17-1108 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

17-1108 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

Wednesday, 8 November 2017

The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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  1. DHS/CBP: “ACE Becoming the Sole CBP-Authorized EDI System for Generating, Transmitting, and Updating Daily and Monthly Statements as of 9 Dec”
  1. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/Census: “Combating the Fear of Routed Export Transactions”
  3. Commerce/BIS Releases Update Concerning Cuba
  4. DHS/ICE Newsroom: “ICE, ATF, PRPD Arrest 22 Individuals for Firearms Trafficking”
  5. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  6. Treasury/OFAC Amends Cuba Sanctions, Publishes New Cuba-Related FAQs
  7. Treasury/OFAC: “Treasury, Commerce, and State Implement Changes to the Cuba Sanctions Rules”
  1. Independent: “UK Sales of Bombs and Missiles to Saudi Arabia Increase by Almost 500% Since Start of Yemen War”
  2. Reuters: “EU to Impose Arms Embargo on Venezuela, Lays Basis for Sanctions: Diplomats”
  3. Reuters: “Trump Administration Tightens Sanctions Against Cuba”
  4. Reuters: “U.S. Lawmakers Aim to Comply with Iran Nuclear Deal: EU”
  1. iSHL: “Substantial Concessions in Israel’s Defense Export Controls”
  2. J.G. Richardson & J.D. Gustavus: “Status of Key U.S. Sanction Programs”
  3. J. Dempsey: “Should Europe Protect Its Strategic Sectors?”
  4. M. Volkov: “CCOs and CFOs: Bringing Everyone Together”
  5. R.L. Cassin: “Airbus Graft Probe Spreads to United States”
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Changes: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (28 Sep 2017), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (1 Nov 2017), FACR/OFAC (31 Oct 2017), FTR (20 Sep 2017), HTSUS (20 Oct 2017), ITAR (30 Aug 2017) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 



DHS/CBP: “ACE Becoming the Sole CBP-Authorized EDI System for Generating, Transmitting, and Updating Daily and Monthly Statements as of 9 Dec”

Federal Register, 8 Nov 2017.) [Excerpts.]
82 FR 51852-51853: Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) Becoming the Sole CBP-Authorized Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) System for Generating, Transmitting and Updating Daily and Monthly Statements
* AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security.
* ACTION: General notice. …
* SUMMARY: This document announces that the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) will be the sole electronic data interchange (EDI) system authorized by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for generating, transmitting, and updating daily and monthly statements for all entries except reconciliation (type 09) entries. This document also announces that the Automated Commercial System (ACS) will no longer be a CBP-authorized EDI system for processing such statements.
* DATES: As of
December 9, 2017, ACE will be the sole CBP-authorized EDI system for generating, transmitting, and updating daily and monthly statements, and ACS will no longer be a CBP-authorized EDI system for such purpose. …
  Dated: November 3, 2017.
Brenda B. Smith, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Trade.

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OGS_a12. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register

* Commerce/BIS; RULES; Amendments to Implement United States Policy toward Cuba [Publication Date: 9 Nov 2017.]
* DHS/CBP; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals:
  – Passenger List/Crew List [Publication Date: 9 Nov 2017.]
  – Vessel Entrance or Clearance Statement [Publication Date: 9 Nov 2017.]
* Justice/ATF; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Application and Permit for Permanent Exportation of Firearms (National Firearms Act) [Publication Date: 9 Nov 2017.]
* State; NOTICES; List of Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (Cuba Restricted List) [Publication Date: 9 Nov 2017.]
* Treasury/OFAC; RULES; Cuban Assets Control Regulations [Publication Date: 9 Nov 2017.]

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Commerce/Census: “Combating the Fear of Routed Export Transactions”

Global Reach Blog, 8 Nov 2017.) [Excerpts.]
A Guide for the U.S. Authorized Agent and U.S. Principal Party in Interest
Routed export transactions always seem to be a hot topic. We receive numerous questions via our call center, webinars and seminars as companies look to better understand their roles and responsibilities to remain compliant.
The Foreign Trade Regulations (FTRs) define a routed export transaction as a transaction in which the Foreign Principal Party in Interest (FPPI) authorizes a U.S. agent to facilitate export of items from the United States on its behalf, and prepare and file the Electronic Export Information (EEI). In this type of transaction, the FPPI is controlling the movement of the goods.
Advice for ALL Parties in a Routed Export Transaction:
  – Communication. Make sure communication is clarified and understood between all parties participating in the transaction.
  – Documentation. Keep all documentation, such as emails, invoices and phone calls on all export transactions for five years from the date of export.
  – Appropriate authorization. Obtain a Power of Attorney (POA) or written authorization from the FPPI. The POA or written authorization should not be provided by the U.S. Principal Party in Interest (USPPI) in a routed export transaction.
Advice for the USPPI in a Routed Export Transaction:
If possible, request to file the EEI:
    (i) If filing, obtain a POA or written authorization from the FPPI before filing the EEI.
  – If the FPPI authorizes a U.S. agent to file the EEI:
    (i) Provide the data elements listed in section 30.3(e)(1)(i) through (xii) of the FTR to the U.S. authorized agent.
    (ii) Request a copy of the data elements you provided to the U.S. authorized agent filed in the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) as well as request the Internal Transaction Number (ITN), date of export and filer name.
    (iii) Request a copy of the authorized agent’s POA or written authorization from the FPPI.
    (iv) Sign up for ACE Export Reports. The USPPI can access ACE Report 203 for routed transactions to obtain a copy of the data elements submitted through the ACE along with the ITN, date of export and filer name. More information on accessing ACE reports can be found here.
Advice for the U.S. Authorized Agent in a Routed Export Transaction:
  – Obtain a POA or written authorization from the FPPI before filing the EEI.
  – Obtain the data elements listed in section 30.3(e)(1)(i) through (xii) of the FTR from the USPPI.
  – If you are having trouble obtaining information from the USPPI, refer them to section 30.3(e)(1) of the FTR so the USPPI will know the law requires this information. The FTR is located here. If you need further assistance, please call the Trade Regulations Branch staff and we may be able to assist.
  – Provide the USPPI with a copy of the POA or written authorization from the FPPI, a copy of the data elements provided by the USPPI that were submitted through ACE along with ITN, date of export and filer name. Authorized agents should use this as a best practice, but it is only required if requested by the USPPI. … 

