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18-0402 Monday “Daily Bugle”

18-0402 Monday “Daily Bugle”

Monday, 2 April 2018

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The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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  1. Commerce/BIS Amends EAR Parts 738, 740, 745, and 774 to Implement AG Intersessional Decisions and Plenary Understandings, Including Addition of India to the AG 
  2. DHS Publishes Final Rule Concerning Annual Inflation Adjustment to Civil Monetary Penalties 
  3. Justice/ATF Extends Information Collection Activities Concerning Records of Imported Items on the U.S. Munitions Import List 
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. State/DDTC Posts Name and Address Change Announcements for 2 Entities
  4. EU Holds Survey Concerning “Specially Designed for Military Use” Guideline
  5. Japanese METI Publishes Summary of 25th Asian Export Control Seminar
  1. Reuters: “Trump to Unveil China Tariff List this Week, Targeting Tech Goods”
  1. E. McClafferty & L. van der Meer: “Export Controls: Little Known Risks for Biopharma Companies”
  2. R.C. Thomsen II, A.D. Paytas, & M.M. Shomali: “Changes to Export Controls in Mar 2018”
  3. Gary Stanley’s EC Tip of the Day
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 166 Jobs Posted, Including 8 New Jobs
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (22 Feb 2018), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (2 Apr 2018), FACR/OFAC (19 Mar 2018), FTR (20 Sep 2017), HTSUS (30 Mar 2018), ITAR (14 Feb 2018) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1

1. 
Commerce/BIS Amends EAR Parts 738, 740, 745, and 774 to Implement Feb 2017 AG Intersessional Decisions and Jun 2017 AG Plenary Understandings, Including Addition of India to the AG

(Source:
Federal Register, 2 Apr 2018.) [Excerpts.]
 
83 FR 13849-13862: Implementation of the February 2017 Australia Group (AG) Intersessional Decisions and the June 2017 AG Plenary Understandings; Addition of India to the AG
 
* AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.
* ACTION: Final rule.
* SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) publishes this final rule to amend the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the recommendations presented at the February 2017 Australia Group (AG) Intersessional Implementation Meeting, and later adopted pursuant to the AG silent approval procedure, and the recommendations made at the June 2017 AG Plenary Implementation Meeting and adopted by the AG Plenary. This rule amends the following Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) on the Commerce Control List (CCL) to reflect the February 2017 Intersessional Implementation Meeting recommendations that were adopted by the AG: ECCN 2B350 (by adding certain prefabricated repair assemblies, and specially designed components therefor, that are designed for attachment to glass-lined reaction vessels, reactors, storage tanks, containers or receivers controlled by this entry); ECCN 2B351 (by clarifying that toxic gas monitoring equipment includes toxic gas monitors and monitoring systems, as well as their dedicated detecting components); and ECCN 2B352 (by adding certain nucleic acid assemblers and synthesizers to this entry and clarifying how the capacity of certain fermenters should be measured for purposes of determining whether they are controlled under this entry).
  Consistent with the June 2017 AG Plenary Implementation Meeting recommendations that were adopted by the AG, this rule amends the following ECCNs on the CCL: ECCN 1C353 (to clarify that genetically modified organisms include organisms in which the nucleic acid sequences have been created or altered by deliberate molecular manipulation and that inactivated organisms containing recoverable nucleic acids are considered to be genetic elements) and ECCN 1C350 (by adding N,N-Diisopropylamino ethanethiol hydrochloride). This rule also corrects several typographical errors in a note to ECCN 1C351 and updates the advance notification requirements in the EAR that apply to certain exports of saxitoxin. Finally, this rule amends the EAR to reflect the addition of India as a participating country in the AG.
* DATES:
This rule is effective April 2, 2018. …
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the recommendations presented at the Australia Group (AG) Intersessional Implementation Meeting held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on February 15, 2017, and adopted pursuant to the AG silent approval procedure in April 2017, and the recommendations presented at the Implementation Meeting of the 2017 AG Plenary held in Paris, France, from June 26-30, 2017, and adopted by the AG Plenary. This rule also amends the EAR to reflect the addition of India as a participating country in the AG, as of January 19, 2018. The AG is a multilateral forum consisting of 42 participating countries and the European Union that maintain export controls on a list of chemicals, biological agents, and related equipment and technology that could be used in a chemical or biological weapons program. The AG periodically reviews items on its control list to enhance the effectiveness of participating governments’ national controls and to achieve greater harmonization among these controls.
 
Amendments to the CCL Based on the February 2017 AG Intersessional
Recommendations
 
ECCN 2B350 (Chemical Manufacturing Facilities and Equipment)
 
  This final rule amends ECCN 2B350 on the CCL to reflect changes to the AG “Control List of Dual-Use Chemical Manufacturing Facilities and Equipment and Related Technology and Software” based on the February 2017 Intersessional Implementation Meeting recommendations that were adopted by the AG pursuant to its silent approval procedure. Specifically, this rule amends ECCN 2B350 to control prefabricated repair assemblies, and their specially designed components, that: (1) Are designed for mechanical attachment to glass-lined reaction vessels and reactors controlled under 2B350.a or glass-lined storage tanks, containers and receivers controlled under 2B350.c; and (2) have metallic surfaces that are made from tantalum or tantalum alloys and come in direct contact with the chemical(s) being processed. These assemblies and components were added to the AG chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment common control list, because they are capable of being used to prolong the life, or even allow the recommissioning, of glass-lined reactors and storage tanks that are suitable for use in the production of chemical weapons (CW) agents or AG-listed precursor chemicals.
  All items controlled under ECCN 2B350 continue to require a license for chemical/biological (CB) reasons to destinations indicated in CB Column 2 on the Commerce Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) and for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons to destinations indicated in AT Column 1 on the Commerce Country Chart.
 
ECCN 2B351 (Toxic Gas Monitors and Monitoring Systems)
 
  This final rule amends ECCN 2B351 on the CCL to reflect changes to the AG “Control List of Dual-Use Chemical Manufacturing Facilities and Equipment and Related Technology and Software” based on the February 2017 Intersessional Implementation Meeting recommendations that were adopted by the AG pursuant to its silent approval procedure. Specifically, this rule amends ECCN 2B351 to clarify that this entry controls toxic gas monitors and monitoring systems, and their dedicated detecting components (i.e., detectors, sensor devices, and replaceable sensor cartridges), having either of the following characteristics: (1) Designed for continuous operation and usable for the detection of chemical warfare agents or precursor chemicals controlled by ECCN 1C350 at concentrations of less than 0.3 mg/m3; or (2) designed for the detection of cholinesterase-inhibiting activity. The decision to specifically identify toxic gas monitors, in addition to toxic gas monitoring systems, on the AG chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment common control list is based on the fact that certain portable toxic gas monitors (e.g., small handheld detectors) are capable of satisfying the technical control criteria applicable to toxic gas monitoring systems and, as such, may also be suitable for use in a CW production or storage facility. This rule also amends related “software” controls in ECCN 2D351 to reflect the updates to ECCN 2B351 described above.
  All items controlled under ECCN 2B351 continue to require a license for CB reasons to destinations indicated in CB Column 2 on the Commerce Country Chart and for AT reasons to destinations indicated in AT Column 1 on the Commerce Country Chart.
 
ECCN 2B352 (Equipment Capable of Use in Handling Biological Materials)
 
  This final rule amends ECCN 2B352 on the CCL to reflect changes to the AG “Control List of Dual-Use Biological Equipment and Related Technology and Software” based on the February 2017 Intersessional Implementation Meeting recommendations that were adopted by the AG pursuant to its silent approval procedure. Specifically, this rule amends ECCN 2B352 to indicate that the “total internal volume” of a fermenter must be measured to determine whether its capacity meets the control level of “20 liters or greater” specified in 2B352.b.1. This clarification was made to ensure that all AG participating countries apply the same criterion to measure capacity for purposes of determining whether a fermenter is subject to control.
  This rule also amends ECCN 2B352 by adding a new paragraph .j to control nucleic acid assemblers and synthesizers that are both: (1) Partly or entirely automated; and (2) designed to generate continuous nucleic acids greater than 1.5 kilobases in length with error rates less than 5% in a single run. These items were added to the AG dual-use biological equipment common control list because they are capable of being used to generate pathogens and toxins without the need to acquire controlled genetic elements and organisms.
  All items controlled under ECCN 2B352 continue to require a license for CB reasons to destinations indicated in CB Column 2 on the Commerce Country Chart and for AT reasons to destinations indicated in AT Column 1 on the Commerce Country Chart.
 
Amendments to the CCL Based on the June 2017 AG Plenary Understandings
 
ECCN 1C350 (Precursor Chemicals)
 
