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18-0220 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

18-0220 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

Tuesday, 20 February 2018

TOP
The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, DOE/NRC, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FAR/DFARS, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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[N.B. The Daily Bugle was not published yesterday, a U.S. Federal Holiday.]

  1. Commerce/BIS Announces MPETAC Meeting on 6 Mar in Washington DC 
  2. Commerce/BIS Announces MTAC Meeting on 8 Mar in Washington DC 
  3. Commerce/BIS Announces TRETAC Meeting on 7 Mar in Washington DC 
  1. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. Justice: “Two Men Arrested and Charged with Illegally Exporting UAV Parts and Technology to Hizballah”
  4. State/DDTC Reminder: DTrade Super Users Need to Update their Email Address in the System
  5. Singapore Customs Posts Notification of Tariff Changes
  1. Defense News: “U.S. Warns Against ‘Protectionism’ with New EU Defense Agreement”
  2. The Fayette Observer: “Fayetteville Man Accused of Stealing, Selling Military Equipment”
  3. ST&R Trade Report: “Proposed Import Restrictions on Steel and Aluminum Could Have Far-Reaching Impact”
  4. Star Tribune: “Minnesota Prosecutors Charge 3 Men with Conspiring to Export Goods to Hezbollah Terrorists”
  5. WSJ: “Iranian Airline, Under Sanctions, Bought U.S. Jet Parts Through Front Firms”
  1. D. Erlow: “Watch Out! Here Are the Top 5 Risk Areas That Are Most Often Overlooked”
  2. J. Carneiro: “Growing Concerns over Global Export Controls (Part I of II)”
  3. S. Yavuz: “Growing Concerns over Global Export Controls (Part II of II)”
  4. Gary Stanley’s ECR Tip of the Day
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 154 Jobs Posted, Including 15 New Jobs
  1. ECS Announces “ITAR/EAR Beyond the Basics” on 20-21 Mar in San Diego, CA
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Amendments: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (8 Dec 2017), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (16 Feb 2018), FACR/OFAC (28 Dec 2017), FTR (20 Sep 2017), HTSUS (8 Feb 2018), ITAR (14 Feb 2018) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1

1. Commerce/BIS Announces MPETAC Meeting on 6 Mar in Washington DC
(Source:
Federal Register
, 20 Feb 2018.) [Excerpts.]
 
83 FR 7143: Materials Processing Equipment Technical Advisory Committee; Notice of Partially Closed Meeting
 
  The Materials Processing Equipment Technical Advisory Committee (MPETAC) will meet on March 6, 2018, 9:00 a.m., Room 3884, in the Herbert C. Hoover Building, 14th Street between Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues NW, Washington, DC. The Committee advises the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Export Administration with respect to technical questions that affect the level of export controls applicable to materials processing equipment and related technology. …
  The open session will be accessible via teleconference to 20 participants on a first come, first serve basis. To join the conference, submit inquiries to Ms. Yvette Springer at
Yvette.Springer@bis.doc.gov
, no later than February 27, 2018.
  A limited number of seats will be available for the public session. Reservations are not accepted. To the extent that time permits, members of the public may present oral statements to the Committee. The public may submit written statements at any time before or after the meeting. However, to facilitate the distribution of public presentation materials to the Committee members, the Committee suggests that presenters forward the public presentation materials prior to the meeting to Ms. Springer via email. …
  For more information, call Yvette Springer at (202) 482-2813.
 
Yvette Springer, Committee Liaison Officer.

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EXIM_a2

2. 
Commerce/BIS Announces MTAC Meeting on 8 Mar in Washington DC

(Source:
Federal Register
, 20 Feb 2018.) [Excerpts.]
 
83 FR 7143-7144: Materials Technical Advisory Committee; Notice of Partially Closed Meeting
 
  The Materials Technical Advisory Committee (MTAC) will meet on March 8, 2018, 10:00 a.m., Herbert C. Hoover Building, Room 3884, 14th Street between Constitution & Pennsylvania Avenues NW, Washington, DC. The Committee advises the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Export Administration with respect to technical questions that affect the level of export controls applicable to materials and related technology. …
  The open session will be accessible via teleconference to 20 participants on a first come, first serve basis. To join the conference, submit inquiries to Ms. Yvette Springer at
Yvette.Springer@bis.doc.gov
, no later than March 1, 2018.
  A limited number of seats will be available during the public session of the meeting. Reservations are not accepted. To the extent time permits, members of the public may present oral statements to the Committee. Written statements may be submitted at any time before or after the meeting. However, to facilitate distribution of public presentation materials to Committee members, the materials should be forwarded prior to the meeting to Ms. Springer via email. …
  For more information, call Yvette Springer at (202) 482-2813.
 

Yvette Springer, Committee Liaison Officer.

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EXIM_a3

3. 
Commerce/BIS Announces TRETAC Meeting on 7 Mar in Washington DC

(Source:
Federal Register
, 20 Feb 2018.) [Excerpts.]
 
83 FR 7145: Transportation and Related Equipment Technical Advisory Committee; Notice of Partially Closed Meeting
 
  The Transportation and Related Equipment Technical Advisory Committee (TRETAC) will meet on March 7, 2018, 9:30 a.m., in the Herbert C. Hoover Building, Room 3884, 14th Street between Constitution & Pennsylvania Avenues NW, Washington, DC. The Committee advises the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Export Administration with respect to technical questions that affect the level of export controls applicable to transportation and related equipment or technology. …
  The open session will be accessible via teleconference to 20 participants on a first come, first serve basis. To join the conference, submit inquiries to Ms. Yvette Springer at
Yvette.Springer@bis.doc.gov
no later than February 28, 2018.
  A limited number of seats will be available during the public session of the meeting. Reservations are not accepted. To the extent time permits, members of the public may present oral statements to the Committee. The public may submit written statements at any time before or after the meeting. However, to facilitate distribution of public presentation materials to Committee members, the Committee suggests that presenters forward the public presentation materials prior to the meeting to Ms. Springer via email. …
  For more information, call Yvette Springer at (202) 482-2813.
 

Yvette Springer, Committee Liaison Officer.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a14. Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

* Commerce; Industry and Security Bureau; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Request for Investigation under Section 232 of Trade Expansion Act [Publication Date: 21 February 2018.]
 
