sec.  (l0)(d)), that the portion of the meeting concerning trade secrets and commercial or financial information deemed privileged or confidential as described in 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4) and the portion of the meeting concerning matters the disclosure of which would be likely to frustrate significantly implementation of an agency action as described in 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(B) shall be exempt from the provisions relating to public meetings found in 5 U.S.C. app. 2 Sec. Sec.  10(a)(1) and l0(a)(3). The remaining portions of the meeting will be open to the public.
  For more information, call Joanna M. Lewis at (202) 482-6440.
Joanna M. Lewis, Committee Liaison Officer.

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OGS_a12. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

* Commerce/BIS; NOTICES; Meetings: Sensors and Instrumentation Technical Advisory Committee [Publication Date: 4 Apr 2018.]
* Justice/ATF; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals:
Licensed Firearms Manufacturers Records of Production, Disposition, and Supporting Data [Publication Date: 4 Apr 2018.]
* State; NOTICES;
  – Designations as Global Terrorist; Laskar-e-Tayyiba (and other aliases); and
  – Designations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations:
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (and other aliases) [Publication Dates: 4 Apr 2018.]

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State/DDTC Posts Name Change Announcements for 2 Entities

State/DDTC, 3 Apr 2018.)
  (1) Airbus Group Australia Pacific Limited
Name Change Web Notice  
  (2) T&M Systems B.V.
Name Change Web Notice

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Dutch Government Publishes Guide Concerning Cloud Exports

The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has published on its website a
 (in Dutch) concerning Cloud Exports.
This guidance explains that an export occurs when controlled technology uploaded to a Cloud is made available to persons physically located outside of the Netherlands, even if they are Dutch nationals. The guide confirms that an export occurs when controlled technology is uploaded to a Cloud accessible to persons located outside of the Netherlands, even if no such access has yet occurred. 

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UK DIT/EJCU Publishes Guidance on “Cryptography Note” in EC Council Regulation 428/2009

UK DIT/EJCU, Notice to Exporters 2018/07, 3 Apr 2018.)
The Export Control Joint Unit (EJCU) of the UK Department of International Trade (DIT) has published on its website a guidance on the “Cryptography Note”.
This guidance is provided to assist exporters to make their own assessment on the application of the “Cryptography Note” – Note 3 to Category 5 Part 2, Information Security as it appears in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 (as last amended by Regulation (EU) No. 2268/2017).

The guidance is available here.

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The Maritime Executive: “U.N. Blacklists 27 Ships for Sanctions-Busting”

The Maritime Executive, 2 Apr 2018.) [Excerpts.]
On Friday, the U.N. Security Council added 27 ships to its blacklist for alleged involvement in North Korean smuggling, including 12 vessels owned outside of the DPRK. The resolution contains the largest new list of U.N.-designated vessels yet, and it includes much more detail than previous announcements. …
Many of these vessels were named in an earlier
announcement regarding sanctions violations. The resolution calls for these 12 ships to be de-flagged by their registries and banned from all ports in U.N. member states (effectively all ports worldwide).

The new sanctions designations cover many of these vessels’ managers as well. Among other allegations, the operators of the Xin Guang Hai, Hao Fan 2, Hao Fan 6, Dong Feng 6 and Asia Bridge 1stand accused of loading North Korean coal for export in violation of U.N. sanctions. Where details are available, the tankers’ operators were allegedly involved in high-seas ship-to-ship petroleum transfers designed to circumvent sanctions restrictions. … 

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ST&R Trade Report: “Chinese Policies, IPR, Tariffs, Import Restrictions Highlighted in Annual Trade Barriers Report”

Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg Trade Report, 3 Apr 2018.) [Excerpts.]
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has issued its annual National Trade Estimate report [available
here], which describes significant foreign barriers to U.S. exports of goods and services, foreign direct investment, and intellectual property rights protection as well as the actions being taken to address those barriers. The NTE report covers the most important barriers, including those that may be consistent with international trade rules (e.g., very high tariffs), affecting U.S. exports to 60 countries, the European Union, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and one regional body.
This year’s report again includes technical barriers, such as product standards and testing, labeling, and certification requirements; sanitary and phytosanitary barriers, which include measures used to ensure that foods and beverages are safe for consumers and to protect animals and plants from pests and diseases; and barriers to exports of telecommunication goods and services. In addition, to highlight the growing and evolving trade using or enabled by electronic networks and information and communications technology, relevant country chapters include a dedicated section on barriers to digital trade. 
USTR states that among the notable changes concerning barriers to U.S. exports in 2017, both positive and negative, are the following.
Argentina. Argentinean authorities undertook significant enforcement actions last year against the sale of counterfeit goods. Authorities seized millions of dollars’ worth of illicit goods and made key arrests to dismantle organized crime operations in La Salada, one South America’s largest black markets for counterfeit and pirated goods.
Canada. In June 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected lower Canadian courts’ rulings that if a patent promised more than it could provide it could be invalidated for lack of utility. Canadian courts had used this “utility” or “promise doctrine” to invalidate a number of patents held by U.S. pharmaceutical companies but the Supreme Court of Canada struck down this doctrine as “unsound,” ruling that it is inconsistent with Canada’s Patent Act.
China. China uses a range of measures, including industrial plans such as “Made in China 2025,” to engineer the transfer of foreign technology to China. To accomplish its industrial policy goals, for example, China denies certain financial or regulatory incentives to companies that do not own their intellectual property in China, do not conduct large amounts of research and development in China, and/or do not manufacture products in China. Beijing also conditions foreign investment approvals on technology transfers to Chinese entities, mandates adverse licensing terms on foreign IP licensors, uses anti-monopoly enforcement to extract technology on unreasonable terms, and subsidizes acquisitions of foreign high-tech firms to bring technology to Chinese parent companies. Additionally, structural gaps and inconsistencies in IPR protection and enforcement allow Chinese entities to appropriate foreign IP. For example, misappropriation of trade secrets for the benefit of Chinese companies has occurred both within China and outside of China.
Chinese government industrial policies and financial support have contributed to massive excess capacity in China, with the resulting over-production and increased exports distorting global markets and hurting U.S. producers and workers in both the U.S. market and third country markets where U.S. exports compete with Chinese exports. This excess capacity has led to lower global prices and a glut of supply that undermine the viability of even the most competitive manufacturers, and policies like Made in China 2025 call for this pattern of distortion to continue.
U.S. and global partners continue to have serious concerns regarding a series of Chinese cybersecurity measures that would impose severe restrictions on a wide range of U.S. and other foreign information and communications technology products and services to replace such products and services with Chinese-made ICT products and services in China’s market. Concerns center on requirements in sectors that China deems “critical” to ensure that ICT equipment and other ICT products and services be “secure and controllable.” In addition, China would impose severe restrictions on cross-border data flows and requirements for data localization. Notwithstanding the negative U.S. and international reaction, China continues to move forward with its cybersecurity regime and problems continue to arise.
Colombia. Following U.S. engagement, Colombia’s Superintendency of Industry and Trade (SIC) in August 2017 added the U.S. to the list of countries that provide an adequate level of data protection. This corrected the original circular that did not include the U.S. and would have posed a significant impediment to digital trade. …
Israel. Israel required U.S. exporters seeking to claim preferential treatment under the U.S.-Israel FTA to provide an original, consularized form (Form A or UNCTAD green form). For many years, U.S. exporters shipping to Israel wishing to take advantage of these tariff preferences struggled to locate and obtain a hard copy “Form A.” To eliminate this barrier to U.S. exports, USTR negotiated an approach with Israel, reflected in a decision of the Joint Committee under the FTA, that would allow Israel to accept self-declarations of origin for U.S. exports and to dispense with the use of the UNCTAD green form. The new simplified procedure went into effect on Jan. 10. …
Korea. USTR called for a special session under the U.S.-Korea FTA in July 2017 to seek changes to rebalance the agreement in ways that will be more favorable to American workers and businesses. An agreement in principle was announced March 28 and the agreement is now being finalized. In its discussions to improve KORUS, the U.S. achieved steps to improve the large trade deficit in industrial goods with Korea and to address KORUS implementation concerns that have hindered U.S. export growth. …
Vietnam. Vietnam is implementing a plan to develop its own local electronic payments industry by requiring that all credit and debit payment transactions be processed by a government-owned monopoly, the National Payments Corporation of Vietnam. Implementation of the new system has been postponed until January 2019. The U.S. continues to urge Vietnam to adopt a competitive approach in which U.S. electronic payment companies are able to supply services without disruption or harm to commercial arrangements that have been in place for many years.
In October 2017, Vietnam issued Decree 116 imposing onerous new requirements on imports, including new certification and testing requirements. The decree has resulted in significant trade disruptions since it entered into force on Jan. 1. The U.S. continues to engage Vietnam for a solution to these concerns that allows trade to resume for the benefit of both countries.