  This final rule amends ECCN 1C350 to reflect updates to the AG “Chemical Weapons Precursors” control list adopted at the June 2017 AG Plenary meeting. Specifically, this rule amends ECCN 1C350.b by adding the precursor chemical hydrochloride salt (C.A.S. #41480-75-5) N,N-Diisopropylamino ethanethiol hydrochloride. This rule also alphabetically reorders the precursor chemicals listed in ECCN 1C350.b, .c, and .d to facilitate the identification of these chemicals. The precursor chemicals affected by these amendments to ECCN 1C350 are indicated in the following table.
AG-Controlled precursor chemicals
Previous CCL designation
Current CCL designation
(C.A.S. #683-08-9) Diethyl methylphosphonate
ECCN 1C350.b.22
ECCN 1C350.b.4
(C.A.S. #15715-41-0) Diethyl methylphosphonite
ECCN 1C350.b.4
ECCN 1C350.b.5
(C.A.S. #2404-03-7) Diethyl-N,N-dimethylphosphoroamidate
ECCN 1C350.b.5
ECCN 1C350.b.6
(C.A.S. #41480-75-5) N,N-Diisopropylaminoethanethiol hydrochloride
None-EAR 99
ECCN 1C350.b.7
(C.A.S. #5842-07-9) N,N-Diisopropyl-beta-aminoethane thiol
ECCN 1C350.b.6
ECCN 1C350.b.8
(C.A.S. #96-80-0) N,N-Diisopropyl-beta-aminoethanol
ECCN 1C350.b.8
ECCN 1C350.b.9
(C.A.S. #96-79-7), N,N-Diisopropyl-beta-aminoethyl chloride
ECCN 1C350.b.9
ECCN 1C350.b.10
(C.A.S. #4261-68-1) N,N-Diisopropyl-beta-aminoethyl chloride hydrochloride
ECCN 1C350.b.7
ECCN 1C350.b.11
(C.A.S. #6163-75-3) Dimethyl ethylphosphonate
ECCN 1C350.b.10
ECCN 1C350.b.12
(C.A.S. #756-79-6) Dimethyl methylphosphonate
ECCN 1C350.b.11
ECCN 1C350.b.13
(C.A.S. #677-43-0) N,N-Dimethylamino-phosphoryl dichloride
ECCN 1C350.b.23
ECCN 1C350.b.14
(C.A.S. #1498-40-4) Ethyl phosphonous dichloride [Ethyl phosphinyl dichloride]
ECCN 1C350.b.12
ECCN 1C350.b.15
(C.A.S. #430-78-4) Ethyl phosphonus difluoride [Ethyl phosphinyl difluoride]
ECCN 1C350.b.13
ECCN 1C350.b.16
(C.A.S. #1066-50-8) Ethyl phosphonyl dichloride
ECCN 1C350.b.14
ECCN 1C350.b.17
(C.A.S. #993-13-5) Methylphosphonic acid
ECCN 1C350.b.21
ECCN 1C350.b.18
(C.A.S. #676-98-2) Methylphos-phonothioic dichloride
ECCN 1C350.b.24
ECCN 1C350.b.19
(C.A.S. #464-07-3) Pinacolyl alcohol
ECCN 1C350.b.18
ECCN 1C350.b.20
(C.A.S. #1619-34-7) 3-Quinuclidinol
ECCN 1C350.b.19
ECCN 1C350.b.21
(C.A.S. #111-48-8) Thiodiglycol
ECCN 1C350.b.20
ECCN 1C350.b.22
(C.A.S. #139-87-7) Ethyldiethanolamine
ECCN 1C350.c.12
ECCN 1C350.c.3
(C.A.S. #10025-87-3) Phosphorus oxychloride
ECCN 1C350.c.3
ECCN 1C350.c.4
(C.A.S. #10026-13-8) Phosphorus pentachloride
ECCN 1C350.c.4
ECCN 1C350.c.5
(C.A.S. #7719-12-2) Phosphorus trichloride
ECCN 1C350.c.5
ECCN 1C350.c.6
(C.A.S. #10025-67-9) Sulfur monochloride
ECCN 1C350.c.6
ECCN 1C350.c.8
(C.A.S. #7719-09-7) Thionyl chloride
ECCN 1C350.c.8
ECCN 1C350.c.9
(C.A.S. #102-71-6) Triethanolamine
ECCN 1C350.c.9
ECCN 1C350.c.10
(C.A.S. #122-52-1) Triethyl phosphite
ECCN 1C350.c.10
ECCN 1C350.c.11
(C.A.S. #121-45-9) Trimethyl phosphite
ECCN 1C350.c.11
ECCN 1C350.c.12
(C.A.S. #109-89-7) Diethylamine
ECCN 1C350.d.25
ECCN 1C350.d.3
(C.A.S. #100-37-8) N,N-Diethylaminoethanol
ECCN 1C350.d.3
ECCN 1C350.d.4
(C.A.S. #298-06-6) O,O-Diethyl phosphorodithioate
ECCN 1C350.d.23
ECCN 1C350.d.5
(C.A.S. #2465-65-8) O,O-Diethyl phosphorothioate
ECCN 1C350.d.22
ECCN 1C350.d.6
(C.A.S. #108-18-9) Di-isopropylamine
ECCN 1C350.d.4
ECCN 1C350.d.7
(C.A.S. #124-40-3) Dimethylamine
ECCN 1C350.d.5
ECCN 1C350.d.8
(C.A.S. #506-59-2) Dimethylamine hydrochloride
ECCN 1C350.d.6
ECCN 1C350.d.9
(C.A.S. #7664-39-3) Hydrogen fluoride
ECCN 1C350.d.7
ECCN 1C350.d.10
(C.A.S. #3554-74-3) 3-Hydroxyl-1-methylpiperidine
ECCN 1C350.d.8
ECCN 1C350.d.11
(C.A.S. #76-89-1) Methyl benzilate
ECCN 1C350.d.9
ECCN 1C350.d.12
(C.A.S. #1314-80-3) Phosphorus pentasulfide
ECCN 1C350.d.10
ECCN 1C350.d.13
(C.A.S. #75-97-8) Pinacolone
ECCN 1C350.d.11
ECCN 1C350.d.14
(C.A.S. #7789-29-9) Potassium bifluoride
ECCN 1C350.d.14
ECCN 1C350.d.15
(C.A.S. #151-50-8) Potassium cyanide
ECCN 1C350.d.12
ECCN 1C350.d.16
(C.A.S. #7789-23-3) Potassium fluoride
ECCN 1C350.d.13
ECCN 1C350.d.17
(C.A.S. #3731-38-2) 3-Quinuclidone
ECCN 1C350.d.15
ECCN 1C350.d.18
(C.A.S. #1333-83-1) Sodium bifluoride
ECCN 1C350.d.16
ECCN 1C350.d.19
(C.A.S. #143-33-9) Sodium cyanide
ECCN 1C350.d.17
ECCN 1C350.d.20
(C.A.S. #7681-49-4) Sodium fluoride
ECCN 1C350.d.18
ECCN 1C350.d.21
(C.A.S. #16893-85-9) Sodium hexafluorosilicate
ECCN 1C350.d.24
ECCN 1C350.d.22
(C.A.S. #1313-82-2) Sodium sulfide
ECCN 1C350.d.19
ECCN 1C350.d.23
(C.A.S. #637-39-8) Triethanolamine hydrochloride
ECCN 1C350.d.20
ECCN 1C350.d.24
(C.A.S. #116-17-6) Tri-isopropyl phosphite
ECCN 1C350.d.21
ECCN 1C350.d.25
  All items controlled under ECCN 1C350 continue to require a license for CB reasons to destinations indicated in CB Column 2 on the Commerce Country Chart and for AT reasons to countries listed in Country Group E:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). In addition, items controlled under 1C350.b or .c require a license to certain destinations for chemical weapons (CW) reasons, as described in the License Requirements section of ECCN 1C350 and in Section 742.18 of the EAR.
 
ECCN 1C353 (Genetic Elements and Genetically Modified Organisms)
 
  This final rule amends ECCN 1C353 on the CCL to reflect updates to the AG controls on certain genetic elements and genetically modified organisms adopted at the June 2017 AG Plenary meeting. Specifically, this rule amends ECCN 1C353 to control any genetically modified organism that contains, or any genetic element that codes for: (1) Any gene or genes specific to any virus controlled by ECCN 1C351.a or .b or 1C354.c; (2) any gene or genes specific to any bacterium controlled by ECCN 1C351.c or 1C354.a, or any fungus controlled by ECCN 1C351.e or 1C354.b, and which in itself or through its transcribed or translated products represents a significant hazard to human, animal or plant health or could endow or enhance pathogenicity; or (3) any toxins, or their subunits, controlled by ECCN 1C351.d.
  In addition, this rule amends the Technical Notes to ECCN 1C353 to clarify that “genetically modified organisms include organisms in which the nucleic acid sequences have been created or altered by deliberate molecular manipulation” (see Technical Note 1 to ECCN 1C353, as amended by this rule) and that inactivated organisms containing recoverable nucleic acids are considered to be genetic elements, whether genetically modified or unmodified, or chemically synthesized in whole or in part (see Technical Note 2 to ECCN 1C353, as amended by this rule). Technical Note 3 to ECCN 1C353, as amended by this rule, states that this ECCN does not control nucleic acid sequences of shiga toxin producing Escherichia coli of serogroups O26, O45, O103, O104, O111, O121, O145, O157, and other shiga toxin producing serogroups, other than those genetic elements coding for shiga toxin, or for its subunits.
  This rule also defines the term “endow or enhance pathogenicity,” for purposes of the controls in ECCN 1C353 (see Technical Note 4 to ECCN 1C353, as amended by this rule), as when the insertion or integration of the nucleic acid sequence or sequences is/are likely to enable or increase a recipient organism’s ability to be used to deliberately cause disease or death. This might include alterations to, inter alia: virulence, transmissibility, stability, route of infection, host range, reproducibility, ability to evade or suppress host immunity, resistance to medical countermeasures, or detectability.
  All items controlled under ECCN 1C353 continue to require a license for CB reasons to destinations indicated in CB Column 1 on the Commerce Country Chart and for AT reasons to destinations indicated in AT Column 1 on the Commerce Country Chart.
 
Amendments to the EAR To Reflect the Addition of India to the AG
 
  This rule makes conforming amendments to the EAR to reflect the addition of India to the AG, as of January 19, 2018. Specifically, this rule amends the entry for India in the Commerce Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) by removing the “X” from this entry under the column CB 2. In addition, this rule amends the Country Groups chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) by adding an “X” to the entry for India under column A:3, Australia Group.
 
Corrections to ECCN 1C351 (Human and Animal Pathogens and “Toxins”)
 
  This final rule amends ECCN 1C351 on the CCL by removing several outdated references to former ECCN 1C352 in the Note that follows 1C351.a.4, which describes avian influenza (AI) viruses subject to control under this ECCN, and adding in their place references to the relevant AI controls described in 1C351.a.4. These corrections do not affect the scope of the items subject to control under this ECCN or the license requirements applicable to these items.
 