* Justice; Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Bureau; NOTICES: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: eForm Access Request [Publication Date: 21 February 2018.]

* Treasury; Foreign Assets Control Office; NOTICES; Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Publication Date: 21 February 2018.]

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

(Source:
Justice, 16 Feb 2018.) [Excerpts.]
 
The indictment of Usama Darwich Hamade, 53, Samir Ahmed Berro, 64, and Issam Darwich Hamade, 55, was announced 16 Feb 2018 for their conspiring to illegally export goods and technology from the United States to Lebanon and to Hizballah, a designated foreign terrorist organization, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Administration Regulations, and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Defendants Usama Hamade and Issam Hamade are currently in custody in South Africa. Samir Ahmed Berro remains at large. …
 
According to the Indictment, those goods included inertial measurement units (IMUs) suitable for use in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), a jet engine, piston engines and recording binoculars.
 
The charges contained in the indictment are merely allegations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. …

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

(Source: 
State/DDTC, 20 Feb 2018.)
 
DTrade Super users should ensure their email address in DTrade is accurate and correct. Please log in to DTrade and verify your email address. To change or update your DTrade email address, follow these instructions: Update Your DTrade Email Address Instruction Form.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

 
Singapore Customs has published a duty revision for several items, which took affect 19 February 2018. The list of affected items can be found here.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWSNEWS

NWS_a1
9. Defense News: “U.S. Warns Against ‘Protectionism’ with New EU Defense Agreement”
(Source: Defense News, 15 Feb 2018.) [Excerpts.]
 
A top American diplomat is concerned that a new European Union defense agreement could lead to “protectionism” that could ice American firms out of sales in Europe.
 
Kay Bailey Hutchison, the U.S. permanent representative to NATO, on Tuesday issued a preemptive warning about the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on security and defense, an EU initiative launched late last year which could potentially lead to joint procurement of European defense products.
 
“Certainly, we do not want this to be a protectionist vehicle for EU. And we’re going to watch carefully because if that becomes the case, then it could splinter the strong security alliance that we have” Hutchison said.
 
There have been concerns from the U.S. about PESCO, as the new agreement excludes several NATO nations, including the U.S., U.K. and Canada, and includes several non-alliance nations in Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. U.S. officials are concerned the group could become a competitor to NATO for military resources.
 
Hutchison specifically called out the idea that nations outside PESCO could find themselves cut off from sales among the European nations.
 
“We want to have a fair process. We want the Europeans to have capabilities and strength, but not to fence off American products, of course. Or Norwegian products. Or potentially U.K. products,” she said. “I think it’s very important that there be transparency and openness in all of those areas where PESCO would be in a bidding process.” …

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NWS_a210. The Fayette Observer: “Fayetteville Man Accused of Stealing, Selling Military Equipment”
(Source: The Fayette Observer, 16 Feb 2018.) [Excerpts.]
 
A Fayetteville man who allegedly sold stolen military property from Fort Bragg to the Netherlands on eBay has been indicted in federal court.
 
Scott Douglas Browning, 40, was indicted Friday on two counts each of receiving, concealing and retaining stolen property belonging to the U.S. military; one count of shipping the stolen items overseas in violation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations; one count of possessing oxycodone; and one count of possessing testosterone. Browning faces a maximum of 42 years imprisonment, a fine of $1.7 million and a term of supervised released following any imprisonment.
 
Browning allegedly conspired with several people to steal government property and military equipment, according to Robert J. Higdon Jr. the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina, who is prosecuting the case. Browning allegedly used eBay accounts to sell and export the stolen equipment to the Netherlands without having obtained from the Department of State a license for such export, or written authorization for such export, after he was formally notified such transactions were in violation of federal export laws, the indictment states.
 
Browning also has sold more than $1.5 million of stolen military equipment within the United States, Higdon said in a news release. …

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NWS_a311. ST&R Trade Report: “Proposed Import Restrictions on Steel and Aluminum Could Have Far-Reaching Impact”
 
The Department of Commerce has recommended the imposition of tariffs and/or quotas on imports of steel mill products and wrought and unwrought aluminum after determining that the quantities and circumstances of such imports are threatening to impair U.S. national security. Any such remedies would likely impact a wide range of downstream users that now have a limited amount of time to communicate their concerns to the White House. President Trump has until April 11 (steel) and April 19 (aluminum) to determine whether to impose these or other remedial actions.
 
The DOC determined that “national security” for purposes of these section 232 investigations includes the general security and welfare of certain industries beyond those necessary to satisfy national defense requirements that are critical to minimum operations of the economy and government. The DOC also recognized the close relation of economic welfare to national security; the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in government revenues, loss of skills, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports.
 
Steel
. The DOC finds that the U.S. is the world’s largest importer of steel, with imports nearly four times its exports. These imports “have adversely affected the steel industry,” the report states, with six basic oxygen furnaces and four electric furnaces having closed since 2000 and employment having dropped by 35 percent since 1998. For some types of steel, such as electrical transformers, only one U.S. producer remains.
 
In the meantime, world steelmaking capacity has increased 127 percent since 2000 and global excess capacity has now reached 700 million tons, almost seven times the annual total of U.S. steel consumption. China is by far the largest producer and exporter of steel, the report states, and its excess capacity alone exceeds total U.S. steelmaking capacity.
 
Given that the U.S. already has 169 antidumping and countervailing duty orders in place against steel products (including 29 against China) along with 25 ongoing investigations, the DOC recommends that the president consider the following alternative remedies.
 
  – a global tariff of at least 24 percent on all steel imports from all countries, or
  – a tariff of at least 53 percent on all steel imports from Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam with a quota by product on steel imports from all other countries equal to 100 percent of their 2017 exports to the U.S., or
  – a quota on all steel products from all countries equal to 63 percent of each country’s 2017 exports to the U.S.
 
Aluminum
. The DOC states that imports and global production overcapacity, caused in part by foreign government subsidies (particularly in China), have had a substantial negative effect on the economic welfare and production capacity of the U.S. primary aluminum industry. Since 2012 import penetration has risen from 66 percent to 90 percent, the report states, while domestic aluminum industry employment has fallen by 58 percent and six smelters have shut down. Only two of the remaining five smelters are operating at full capacity and only one of these produces high-purity aluminum required for critical infrastructure and defense aerospace applications, including types of high-performance armor plate and aircraft-grade aluminum products.
The DOC has two AD and CV duty orders in place on aluminum, both against China, and four ongoing investigations against China. The DOC is now recommending the following alternative remedies, which would cover both aluminum ingots and a wide variety of aluminum products.
 