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Commerce/BIS Releases Update Concerning Cuba

Commerce/BIS, 8 Nov 2017.) [Excerpts.]
On November 9, 2017, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the Department of State will take coordinated actions to implement portions of the National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba (“Cuba NSPM”), dated June 16, 2017. These actions include a rule published by BIS that amends the licensing policy for Cuba and portions of three license exceptions available for exports and reexports to Cuba: License Exceptions Gift Parcels and Humanitarian Donations (GFT), Consumer Communications Devices (CCD), and Support for the Cuban People (SCP).
The United States maintains a comprehensive embargo on trade with Cuba. The export and reexport to Cuba of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) require a BIS license unless authorized by a license exception specified in section 746.2(a)(1) of the EAR or exempted from license requirements in section 746.2(a)(2). The EAR sets forth licensing policy for exports and reexports that generally will be approved, exports and reexports that will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis and exports and reexports that will generally be denied.
For additional information, please review the BIS rule, the joint fact sheet, and BIS’s updated Frequently Asked Questions. For specific questions regarding exports or reexports to Cuba, please contact the Foreign Policy Division at (202) 482-4252.
Relevant Links
  – January 2015 Cuba rule                                        
  – July 2015 Cuba rule                                              
  – FAQs
Licensing Policy
There is a general policy of denial for exports and reexports to Cuba of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), as described in Section 746.2(b) of the EAR. However, there are exceptions to the general policy of denial, some of which are listed below:
  – Medicines and medical devices, whether sold or donated, are generally approved.
  – Items to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of commercial aircraft engaged in international air transportation are generally approved.
  – Items necessary for the environmental protection of U.S. and international air quality, waters and coastlines, including items related to renewable energy or energy efficiency, are generally approved.
  – Telecommunications items that would improve communications to, from, and among the Cuban people are generally approved.
  – Items to meet the needs of the Cuban people, including items for export or reexport to state-owned enterprises, agencies, and other organizations of the Cuban government that provide goods and services for the use and benefit of the Cuban people, are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
In addition to authorization provided under licenses, there is authorization provided by license exception, some of which are described below.
License Exceptions
A license exception is an authorization to export or reexport under stated conditions certain items without a license that would otherwise require a license. Only the license exceptions, or portions thereof, listed Section 746.2(a)(1) of the EAR are available for Cuba.
You may export or reexport to Cuba without an individual validated license if your transaction meets all the applicable terms and conditions of the available license exceptions. To determine the scope and eligibility requirements, you must review the sections or specific paragraphs of Part 740 of the EAR. Read each license exception carefully, as the provisions available for sanctioned countries are generally narrow.
Support for the Cuban People
License Exception Support for the Cuban People (SCP) (Section 740.21 of the EAR) authorizes the export and reexport of certain items to Cuba that are intended to improve the living conditions, support independent economic activity, strengthen civil society, improve the free flow of information and facilitate travel and commerce. Items eligible for export and reexport to Cuba pursuant License Exception SCP must be for certain specified end uses and end user and are limited to those designated as EAR99 (i.e., items subject to the EAR but not specified on the Commerce Control List (CCL)) or controlled on the CCL only for anti-terrorism reasons.
Agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical devices are not eligible for any provision of License Exception SCP due to limitations in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, as amended (22 U.S.C. 7201-7211) and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, as amended (22 U.S.C. 6001-6010). …
Aircraft and Vessels
Flying an aircraft or sailing a vessel to Cuba, even temporarily, constitutes an export or reexport to Cuba. If the aircraft or vessel is subject to the EAR (e.g., those departing from the United States), then BIS authorization is required, either through a license or license exception, to fly/sail to Cuba. Most aircraft and vessels on temporary sojourn to Cuba are eligible for License Exception Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (AVS) (Section 740.15 of the EAR). Note that all corresponding requirements and criteria must be met in order to be eligible.
When ineligible for the License Exception AVS, license applications for exports and reexports of aircraft and vessels on temporary sojourn to Cuba are reviewed on a case-by-case basis when they are used to deliver humanitarian goods or services or when their use is consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United States. You may contact the Foreign Policy Division at (202) 482-4252 for additional information regarding temporary sojourns and assistance with associated license applications.
Other U.S. Government Agencies
Please be aware that other U.S. Government agencies administer regulations that could also impact your export or reexport transaction. For example, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) maintains certain Cuba-related sanctions. Exporters and reexporters are responsible for complying with all applicable regulatory requirements.
Foreign-Made Items
Both BIS and OFAC administer Cuba sanctions pursuant to the EAR and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) (31 C.F.R. Part 515), respectively. Most export or reexport transactions require general or specific authorizations from both BIS and OFAC. OFAC has issued a general license authorizing all transactions ordinarily incident to the exportation of items from the United States, or the reexportation of 100 percent U.S.-origin items from a third country, to any person in Cuba, provided that the exportation is licensed or otherwise authorized by BIS. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.533. Accordingly, for those BIS-licensed exports or reexports, further OFAC authorization generally is not needed.
However, in some cases, a specific license from OFAC may be required in connection with BIS-authorized exports or reexports. For example, even if BIS has authorized the reexport of items that are not 100 percent U.S.-origin to Cuba, persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction would also require a specific license from OFAC to reexport the items, and OFAC’s consideration of applications for such licenses may be subject to statutory restrictions. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.559. …  