Correction To Advance Notification Requirements for Certain Exports of
Saxitoxin
 
  This final rule also corrects the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 1 chemical advance notification requirements in Section 745.1 of the EAR to reflect the April 27, 2006 (71 FR 24918), amendments to the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) (15 CFR parts 710-722) that, inter alia, amended the definition of advance notification in Section 710.1 of the CWCR, as well as the advance notification requirements in Section 712.6(a) of the CWCR, to indicate that the 45-day advance notification requirement for exports or imports of Schedule 1 chemicals does not apply to the export or import of 5 milligrams or less of saxitoxin (see ECCN 1C351.d.12) for medical or diagnostic purposes only–the latter requires only a 3-day advance notification. Specifically, this final rule amends the first sentence in Section 745.1(a) of the EAR to read as follows: “You must notify BIS at least 45 calendar days prior to exporting any quantity of a Schedule 1 chemical listed in Supplement No. 1 to this part to another State Party, except that notifications for exports of 5 milligrams or less of saxitoxin (for medical or diagnostic purposes only) must be submitted to BIS at least 3 calendar days prior to the date of export (see 15 CFR 712.6(a)).” The advance notification requirements in Section 745.1 of the EAR refer only to exports, because imports are outside the scope of these EAR requirements. However, as indicated above, the advance notification requirements described in Section 712.6(a) of the CWCR apply to imports, as well as exports. The exemption from the 45-day advance notification requirement, for certain exports and imports of saxitoxin (as described above), was approved and entered into force for all CWC States Parties on October 31, 1999. …
 
Saving Clause
 
  Shipments of items removed from eligibility for export or reexport under a license exception or without a license (i.e., under the designator “NLR”) as a result of this regulatory action that were on dock for loading, on lighter, laden aboard an exporting carrier, or en route aboard a carrier to a port of export, on May 2, 2018, pursuant to actual orders for export or reexport to a foreign destination, may proceed to that destination under the previously applicable license exception or without a license (NLR) so long as they are exported or reexported before May 17, 2018. Any such items not actually exported or reexported before midnight, on May 17, 2018, require a license in accordance with this regulation.
  “Deemed” exports of “technology” and “source code” removed from eligibility for export under a license exception or without a license (under the designator “NLR”) as a result of this regulatory action may continue to be made under the previously available license exception orwithout a license (NLR) before May 17, 2018. Beginning at midnight on May 17, 2018, such “technology” and “source code” may no longer be released, without a license, to a foreign national subject to the “deemed” export controls in the EAR when a license would be required to the home country of the foreign national in accordance with this regulation. …
 
  Dated: March 27, 2018.
Matthew S. Borman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

EXIM_a2

2. 
DHS Publishes Final Rule Concerning Annual Inflation Adjustment to Civil Monetary Penalties

(Source:
Federal Register, 2 Apr 2018.) [Excerpts.] 

 
83 FR 13826-13839: Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation
 
* AGENCY: Department of Homeland Security.
* ACTION: Final rule.
* SUMMARY: In this final rule, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) is making the 2018 annual inflation adjustment to its civil monetary penalties. The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015 (2015 Act) was signed into law on November 2, 2015. Pursuant to the 2015 Act, all agencies must adjust civil monetary penalties annually and publish the adjustment in the Federal Register. Accordingly, this final rule adjusts DHS’s civil monetary penalties for 2018 pursuant to the 2015 Act and OMB guidance. The new penalties will be effective for penalties assessed after April 2, 2018 whose associated violations occurred after November 2, 2015.
* DATES:
This rule is effective on April 2, 2018. …
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: … This final rule makes the 2018 annual inflation adjustments to civil monetary penalties pursuant to the 2015 Act and pursuant to guidance OMB issued to agencies on December 15, 2017. [FN/1] The penalty amounts in this final rule will be effective for penalties assessed after April 2, 2018 where the associated violation occurred after November 2, 2015. Consistent with OMB guidance, the 2015 Act does not change previously assessed penalties that the agency is actively collecting or has collected. …
 
(A) National Protection and Programs Directorate …
 
(B) U.S. Customs and Border Protection
 
  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) assesses civil monetary penalties under various titles of the United States Code and the CFR. These include penalties for certain violations of title 8 of the CFR regarding the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Pub. L. 82-414, as amended) (INA). The INA contains provisions that impose penalties on persons, including carriers and aliens, who violate specified provisions of the INA. The relevant penalty provisions are located in numerous sections of the INA, however CBP has enumerated these penalties in regulation in one location–in 8 CFR 280.53. For a complete list of the INA sections for which penalties are assessed, in addition to a brief description of each violation, see the IFR preamble at 81 FR 42989-42990.
  On December 8, 2017, CBP adjusted three non-INA penalties inadvertently left out of the IFR and 2017 final rule. See 82 FR 57821. The three penalties concern the following violations: Transporting passengers between coastwise points in the United States by a non-coastwise qualified vessel; towing a vessel between coastwise points in the United States by a non-coastwise qualified vessel; and dealing in or using an empty stamped imported liquor container after it has already been used once. This final rule incorporates those three penalties alongside the other CBP penalties and adjusts them according to the 2018 multiplier.
  Below is a table showing the 2018 adjustment for the penalties that CBP administers.

Penalty name
Citation
Penalty amount as adjusted in the 2017 FR
Multiplier
*
New penalty as adjusted by this final rule
Penalties for non-compliance with arrival and departure manifest requirements for passengers, crewmembers, or occupants transported on commercial vessels or aircraft arriving to or departing from the United States
8 U.S.C. 1221(g) 8 CFR 280.53(b)(1) (INA section 231(g))
$1,333
1.02041
$1,360.
Penalties for non-compliance with landing requirements at designated ports of entry for aircraft transporting aliens
8 U.S.C. 1224 8 CFR 280.53(b)(2) (INA section 234)
$3,621
1.02041
$3,695.
Penalties for failure to depart voluntarily
8 U.S.C. 1229c(d) 8 CFR 280.53(b)(3) (INA section 240B(d))
$1,527-$7,635
1.02041
$1,558-$7,791.
Penalties for violations of removal orders relating to aliens transported on vessels or aircraft under section 241(d) of the INA, or for costs associated with removal under section 241(e) of the INA
8 U.S.C. 1253(c)(1)(A) 8 CFR 280.53(b)(4) (INA section 243(c)(1)(A))
$3,054
1.02041
$3,116.
Penalties for failure to remove alien stowaways under section 241(d)(2) of the INA
8 U.S.C. 1253(c)(1)(B) 8 CFR 280.53(b)(5) (INA section 243(c)(1)(B))
$7,635
1.02041
$7,791.
Penalties for failure to report an illegal landing or desertion of alien crewmen, and for each alien not reported on arrival or departure manifest or lists required in accordance with section 251 of the INA
8 U.S.C. 1281(d) 8 CFR 280.53(b)(6) (INA section 251(d))
$362 for each alien
1.02041
$369 for each alien.
Penalties for use of alien crewmen for longshore work in violation of section 251(d) of the INA
8 U.S.C. 1281(d) 8 CFR 280.53(b)(6) (INA section 251(d))
$9,054
1.02041
$9,239.
Penalties for failure to control, detain, or remove alien crewmen
8 U.S.C. 1284(a) 8 CFR 280.53(b)(7) (INA section 254(a))
$906-$5,432
1.02041
$924-$5,543.
Penalties for employment on passenger vessels of aliens afflicted with certain disabilities
8 U.S.C. 1285 8 CFR 280.53(b)(8) (INA section 255)
$1,811
1.02041
$1,848.
Penalties for discharge of alien crewmen
8 U.S.C. 1286 8 CFR 280.53(b)(9) (INA section 256)
$2,716-$5,432
1.02041
$2,771-$5,543.
Penalties for bringing into the United States alien crewmen with intent to evade immigration laws
8 U.S.C. 1287 8 CFR 280.53(b)(10) (INA section 257)
$18,107
1.02041
$18,477.
Penalties for failure to prevent the unauthorized landing of aliens
8 U.S.C. 1321(a) 8 CFR 280.53(b)(11) (INA section 271(a))
$5,432
1.02041
$5,543.
Penalties for bringing to the United States aliens subject to denial of admission on a health-related ground
8 U.S.C. 1322(a) 8 CFR 280.53(b)(12) (INA section 272(a))
$5,432
1.02041
$5,543.
Penalties for bringing to the United States aliens without required documentation
8 U.S.C. 1323(b) 8 CFR 280.53(b)(13) (INA section 273(b))
$5,432
1.02041
$5,543.
Penalties for failure to depart
8 U.S.C. 1324d 8 CFR 280.53(b)(14) (INA section 274D)
$763
1.02041
$779.
Penalties for improper entry
8 U.S.C. 1325(b) 8 CFR 280.53(b)(15) (INA section 275(b))
$76-$382
1.02041
$78-$390.
Penalty for dealing in or using empty stamped imported liquor containers
$508
**
1.02041
$518.
Penalty for transporting passengers between coastwise points in the United States by a non-coastwise qualified vessel
$762
**
1.02041
$778.
Penalty for towing a vessel between coastwise points in the United States by a non-coastwise qualified vessel
$889-$2795, plus $152 per ton
**
1.02041
$907-$2852, plus $155 per ton.

* OMB, Implementation of the 2018 annual adjustment pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment
  Act Improvements Act of 2015, December 15, 2017. Available
here.
** Adjustments made in Dec 8, 2017 final rule, 82 FR 57821. …
 
(C) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement …
 
(D) U.S. Coast Guard …
 
(E) Transportation Security Administration …
 
  Dated: March 26, 2018.
Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary.
——-
  [FN/1] OMB, Implementation of the 2018 annual adjustment pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015, December 15, 2017. Available
here (last accessed Dec. 15, 2017).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

EXIM_a3

3. 
Justice/ATF Extends Information Collection Activities Concerning Records of Imported Items on the U.S. Munitions Import List

(Source:
Federal Register, 2 Apr 2018.) [Excerpts.]
 
83 FR 14028: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed eCollection eComments Requested; Extension without Change of a Currently Approved Collection; Records of Acquisition and Disposition, Registered Importers of Arms, Ammunition & Implements of War on the U.S. Munitions Import List
 
* AGENCY: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Department of Justice.
* ACTION: 60-Day notice.
* SUMMARY: The Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), will submit the following information collection request to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and approval in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
* DATES: Comments are encouraged and will be accepted for 60 days until June 1, 2018. …
 
Overview of This Information Collection
 
  – Type of Information Collection (check justification or form 83): Extension, without change, of a currently approved collection.
  – The Title of the Form/Collection: Records of Acquisition and Disposition, Registered Importers of Arms, Ammunition & Implements of War on the U.S. Munitions Import List. …
  – Form number (if applicable): None.
  – Component: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Department of Justice. …
  – Abstract: This information collection involves records of imported items that are on the United States Munitions Import List. The importers must register with ATF, file an intent to import specific items, as well as certify to the Bureau, that the list of imported items were received. The records are maintained at the registrant’s business premises where they are available for inspection by ATF officers during compliance inspections or criminal investigations. …
 
  Dated: March 28, 2018.