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M. Bromley & G. Maletta: “The Conflict in Yemen and EU’s Arms Export Controls: Highlighting the Flaws of the Current Regime”

SIPRI, 16 Mar 2018.) [Excerpts.]
* Authors: Mark Bromley, Director of the SIPRI Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control program, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (“SIPRI”); Giovanna Maletta, Research Assistant at SIPRI.
Under the 1998 
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export, which was replaced in 2008 by the 
EU Common Position on Arms Exports, member states of the European Union have committed themselves to achieving ‘high common standards’ and ‘convergence’ in their arms export controls. The standards are outlined in eight criteria that require member states to abide by certain standards when assessing licenses
 for arms exports. This includes denying licenses when there is a ‘clear risk’ that the arms ‘might’ be used to commit violations of human rights or 
international humanitarian law (IHL) and ‘[taking] into account’ the risk that they will be diverted to an unauthorized end-user or end-use. Meanwhile, convergence in member states’ controls is promoted through systems of information sharing and-in cases where one state wishes to issue a license for an arms export that another state has previously denied-a commitment to consult one another. However, decision-making in arms export licensing falls under states’ national competence and there is no formal mechanism at the EU level to sanction non-compliance with the Common Position. As such, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), parliamentarians and academics have often questioned whether EU member states are applying the criteria of the Common Position correctly and consistently. … 

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O. Torres, D. Kyle & J. Creek: “Non-U.S. Companies Beware: U.S. Export Laws May Apply to You”