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DHS/ICE Newsroom: “ICE, ATF, PRPD Arrest 22 Individuals for Firearms Trafficking”

DHS/ICE, 8 Nov 2017.) [Excerpts.]
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agents, working jointly with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD) arrested Wednesday (8 Nov 2017) 22 individuals for trafficking firearms without a license. The arrests took place in the municipalities of Toa Alta, Toa Baja, Canovanas, Cataño, Caguas and San Juan.
Those arrested also face charges for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, possession of a machine gun and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. During the investigation and leading up to Wednesday’s arrests, authorities seized 35 firearms, including 20 pistols and 15 rifles, including five machine guns. …
If convicted, the defendants face up to five years in prison for engaging in the business of dealing firearms without a license, up to 10 years for possession of a machine gun and for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and up to life in prison for possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.

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Treasury/OFAC Amends Cuba Sanctions, Publishes New Cuba-Related FAQs

Treasury/OFAC, 8 Nov 2017.)      
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is amending the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515 (the “CACR”), to implement the National Security Presidential Memorandum issued by the President in June. These regulatory changes are intended to channel economic activities away from the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services, while maintaining opportunities for Americans to engage in authorized travel to Cuba and support the private, small business sector in Cuba. 
The CACR amendment will be published in the Federal Register on Thursday (9 Nov 2017), at which time the changes will take effect. OFAC is also publishing a number of new and updated Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and a Fact Sheet pertaining to this regulatory amendment.
[Editor’s Note: excerpts of the Federal Notice concerning the amended Cuban Assets Control Regulations will be published in the Daily Bugle of 9 Nov 2017.]

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Treasury/OFAC: “Treasury, Commerce, and State Implement Changes to the Cuba Sanctions Rules”

Treasury/OFAC, 8 Nov 2017.)
Amendments Implement President Trump’s June 2017 National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba
Today (8 Nov 2017), the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) are announcing amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR), respectively, to implement changes to the Cuba sanctions program announced by the President in June. The State Department is taking complementary steps to implement these policy changes that cumulatively seek to channel economic activities away from the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services, while maintaining opportunities for Americans to engage in authorized travel to Cuba and support the private, small business sector in Cuba. The changes will take effect on Thursday, November 9, 2017, when the regulations are published in the Federal Register.
  “We have strengthened our Cuba policies to channel economic activity away from the Cuban military and to encourage the government to move toward greater political and economic freedom for the Cuban people,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.
For the Treasury regulations, which can be found at 31 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 515, see here
. For the Commerce regulations, which can be found at 15 CFR parts 730-774, see here
. For the State Department list, which can be found on the State Department website and in the Federal Register, see 
. Major elements of the changes in the revised regulations include:
Financial Transactions
In accordance with the NSPM, the State Department is publishing a list of entities and subentities that are under the control of, or act for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel and with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba – the State Department’s List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (“Cuba Restricted List“). The Cuba Restricted List is maintained by the State Department and will be published and periodically updated as necessary in the Federal Register.
Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction will now be prohibited from engaging in certain direct financial transactions with entities and subentities identified by the State Department on the Cuba Restricted List. Certain transactions will be excluded from this prohibition pursuant to exceptions detailed in the NSPM.
Consistent with the Administration’s interest in avoiding negative impacts on American businesses and travelers, commercial engagements in place prior to the State Department’s listing of any entity or subentity will continue to be authorized, as will most previously arranged travel.
Trade and Commerce
In accordance with the NSPM, BIS is establishing a general policy of denial for license applications to export items for use by entities and subentities on the Cuba Restricted List unless the transaction is otherwise consistent with the NSPM. 
Consistent with the Administration’s policy to support free enterprise in Cuba, BIS is simplifying and expanding its license exception that authorizes certain license-free exports to the Cuban private sector.
People-to-People Travel
In accordance with the NSPM, OFAC is requiring that (1) all people-to-people nonacademic educational travel be conducted under the auspices of an organization that is subject to U.S. jurisdiction and that sponsors such exchanges to promote people-to-people contact, and (2) such travelers be accompanied by a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction who is a representative of the sponsoring organization. Individual people-to-people nonacademic educational travel will no longer be authorized as announced by the President.
Consistent with the Administration’s interest in avoiding negative impacts on Americans for arranging lawful travel to Cuba, certain people-to-people travel that previously was authorized will continue to be authorized where the traveler had already completed at least one travel-related transaction (such as purchasing a flight or reserving accommodation) prior to the President’s June 16, 2017 announcement.
Educational Travel
In accordance with the NSPM, Americans engaging in certain authorized educational travel will now be required to do so under the auspices of an organization that is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 
These authorized educational travelers will now also be required to be accompanied by a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction who is a representative of the sponsoring organization, unless the traveler is the representative and obtains a certification letter from the sponsoring organization. 
Consistent with the Administration’s interest in avoiding negative impacts on Americans for arranging lawful travel to Cuba, certain educational travel that previously was authorized will continue to be authorized where the traveler has completed at least one travel-related transaction prior to the publication of the regulations on November 9.
Support for the Cuban People Travel
In accordance with the NSPM, OFAC is requiring that each traveler under this travel category engage in a full-time schedule of activities that result in meaningful interaction with individuals in Cuba. Such activities must also enhance contact with the Cuban people, support civil society in Cuba, or promote the Cuban people’s independence from Cuban authorities. Renting a room in a private Cuban residence (casa particular), eating at privately owned Cuban restaurants (paladares), and shopping at privately owned stores run by self-employed Cubans (cuentapropistas) are examples of authorized activities; however, in order to meet the requirement of a full-time schedule, a traveler must engage in additional authorized Support for the Cuban People activities.   
Prohibited Officials
In accordance with the NSPM, OFAC is amending the definition of the term prohibited officials of the Government of Cuba to include certain additional individuals. BIS is making conforming changes to three license exceptions that include the same definition. This definitional change will affect certain otherwise-authorized transactions with the expanded group of such officials.