Melody Braswell, Department Clearance Officer for PRA, U.S. Department of Justice.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a14. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

* Commerce/BIS; NOTICES; Meetings: Information Systems Technical Advisory Committee [Publication Date: 3 Apr 2018.]
 
* Treasury/OFAC; NOTICES; Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Publication Date: 3 Apr 2018.]

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a36.

State/DDTC Posts Name and Address Change Announcements for 2 Entities

(Source:
State/DDTC, 2 Apr 2018.)
 
  (1) BAE Systems Protection Systems Inc.
name change
  (2) Hanwha Techwin Co. Ltd.
name and address change

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

 
Directive 2009/43/EC simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defense-related products within the Community (Transfers Directive) aims at eliminating the disparity between the Member States’ laws and rules on the transfers of defense-related products. The objective is to facilitate circulation of defense-related products within the EU and thus, help to boost the competitiveness of the EU’s defense sector.

For the moment, the tools available under the Transfers Directive are undergoing a process of harmonization, for example in the form of Recommendations on harmonization of general transfer licenses.[FN/1]

Goods are considered as defense-related products if they are listed in the Annex to the Transfers Directive, regularly updated in line with the Common Military List. This means that the scope of the Transfers Directive and the need for prior authorization (i.e. licensing requirement) is determined by the List of Defense-related products.

At several instances in the Annex, products are considered to be subject to licensing requirements to the extent they are “specially designed for military use” (“SDfMU”). The Commission, in close cooperation with Member States, has undertaken an attempt to provide for an interpretative guideline on the term SDfMU, directed to Member States competent authorities and the defense industry alike. The aim of the guideline is to facilitate the assessment of whether a specific product is subject to control or not, while at the same time promoting a unified approach across the EU.

Before finalizing the work on the guideline on SDfMU, the Commission wishes to launch a survey to evaluate the usefulness of the draft guideline. The respondents in this survey are requested first to apply the guideline on SDfMU and then, based on experience, reply to the questions below.

When answering the survey, please apply the guideline to those products that are relevant for you and compare to how you today assess whether a product is considered as SDfMU. Please include both products that require a license and those products that do not. Furthermore, we would welcome your feedback on whether the “catch” and “release” clauses are understandable, convenient to use, and whether they provide the same results in situation without applying the guideline.

The Commission will collect the data from the survey, and make it available for the competent authorities of the Member States. The survey is anonymous; however, if you wish to discuss the results with your Member State’s competent authority, you are free to leave your contact details in the relevant comment box.

 
The survey is available
HERE.

——–
[FN/1] See;
  – OJ L 329, 3.12.2016, p. 101-104, available
here; and

  – OJ L 329, 3.12.2016, p. 105-108, available
here

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_a5
8.

Japanese METI Publishes Summary of 25th Asian Export Control Seminar

(Source:
METI, 6 Mar 2018.)
 

The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has published a summary of the 25th Asian Export Control Seminar, held in Tokyo, from 27 Feb to 1 Mar 2018. The summary is available here

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWSNEWS

NWS_a1
9. 
Reuters: “Trump to Unveil China Tariff List this Week, Targeting Tech Goods”

(Source:
Reuters, 2 Apr 2018.) [Excerpts.]
 
The Trump administration this week will unveil a list of advanced technology Chinese imports targeted for U.S. tariffs to punish Beijing over technology transfer policies, a move expected to intensify trade tensions between the world’s two largest economies.
 
U.S. tariffs on $50 billion to $60 billion worth of annual imports is expected to be levied on products benefiting from Beijing’s “Made in China 2025” industrial development program, but it may be more than two months before the import curbs take effect, administration officials have said.
 
The U.S. Trade Representative’s office needs to unveil the list of products by Friday under President Donald Trump’s China tariff proclamation signed on March 22.
 
The tariffs are aimed at forcing changes to Chinese government policies that USTR says results in the “uneconomic” transfer of U.S. intellectual property to Chinese companies.
 
The agency’s “Section 301” investigation authorizing the tariffs alleges China has systematically sought to misappropriate U.S. intellectual property through joint venture requirements, unfair technology licensing rules, purchases of U.S. technology firms with state funding and outright theft.
 
China has denied that its laws require technology transfers and has threatened to retaliate against any U.S. tariffs with trade sanctions of its own, with potential targets such as U.S. soybeans, aircraft or heavy equipment.
 
On Sunday, Beijing slapped extra tariffs of up to 25 percent on 128 U.S. products including frozen pork, as well as wine and certain fruits and nuts in response to steep U.S. tariffs on imports of aluminum and steel announced last month by the Trump administration.
 

Fears have arisen that the two countries will spiral into a trade war that will crush global growth. … 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMMCOMMENTARY

COMM_a01
10.
E. McClafferty & L. van der Meer: “Export Controls: Little Known Risks for Biopharma Companies”

(Source:
Kelley Drye, 2 Feb 2018.  Published in
Pharma Horizon, Vol. 1 (4) 2017, p. 60-62.)
 
* Authors: Eric McClafferty, Esq.,
emcclafferty@kelleydrye.com; and Laura van der Meer, Esq.
lvandermeer@kelleydrye.com. Both of Kelley Drye, Washington DC and Brussels, respectively.
 
This article presents an overview of generally unknown violations when exporting items of a dual-use nature to either the US or the EU in the context of biopharmacological goods and research. Such companies often overlook their legal exposure and ought to be aware of the risks in order to prevent financial and reputational damages. The article introduces the fundamental regulations and addresses the main areas of concern, such as ambiguities in the legislation as illustrated by the 2013 Dutch decision in the “H5N1 Case”, and provides sound advice for companies involved in international collaboration.
 
Recent discussions among pharmaceutical and biotech companies, public sector research scientists and the U.S. Government revealed a significant lack of awareness by for profit and nonprofit organizations about the potential applicability of export controls to their activities; in all likelihood, the same is true in Europe. Even unintentional failure to comply with restrictions imposed on the transnational movement of certain chemicals, pathogens, toxins, genetic material, and associated equipment or technology can result in penalties and reputational damage. Companies operating in the biopharmaceutical space are well advised to seek expert assistance to navigate the complex regulations and to build export control policies and tools into their compliance programs to reduce risk.
 
Dual-Use Regulations EU/US
 
Aimed to strengthen security and contribute to international peace, “dual-use” regulations control the export, transfer, and transit of items, know how, and related services that can have potential use for both civil and military, terrorist, and weapons proliferation purposes. Export rules in the U.S., EU and various other countries are based on international agreements, such as
the Australia Group arrangement. In the U.S., the regulations most likely to affect most companies in the biopharmaceutical industry are the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) maintains a list of regulated items pursuant to the Commerce Control List with additional controls on military items overseen by the U.S. Departments of State.
 
In the European Union (EU), export of designated dual use items is governed by Regulation 428/2009 (the “EU Dual- use Regulation”). The Regulation is binding on the EU Member States, however, the Member States and their competent authorities are responsible for export licensing of individual shipments and technology transfers and enforcement (e.g. through penalties). In addition, competent authorities can invoke a “catch-all clause” to impose an authorization requirement on non-listed items where they are concerned about potential misuse. For certain types of exports, general licenses can be used by registered entities to send dual use items to specified low risk countries.
 
In the EU, U.S. and elsewhere, dual-use regulations target goods and technology (know how) with applications in research, biotechnology, chemical processing, and biopharmacological manufacturing processes, which, if deployed with nefarious intent, could be used as or contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. This includes an extensive list of chemicals that may be used as precursors for toxic chemical agents and toxic chemicals precursors and mixtures. A number of chemical weapons precursors that are controlled for export are quite commonly used in other manufacturing processes. Controls also are in place for human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins, including a range of viruses, bacteria and fungi. The rules cover isolated 
live cultures and material that has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures. Under EU law, vaccines and immunotoxins (antibody-toxin conjugate intended to destroy targeted cells) are excluded from regulations, whereas the U.S. goes beyond the internationally agreed approach and imposes controls on certain vaccines, medical products, and diagnostic and food testing kits.
 
Controls related to biotechnology cover genetically modified organisms or genetic elements containing nucleic acid sequences associated with certain pathogens or toxins. “Genetic elements” covered by these provisions include, but are not limited to, chromosomes, genomes, plasmids, transposons, and vectors, whether genetically modified or unmodified, or chemically synthesized in whole or in part. These provisions do not restrict the export of nucleic acid sequences associated with the pathogenicity of enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli, serotype O157 and other verotoxin producing strains, other than those coding for the verotoxin or its sub-units.

Beyond substance and materials, the EU Dual-use Regulation also controls biological processing equipment commonly used in research, testing, and production of chemicals and biopharmaceuticals and other products of biotechnology. For example, the export of certain pumps, valves and other chemical processing equipment, biological containment facilities, fermenters (including single use systems), centrifugal separators, and equipment for cross (tangential) flow filtration or freeze or spray drying can be restricted. Certain protective equipment, 
such as laboratory fume hoods and protective wear, also is regulated.
 
The Regulation not only restricts the export or transit of dual-use items as such, but also related software and technology. Technology may take the form of “technical data” or “technical assistance” which may have considerable consequences for the sharing of data internationally and for the provision of intellectual services. In a notorious decision issued in September 2013, a Dutch judge ruled that the Dutch government properly required an authorization for the publication of research results pertaining to the genetic modification of the H5N1 virus (“bird flu”) on the basis of the Dual-use Regulation. This controversial decision not only rattled the scientific community but also raises the issue of whether the work qualified for an exemption in the Regulation for “basic scientific research”, which excludes fundamental research from controls. Many companies are overly aggressive in claiming that commercial work is fundamental research, which creates serious risks of violating the regulations. If your company protects its know-how from competitors, the information likely does not qualify as fundamental research. We recommend a careful external legal compliance review of such technology issues. One incorrect classification of technical data can result in multiple export violations.
 