Torres Law PLLC, 2 Apr 2018.)
* Authors: Olga Torres, Esq.; Dick Kyle, Esq., and Jonathan Creek, Esq. All of Torres Law PLLC. Contact information: 214-593-7120, info@torrestradelaw.com.
Non-U.S. companies involved in the reexporting of U.S. goods or technology should familiarize themselves with the applicable U.S. export laws, regardless of where they are located. This is because the U.S. export and economic sanctions laws have wide ranging extraterritorial reach. While companies with little or no connection to the U.S. may think they are not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, recent enforcement cases are a stark reminder that this is not the case. In fact, companies not located in the U.S. can be penalized for reexports of U.S.-origin products or technology contrary to U.S. laws such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (“ITAR”) and the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”). This is because these laws apply to U.S.-origin products wherever located. This includes foreign products containing U.S.-origin components or incorporating U.S.-origin technology controlled by the U.S. export laws. Additionally, the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) administers and enforces U.S. embargoes and sanctions programs against countries and certain identified individuals. OFAC sanctions address the conduct of U.S. persons, meaning U.S. citizens and permanent residents wherever located; all persons in the U.S., irrespective of citizenship; and all U.S. incorporated entities and their foreign branches or subsidiaries owned or controlled by U.S. entities.
U.S. Export Laws
The EAR generally imposes the same licensing requirements on exports as it does on reexports. Items subject to the EAR include: all U.S.-origin items wherever located; foreign made commodities that incorporate controlled U.S.-origin commodities; and certain foreign made direct products of U.S.-origin technology or software. [FN/1] Non-U.S. products will be subject to the EAR where the foreign made product incorporates more than a de minimis amount of U.S.-origin components or technology.
The key to determining whether a non-U.S. product is subject to the EAR is to determine whether there is more than a de minimis amount of U.S.-origin components or technology. For most destinations, non-U.S. made items incorporating controlled U.S. commodities, software, or technology valued at 25% or less are not subject to EAR jurisdiction. If, however, the non-U.S. product is destined for a country in EAR group E:1 (e.g., Iran, North Korea), then the de minimis threshold is 10% or less of the total value of the finished item. Ultimately, the application of the de minimis rule depends on the Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) of the U.S.-origin component or technology and the ultimate destination. Notably, when determining whether the U.S. content is incorporated into the non-U.S. item, the EAR looks at the country of destination and not the end-use. [FN/2]
The ITAR requires U.S. State Department authorization for the export, reexport, or retransfer of defense articles or technical data subject to the ITAR. [FN/3] For purposes of the ITAR, a defense article is any item on the United States Munition List (“USML”). ITAR jurisdiction applies where the defense article is in the U.S., regardless of its origin; the transaction involves a U.S.-origin defense article; or the transaction involves a defense article developed or manufactured with U.S.-origin technical data or assistance subject to the ITAR.
Unlike the EAR, the ITAR does not contain an exception for non-U.S. items that incorporate less than a de minimis amount of U.S.-origin content. Instead, a see-through rule is adopted where the ITAR sees through the non-ITAR controlled end item to control the ITAR controlled part contained within. Additionally, the use of U.S.-origin ITAR controlled technical data or defense services in overseas production of defense articles will subject any article produced with such controlled data or services to the jurisdiction of the ITAR.
Extraterritorial Effect Examples
In recent years, the U.S. government has more widely applied the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. export laws and sanctions. One of the biggest cases occurred in May 2017 when ZTE Corporation (“ZTE”), a Chinese telecommunications firm, agreed to a combined penalty of $1.19 billion in a settlement agreement with the Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce. [FN/4] (A more detailed description of this settlement can be found in our previous article,
From A to ZTE: A Review of Lessons Learned from the ZTE Case.) Despite operating primarily in China, ZTE was still given one of the largest penalties ever for violating relevant U.S. export and sanctions laws. Although ZTE was fortunate to avoid a denial of export activities for any prolonged period of time, this case shows a renewed resolve to enforce U.S. export laws and sanctions, even against companies operating primarily outside of the U.S.
A notable case for violations of the ITAR and involving a Spanish company ended up in administrative debarment.  On June 4, 2014, Carlos Dominguez and the Spanish company of which he was principal, Elint SA, and successor companies were administratively debarred pursuant to ITAR § 127.7(a) for unauthorized reexports and retransfers of night-vision equipment. [FN/5] Administrative debarment prohibits any person from participating directly or indirectly with the debarred party in activity subject to the ITAR. Mr. Dominguez’s illegal activity was discovered through “unfavorable responses” to Blue Lantern checks, which are end-use inquiries conducted around the world by U.S. embassy personnel. Mr. Dominguez attempted to avoid a policy of denial issued by DDTC by establishing new business names and other means of circumvention. Mr. Dominguez ignored further communication from DDTC related to the suspected illegal activity, and eventually ignored DDTC’s charging letter, leading to a default order and debarment.
Many non-U.S. companies have learned the hard way that a lack of a U.S. presence will not prevent the extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. laws. On January 12, 2017, Aban Offshore Limited (“Aban”), an Indian drilling services company, settled with OFAC for conduct that violated the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. [FN/6] On or around June 27, 2008, Aban’s subsidiary in Singapore placed an order for oil rig supplies from a U.S. vendor with the intent of reexporting these supplies from the United Arab Emirates to an off-shore oil rig in the territorial waters of Iran. Although Aban is an Indian company with no U.S. offices, it was subject to the extraterritorial reach of OFAC’s jurisdiction due to the reexported oil rig parts being U.S.-origin.
Steps to Comply with U.S. Export Laws
Because U.S. export laws apply to the products themselves, reexporters of U.S.-origin products should ensure they are in compliance with these laws. If a non-U.S. -origin item is subject to the EAR by virtue of the de minimis rule, the reexporter should determine whether a reexport license is needed, based on the classification of the finished item, not the status of the controlled U.S. content. In many cases, the end-use may be subject to a lower classification than the U.S.-origin content contained within, and may not require a license for reexport.
Additionally, exporters and reexporters should prepare for any end-use checks conducted by the U.S. government. An end-use check allows the U.S. government to verify the end-use declared on the license application is the same as the actual end-use of the covered item. End-use checks are also used in situations where an item is shipped subject to a license exception. While an end-use check may seem overly intrusive to a foreign exporter, once undergone, an end-use check and favorable result can actually make it easier for U.S. exporters to obtain licenses when shipping to the foreign company. Refusing an end-use check will lead to an automatic unfavorable determination by the U.S. agent performing the check. This will likely result in the company being listed on the Entity List and/or the Unverified List. A company listed on the Entity List will effectively lose their export privileges, and the vast majority of U.S. exporters will not ship to companies on the lists.
U.S. export and sanctions laws can be complicated for anyone, but can cause unnecessary headaches for reexporters who are not located in the U.S. If these foreign reexporters are subject to U.S. laws they can face major consequences if they do not comply with them. As such, foreign companies should also consider developing and implementing policies and procedures to navigate the complex area of U.S. export and economic sanctions laws.
  [FN/1] 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(a).
  [FN/2] 15 C.F.R. § 734 Supp. No. 2 at (a)(1) (“Part 744 of the EAR should not be used to identify controlled U.S. content for purposes of determining the applicability of the de minimis rules”).
  [FN/3] 22 C.F.R. § 127.1. (ITAR authorization is also required for the temporary imports of defense items).
  [FN/4] Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, ZTE Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay Over $430.4 Million for Violating U.S. Sanctions by Sending U.S.-Origin Items to Iran, available
here (last visited March 29, 2018).
  [FN/5] Administrative Debarment of Carlos Dominguez, Elint, S.A., Spain Night Vision, S.A., and SNV, S.A. Under the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations; Correction, 79 Fed. Reg. 37384, available
here (last visited March 29, 2018).
  [FN/6] Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Information, Aban Offshore Settles Potential Civil Liability for an Apparent Violation of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, available
here (last visited March 29, 2018).