  – a tariff of at least 7.7 percent on all aluminum exports from all countries, or
  – a tariff of 23.6 percent on all products from China, Hong Kong, Russia, Venezuela, and Vietnam, with all other countries subject to quotas equal to 100 percent of their 2017 exports to the U.S., or
  – a quota on all imports from all countries equal to a maximum of 86.7 percent of each country’s 2017 exports to the U.S.
 
Next Steps
. For both steel and aluminum, any tariffs and/or quotas would be in addition to any duties already in place. However, the report recommends implementing a process to allow the DOC to grant requests from U.S. companies to exclude specific products if the U.S. lacks sufficient domestic capacity or for national security considerations. Any exclusions granted could result in changed tariffs or quotas for the remaining products to maintain the overall effect. In addition, the president could exempt specific countries from any remedies imposed.

The reports are currently under consideration and no final decisions have yet been made. The president may take a range of actions, or no action, based on the DOC’s analysis and recommendations. Actions could include making modifications to the courses of action proposed, such as adjusting percentages.

Business groups have reacted negatively to the DOC’s recommendations. National Foreign Trade Council President Rufus Yerxa urged the president to reject the proposed measures, which he said would increase costs to downstream industries that “are far greater than steel and aluminum in terms of manufacturing output, jobs and exports.” The NFTC and Business Roundtable also warned that using national security as a pretense for import restrictions could embolden other countries to take the same approach, which could restrict U.S. exports of goods and services.

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NWS_a412. Star Tribune: “Minnesota Prosecutors Charge 3 Men with Conspiring to Export Goods to Hezbollah Terrorists”

(Source: Star Tribune, 16 Feb 2018.)
 
Feds in Minnesota say they’re part of a global ring that funneled technology to Hezbollah.
 
Federal prosecutors in Minnesota announced charges Friday against three men accused of conspiring to illegally export drone aircraft technology to a terrorist organization in Lebanon.
An indictment unsealed Friday detailed a complex international scheme through which the men sourced drone materials from businesses around the world – including digital compasses made by Honeywell in Minnesota – for members of the Hezbollah terrorist group.
 
Interpol agents arrested Usama Darwich Hamade, 53, and his brother Issam Darwich Hamade, 55, in South Africa this week while a third co-conspirator – Samir Ahmed Berro, 64 – is still at large, authorities said. The three are accused of evading international export controls to funnel parts including drone technology, a jet engine, piston engines and “recording binoculars” to Hezbollah members from 2009 to 2013.
 
“This indictment describes an elaborate conspiracy and scheme to allegedly provide goods and technology to Hezbollah,” U.S. Attorney Gregory Brooker said in a statement. “The investigation of this case was extremely complicated and our federal law enforcement partners at the FBI, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Office of Export Enforcement, and Homeland Security Investigations conducted a thorough investigation and we are thankful for their dedication.”
 
Usama Hamade, aka “Prince Sam,” holds both Lebanese and South African citizenship. His brother, Issam Hamade, is a citizen of Lebanon who had been living in South Africa at the time of his arrest. According to the indictment, Berro, aka “Tony,” was thought to have been living in either Jordan or Lebanon during the conspiracy and holds citizenship in both Lebanon and the United Kingdom.
 
Berro owned an engineering firm called SAB Aerospace in Dubai, according to the charges, allegedly used as a transshipment point for piston engines shipped from the U.S. to Germany and eventually destined for Hezbollah.
 
The indictment cited two unnamed people in South Africa and Arizona, respectively, who aided the conspiracy but either did so unwittingly or “did not fully understand the scheme’s illegal purpose.” In some cases, the charges said, Usama Hamade allegedly lied about the intended use of certain products he “directed” the unidentified South African to order and deliver to Berro’s business.
 
For example, Hamade told the person, called “Individual A” in the indictment, that drone parts scheduled for delivery in South Africa would be used to fly over wildlife areas on anti-poaching missions.
 
Instead, the parts were “transshipped” from South Africa to Hezbollah members after making stops in states like Minnesota along the way as part of an illicit, and elaborate, supply chain.
 
Followers or ‘Useful Idiots’?
 
According to charges, Issam Hamade also allegedly made nearly $174,000 in wire transfers from a bank in Beirut to accounts his brother controlled in Lebanon to pay for the drone parts, describing the payments as “family support” or funds for “his brothers” to buy “spare parts.”
 
The United States is seeking to extradite the Hamade brothers, according to court filings, and a court hearing in South Africa is expected to take place next week.
 
An ally of Iran and Syria, Hezbollah is considered a terrorist organization by both the United States and the European Union. The group supported insurgents who engaged U.S. troops in Iraq and has increasingly relied on international supporters for weapons and drone procurement as it stepped up its role in the Syrian civil war.
 
Matthew Levitt, director of the Washington Institute’s Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, said the new charges out of Minnesota “demonstrate that Hezbollah has a sophisticated illicit procurement program that’s proactively engaged around the world” – including the U.S.
 
It’s unclear whether the three men indicted are merely supporters using their professional expertise to help the group or if they have deeper ties to Hezbollah. Levitt said the FBI has described some like-minded followers as “useful idiots,” but others may be actual members with a talent for money laundering or other skills put to illicit use.

“It is indicative of the fact that Hezbollah is deeply involved in these types of activities at multiple levels involving multiple groups, individuals, and … using different companies at the same time,” Levitt said.

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NWS_a513. WSJ: “Iranian Airline, Under Sanctions, Bought U.S. Jet Parts Through Front Firms”
(Source: Wall Street Journal, 19 Feb 2018.) [Excerpts.]
 
Mahan Air used Turkish companies to buy engines, transactions that could complicate Boeing’s Iran contract
 
The U.S. says in the filing that a Turkish woman set up a series of shell companies to buy needed equipment from U.S. suppliers for Iran’s Mahan Air, helping the airline circumvent the longstanding sanctions and fueling suspicions about Iran within the Trump administration.
 