The movement of export controlled materials and technology from one Member State to another within the EU – barring the transfer of ricin and saxitoxin – may not be subject to restrictions. On the other hand, even activities entirely within the U.S. can be captured by export control regimes. For example, providing access to or information about technology (i.e., the transfer of “know-how”) to certain foreign national employee working in a U.S. laboratory may qualify as a “deemed export” requiring an export license and regulated as if the technology had been transferred outside of the U.S. Such releases of technical data to non-U.S. persons are deemed to be exports to that persons home country, which might require an export license.
 
Penalties
 
Penalties for violation of the EU Dual use Regulation range from a few thousand euros to hundreds of thousands (e.g., three times the value of the exported items in Ireland with unlimited penalties in the U.K.) and can include the imprisonment of executives. In the U.S., even a single unintentional violation can result in a penalty of $250,000 or double the value of the transaction. Willful violations can lead to criminal sanctions and fines up to one million USD per violation.
 
Compliance
 
As biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes increasingly involve international collaboration and are refined with state-of-the-art biotechnological applications, there is very real risk of overlooking export control requirements. The key to assessing risk is proper classification of company activities including substances, equipment, technology, and services.
To the extent this classification exercise results in 
the identification of potentially controlled items, follow on work is necessary to further analyze how to handle potential exports, re-exports, and “deemed exports” (for operations in the U.S.) in a systematic, reliable and replicable way. Where there is possible exposure, compliance checklists and other tools can be put in place as part of existing company compliance systems or as free-standing mechanisms. The cost of implementing export control compliance policies and mechanisms will be a fraction of the financial and reputational costs of a violation.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a2
11.

R.C. Thomsen II, A.D. Paytas, & M.M. Shomali: “Changes to Export Controls in Mar 2018”

(Source: 
alerts@t-b.com, 30 Mar 2018.) [Excerpts.]
 
* Authors: Roszel C. Thomsen II, Esq., 
roz@t-b.com; Antoinette D. Paytas, Esq., 
toni@t-b.com; and Maher M. Shomali, Esq., 
maher@t-b.com. All of Thomsen & Burke LLP.
 
This memo summarizes the regulatory, legislative, and enforcement developments with respect to U.S. and multilateral export controls during the month of March 2018. …  
 
Regulatory Updates
 
BIS Removes CNT Ecuador from the Entity List
 
BIS published a final rule this month amending the EAR by adding twenty-three persons to the Entity List. These twenty-three persons have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States and will be listed on the Entity List under the destinations of Pakistan, Singapore and South Sudan. This rule also removes one person under the destination of Ecuador and one person under the destination of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) from the Entity List. Both removals are the result of requests for removal received by BIS pursuant to the section of the EAR used for requesting removal or modification of an Entity List entry and a review of information provided in the removal requests. Lastly, this rule corrects the license requirement for twelve entities that were added under the destination of Russia as part of a recent BIS rule.  
 
We do not typically update you on changes to the Entity List. However, this rule implemented a decision of the ERC to remove Corporacion Nacional de Telecommunicaciones (CNT), located in Ecuador, from the Entity List on the basis of a removal request received by BIS. We have processed several license application for CNT over the years for encryption products classified under Category 5, Part 2 of the EAR, and this rule removes the licensing requirement for the end-user based on their inclusion on the Entity List. Please note, however, that there still may be licensing requirements for certain encryption products to the entity, as they are a government end-user as defined in the EAR.    
 
OFAC Amends and Reissues North Korea Sanctions Regulations
 
OFAC is amending the North Korea Sanctions Regulations and reissuing them in their entirety, in order to implement three recent Executive orders and to reference the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 and the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. OFAC is also incorporating several general licenses that have, until now, appeared only on OFAC’s website on the North Korea Sanctions page, adding several new general licenses, and adding and expanding provisions to issue a more comprehensive set of regulations that will provide further guidance to the public.
 
Finally, OFAC is updating certain regulatory provisions and making other technical and conforming changes. Due to the number of regulatory sections being updated or added, OFAC is reissuing the North Korea Sanctions Regulations in their entirety.
 
 
OFAC designated five entities and 19 individuals this month under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) as well as Executive Order (E.O.) 13694, “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,” as amended, and codified pursuant to CAATSA.
 
These actions include the designation of three entities and 13 individuals pursuant to E.O. 13694, as amended, which targets malicious cyber actors, including those involved in interfering with election processes or institutions. …
 
These actions also include the designation of two entities and six individuals pursuant to section 224 of CAATSA, which targets cyber actors operating on behalf of the Russian government…  The CAATSA listing includes the Federal Security Service (FSB), a Russian intelligence organization, knowingly engages in significant activities that undermine cybersecurity on behalf of the Russian government. Specifically, the FSB has utilized its cyber tools to target Russian journalists and politicians critical of the Russian government; Russian citizens and government officials; former officials from countries bordering Russia; and U.S. government officials, including cyber security, diplomatic, military, and White House personnel. Additionally, in 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted two FSB officers for their involvement in the 2014 hacking of Yahoo that compromised millions of Yahoo accounts. OFAC previously sanctioned the FSB under E.O. 13694, as amended, on December 28, 2016.
 
OFAC Reaffirms Commitment to Fostering Internet Freedom and Supporting the Iranian People
 
OFAC this month highlighted existing guidance to underscore the U.S. Government’s ongoing commitment to ensure that the Iranian people can exercise their universal right to freedom of expression and can freely access information via the Internet. OFAC’s guidance, authorizations, and licensing policies support the Administration’s continued commitment to promote the free flow of information to citizens of Iran – which the Iranian regime has consistently denied to its people. 
 
OFAC continues to foster and support the free flow of information to the Iranian people through the following authorizations and licensing policies:
 
General Licenses. OFAC has two Iran-related general licenses that authorize the provision of certain hardware, software, and services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, and social networking software and services, as well as certain apps for mobile operating systems, anti-censorship tools, anti-tracking software, mobile phones, and other devices.
 
 –
Section 560.540 of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), 31 C.F.R. Part 560, authorizes the exportation from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to persons in Iran of certain publicly available, no-cost services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet and certain publicly available, no-cost software necessary to enable such services.  
 
 –
General License D-1 (GL D-1), which is broader than the general license in section 560.540 of the ITSR, authorizes the export and reexport of fee-based services and software incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, as well as the export, reexport, or provision of certain software and hardware incident to personal communications. The Annex to GL D-1 provides a list of services, software, and hardware that are considered “incident to personal communications” and eligible for export or reexport to Iran under this general license.
 
Guidance. OFAC has provided extensive guidance on its website on these general licenses, including ”
Interpretive Guidance and a Statement of Licensing Policy on Internet Freedom in Iran” (describing the authorization in Section 560.540 of the ITSR and OFAC’s policy for reviewing specific licenses in this area) and multiple “Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQs) on GL D-1 (FAQs 337-348 and FAQs 434-443).  
 
Licensing Policies. OFAC will consider applications to provide products and services outside the scope of these authorizations on a case-by-case basis based on U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. Section 560.540 includes a specific licensing policy for the export of other services and software incident to information-sharing over the Internet, subject to certain conditions. Additionally, GL D-1 also includes a specific licensing policy for the export of other services, software, or hardware incident to personal communications that are outside the scope of the general license.
 
As the Iranian people seek to exercise their universal right to freedom of expression and continue to seek access to information via the Internet, OFAC remains committed to engaging with the private sector to provide guidance on the range of activities authorized by section 560.540 and GL D-1 of the ITSR. If you require assistance with interpreting the authorizations contained in section 560.540 and GL D-1 of the ITSR or assessing how they apply to your situation, or need guidance on how to apply for a specific license, please contact
OFAC’s Licensing Division online, by phone at 202-622-2480, or by email at
ofac_feedback@do.treas.gov.
 
Enforcement Actions
 
 
Muhammad Ismail and Kamran Khan of Connecticut pleaded guilty this month in federal court to money laundering in connection with funds they received for the unlawful export of goods to Pakistan. A third defendant, Imran Khan previously pleaded guilty to violating U.S. export laws.
 
According to court documents and statements made in court, from at least 2012 to December 2016, Ismail, and his two sons, Kamran and Imran Khan, were engaged in a scheme to purchase goods that were controlled under the Export Administration Regulations and to export those goods without a license to Pakistan, in violation of the EAR. Through companies conducting business as Brush Locker Tools, Kauser Enterprises-USA and Kauser Enterprises-Pakistan, the three defendants received orders from a Pakistani company that procured materials and equipment for the Pakistani military, requesting them to procure specific products that were subject to the EAR. When U.S. manufacturers asked about the end-user for a product, the defendants either informed the manufacturer that the product would remain in the U.S. or completed an end-user certification indicating that the product would not be exported.
 
After the products were purchased, they were shipped by the manufacturer to the defendants in Connecticut. The products were then shipped to Pakistan on behalf of either the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (“PAEC”), the Pakistan Space & Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (“SUPARCO”), or the National Institute of Lasers & Optronics (“NILOP”), all of which were listed on the U.S. Department of Commerce Entity List. The defendants never obtained a license to export any item to the designated entities even though they knew that a license was required prior to export. The defendants received the proceeds for the sale of export controlled items through wire transactions from Value Additions’ Pakistan-based bank account to a U.S. bank account that the defendants controlled.
 
 
On or about January 23, 2010, April 6, 2010, and May 14, 2010, respectively, Trilogy International engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations by exporting items subject to the Regulations and controlled on national security grounds to Russia without the required BIS export licenses.
 
The items involved were an explosives detector and a total of 115 analog-to-digital converters. The items were classified under Export Control Classification Numbers 1A004 and 3A001, respectively, controlled as indicated above on national security grounds, and valued in total at approximately $76,035. Each of the items required a license for export to Russia pursuant to Section 742.4 of the Regulations.
 