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9. Independent: “UK Sales of Bombs and Missiles to Saudi Arabia Increase by Almost 500% Since Start of Yemen War”

(Source: Independent, 8 Nov 2017.) [Excerpts.]
The number of British-made bombs and missiles sold to Saudi Arabia since the start of its bloody campaign in Yemen has risen by almost 500 per cent, The Independent can reveal. …
The High Court has ruled that arms exports to Saudi Arabia was legal because the available evidence did not prove “a clear risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law”, but CAAT is hoping to appeal the case. …
A Department for International Trade spokesperson said: “The UK government takes its export control responsibilities very seriously and operates one of the most robust arms export control regimes in the world.
  “We rigorously examine every application on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. We will not grant a license if to do so would be inconsistent with these Criteria.
  “The Government publishes regular statistics on the value of export licenses, but these are not necessarily a measure of actual exports shipped as exporters must re-apply where a license is unused. This results in double counting.”

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10. Reuters: “EU to Impose Arms Embargo on Venezuela, Lays Basis for Sanctions: Diplomats”

(Source: Reuters, 8 Nov 2017.)
The European Union is set to impose an arms embargo on Venezuela and will consider further sanctions in response to the political crisis in the South American country, two EU diplomats said.
The measures will bring the EU more into line with the United States, which imposed sanctions earlier this year, and they signal a change of tone in Brussels, which had previously resisted taking a tougher approach toward Caracas.
  “The steps were approved today, paving the way for approval (by the bloc’s foreign ministers) next Monday,” an EU diplomat said, adding that the ministers’ backing was a formality.
Spain has long pushed for sanctions on those close to President Nicolas Maduro, whom Washington accuses of installing a dictatorship, but the EU has been divided over whom to target, while Britain is a significant arms supplier to Venezuela.
Diplomats said the turning point for EU governments was regional elections that appeared to favor Maduro’s ruling Socialists last month. Polls had suggested the opposition would easily win a majority but in the end it won only a handful of governorships, according to the pro-government electoral board.
However, the decisions taken by EU ambassadors at a meeting on Wednesday only prepare the legal basis for sanctions, without any names. Travel bans and asset freezes would only be imposed on Venezuelan officials “should the evolution of the situation require it”, a second EU diplomat said.

Once approved, the arms embargo will be accompanied by a ban on exports of equipment that could be used for internal repression and of surveillance equipment, the diplomats said.

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11. Reuters: “Trump Administration Tightens Sanctions Against Cuba”

(Source: Reuters, 8 Nov 2017.)
The U.S. government announced new restrictions against Cuba on Wednesday, tightening sanctions as part of President Donald Trump’s pledge to roll back his Democratic predecessor’s move toward warmer ties with Havana.
The changes, which take effect on Thursday, are aimed at preventing U.S. trade and travelers from benefiting its military, intelligence, and security arms of the Communist-ruled country, the U.S. Treasury Department said in a statement.
They will expand the list of Cuban government officials barred from transactions as well as set policy to deny exports to prohibited Cuban entities, Treasury said.
But the administration said it would still allow commercial transactions and most travel arrangements that have already been made before the changes to continue.
And while U.S. travelers will still be able to make authorized trips to Cuba, they will have to use a U.S.-based organization and be accompanied by a U.S. representative of the group, Treasury said.
The move comes after Trump in June ordered tighter restrictions against Cuba even as he left in place many of the changes former President Barack Obama made as part of his 2014 diplomatic breakthrough between the two former Cold War foes.

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12. Reuters: “U.S. Lawmakers Aim to Comply with Iran Nuclear Deal: EU”