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Gary Stanley’s EC Tip of the Day

(Source: Defense and Export-Import Update; 2 Apr 2018. Available by subscription from
* Author: Gary Stanley, Esq., Global Legal Services, PC, (202) 352-3059,

Law, accounting, audit, and consulting firms are subject to U.S. export controls and DFARS cybersecurity requirements just like other entities. Many such firms will receive ITAR and EAR-controlled technical data from their clients in the course of litigation, mergers and acquisition, regulatory, and consulting projects. Many such firms have multiple non-U.S. offices, and some have foreign persons working in their U.S. offices. Some may wish to assign foreign persons to work on projects or provide IT services. In all such circumstances, these firms need to consider what licensing requirements may apply. This includes licensing requirements applicable to deemed exports and deemed reexports.  As compliance professionals, have you asked your company’s service providers what steps they are taking to protect your company’s data and comply with U.S. controls?

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. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments to applicable regulations are listed below.
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 22 Feb 2018: 83 FR 7608-7610: Technical Amendment to List of User Fee Airports: Name Changes of Several Airports and the Addition of Five Airports

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 

: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  – Last Amendment: 
2 Apr 2018:
83 FR 13849-13862
: Implementation of the February 2017 Australia Group (AG) Intersessional Decisions and the June 2017 AG Plenary Understandings; Addition of India to the AG [Amendment of EAR Parts 738, 740, 745, and 774.]

: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

  – Last Amendment: 19 Mar 2018:
83 FR 11876-11881: Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties 

: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment:
20 Sep 2017:
82 FR 43842-43844
: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on Filing Requirements; Correction
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – The latest edition (16 March 2018) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance websiteBITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.  
, 1 Jan 2018: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 30 Mar 2018:
Harmonized System Update 1804, containing 710 ABI records and 166 harmonized tariff records.
  – HTS codes for AES are available 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 


  – Last Amendment: 14 Feb 2018: 83 FR 6457-6458: Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Addition of South Sudan [Amends ITAR Part 126.] 

  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 14 Feb 2018) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated 

, by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.
 The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
. BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please
contact us
to receive your discount code.

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Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 

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* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission, provided attribution is given to “The Export/Import Daily Bugle of (date)”. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

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