BIS issued $200,000 in penalties and 10-year export bans to Trilogy International Associates and its president for exporting an explosives detector and other equipment to Russia without the required licenses.
 
 
An Iranian national, who was arrested in New York City, was sentenced in Minneapolis this month to 15 months in prison for his role in illegally exporting restricted technology to his home country. Aliereza Jalali, 39, was sentenced before U.S. District Judge Joan N. Ericksen in the District of Minnesota, on one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States. He pleaded guilty to the charge on Nov. 29, 2017.
 
According to the defendant’s guilty plea, from 2009 through December 2015, Jalali was a part-time employee of Green Wave Telecommunication, Sdn Bhn, (Green Wave) a Malaysian company located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Since its incorporation in 2009, Green Wave operated as a front company for Fanavar Moj Khavar (Fana Moj), an Iran-based company that specializes in both broadcast communications and microwave communications.
 
As part of this conspiracy, Green Wave was used to acquire unlawfully sensitive export-controlled technology from the United States on behalf of Fana Moj. In order to accomplish these acquisitions, Jalali and his co-conspirators concealed the ultimate unlawful destination and end users of the exported technology through false statements, unlawful financial transactions, and other means.
 
The defendant’s co-conspirators contacted producers of the sought-after technology, solicited purchase agreements, and negotiated the purchase and delivery of the goods with the seller. When the goods were received by Green Wave in Malaysia, Jalali repackaged and unlawfully exported the items from Malaysia to Fana Moj in Tehran, Iran. In 2017, the U.S. Department of the Treasury placed Fana Moj on its list of ”
Specially Designated Nationals” for providing financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC. 
 
Vladimir Nevidomy, 31, of Hallandale Beach, Florida, pleaded guilty this month, to conspiring to illegally export military-grade night vision and thermal vision devices and ammunition primers to Russia. According to information contained in court documents, from as early as April 2013 through November 2013, customers in Russia contacted Nevidomy by email requesting night vision rifle scopes, thermal monoculars and ammunition primers, all of which were on the U.S. Munitions List and subject to export control by the U.S. Department of State. Nevidomy proceeded to obtain at least three ATN MARS 4×4 night-vision rifle scopes and an ODIN 61BW thermal multi-purpose monocular from U.S. vendors by falsely representing to the vendors that the items were not for export.
 
On or about April 16, 2013, a co-defendant caused a wire transfer from a Shanghai, China bank account in the amount of $11,755 for the purchase and shipment of two ATN MARS 4×4 night-vision rifle scopes. That same day, Nevidomy paid $9,599 to a U.S. vendor for the purchase of those two night-vision rifle scopes. On or about May 2, 2013, Nevidomy also caused a wire transfer in the amount of $10,000 to be sent to a U.S. vendor for the purchase of the ODIN 61BW thermal multi-purpose monocular.
 
Later, Nevidomy’s co-defendant caused a wire transfer from a bank account in Riga, Latvia in the amount of $18,036, part of which was for the purchase of a third ATN Mars 4X4 night-vision rifle scope. On the same day, Nevidomy caused a wire transfer in the amount of $9,599 to a U.S. vendor, part of which was for the purchase of the third ATN Mars 4X4 night-vision rifle scope.
 
After the U.S. vendors sent the night vision devices to Nevidomy in South Florida, he exported them to the co-defendant in Russia by either concealing the defense articles in household goods shipments sent through a freight forwarding company or using a private Russian postal service that operated in South Florida. In June 2013, Nevidomy aided and abetted the export of the ATN MARS 4×4 night-vision rifle scopes from the U.S. to the co-defendant in Russia, and in August 2013, he exported the ODIN 61BW thermal multi-purpose monocular from the U.S. to the co-defendant in Russia.
 
On or about July 19, 2013, the same co-defendant sent an email to Nevidomy requesting 1,000 large-rifle ammunition primers to be shipped to Vladivostok, Russia. On or about Oct. 2, 2013, Nevidomy attempted to export 1,000 Sellier & Bellot ammunition primers from the U.S. to the co-defendant in Vladivostok, Russia. These ammunition primers were seized by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 
These night vision rifle scopes, thermal monocular, and ammunition primers required a license or other authorization from the U.S. Department of State before being exported from the U.S. since they were on the U.S. Munitions List. A certified license history check revealed that neither Nevidomy nor his associates ever applied or attempted to apply for an export license from the State Department for the night-vision equipment or ammunition primers.
 
 
A Massachusetts couple, their company, and a Syrian national were indicted today in federal court in Boston in connection with a scheme to smuggle goods out of the United States and to supply services to Syria. The company and the defendants also conducted business with EKT Electronics, which was involved in the acquisition and/or development of improved explosive devices used against U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.Anni Beurklian, a/k/a Anni Ajaka (“Beurklian”), 49, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Lebanon who resided in Waltham; her husband, Antoine Ajaka, a/k/a Tony Ajaka (“Ajaka”), 50, a lawful permanent resident from Lebanon who resided in Waltham; Amir Katranji, a/k/a Amir Hachem Katranji, a/k/a Amir Hachem Alkatranji, a/k/a Amir Katra (“Katranji”), 52, a Syrian national; and Top Tech US Inc., a U.S. company, which operated out of the Ajaka/Beurklian residence in Waltham, were indicted on conspiracy to violate U.S. export laws and regulations, conspiracy to defraud the United States, smuggling U.S. goods out of the United States, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and obstruction of justice. Beurklian, Ajaka, and Top Tech US Inc. are also charged with illegally providing services to persons located in Syria and mail fraud. Beurklian and Ajaka previously fled the U.S. and have not returned.
 
As alleged in the indictment, beginning no later than 2012 and continuing until Jan. 9, 2018, Beurklian and her husband operated an export business, Top Tech US Inc., out of their Waltham residence. The couple used their business to procure goods, including electronics, computer equipment, and electrical switches, from U.S. companies and export those goods out of the United States to customers in Lebanon and Syria. One of their customers was Amir Katranji, a citizen of Syria who operates and manages EKT Electronics (EKT), a company headquartered in Syria. In 2007, EKT and its founder, Mohammad Katranji, Amir Katranji’s father, were added to the Department of Commerce’s Entity List because the U.S. Government had determined that EKT and Mohammad Katranji were involved in activities related to the acquisition, attempted acquisition, and/or development of improvised explosive devices, which were being used against U.S. and Coalition troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, since 2007, no U.S. person has been permitted to export U.S. goods to EKT without first obtaining an export license from the Department of Commerce. As alleged in the indictment, no one has sought or obtained an export license to export any U.S. goods to EKT or Mohammad Katranji.
 
The indictment further alleges that in or about 2013, Ajaka and Beurklian began doing business with Katranji and supplying U.S. origin goods to EKT using Top Tech US. Ajaka and Beurklian knew that Katranji operated a business in Syria and that they were providing brokering services to Katranji and his Syrian company, EKT, by buying and shipping U.S. origin goods to EKT and its customers. EKT paid Ajaka and Beurklian more than $200,000 through Top Tech US bank accounts for their services. To conceal their illegal activity with EKT and evade the mandatory export filing requirement, Ajaka and Beurklian, with the knowledge and agreement of Katranji, falsified shipping paperwork and undervalued goods being shipped overseas directly to, or on behalf of, EKT.
 
Additionally, the indictment alleges that, in or about 2016, after U.S. Government officials began detaining international shipments made by Top Tech US before they had exited the country, Beurklian, Ajaka, and Katranji conspired to obstruct justice and obstructed justice by manipulating, deleting, and falsifying records regarding shipments of U.S. goods overseas. The indictment further alleges that, on Jan. 9, 2018, after engaging in plea negotiations with the U.S. Government, Beurklian and Ajaka fled the United States to avoid prosecution. To date, they have not returned.  
 
 
Ross Roggio, 49, of Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, and Roggio Consulting Company, LLC, a firm with which Ross Roggio was associated, for alleged involvement in a conspiracy to illegally export firearm parts, firearm manufacturing tools, and “defense services,” including items used to manufacture M4 rifles, from the United States to Iraq, in violation of the Arms Export Control Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
 
The indictment charges Ross Roggio and Roggio Consulting Company, LLC with criminal conspiracy, illegal export of goods, wire fraud and money laundering. Pursuant to regulations of the U.S. Department of Commerce, a license is required to export certain goods and services from the United States to Iraq for reasons of regional stability and national security. Similarly, defense services and defense articles may not be exported to Iraq without a license from the U.S. Department of State.
The indictment alleges that, beginning in January of 2013 until the date of the indictment, Ross Roggio conspired to export both items and services from the United States to Iraq, without the required U.S. Commerce Department and U.S. State Department licenses. The conspirators allegedly purchased firearms parts and manufacturing tools from the United States, illegally exported the items to Iraq where the items were utilized and incorporated in the manufacture and assembly of complete firearms in a firearms manufacturing plant constructed and operated in part by Ross Roggio. It is alleged that the items illegally exported included: M4 Bolt Gas Rings MIL; Firing Pin Retainers; Rifling Combo Buttons, and “defense services.” The defense services allegedly provided by Ross Roggio and his firm include the furnishing of assistance to foreign persons in the manufacture of firearms.
 
In addition to the charges relating to export controls violations, the indictment also alleges that Ross Roggio and his firm committed wire fraud on at least three occasions by purchasing items from a United States company and providing said company with false information about the end-user of the items. Finally, the indictment charges Ross Roggio and his firm with 27 counts of money laundering in the form of bank transfers from Iraq to two accounts within the Middle District of Pennsylvania, in furtherance of their unlawful export conspiracy.
 
 
A Russian citizen was sentenced this month to 18 months in federal prison for attempting to illegally export from the United States more than $100,000 in firearm parts, ammunition and accessories, including parts designed for assault rifles. Konstantin Checkovskoi was apprehended by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Special Agents at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago on April 26, 2017, as he attempted to board a flight for Stockholm, Sweden. In Chekhovskoi’s eleven checked bags were the firearm parts, ammunition and accessories, including bullets, rifle magazines, triggers, stocks, muzzle brakes and scopes, many of which were designed for assault rifles such as AK-47s and M4s. Chekhovskoi lacked the required license for the export-controlled items. Chekhovskoi, 44, of St. Petersburg, Russia, pleaded guilty last year to one count of attempting to fraudulently and knowingly export firearm parts. U.S. District Judge Sara L. Ellis imposed the 18-month prison term and fined Chekhovskoi $100,000.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a3
12.
Gary Stanley’s EC Tip of the Day

(Source: Defense and Export-Import Update; 31 Mar 2018.  Available by subscription from
gstanley@glstrade.com.)
 