(Source: Reuters, 7 Nov 2017.)
U.S. lawmakers signaled they plan to ensure the United States complies with the 2015 Iran nuclear deal despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s misgivings about the pact, the European Union’s foreign policy chief said on Tuesday.
   “I got clear indications that the intention is to keep the United States compliant with the agreement,” the EU’s Federica Mogherini said at a press conference on a visit to Washington.
Trump on Oct. 13 dealt a blow to the pact by refusing to certify that Tehran was complying with the accord even though international inspectors said it was.
Under the deal Iran agreed to curb its nuclear program in return for relief from economic sanctions.
Trump’s decision has thrown into doubt the future of the pact negotiated by Iran, the EU and six major powers – Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States. Congress has until mid-December to decide whether to reimpose sanctions lifted under the deal, something few diplomats expect.
Mogherini sought to avoid publicly becoming embroiled in the U.S. congressional debate about what kind of legislation, if any, to pass even as she stressed the EU’s desire to see the United States stick with the nuclear agreement. ….
  “I made clear any outcome of any process … has to be, at the end of the day, compliant with the deal,” Mogherini said. She said she had voiced her readiness to help lawmakers “find solutions that are compatible” with U.S. compliance under the agreement.
Separately, the head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog told reporters it would be “a pity” if Iran were to cease to provisionally implement the Additional Protocol, which gives the agency more tools to verify a country’s nuclear compliance.
  “The Additional Protocol is the most … important tool for us in the verification. So if it happens, it’s a pity,” said International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Yukiya Amano.
Under the 2015 deal, Iran agreed to provisionally implement the Additional Protocol.
Amano told reporters that if Iran were to discontinue the protocol, the IAEA would not be able to get access to undeclared potential nuclear sites.
Amano said that on a visit to Iran last month, Iranian officials had assured him they would continue implementing the nuclear deal and would not be the first to abandon it.
The Additional Protocol was created in the 1990s as a way to smoke out covert, arms-related activities after the discovery of Iraq’s secret nuclear weapons program and revelations that North Korea and Romania had separated plutonium.
Asked if the Iranians had given him any sign that they might abandon the Additional Protocol, Amano replied: “They don’t say what will happen, but anything can happen. That is my sense.”

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iSHL: “Substantial Concessions in Israel’s Defense Export Controls”

(Source: iSHL, 6 Nov 2017.)
The Israeli Ministry of Defense has announced a substantial loosening of restrictions on defense exporters, including significantly shortening the list of products for which overseas marketing requires prior approval from the Defense Export Controls Agency (DECA). Among others – unclassified cyber, electro-optics products, security and anti-terrorism courses will be taken out of the list of excluded products.
The announcement was made by DECA director Racheli Chen during the agency’s annual conference.
This is, in fact, the most comprehensive move of loosening restrictions on exporters since the establishment of DECA, 11 years ago. According to the agency’s announcement, it has been part of a large-scale reform led by the Ministry of Defense during the last two years. DECA director said that after the completion of the reform, defense exporters will be able to “conduct a one-stage licensing process of unclassified products in the authorized countries. The reform will relieve the burden of thousands of requests for licenses every year, cut bureaucracy, enable DECA to focus on the control of substantial issues, and improve services to exporters”.
Following the Knesset confirmation of the updated defense export control regulations and the exemption of some of the export licences, an exempt on marketing license for some of the anti-terror courses was added (e.g. VIP and installation security, airport and public transportation security, security training and policing courses).
According to DECA director, “within the next few months we will execute the most substantial stage of the reform, which will decrease to a large extent the need to receive marketing licenses for many products”.
The reform’s second stage includes the following concessions:
  – Reduction in the excluded products list that require two-stage license process (marketing and export) regarding unclassified products to authorized contries. The list includes 27 families of products that encompass thousands of items.
  – The reform will take out of the list most of the unclassified cyber products, electro-optics (observation, night vision and other unclassified products), satellite products, etc.
  – The number of authorized countries (where marketing license of unclassified products is not obligatory) will be expanded to 102 countries.
  – Shifting the marketing stage – a revolutionary move that will enable the marketing abroad of most of the unclassified products without the need of a marketing license, until the stage of a compelling offer. In fact, this will let exporters conduct most of the initial marketing activities without license.
  – Exempt from marketing licenses for unclassified products to the US.
  – Exempt from the expansion of a marketing license to an intermediate factor (for authorized countries) – a licensed exporter will not need an additional license.
  – Substantial updates in “combat equipment order”.
Among the concessions that came into force during the last months are: an exempt from temporary export license for demonstration and participation in exhibition of unclassified products to authorized countries, an exempt from export license for demonstration to a final user, etc.

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14. J.G. Richardson & J.D. Gustavus: “Status of Key U.S. Sanction Programs”