The revelation could bolster a case by some within the Trump administration against granting Boeing Co. licenses to sell Iran scores of new planes, a multibillion-dollar deal inked after Tehran signed the landmark 2015 nuclear agreement. The filing documents purchases from September 2016 through December 2017.
 
The Trump administration is considering whether to grant the Boeing licenses to sell planes to another airline, Iran Air, as the White House takes a more aggressive stance on Iran and steps up sanctions. Administration officials are concerned the nuclear accord is inadequate and that Tehran’s growing influence is fueling war and militancy in the region. The U.S. also has accused Iran of violating international bans on ballistic missile development.
 
Iran has disputed evidence cited by the U.S. and the United Nations that it is violating weapon bans, and said U.S. efforts to change the nuclear deal and escalate sanctions against Tehran undermine the agreement and violate its terms.
 
Although the Boeing deal would benefit U.S. firms, some in the administration are uneasy about the signal it would send to Tehran.
 
At the same time, scuttling the Boeing deal could have far-reaching consequences, both for the nuclear accord and the jet makers. Boeing and Airbus, the European firm reliant on U.S. licensing for its own deal with Iran because of the large U.S. content on its aircraft, stand to lose an estimated $40 billion in contracts if the licenses are rejected. …

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COMMCOMMENTARY

COMM_a01
14. D. Erlow: “Watch Out! Here Are the Top 5 Risk Areas That Are Most Often Overlooked”

(Source:
Braumiller Law Group, 14 Feb 2018.)
 
* Darlene Erlow, Global Trade & Customs Compliance Manager
Metso Corporation.
 
Mitigating risk should be a main objective of any trade compliance program. Most programs include improvements in the well-known areas of risk: classification, the proper utilization of special programs, record keeping, and valuation. These risk areas can quickly consume much of your time and resources, but what about the areas that are not well-known? Are there areas of risk that are being overlooked by your compliance program? If so, what, as global manager, should you look out for?
 
Below are the top five most overlooked areas that pose the largest risk to a company.
 
(1) Improper Payments
 
One of the most often overlooked risk areas in trade compliance is improper payments.
 
Generally, payments made on behalf of a company by its Brokerage Service Provider (BSP) to circumvent the customs process for importing and exporting goods is considered an improper payment. It is good practice to make employees aware of the many forms improper payments may take in your respective industry, and conduct regular internal audits to identify any suspicious activity. Increased awareness in this area is key to ensuring compliance to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and maintaining a standard of reasonable care. Properly vetting your BSP and monitoring their activity through established KPIs and Quarterly Business Reviews (QBRs) will let you monitor your provider, protect both parties from potential liabilities, and make sure all payments are proper and accounted for.
 
(2) Keeping up with Denied Parties and Sanctions
 
An essential step to ensuring your global compliance program is compliant with international sanctions and export controls is to regularly screen the latest denied parties lists. In today’s society, this list is extremely volatile and could change often, so it is important to make sure all levels of employees are aware of any changes that result.
 
Russia, Iran, and North Korea are just a few of the countries where recent changes have occurred
 
in regard to imposed sanctions by the federal administration. Because economic sanctions are imposed in the form of establishing higher import duty rates, or restricting the exportation of specific goods from the targeted country, it is imperative to remain informed of emerging legislation and other sanction developments.
 
(3) The World is not Flat
 
An effective compliance program takes into consideration that the world is not flat and adjusts in areas where more restrictive processes are needed. One of the most common misconceptions is that a good compliance program can be implemented globally through the standardization of procedures and policies, but it is important to note that Global Compliance Programs are not “one size fits all.” On a macro level, your companies located in higher risk countries may need a more strict compliance program. On a micro level, perhaps only one particular area is higher risk in one location than another. Whatever the case, compliance programs should be in accordance with one another, but particularized enough to address specific risks in different locations. You can keep up to date with high risk countries by checking Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). If not careful, a universal program may require too many restrictive procedures in countries determined to be low risk and too few procedures in countries determined to be high-risk.
 
(4) Lack of a Global Compliance Policy
 
International trade operations are a major source of risk for companies in terms of strict
 
control by governmental authorities due to customs issues, complex rules regarding import and export controls, and high penalties applicable to international trade activities. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to have a sustainable global compliance policy in place that addresses international trade and supply chain issues. Lacking a Global Compliance Policy invites risk and liabilities to run rampant, so instituting a policy should be your first priority. It will also be instrumental in implementing future trade compliance processes that will prevent and mitigate damages related to the different customs laws of countries where the company operates.
 
(5) Training
 
Any business involved in importing or exporting goods cannot avoid involvement in customs and trade compliance issues. Even a basic understanding of customs issues at all employee levels will equip your company to make basic checks for accuracy and completeness. An increased level of knowledge will enable you to plan ahead, minimize costs, and structure your business in the most cost-efficient manner. Also, more eyes will be equipped to identify potential problem areas early and formulate strategies to deal with them before they become significant difficulties. Finally, a commitment to customs training provides a demonstrable commitment to customs and global trade compliance.
 
Compliance programs should be risk-based, and if you truly want your program to be successful, you must continue to manage and mitigate identified risks. Knowing what to look for is the first step in establishing an effective compliance program. Step two is to assess your current approach to compliance risk management. Step three is to determine the impact those risks pose on your organization and establish processes to address those areas of concern. The final step is to develop a strategy for conducting regular compliance risk assessments to identify gaps in the program. This approach will aid in the creation of an effective program that enables your organization to mitigate business risks that are often overlooked.

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COMM_a215. J. Carneiro: “Growing Concerns over Global Export Controls (Part I of II)”

(Source:
Thomson Reuters, 9 Feb 2018.)  
 
* Author: James Carneiro, International Trade Manager, Thomson Reuters.
 
In this two-part series, we will outline the issues and concerns over Global Export Controls.
 
While many global companies based in the United States have dedicated resources to making sure they fully understand U.S. and, perhaps, EU export control regulations, there is a growing need to understand the export rules for an increasing number of countries from which companies’ export products, software, and technology. It is no longer reasonable to assume that an understanding of U.S. export controls for a product will be sufficient to know how a product will be treated when exported or re-exported from a country other than the U.S.
 