* Author: Gary Stanley, Esq., Global Legal Services, PC, (202) 352-3059,
gstanley@glstrade.com.
 
Under the
Export Administration Regulations (EAR), you maintain effective control over an item when you either retain physical possession of the item, or secure the item in such an environment as a hotel safe, a bonded warehouse, or a locked or guarded exhibition facility. Retention of effective control over an item is a condition of certain temporary exports and reexports.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

MSEX/IM MOVERS & SHAKERS

MS_a213. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings; 166 Jobs Posted This Week, Including 8 New Jobs

(Source: Editor)  
 

Published every Monday or first business day of the week. Please, send job openings in the following format to 
jobs@fullcirclecompliance.eu
.

 
* COMPANY; LOCATION; POSITION TITLE (WEBLINK); CONTACT INFORMATION; REQUISITION ID
 

#
” New or amended listing this week (
8 New Jobs
)

# Abaco Systems, Inc.; Huntsville, AL; Trade Compliance Manager;
* Aerovironment; Simi Valley, CA; Trade Compliance Specialist II; Job ID: 18-017

* Aerovironment; Simi Valley, CA;
Trade Compliance Director
; Job ID: 18-018

*
AJC Logistics; Atlanta, GA; NVOCC Export Specialist;

*
 Allports Forwarding Inc.; Portland, OR;
Import Entry Specialist

* Arent Fox LLP; Washington, D.C.; International Trade Associate;

* Arent Fox LLP; Los Angeles, CA;
International Trade Associate
;

*
 BAE Systems; Los Angeles, CA; 
Program Manager, International and Offset
; Requisition ID: 33778BR

* Boeing; St. Louis, MO; Trade Control Specialist – Mid Career; Requisition ID: 1700022214

*
 BMW North America; Woodcliff Lake, NJ;
Senior Analyst, Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 170004RD
* Buehler; Lake Bluff, IL;
Manager, Compliance and Logistics
; Requisition ID: 2018-004

* Crown Corporation; New Bremen, Ohio; Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 45311

*
 CSRA; San Diego, CA;
Mid-Level FMS Case Analyst
; Requisition ID: RQ 3035

*
 CSRA; San Diego, CA;
Mid-level Case Analyst for MIDS FMS Program
; Requisition ID: RQ6975
 

*
 CSRA; San Diego, CA; 
Senior Case Analyst for MIDS FMS Program
; RQ6763 

*
 CSRA; San Diego, CA;
Senior FMS Case Analyst
; Requisition ID: 3004

*
 CSRA; San Diego, CA; 
Senior FMS Financial Analyst
; Requisition ID: 
RQ3010

* Curtiss-Wright Corporation; Los Angeles, CA;
Director, Trade Compliance
;

* Danaher Science and Technology; United States; Senior Global Trade Compliance ManagerJob ID: COR000942
 

* Danaher Science and Technology;
Biberach an der Riß, Germany
;
European Trade Compliance Specialist

Job ID: KAV001714 

* Danaher Science and Technology; Nationwide, India; Manager, International Regulatory Affairs
Job ID: CEP000339

* Dorman Products; Colmar, PA; Global Trade Compliance Specialist;
* DSJ Global; Minneapolis, MN; Director of International Logistics;
*
 DynCorp International; Tampa, FL; Foreign Disclosure Officer; Requisition ID: PR1701977

*
 Eaton; Syracuse, NY;
Global Logistics Manager
; Requisition ID: 036620

*
 Eaton; Shanghai Shi, China;
Global Ethics and Compliance Director, APAC
; Requisition ID: 039260
* Eaton; Mississagua, Canada; Global Trade & Compliance Manager;

* Elbit Systems of America; Fort Worth, TX;
Trade Compliance Manager
; 2018-5916

* Elbit Systems of America; Fort Worth, TX;
Trade Compliance Officer
; 2018-5917

* EMD Serono; Milan, Italy;
Trade Compliance Associate Internship
;

* EMD Serono; Shanghai, China; Import Export Supervisor;

* Emerson; Mexico City, Mexico; Export and Trade Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 18001203
* Esterline; Xenia, OH; Manager, International Trade Compliance;

* Esterline; Hong Kong;
Regional ITC Manager
;
* Esterline; Singapore; Regional ITC Manager; 

* Esterline; Brea, CA; 
Senior Trade Compliance Specialist
;

*
 EoTech Technologies; Ann Arbor, MI;
Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 092335

*
 Expeditors; Sunnyvale, CA;
Customs Compliance Supervisor
;


*
 Expeditors; Krefeld, Germany; 
Clerk Import / Export
 ;
*
 Expeditors; Bedfont, United Kingdom;
Customs Brokerage Clerk
;
*
 Expeditors; Birmingham, UK;
Customs Brokerage Agent
;

*
 Expeditors; Dusseldorf, Germany;
Clerk, Airfreight Import
;


* Export Solutions Inc.; Melbourne FL; 
Trade Compliance Specialist
;
info@exportsolutionsinc.com

*
 EY; Belgium; 
Senior Consultant, Global Trade
; Requisition ID: BEL000PT

*
 FD Associates; Tysons Corner, VA; 
Senior Export Compliance Associate;
 Send 
resume to and salary requirements to 
jobs@fdassociates.net 

*
 FLIR; Billerica, MA;
Global Trade Compliance Analyst,Traffic
;
*
 FLIR; Wilsonville, OR; 
Global Trade Compliance Analyst,Traffic
;

* FLIR; Nashua, NH; 
Global Trade Compliance Analyst,Traffic
;
*
 FLIR; Elkridge, MD; 
Global Trade Compliance Analyst,Traffic
;

*
 FLIR; Billerica, MA;
Global Trade Compliance Analyst, Licensing
;
*
 FLIR; Arlington, VA;
Senior Analyst, Licensing
*
 FLIR; Billerica, MA;
Senior Analyst, Licensing
;
* Floor and Decor; Smyrna, GA; Customs Compliance Manager;
* Full Circle Compliance; Bruchem, Netherlands;
Legal Analyst, Manager

* FusionStorm; Newark, CA; Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 2018-2350
* Garmin; Olathe, Kansas; International Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 1800006

*
 General Atomics; San Diego, CA; 
Internship, Import/Export, Summer 2018
; Requisition ID: 15731BR 

* General Dynamics; Fairfax, VA; Export Policy Analyst; Job ID: 2018-36089 
* General Dynamics; Arlington, VA; Analyst, Export Control; Job ID: 2018-36963

* General Dynamics; Falls Church, VA;
Director, Trade Control
; Job ID: 2018-1122

* General Motors; Pontiac, MI; 
GM Defense Sub Export Compliance Officer
 (Full Time or Flex time)
; Requisition ID: GPS0003372
*
 Georgia-Pacific; Atlanta, GA; 
Sr. Analyst, International Trade
; Requisition ID: 052010

* GHY International; Manitoba, Canada; Trade Analyst;
* GHY International; Pembina, ND (or remote); Ocean & Air Import Coordinator
* Gilead Sciences; Foster City, CA; Manager, Global Trade Compliance; R0001742
* H.B. Fuller; St. Paul, MN; Global Trade Compliance Director;
* Henderson Group Unlimited; Inc; Washington, DC; 
Process Improvement Mgr

* Henderson Group Unlimited; Inc; Washington, DC; 
Defense Control Analyst

* Henderson Group Unlimited, Inc; Washington, DC; 
Compliance Analyst
;

* Hubbell, Incorporated; Greenville, SC; Export Compliance Specialist;
* Hubbell, Incorporated; Shelton, CT; Export Compliance Specialist;
* Hubbell, Incorporated; Centralia, MO; Export Compliance Specialist;
*
 Honda of America Manufacturing; Marysvile, OH;
Import Specialist

*
 Infineon Technologies; Munich, Germany;
Experte Export Control (w/m)
; Requisition ID: 22825

*
 InteliTrac Global Solutions; Herndon, VA; 
ITAR Compliance Official / Deputy Facility Security Officer
;

*
 InteliTrac Global Solutions; Herndon, VA;
ITAR Compliance Official
;

* JABIL; St. Petersburg, FL;
Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 207029
* JABIL; St. Petersburg, FL;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 206581
* JABIL; Guadalajara, Mexico;
Classification & Export Licensing Analyst
; Requisition ID: 207594

* KPMG U.S.; San Francisco, CA; Associate, Trade & Customs;

# 
Leonardo DRS; Arlington, VA;
Senior Customs & Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 87488
*
 Lockheed Martin; Stratford, CT;
International Trade Compliance Technology Specialist
; Requisition ID: 415922BR

*
 Lockheed Martin; Ft Worth, TX;
International Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 416747BR

* Lockheed Martin; Arlington, VA; Export Licensing Staff
Requisition ID 419903BR
* Lockheed Martin; Arlington, VA; International Trade Compliance Staff; Requisition ID 418761BR

*
 L-3 LINK Division; Tulsa, OK; 
Contracts Administrator 1
; Requisition ID: 091686
*
 L-3 ALST; Orlando, FL;
Contracts Manager / Empowered Official
; Requisition ID: 093069
*
 L-3 Warrior Sensor Systems; Middle East;
International Business Development Manager – Middle East Region
; Requisition ID: 093343
# L-3; Ann Arbor, MI; Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 092335
# L-3; Greenville, TX; International Trade Compliance Administrator 3; Requisition ID: 095830
# L-3; Greenville, TX; Import/Export Administrator 3; Requisition ID: 095921
# L-3; Arlington, TX; Trade Compliance Practitioner, Empowered Official; Requisition ID: 089915
* Maersk/DAMCO; Agent de transit IMPORT – EXPORT; Job Ref.: DC-164022
* Medtronic; Heerlen, The Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 16000DYY
* Medtronic; Wash DC;
Global Trade Lawyer
;
stacy.m.johnson@medtronic.com
; Requisition ID: 170002ON