(Source: Miller Canfield PLC, 7 Nov 2017.)
* Authors: Jeffrey G. Richardson, Esq., richardson@millercanfield.com; and Joe Gustavus, Esq. gustavus@millercanfield.com. Both of Miller Canfield PLC.
Recently, many revisions to U.S. sanction programs (both implemented and under consideration) have been the topic of much public discussion. Often, the legal status or these revisions may be difficult to determine. The U.S. sanctions programs are administered and enforced by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The following provides a chronological overview of key announcements and updates to U.S. sanction programs recently occurring within recent months:
. On July 25, 2017, OFAC published online frequently asked questions (FAQs) supporting President Trump’s June 2017 policy announcements regarding Cuba. The first FAQ states that “OFAC will implement the Treasury-specific changes via amendments to its Cuban Assets Control Regulations. OFAC expects to issue its regulatory amendments in the coming months. The Department of Commerce will implement any necessary changes via amendments to its Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The announced changes do not take effect until the new regulations are issued.” However, importantly, new regulations have not been issued, so the changes announced by President Trump earlier in June have yet not taken legal effect.
. On Aug. 24, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13808, imposing additional sanctions in response to the Venezuelan government’s actions taken with respect to the continuing Venezuelan political unrest. Executive Order 13808 prohibits U.S. persons from dealing in new debt of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) with a maturity longer than 90 days and new debt of the government of Venezuela with a maturity longer than 30 days. Note, however, Executive Order 13808 does not otherwise prohibit U.S. persons from dealing with the government of Venezuela as a counterparty or underwriter in debt transactions, so long as the government of Venezuela is not the borrower. In sum, in light of Executive Order 13808, U.S. persons should proceed cautiously when extending credit to PdVSA and the government of Venezuela and refrain from purchasing securities from the government of Venezuela.
North Korea
. On Sept. 21, 2017, the president issued Executive Order 13810 imposing additional sanctions with respect to North Korea. Executive Order 13810, which blocks (i.e., freezes) property of individuals determined by the Secretary of Treasury: “(i) to operate in the construction, energy, financial services, fishing, and information technology, manufacturing, medical, mining, textiles, or transportation industries in North Korea; (ii) to own, control, or operate any port in North Korea, and/or (iii) to have engaged in at least one significant importation from or exportation to North Korea of any goods, services, or technology.” Note that an export license under the EAR is still required for the export or reexport to North Korea of all items subject to the EAR (other than food or medicine) that are designated as EAR 99. U.S. persons should continue avoiding transactions with any nexus to North Korea.
. On Oct. 12, 2017, the comprehensive embargo against Sudan was lifted based on reports by the U.S. government that the government of Sudan has continued to take positive steps in cooperating with the U.S. to address regional conflicts, the threat of terrorism, and improve humanitarian access throughout Sudan. The lifting of the comprehensive embargo does not affect the following preexisting U.S. policy actions: those OFAC sanctions related to the conflict in Darfur; the status of Sudanese individuals on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List designated under executive orders not subject to the revocation of the comprehensive embargo; and, the export license requirements for items and exports otherwise subject to the EAR. The lifting of the comprehensive embargo finalizes the U.S. policy direction on Sudan first taken in Executive Order 13761 by President Obama on Jan. 13, 2017, which itself was as amended by President Trump by Executive Order 13804 on July 11, 2017.
. On Oct. 13, 2017, President Trump chose not certify Iran’s continued compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Act of 2015 (INARA), the president must certify Iran’s continued compliance with the JCPOA every 90 days. As we explained in a prior alert (Feb. 9, 2016), the JCPOA provided limited nuclear-related sanctions relief, which included, among other things, the removal of secondary sanctions on the automotive sector, and the implementation of General License H authorizing certain Iranian transactions relating to non-U.S. subsidiaries of U.S. companies. The president’s decision not to certify Iran’s continued compliance with the JCPOA places this limited relief in jeopardy, and Congress now has a 60-day window (until Dec. 14, 2017) to decide whether or not to re-impose under INARA the nuclear-related sanctions relief granted by the JCPOA.

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15. J. Dempsey: “Should Europe Protect Its Strategic Sectors?”