More Countries Implementing Multilateral Export Controls
 
The “big four” multilateral export control regimes with which most people are familiar are: The Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. At their core, these regimes put restrictions on exported items (and software and technology) that are considered “dual use” (i.e., can possibly be used for both civilian and military purposes) or are clearly designed for military purposes. Over time, more countries have joined one or more of these groups and have implemented, or are in the process of implementing, the obligatory export controls.
 
The challenge is in keeping up with what countries are currently participating in these agreements and the current stage of each implementation. For example, while Malaysia is not currently a regime member, it has implemented an export control policy that leverages the common multilateral control list category structure (
see Strategic Trade Act of 2010). India has had its own version of an export control list called SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies), but was recently
accepted as a Wassenaar member after updating the SCOMET to encompass Wassenaar considerations (
India’s export control in line with Wassenaar Arrangement: Government).
 
Combined vs. Separate Lists
 
A key consideration for implementing an effective export control procedure for any country is to know how the country designates controlled items. While the U.S has one list for items that are considered dual use and another list for military items (the Commerce Control List vs. the Munitions List) and are found in different places, some countries make both lists available in the same document, or combine all items into one list. For example, the United Kingdom has a single document that contains multiple lists (
Consolidated list of strategic military and dual-use items), while Japan combines dual use and military controlled items into a single list:
 
 
Source: http://www.cistec.or.jp/english/export/Overview4th.pdf.
 
Periodic Updates to Lists
 
Changes are periodically made to export control lists based on multilateral or country specific considerations. For example, under the Wassenaar Arrangement, member countries meet to consider changes to export controls. In a
statement issued by the Plenary Chair on 2017 outcomes, the following changes were noted:
 
New export controls in a number of areas, including military explosives and specific electronic components.
 
Existing controls were further clarified regarding ground stations for spacecraft, submarine diesel engines, and technology related to intrusion software, software for testing gas turbine engines, analogue-to-digital converters, non-volatile memories and information security.
 
Some controls were relaxed, such as for mechanical high-speed cameras and digital computers.
 
Perhaps the most important point regarding these changes is that different member countries are unlikely to update their own export control lists and policies according to the same timetable, thereby, requiring closer monitoring country by country.
 
As an example of changes specific to an individual country, one has to look no further than the Export Control Reform initiative that has been underway in the United States since 2010. Exporters must be aware of the changes regarding movement of items from the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce Control list, and the impact the changes may or may not have on their local and global licensing procedures.
 
Conclusion
 
Due to the growing interest by countries around the world in implementing export control programs like those used by the U.S. and EU, the frequent changes to controls made multilaterally and locally, and the different ways controls are implemented on a country by country basis; it is imperative that companies operating globally understand all of their export control obligations and monitor changes over time.
 
Ideally, companies should have a single data repository for export control classification numbers assigned to their products. This way, when different classification models across countries exist, they can be clearly called out. Knowing the true classification for a given country will determine the existing control level when exported from that country and what licenses may be required. Staying in compliance with export control regulations around the world is critical for maintaining the ability to freely operate in the increasingly global economy in which we find ourselves. Bad publicity, fines, and the loss of export privileges can cut short any company’s global expansion plans. 

 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a3
16. 
S. Yavuz: “Growing Concerns over Global Export Controls (Part II of II)”

(Source:
Thomson Reuters, 9 Feb 2018.)  
 
* Author: Selin Yavuz, Thomson Reuters.
 
As discussed in 
Part 1 [included in today’s Daily Bugle under the previous item] of this two-part blog series, keeping track of global export control agreements is a growing challenge for trade professionals. Companies not only have to keep track of which countries are participating in which of the four regimes, but also must determine which stage of implementation each country is currently in. Companies can no longer assume that an understanding of U.S. export controls will suffice when doing business globally. In this post, we’ll delve into what goods fall under export controls regulations, the history of these regulations, and then a specific example of the Turkish export controls regime.
 
What Falls Under Export Controls?
 
Some goods and technologies may be considered potentially dangerous. The criteria generally used is if they can be used for the production of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, or nuclear weapons. For this reason, governments enforce controls on exports of goods, software and technologies to protect national security. Export control is the general name of the monitoring and control mechanisms that control transfers to and from countries and states and non-state actors that wish to provide materials used in the production of sensitive materials and technologies.
 
History of Export Controls
 
Export controls started with the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCoM) during the Cold War. There had been many attempts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and, in 1995, the Wassenaar Arrangement replaced CoCoM.
 
Several world-wide controls and restrictions are already in place to prevent the spread of materials and technologies that can be used both for military and civil purposes, with continual measures being implemented to monitor the movement of such materials. 
 
There are three types of international regulations that require export control. These are international embargo resolutions, international agreements and multilateral export control regimes.
 
There are now four main multilateral export control regimes that govern the transfer of goods that fall under these regulations, 
covered in Part 1 of this series. They are: The Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In the following example of Turkey’s export control regime, all four apply depending on the goods, in addition to other regulations.
 
Turkey’s Export Controls
 
The Turkish export controls regime is largely in line with the European Union’s system. However, in addition to the Wassenaar Arrangement for conventional arms and dual use goods and technologies, the Missile Technology Control Regime for technology capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; the Australia Group for chemical production equipment and the proliferation of biological technology that could be “weaponized”; the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) for limiting the proliferation of nuclear-related technology; the Zangger Committee; and the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
 
Turkey also implements export controls through different control lists that are managed under government jurisdictions based on the goods and license requirements. There may be several reasons why a specific item or technology is challenged during the export process and may require additional license or permission for export. The responsibility and risk is on the exporter to investigate and comply on specific exports of a product, technology or technical support services subject to the export control rules. 
 
It is in the best interest of companies to investigate whether a specific item or technology is subject to export control rules. If not, then the organization should investigate who the customer is, and ensure that the item or technology will be used in a civilian and peaceful context. 
 
As mentioned the risk and responsibility for the decision rests with the exporter. Most exporters seek third party advice and guidance from relevant authorities, consultants or brokers; though the latest trend is for organizations to utilize content technology to reduce those third-party costs.
 