# Mitchell Martin, Inc.; Dallas, Texas; Export Regulatory Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 104405
* MTS Systems; Eden Prairie, MN;
Global Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 37841
* NORDHAM; Tulsa, OK;
Global Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 14080BR
* Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
Manager, International Trade Compliance 2

Requisition ID
:
17022803
 
 

*
 Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
Manager, International Trade Compliance 2
; Requisition ID: 17022805
*
 Northrop Grumman; Huntsville, AL;
International Trade Compliance 3
; Requisition ID: 17026172
* Northrop Grumman; El Segundo, CA; Supply Chain Logistics Spec 3; Requisition ID: 18004948

* Office of the Director of National Intelligence; McLean, VA;
Associate General Counsel
;
* Oracle; United States;
Senior Customs Compliance Specialist
; Job ID: 170018FJ

* Oracle; United States;
Customs Compliance Specialist
; Job ID: 17001CBG

* Oracle; Bejing, China;
Senior Customs Compliance Specialist – APAC
; Job ID: 17001CBI

* PwC; Portland, OR; Compliance Senior Manager;
* Raytheon Company; Doha, Qatar;
Global Trade Compliance Consulting Analyst
; Requisition ID: 110234BR

* Raytheon Company; El Segundo, CA; Senior Analyst, Global Trade Licensing; Requisition ID: 111121BR
* Raytheon Company; El Segundo, CA; Global Trade Manager; Requisition ID: 108227BR

* Raytheon Company; El Segundo, CA;
Principal, Global Trade Licensing
; Requisition ID: 
108230BR
 

* Raytheon Company; Tucson, AZ;
Sr. Export Licensing Specialist
;
 Requisition ID: 
108970BR; 
ryan.murphy@raytheon.com
 

* Raytheon Company; Tucson, AZ;
Export Licensing Specialist
; Requisition 


ID: 108960BR; 
ryan.murphy@raytheon.com
  

* Raytheon Company; Tucson, AZ;
Export License & Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 
108961BR

*
Raytheon Company; Tucson, AZ;
Trade Compliance Principal Investigator
; Requisition ID: 
110444BR

* Raytheon Company; Tewksbury, MA;
Licensing Manager
; Requisition ID: 
110837BR

* Raytheon Company; Waltham, MA; 
Licensing Manager
; Requisition ID: 
110837BR 
* Raytheon Company; El Segundo, CA; Licensing Director; Requisition ID: 110838BR

* Raytheon Company; Richardson, TX;  
Licensing Director
; Requisition ID: 110838BR 

* REDCOM Laboratories; Victor NY;  
Director of Trade Compliance
; Contact 
Chad Boehly 

*
 Rolls-Royce; Indianapolis, IN;Export Control Specialist; Req ID:
  
 
 

JR6025484 

*
 SABIC; Houston TX; 
Senior Analyst, Trade Compliance
;
Danielle.Cannata@sabic.com
; Requisition ID: 8411BR

* SABIC; Houston, TX; Senior Analyst, International Trade Compliance

Requisition ID 8655; OR Contact: Jason Washington
* SABIC; Houston, TX;
Senior Analyst, Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 8644BR

*
 SAFRAN Group; United Kingdom;
Trade Compliance Specialist
;

* Sig Sauer; Newington, New Hampshire; Trade Compliance Manager
* The Spaceship Company; Mojave, CA; Export Compliance Officer;
* Spirent; San Jose, CA;
Global Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 4088

* TE Connectivity; Middletown, PA; Manager II, Global Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 17361
* Teledyne Geophysical; Houston, TX; Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 2017-5459

* Teledyne Microwave Solutions; Mountain View, CA; 
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 2018-6089

*
 Teledyne Imaging; Chestnut Ridge, NY; 
Director of International Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 2017-5558
*
 Teledyne Imaging; Billerica, MA; Director of International Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 2017-5558 

*
 Teledyne Imaging; Tarrytown, NY; 
Director of International Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 2017-5558
*
 Teledyne Imaging; Kiln, MS; 
Director of International Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 2017-5558
*
 Teledyne Imaging; Fredricton, NB; 
Director of International Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 2017-5558 

* Tenneco, Inc.; Lake Forest, IL;
Americas Global Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 178693-846

* Tenneco, Inc.; Lake Forest, IL; Customs & Trade Compliance Coordinator; Requisition ID: 178353-846
*
 Textron; Hunt Valley, MD;
Senior Manager – Export Compliance
;

*
 Thermo Fisher Scientific; Waltham, MA;
Director, Global Trade Compliance
;

* Thermo Fisher Scientific; Shanghai, China; 
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Job ID: 57953BR 

* T
hermo Fisher Scientific; Franklin, MA; 
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Job ID: 
61435BR

* T
hermo Fisher Scientific; Carlsbad, CA; 
Compliance Specialist II
; Job ID: 
60951BR

* T
hermo Fisher Scientific; Suwanee, GA;
Export Compliance Specialist III
; Job ID:
60224BR

*
TLR; San Fransisco, CA;
Import CSR
 ; Requisition ID: 1040

*
 Tradewin; Portland, OR;
U.S. Export Compliance Consultant

* Trek; Waterloo, WI; Global Trade & Logistics Specialist;

* United Technologies Corp, Pratt & Whitney; East Hartford, CT;
International Trade Compliance Technology Manager
; Requisition ID: 51863BR

* United Technologies Corp, Pratt & Whitney; East Hartford, CT;
ITC & ACE Compliance Program Manager, ASC
; Requisition ID: 58388BR

* 
University of Colorado, LASP; Boulder CO; 
Export Compliance Administrator

hrads@lasp.colorado.edu
; Requisition ID: 12298
* Varian; Belgium, Switzerland, Netherlands, or UK; EMEIA Trade Lead – Senior Manager Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 12301BR; Contact 
Gavin Tickner at 
Gavin.Tickner@varian.com
 
* Varian; Paolo Alto, CA; Senior Trade Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 12735BR; Contact 
Uyen Tran at
Uyen.Tran@varian.com
* Varian; Beijing, China;
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 
12297BR; Contact 
Susan Lin at
WeiZhen.Lin@varian.com
  
* Vigilant; Negotiable Location, USA;
Global Trade Compliance Analyst
;

* Virgin Galactic; Mojave, CA; Export Compliance Officer; Requisition ID: 2018-3440
* Virgin Galactic; Las Cruces, NM; Export Compliance Officer; Requisition ID: 2018-3558
* Virgin Galactic; Las Cruces, NM; Director of Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 2018-3349
* Virgin Galactic; Washington, D.C.; Director of Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 2018-3349
* Williams International; Pontiac, MI; Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 17-0275

* World Wide Technology; Hong Kong;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 005

* World Wide Technology; Edwardsville, IL; International Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 6110
*
 Xylem, Inc.; Remote, United States;
Manager, Global Ethics & Compliance
;

* Zeiss Group; Thornwood, NY;
Trade Compliance Specialist
;
Zimmer Biomet; Warsaw, IN; Trade Compliance Manager

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ENEDITOR’S NOTES

 

Otto von Bismarck (Otto Eduard Leopold, Prince of Bismarck, Duke of Lauenburg; 1 Apr 1815 – 30 Jul 1898; was a conservative Prussian statesman who was the first Chancellor of the German Empire between 1871 and 1890.
  – “There is a Providence that protects idiots, drunkards, children, and the United States of America.”
 

Hans Christian Andersen (2 Apr 1805 – 4 Aug 1875, was a Danish author. Although a prolific writer of plays, travelogues, novels, and poems, Andersen is best remembered for his fairy tales, of which 3381 were published. Some of his most famous fairy tales include “The Emperor’s New Clothes”, “The Little Mermaid”, “The Nightingale”, “The Snow Queen”, “The Ugly Duckling”, and “Thumbelina”.  Andersen’s popularity is not limited to children; his stories express themes that transcend age and nationality.)
  – “Being born in a duck yard does not matter if you are hatched from a swan’s egg.” 

Monday is Punday:
 
Q.  Where did the Easter Bunny go to eat pancakes?
A.  To IHOP, of course!
 
Q.  How does the Easter Bunny dry himself after his shower?
A.  With a hare dryer.
 
Q.  What happened to the Easter egg when he heard a funny joke?
A.  He cracked up!
 
Q.  What day do eggs hate the most?
A.  Fry-days.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a315
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments to applicable regulations are listed below.
 
*
ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
 
*
CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 22 Feb 2018: 83 FR 7608-7610: Technical Amendment to List of User Fee Airports: Name Changes of Several Airports and the Addition of Five Airports
 
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 
here
.)


EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR)
: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  – Last Amendment: 
2 Apr 2018:
83 FR 13849-13862
: Implementation of the February 2017 Australia Group (AG) Intersessional Decisions and the June 2017 AG Plenary Understandings; Addition of India to the AG [Amendment of EAR Parts 738, 740, 745, and 774.]

  
*
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR)
: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders

  – Last Amendment: 19 Mar 2018:
83 FR 11876-11881: Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties 

 
*
FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR)
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment:
20 Sep 2017:
 
82 FR 43842-43844
: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on Filing Requirements; Correction
 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
  – The latest edition (16 March 2018) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and approximately 250 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and explanations of the numerous errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies in Microsoft Word every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance websiteBITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. Government employees (including military) and employees of universities are eligible for a 50% discount on both publications at www.FullCircleCompiance.eu.  
 
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HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA)
, 1 Jan 2018: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 30 Mar 2018:
Harmonized System Update 1804, containing 710 ABI records and 166 harmonized tariff records.
  – HTS codes for AES are available 
here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 
here.

 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130.

  – Last Amendment: 14 Feb 2018: 83 FR 6457-6458: Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Addition of South Sudan [Amends ITAR Part 126.] 

  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 14 Feb 2018) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated 
ITAR

(“BITAR”)
, by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.
 The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
 
website
. BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please
contact us
to receive your discount code.

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EN_a0316
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 
here

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EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission, provided attribution is given to “The Export/Import Daily Bugle of (date)”. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.


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