(Source: Carnegie Europe, 25 Oct 2017.)
* Author: Judy Dempsey, Non-resident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe.
Shawn Donnan – World trade editor at the Financial Times
The answer ought to be an easy “yes.” But it isn’t. Defending strategic industries and assets starts with defining them. And that’s a conversation that all too often ends up taking countries down a protectionist path.
There are, of course, the easy and obvious strategic assets. Power plants and grids, ports, and roads all deserve the label. You can probably include a country’s digital infrastructure and maybe even some of its food supply chain.
But the conversation quickly gets murky beyond that.
In a knowledge-based economy, human capital is an increasingly important asset. But is a German research scientist a strategic asset worth defending from a Chinese company’s lucrative job offer? Is a French tech pioneer worth protecting from a Google recruitment drive?
Consider Canada’s “strategic” maple syrup reserve. What ought to be a joke in a bad film, isn’t. Instead it is an all-too-real economic tool worthy of Beijing’s finest state planning minds that for decades has helped fix prices and control supply and, inevitably, had an impact on farmers and consumers across the border in the U.S. state of Vermont.
If a Chinese state-backed food giant were to start buying up maple farms in Quebec, would that be an assault on Canada’s strategic infrastructure?
Put that in a European context. Would a Chinese bid for a Parma ham producer come under the same scrutiny? A New Zealand dairy giant buying up French butter producers? A U.S. agribusiness’ purchase of Danish pork farms?
There’s nothing wrong with protecting strategic assets. But let’s be careful how we define them.
Philippe Le Corre – Non-resident senior fellow in the Europe and Asia Programs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The answer is an emphatic yes. In today’s business world where cyber and competition issues are critical, it is essential for EU companies to protect themselves. In a number of European countries, China has invested into strategic sectors such as energy, utilities, port, and airport infrastructures. For example, China Three Gorges, a state-owned enterprise, controls 23.27 percent of Portugal’s national grid company, EDP-Energias de Portugal (it recently raised its stake from 21.35 percent, with few people even noticing), while COSCO-China’s largest shipping company-now runs Piraeus, Greece’s main harbor.
China has also been actively pursuing European technology companies through mergers and acquisitions, which has led to a debate in Germany about robotics or semi-conductors-two of the most cutting edge sectors in the German industry. Will Germany remain the leader of these fields, or will it be supplanted by the United States or China? The Federation of German Industries (BDI) thinks there’s nothing to be worried about as German technology still performs well, for example in robotics. Yet, analysts are less sure. In his State of the Union address last month, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker insisted that EU member states should share with the Commission details of a proposed acquisition on grounds of security or public order. This includes major programs in the areas of research, transport, energy, and space (Galileo).
Stefan Mair – Member of the executive board for the Federation of German Industries (BDI)
Any form of investment control ultimately affects the functioning of a market economy. The right of entrepreneurs and shareholders to sell companies is a core element in the exercise of private property rights. Any measure that affects this right can only be justified for the sake of protecting another higher public good. This is certainly the case for security and public order, but is it when it comes to the protection of strategic sectors and key technologies? And if so, is investment control the right means?
Are key technologies and strategic sectors more threatened by the takeover of a midsized company by a Chinese investor, or by the transfer of research and development departments and data storage capacities of multinational companies to China? And who defines what a strategic sector is? Not long ago, the steel sector was certainly classed as one and data processing was not. Can governments know what will become the key technologies of the future? In the 1980s, almost nobody would have expected mobiles phones to become one.
There are serious fundamental and operational questions involved in broadening investment control-questions that have hardly been discussed yet. They have been overshadowed by a mere defensive approach and hasty proposals to find quick fixes for a long-term strategic challenge.
Jonas Parello-Plesner – Senior policy fellow at the Hudson Institute
Europe should scrutinize foreign investment based on national security. Afterward, it gets harder-as demonstrated by the enormous effort put into disentangling the EU from the Russian gas monopoly. There are considerations of dependency particularly with foreign, state-owned companies in strategic sectors.
Huawei, the nominally private Chinese company, is a case in point. The Americans may have been too paranoid, mostly blocking the company’s proposed deals in the United States. On the other hand, the European countries may have been too naïve, letting Huawei roll into sensitive grids all over the continent without a background check.
Screening investments doesn’t entail that the EU suddenly turns protectionist, as some would allege. The EU is a latecomer to this. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process is standard procedure in the United States. China also has a national security screening system, although opaque in its limits.
The EU should establish a clear, limited, and rule-bound screening. Introducing such a screening shouldn’t lead to classifying yoghurt as a strategic asset-as tried by French lawmakers when foreign bidders eyed the French dairy giant, Danone. Even with investment screening in place, the EU would remain a top destination for FDI, which is on the uptick after a slowdown in 2014.
Marc Pierini – Visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe
Europe should promote its strategic sectors, rather than protecting them. From shipbuilding to high-speed trains, from electric cars to one of the two world leading aerospace industries, European industries have been spearheading innovation in many fields and continue to do so on a daily basis.
They are now faced with new competitors, for example, China in aerospace, railways, and shipbuilding; India in space exploration and biotechnologies; Brazil, Canada, and Russia in small-size aircraft manufacturing.
This new competitive environment has already triggered healthy decisions: the German-French decision to merge their high-speed train manufacturers Siemens and Alstom; a similar decision between France and Italy on shipbuilding; the multi-country European plane maker Airbus setting up production plants in China and the United States.
Europe is also faced with new threats, for example, a protectionist position of principle from the U.S. president and protectionist decisions by China; and an aggressive investment posture by, again, China in strategic European industries.
Forbidding foreign entities from investing in certain European industrial sectors will probably prove difficult in the long term. There is instead an array of alternative measures. This includes protecting European patents; teaming up previously competing EU industries (as in the Siemens-Alstom merger); and jointly promoting their products as well as manufacturing them locally in highly competitive markets.
Gianni Riotta – Member of the Council on Foreign Relations
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th Party Congress lasted for almost four hours, but made very clear that China has a solid geopolitical strategy for the twenty-first-century: investing in Asia and Africa; confronting America on trade and defense; buying off Russia as a vassal; trading with Europe; neatly parting the entire world.
The United States bets on the impromptu tactics that President Trump dictates via Twitter, Russia chugs on under Putin’s steely hand, but divining Europe is difficult task. Brexit; the waves of populism crushing from the Atlantic to Prague; and the referenda in Scotland, Catalonia, Lombardy, and Veneto are a testament to a public opinion that is wary of global powers, and nostalgic of national, homey cultures.
The EU badly needs a common strategic industrial policy (think of the difficult Fincantieri-Stx deal that was painfully negotiated in Rome and Paris by Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni and French President Emmanuel Macron!) The union does not even have a military, or European industrial arm powerful enough to face the United States, or even China.
Brussels keeps fining the digital giants-like a paunchy policeman jealously slapping a ticket on a brand new, red Ferrari-but does not invest in AI, data, or social media. How can you “protect a strategic sector” if it is not clear that you own one after all?
Marietje Schaake – Member of the European Parliament
Yes, but only when there are legitimate reasons, not as thinly veiled protectionism. The EU is-and should remain-an attractive destination for foreign investments. But openness should not make us naïve. Key enabling technology companies are often strategic, therefore we must assess an investor’s motives and sources of resources. Member states have the freedom to reject FDI for national security reasons already, and EU-wide harmonizing criteria makes sense for the single market.
The EU should continue to pursue its efforts at bilateral and multilateral levels to ensure that third countries offer a level of openness toward foreign investments equivalent to that of the EU. We are open for business, but not at every cost.
Paul Taylor – Contributing editor at POLITICO Europe
It’s legitimate for Europe to protect truly strategic sectors and technologies against hostile takeovers by state-controlled or opaque investors. The United States, Russia, and China don’t hesitate to preserve national control of strategic industries and to veto unwelcome foreign acquisitions. So why not Europe?
Several EU countries, including Germany, already have review procedures. To ensure a level playing field and avoid abuses, it makes sense for the European Commission to exercise these powers in the single market-except in strictly national industries, such as defense.
The hard part is defining which sectors and companies are strategic, and from whom they should be protected. A French decree lists 30 sectors, including water, energy, transport, health, IT, gambling, and telecommunications, requiring approval for takeovers. Some seem abusive or too broadly drawn. A Gaullist government issued the sweeping decree after rumors that U.S. beverage giant Pepsico wanted to buy French yoghurt-maker Danone.
The EU must understand that countries blocked will likely retaliate against European investments. The example of COSCO’s acquisition of Athens’ Piraeus port shows how EU objectives can clash. By forcing bailed-out Greece to privatize state assets, it has handed China a strategic foothold in Europe’s southeastern gateway.