Conclusion
 
The world is changing, and countries are now looking to their exports to protect their technology, as well as their borders. Goods and the related technology are becoming increasingly controlled by the governments by implementing controls to evaluate the legality of their export through the mechanism of proper authorization and licensing. Exporters are held culpable in exhibiting care when determining whether their activities with defense or dual-use goods, software or technologies are subject to export controls. They are also required to determine if some of these controls apply to destination locations. All of these activities adding complexity to their jobs.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a4
17. Gary Stanley’s ECR Tip of the Day

(Source: Defense and Export-Import Update, 20 Feb 2018; available by subscription from
gstanley@glstrade.com
)
 
* Author: Gary Stanley, Esq., Global Legal Services, PC, (202) 352-3059,
gstanley@glstrade.com
.
 
A further point regarding BIS’ “second incorporation” rule that I described in my February 15 “Tip.” According to Sharron Cook at BIS, it’s important to remember that the “second incorporation” rule is not applicable to “600 series” items. My thanks to Sharron for highlighting this.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

MSEX/IM MOVERS & SHAKERS

MS_a218. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings; 154 Jobs Posted This Week, Including 15 New Jobs

(Source: Editor)  
 

Published every Monday or first business day of the week. Please, send job openings in the following format to 
jobs@fullcirclecompliance.eu.

 
* COMPANY; LOCATION; POSITION TITLE (WEBLINK); CONTACT INFORMATION; REQUISITION ID
 

#
” New or amended listing this week (
15 New Jobs
)

* Aerojet Rocketdyne; Huntsville, AL, or Camden, AR; 
Senior International Trade and Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 12620

*
AJC Logistics; Atlanta, GA; NVOCC Export Specialist;

* Allports Forwarding Inc.; Portland, OR;
Import Entry Specialist

# Arent Fox LLP; Washington, D.C.; International Trade Associate;

# Arent Fox LLP; Los Angeles, CA;
International Trade Associate;

* BAE Systems; Los Angeles, CA; 
Program Manager, International and Offset; Requisition ID: 33778BR


Boeing; Multiple Locations;
Trade Control Specialist
; Requisition ID: 
1700011280

*
 
Boeing; St Louis, MO; 
Trade Control Specialist
; Requisition ID: 1700011280 

#
 
Boeing; St. Louis, MO; Trade Control Specialist – Mid Career; Requisition ID: 1700022214

# Boeing; Melbourne, Australia;
Trade Control Specialist; Requisition ID: 
1700015249

* BMW North America; Woodcliff Lake, NJ;
Senior Analyst, Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 170004RD
 * Buehler; Lake Bluff, IL;
Manager, Compliance and Logistics; Requisition ID: 2018-004

Carl Zeiss, Inc.; Thornwood, NY;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Internal Number: 13309

* Crane ChemPharma & Energy; Long Beach, CA;
Import Export Compliance Specialist;

* CSRA; San Diego, CA;
Mid-Level FMS Case Analyst; Requisition ID: RQ 3035

* CSRA; San Diego, CA;
Mid-level Case Analyst for MIDS FMS Program; Requisition ID: RQ6975
 

*
 CSRA; San Diego, CA; 
Senior Case Analyst for MIDS FMS Program
; RQ6763 

* CSRA; San Diego, CA;
Senior FMS Case Analyst; Requisition ID: 3004

* CSRA; San Diego, CA; 
Senior FMS Financial Analyst; Requisition ID: 
RQ3010

# Danaher Science and Technology; United States; Senior Global Trade Compliance ManagerJob ID: COR000942

#
 Danaher Science and Technology; Brea, CA; Senior Coordinator Regulatory Affairs – Trade ComplianceJob ID: BEC009263 

# Danaher Science and Technology;
Biberach an der Riß, Germany;
European Trade Compliance Specialist
Job ID: KAV001714 

# Danaher Science and Technology; Nationwide, India; Manager, International Regulatory Affairs
Job ID: CEP000339

*
 DynCorp International; Tampa, FL; Foreign Disclosure Officer; Requisition ID: PR1701977

* Eaton; Syracuse, NY;
Global Logistics Manager; Requisition ID: 036620

* Eaton; Shanghai Shi, China;
Global Ethics and Compliance Director, APAC; Requisition ID: 039260

* Elbit Systems of America; Merrimack, NH or Fort Worth, TX; 
Trade Specialist I (Export); Requisition ID 5869
* Elbit Systems of America; Merrimack, NH or Fort Worth, TX;  
Trade Specialist I (Import); Requisition ID 5869

Elbit Systems of America; Fort Worth, TX; 
Trade Specialist II
; Requisition ID 5862

* EoTech Technologies; Ann Arbor, MI;
Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 092335

* Expeditors; Portland, OR;
US Export Compliance Consultant;

* Expeditors; Sunnyvale, CA;
Customs Compliance Supervisor;


* Expeditors; Krefeld, Germany; 
Sachbearbeiter Import/ Export;
* Expeditors; Bedfont, United Kingdom;
Customs Brokerage Clerk;
* Expeditors; Birmingham, UK;
Customs Brokerage Agent;

* Expeditors; Düsseldorf, Germany;
Sachbearbeiter Luftfracht Import;


* Export Solutions Inc.; Melbourne FL; 
Trade Compliance Specialist;
info@exportsolutionsinc.com

* EY; Belgium; 
Senior Consultant, Global Trade; Requisition ID: BEL000PT

* FD Associates; Tysons Corner, VA; 
Senior Export Compliance Associate;
 Send 
resume to and salary requirements to 
jobs@fdassociates.net 

* FLIR; Billerica, MA;
Global Trade Compliance Analyst,Traffic;
*
 FLIR; Wilsonville, OR; 
Global Trade Compliance Analyst,Traffic
;

*
 FLIR; Elkridge, MD; 
Global Trade Compliance Analyst,Traffic
;

*
FLIR; Arlington, VA;
Senior Analyst, Licensing
* FLIR; Billerica, MA;
Senior Analyst, Licensing
;

* Garmin; Olathe, Kansas; International Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 1800006
*
 
General Atomics; San Diego, CA; Sr. Director of Import/Export Compliance; Job ID: 13892BR

* General Atomics; San Diego, CA;
Internship, Import/Export, Summer 2018; Requisition ID: 15729BR
*
 General Atomics; San Diego, CA; 
Internship, Import/Export, Summer 2018
; Requisition ID: 15731BR 

* Georgia-Pacific; Atlanta, GA; 
Sr. Analyst, International Trade
; Requisition ID: 052010

# GHY International; Manitoba, Canada; Trade Analyst;
# GHY International; Pembina, ND (or remote); Ocean & Air Import Coordinator
* Henderson Group Unlimited; Inc; Washington, DC; 
Process Improvement Mgr

* Henderson Group Unlimited; Inc; Washington, DC; 
Defense Control Analyst

* Henderson Group Unlimited, Inc; Washington, DC; 
Compliance Analyst;

* Honda of America Manufacturing; Marysvile, OH;
Import Specialist

* Huntington Ingalls Industries – TSD (Camber Corporation); Fairfax, VA; Export Control Analyst; Job ID: #16405

* Infineon Technologies; Milpitas, CA;
Senior Export Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 21326

* Infineon Technologies; Munich, Germany;
Experte Export Control (w/m); Requisition ID: 22825

* InteliTrac Global Solutions; Herndon, VA; 
ITAR Compliance Official / Deputy Facility Security Officer;

* InteliTrac Global Solutions; Herndon, VA;
ITAR Compliance Official;

* Johnson and Johnson; Skillman, NJ; 
Senior Trade Compliance Customs Analyst, CLS North America
; Requisition ID: 4380171108
* Koch Industries; Tulsa, OK;
Global Trade Compliance & Logistics Director; Requisition ID: 052013
* Koch Industries; Tulsa, OK;
Import/Export Compliance Specialist; Job ID: 052017
* Koch Industries – Invista; Wilmington, DE;
Compliance Program Manager / Apparel and Advanced Textiles
; Job ID: 051793
* Koch Industries; Houston, TX;
Business Compliance Leader; Job ID: 052094

* Lockheed Martin; Sunnyvale, CA;
Licensing Analyst (Early Career); Requisition ID: 415037BR_1

*
 Lockheed Martin; Littleton, CO; 
Licensing Analyst (Early Career)
; Requisition ID: 415037BR

* Lockheed Martin; Littleton, CO;
International Licensing Analyst; Requisition ID: 412863BR

* Lockheed Martin; Manassas, VA;
International Licensing Analyst; Requisition ID: 399617BR
* Lockheed Martin; Stratford, CT;
International Trade Compliance Technology Specialist; Requisition ID: 415922BR
* Lockheed Martin; Ft Worth, TX;
International Trade Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 416747BR

* Lockheed Martin; Ft Worth, TX; 
Senior Regulatory Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 
406664BR

* Lockheed Martin; Arlington, VA; Export Licensing Staff
Requisition ID 419903BR
* Lockheed Martin; Arlington, VA; Export Licensing Staff
Requisition ID 418603BR
* Lockheed Martin; Arlington, VA; International Trade Compliance Staff; Requisition ID 418761BR

* L-3 LINK Division; Tulsa, OK; 
Contracts Administrator 1; Requisition ID: 091686
* L-3 ALST; Orlando, FL;
Contracts Manager / Empowered Official; Requisition ID: 093069
* L-3 Warrior Sensor Systems; Middle East;
International Business Development Manager – Middle East Region; Requisition ID: 093343
* Maersk/DAMCO; Agent de transit IMPORT – EXPORT; Job Ref.: DC-164022
* Medtronic; Heerlen, The Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 16000DYY
* Medtronic; Wash DC;
Global Trade Lawyer;
stacy.m.johnson@medtronic.com; Requisition ID: 170002ON

* Moog Inc.; Blacksburg, VA; 
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 174447

* Nortek Security & Control; Carlsbad, CA;
Global Logistics & Trade Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: GLOBA01150
* Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
Manager, International Trade Compliance 2
Requisition ID
:
 
17022803
* Northrup Grumman; Rolling Meadows, IL; International Trade Compliance Analyst 3; Requisition ID: 17028134

* Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
Manager, International Trade Compliance 2; Requisition ID: 17022805
*
Northrop Grumman; Huntsville, AL;
International Trade Compliance 3
; Requisition ID: 17026172

* OneWeb; Arlington, VA;
Export Compliance Specialist;

* Orbital ATK; Fort Worth, TX;
Customs Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 
JAY20182301-43349
* Oracle; United States;
Senior Customs Compliance Specialist; Job ID: 170018FJ

* Oracle; United States;
Customs Compliance Specialist; Job ID: 17001CBG

* Oracle; Bejing, China;
Senior Customs Compliance Specialist – APAC; Job ID: 17001CBI

* Oracle; Singapore;
Trade Compliance Specialist; Job ID: 17001ESC

* Raytheon SAS; McKinney, TX;
Senior Regulatory Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 
107180BR
* Raytheon IIS; Orlando, FL;
 
Global Trade Licensing Analyst II; Requisition ID: 104036BR
* Raytheon IIS; Dulles, VA;
Global Trade Licensing Analyst II
Requisition ID: 104036BR

* Rolls-Royce; Indianapolis, IN;
 
Export Control Specialist; Req ID:
 

JR6025484 

* SABIC; Houston TX; 
Senior Analyst, Trade Compliance
;
Danielle.Cannata@sabic.com
; Requisition ID: 8411BR

* SAFRAN Group; United Kingdom;
Trade Compliance Specialist;

* The Spaceship Company; Mojave, CA; Export Compliance Officer;
* Spirent; San Jose, CA;
Global Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 4088

* Teledyne Geophysical; Houston, TX; Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 2017-5459
* Teledyne Microwave Solutions; Mountain View, CA; Trade Compliance Administrator II; Requisition ID: 2018-6089
* Teledyne Imaging; Waterloo, Ontario, Canada;
Director of International Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: TC0617

* Teledyne Imaging; Chestnut Ridge, NY; 
Director of International Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 2017-5558
*
 Teledyne Imaging; Billerica, MA; Director of International Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 2017-5558 

* Teledyne Imaging; Tarrytown, NY; 
Director of International Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 2017-5558
* Teledyne Imaging; Kiln, MS; 
Director of International Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 2017-5558
*
 Teledyne Imaging; Fredricton, NB; 
Director of International Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 2017-5558 

* Textron; Hunt Valley, MD;
2018 Intern – Export Import Analyst;

* Textron; Hunt Valley, MD;
Manager – Export Compliance;

* Textron; Hunt Valley, MD;
Senior Manager – Export Compliance;

*
Thermo Fisher Scientific; Waltham, MA;
Director, Global Trade Compliance
;