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16. M. Volkov: “CCOs and CFOs: Bringing Everyone Together”

(Source: Volkov Law Group Blog, 6 Nov 2017. Reprinted by permission.)
* Author: Michael Volkov, Esq., Volkov Law Group, mvolkov@volkovlaw.com, 240-505-1992.
Chief compliance officers are politicians and have to possess great interpersonal skills. They have to “get along” and persuade key constituencies – most especially their business partners – to commit and devote time and resources to ethics and compliance.
In order to operationalize their programs, CCOs have to build relationships with important partners – human resources, legal, internal audit, procurement, and finance. Up to this date, CCOs have done well with all of these partners, except for one glaring omission – the Chief Financial Officer.
The historical background provides some explanation – CFOs and financial reporting became the focus of corporate governance in the aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley. CFOs and Internal Audit were elevated in the corporate governance world. To remedy the financial reporting scandals, CFOs were charged with important tasks – improvement of financial reporting processes and design and implementation of internal controls. To reinforce the importance of financial reporting controls, CEOs and CFOs are required to certify to the integrity of their company’s financial reports.
CFOs and Internal Auditors were elevated by direction of federal law – a very specific direction to improve the accuracy of financial reports, and implement internal controls. CCOs have been elevated for a variety of reasons – government enforcement actions and increased focus on corporate culture as a sustainable and valuable asset.
Over the last twenty years, CFOs have exercised their power over the internal controls, under the purview of external auditors. CFOs and Internal Auditors are regularly provided with resources upon demand, with the support and authority of the board of director’s audit committee. CFOs and Internal Auditors manager and oversee the internal controls and any and all “material” transactions.
CCOs have an important responsibility as well – to implement an effective ethics and compliance program in order to promote an ethical culture, and ultimately ensure the company’s sustainable growth and profitability. As part of their mission, CCOs play an increasingly important role in designing compliance controls and enforcing all of the internal controls. CCOs depend on the company’s internal controls and have to be involved in the design and implementation of the company’s internal controls.
CFOs, however, have not put out a welcome mat for CCOs. Instead, CFOs have hidden behind the financial reporting and controls to prevent CCOs from collaborating in this important area.
Given the risk of internal controls violations, there is a need to carefully craft a company’s internal controls. The specific drafting of internal controls creates internal statutes that the government can enforce – in criminal and civil enforcement proceedings. CFOs have to bring in legal, compliance and other key parties when crafting internal controls to ensure that all risks are addressed and evaluated.
The transformation in the CFO and Internal Audit functions has to occur and company’s internal controls need to reflect the input of all key constituencies – and most importantly, the CCO. CFOs have a well-established fiefdom, and they need to release the reins and bring greater collaboration. CCOs need to commit to this important task – collaborating in the design of compliance and accounting internal controls.

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17. R.L. Cassin: “Airbus Graft Probe Spreads to United States”

(Source: The FCPA Blog, 8 Nov 2017.) [Excerpts.]
* Author: Richard L. Cassin, publisher and editor of the FCPA Blog. Contact Mr. Cassin at rlc@fcpablog.com.
The DOJ unsealed FCPA charges against five men Tuesday (7 Nov 2017) for a bribery plot to help Rolls-Royce win an equipment contract on a gas pipeline from Kazakhstan to China. Four have pleaded guilty and the fifth man is a fugitive.
The guilty pleas and charges were unsealed in federal court in Ohio.
Acting Assistant Attorney General Kenneth Blanco said Tuesday the case “represents another important step towards leveling the playing field for all ethical and honest businesses.”
In January this year, the DOJ charged Rolls Royce plc with a conspiracy to violate the FCPA. The company entered into a deferred prosecution agreement that required it to cooperate in related investigations.
Rolls-Royce paid a U.S. criminal penalty of $170 million as part of an $800 million global settlement that also involved investigations by the UK and Brazil. …
[Editor’s Note: Due to copyright restrictions, we are not authorized to include the entire article. To read the entire article, click on the source link above.]

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* William Wirt (
William Wirt; 8 Nov 1772 – 18 Feb 1834; was an 
 author and statesman who is credited with turning the position of 
United States Attorney General
 into one of influence.)

  – “Seize the moment of excited curiosity on any subject to solve your doubts; for if you let it pass, the desire may never return, and you may remain in ignorance.”

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. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  Changes to applicable regulations are listed below.
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 28 Sep 2017: 82 FR 45366-45408: Changes to the In-Bond Process [Effective Date: 27 Nov 2017.]

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 

: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  – Last Amendment: 1 Nov 2017:
82 FR 50511-50517
: Export Administration Regulations for Use of License Exceptions; Clarifications

: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
  – Last Amendment: 31 Oct 2017:
82 FR 50313-50315
: Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations

: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment:
20 Sep 2017:
82 FR 43842-43844
: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on Filing Requirements; Correction
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – The latest edition (20 Sep 2017) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and to many errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR.
, 1 Jan 2017: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 20 Oct 2017: Harmonized System Update 1707, containing 27,291 ABI records and 5,164 harmonized tariff records.

  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

  – Last Amendment: 30 Aug 2017: 82 FR 41172-41173: Temporary Modification of Category XI of the United States Munitions List
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 1 Nov 2017) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated 

, by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.
 The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
. BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please
contact us
to receive your discount code.

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Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 

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* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

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