* Thermo Fisher Scientific; Yokohama, Japan; 
Compliance Specialist
; Job ID: 53213BR

* Thermo Fisher Scientific; Shanghai, China; 
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Job ID: 57953BR 

* Thermo Fisher Scientific; Franklin, MA; 
Trade Compliance Specialist; Job ID: 
61435BR

* Thermo Fisher Scientific; Carlsbad, CA; 
Compliance Specialist II; Job ID: 
60951BR

* Thermo Fisher Scientific; Suwanee, GA;
Export Compliance Specialist III; Job ID:
60224BR

* Thermo Fisher Scientific; Suwanee, GA;
Senior Director and GM, Global Export and Developing Regions; Job ID: 
56334BR

* TLR; San Fransisco, CA;
Import CSR; Requisition ID: 1040

*
Tradewin; Portland, OR;
U.S. Export Compliance Consultant

* Trek; Waterloo, WI; Global Trade & Logistics Specialist;
* Ultra Electronics; Loudwater, United Kingdom;
International Trade Manager;

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Birmingham, UK; 
International Trade Compliance Manager;
Requisition ID: 39257
* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista, CA; 
Supply Chain International Trade and Compliance Focal
; Requisition ID: 53794BR
* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista, CA; 
Sr. Associate, ITC Digital Solutions
; Requisition ID: 59662BR
* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista, CA

Supply Chain Specialist- ITC/Regulatory
; Requisition ID: 53794BR
# United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Hood River, OR;
International Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 60584BR
# United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Phoenix, AZ;
Senior Manager, International Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 54860BR

* 
University of Colorado, LASP; Boulder CO; 
Export Compliance Administrator

hrads@lasp.colorado.edu
; Requisition ID: 12298
# 
Varian Medical Systems; Cham, Switzerland; Senior Manager Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 12301BR
# 
Varian Medical Systems; Paolo Alto, CA; Senior Trade Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 12735BR
# Varian Medical Systems; Beijing, China;
Trade Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 
12297BR
* Vigilant; Negotiable Location, USA;
Global Trade Compliance Analyst;

* Virgin Galactic; Mojave, CA; Export Compliance Officer; Requisition ID: 2018-3440
* Virgin Galactic; Las Cruces, NM; Export Compliance Officer; Requisition ID: 2018-3558
* Virgin Galactic; Las Cruces, NM; Director of Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 2018-3349
* Virgin Galactic; Washington, D.C.; Director of Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 2018-3349 

* Xilinx; San Jose, CA;
Global Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 154441

*
 Xilinx; San Jose, CA; Global Trade Compliance Program Manager; Requisition ID: 154442 

*
Xylem, Inc.; Any Location, United States;
Manager, Global Ethics & Compliance

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

TEEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

 
* What: ECS Presents ITAR/EAR Beyond the Basics, Establishing A Rock-solid Export Compliance Program
* When: March 21-22, 2018
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Solutions (ECS)
* ECS Speaker Panel: Suzanne Palmer, Lisa Bencivenga
* Register HERE or by calling 866-238-4018 or e-mail spalmer@exportcompliancesolutions.com.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ENEDITOR’S NOTES


Nicolaus Copernicus (19 Feb 1473 – 24 May 1543; was a Renaissance-era mathematician and astronomer who formulated a model of the universe that placed the Sun rather than the Earth at the center of the universe, likely independently of Aristarchus of Samos, who had formulated such a model some eighteen centuries earlier. The publication of Copernicus’ model in his book 
De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres), just before his death in 1543, was a major event in the history of science, triggering the Copernican Revolution and making an important contribution to the Scientific Revolution.
  – “To know that we know what we know, and to know that we do not know what we do not know, that is true knowledge.”


Ansel Adams (Ansel Easton Adams (20 Feb 1902 – 22 Apr 1984; was an American photographer and environmentalist. His black and white landscape photographs of the American West, especially Yosemite National Park, have been widely reproduced on calendars, posters, books, and the internet.  Adams and Fred Archer developed the Zone System as a way to determine proper exposure and adjust the contrast of the final print. The resulting clarity and depth characterized his photographs. He primarily used large-format cameras because the large film used with these cameras (primarily 5×4 and 8×10) contributed to the clarity of his prints.)
 – “Photography, as a powerful medium of expression and communications, offers an infinite variety of perception, interpretation, and execution.”
 
Monday was Punday, but yesterday was a holiday, and we know you want your puns, so …
 
Q. Why are the other numbers afraid of number 7?
A. Because 7-8-9!
 
Q: What did Silicon Carbide tell the doctor?
A: Doctor, I’m SiC!
  – Alex Liberman, 
alexl@rafael.co.il
Q. What’s the difference between a hippo and a Zippo?
A. One is really heavy, and the other is a little lighter.

Definitions:
  – Marriage: The mourning after the knot before.

  – Propaganda: A gentlemanly goose.
  – Hangover: The wrath of grapes.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a321
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments to applicable regulations are listed below.
 
*
ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
 
*
CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 8 Dec 2017: 82 FR 57821-57825: Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation
 
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 
here
.)


EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR)
: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  – Last Amendment: 
16 Feb 2018:
83 FR 6949-6956
: Russian Sanctions: Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List [Addition of 21 Entities to Entity List.]

  
*
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR)
: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
  – Last Amendment: 28 Dec 2017: 
82 FR 61450-61451: Iraq Stabilization and Insurgency Sanctions Regulations

 
*
FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR)
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment:
20 Sep 2017:
 
82 FR 43842-43844
: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on Filing Requirements; Correction
 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
  – The latest edition (1 Jan 2018) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and to many errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR.
 
*
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA)
, 1 Jan 2018: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 8 Feb 2018: 83 FR 5674: Technical Corrections to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States [Concerns HTSUS Chapter 99, Subchapter III]

  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130.

  – Last Amendment: 14 Feb 2018: 83 FR 6457-6458: Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Addition of South Sudan [Amends ITAR Part 126.] 

  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 14 Feb 2018) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated 
ITAR

(“BITAR”)
, by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.
 The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
 
website
. BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please
contact us
to receive your discount code.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a0322
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 
here

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission, provided attribution is given to “The Export/Import Daily Bugle of (date)”. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

* SUBSCRIPTIONS: Subscriptions are free.  Subscribe by completing the request form on the Full Circle Compliance website.

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