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17-1023 Monday “Daily Bugle”

17-1023 Monday “Daily Bugle”

Monday, 23 October 2017

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The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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  1. Commerce/BIS Amends EAR, Revises VEU List for China by Updating List of Eligible Destinations and Eligible Items for Lam Research Service Co., Ltd.
  2. Commerce/BIS Denies Export Privileges to 5 Individuals
  1. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  4. UK/DIT ECO Publishes Sanctions and Money Laundering Bill
  5. Singapore Customs Revises Security Application Form and Security Extension Form
  1. Reuters: “Turkish Banks Could Face Big U.S. Fines Over Iran – Report”
  2. Reuters: “U.S. Will Not Interfere in EU Trade With Iran: Tillerson”
  1. D. Yang & C.N. Curran: “Managing the Export Controls Minefield” (Part 1 of 3)
  2. M.A. Gajewski Barnhil: “Trump Administration Unveils Strategy on Iran”
  3. M. Volkov: “ISO 37001: Training, Employee Concerns, and Internal Investigations (Part V of V)”
  4. M. Herron: “UK Government Consults on Proposals to Expand National Security Review of Foreign Investments Beyond Current Merger Control Regime”
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 99 Jobs Posted This Week, Including 11 New Jobs
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Changes: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (28 Sep 2017), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (23 Oct 2017), FACR/OFAC (16 Jun 2017), FTR (20 Sep 2017), HTSUS (20 Oct 2017), ITAR (30 Aug 2017) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMEX/IM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1

1. 
Commerce/BIS Amends EAR, Revises VEU List for China by Updating List of Eligible Destinations and Eligible Items for Lam Research Service Co., Ltd.

(Source: Federal Register, 23 Oct 2017.) [Excerpts.]
 
82 FR 48925-48931: Amendments to Existing Validated End-User Authorization in the People’s Republic of China: Lam Research Service Co., Ltd.
 
* AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.
* ACTION: Final rule.
* SUMMARY: In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to revise the existing Validated End-User (VEU) list for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by updating the list of eligible destinations (facilities) and eligible items in Supplement No. 7 to part 748 for Lam Research Service Co., Ltd. (Lam). The End-User Review Committee (ERC) reviewed and authorized the amendments to the eligible facilities in response to a request made by Lam and in accordance with established procedures. Changes to the list of eligible items are technical corrections intended to improve clarity. As a consequence of these amendments, the EAR will include an updated and accurate list of eligible items (items that may be exported, reexported and transferred (in-country)), and eligible Lam facilities in the PRC. Publication of this rule supports the VEU program by providing information that assists the exporting public.
* DATES: This rule is effective October 23, 2017. …
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
 
Background
 
Authorization Validated End-User
 
  Validated End-Users (VEUs) are designated entities located in eligible destinations to which eligible items may be exported,
reexported, or transferred (in-country) under a general authorization instead of a license. The names of the VEUs, as well as the dates they were so designated, and the associated eligible destinations (facilities) and items are identified in Supplement No. 7 to part 748 of the EAR. Pursuant to section 748.15 (Authorization Validated End-User (VEU)), eligible destinations of VEUs may obtain eligible items without the need for the VEUs’ supplier to obtain an export or reexport license from BIS. Eligible items vary among VEUs and may include commodities, software, and/or technology, except items controlled for missile technology or crime control reasons on the Commerce Control List (CCL) (Supp. No. 1 to part 774 of the EAR). …
 
Facilities
 
Revisions to Lam’s Eligible Facilities
 
  Prior to this rule, Lam’s VEU authorization included 18 facilities in the PRC. Of those facilities, 13 remain substantially unchanged in Supplement No. 7 to part 748 apart from minor edits made by BIS to punctuation and display (e.g., adding a space after asterisks and removing unnecessary commas) of addresses for the 13 facilities, as set forth below. BIS also updated the address for one facility, updated the names of two facilities, updated both the name and address of one facility, and removed one facility. In this rule, BIS also adds six facilities to Lam’s VEU authorization. With the publication of this rule, Lam’s total number of facilities in the PRC is 23. …
 
Items
 
Revisions to Lam’s Eligible Items
 
  For all Lam’s facilities, this rule limits the authorization for ECCNs 2B230, 2B350.c, 2B350.d, 2B350.g, 2B350.h, 2B350.i and 3B001.e to items for the installation, warranty maintenance/repair, or maintenance/repair service of semiconductor manufacturing equipment manufactured by Lam. These end-use limits for eligible items are not new. Previously, these limitations were imposed as a condition to the authorization given to Lam, rather than specified in the description of eligible items set forth in Supplement No. 7 to Part 748.
  This rule also limits the authorization for 3D001 software (excluding source code) for all facilities to allow only such software that is specially designed for the “development” or “production” of equipment controlled by paragraph .e of ECCN 3B001. A similar limitation is made for 3D002 software (excluding source code) for all facilities, so that only such software that is specially designed for the “use” of equipment controlled by paragraph .e of ECCN 3B001 qualifies as an eligible item. These changes are consistent with the fact that 3B001.c no longer appears under Lam’s list of Eligible items. As a result of a foreign availability determination, BIS removed the items under paragraph .c from the CCL with the publication of the Wassenaar Arrangement Regime 2015 Implementation Rule on September 20, 2016 (81 FR 64656). Paragraph .c to 3B001 is now reserved in the CCL. The changes made by this rule recognize that paragraph .c of 3B001 no longer exists by now limiting the authorization for all Lam facilities to certain software related to paragraph .e of 3B001, rather than software that relates to all paragraphs of 3B001.
  Lastly, for Lam’s “Warehouse Facilities,” identified by a single asterisk in Supplement No. 7 to part 748, this rule further limits the scope of the authorization for items under ECCN 3E001 to “development” “technology” according to the General Technology Note of a type of equipment classified under paragraph .e of ECCN 3B001. For Lam’s “Sales Offices,” identified by a set of double asterisks in Supplement No. 7 to part 748, this rule narrows the scope of eligible ECCN 3E001 items to “development” “technology” or “production” “technology” according to the General Technology Note of a type to support integration, assembly (mounting), inspection, testing, and quality assurance of equipment classified under paragraph .e of ECCN 3B001. Although the wording of the eligible 3E001 items changed slightly in an attempt to improve clarity, this change also reflects the removal of paragraph .c of ECCN 3B001 from the Lam list of eligible items, consistent with change to the CCL, as described above, by limiting the eligible technology to items only associated with paragraph .e of ECCN 3B001.
  In summary, Eligible Items both for Lam’s “Warehouse Facilities” and for “Sales Offices” will include items classified under ECCNs 2B230, 2B350.c, 2B350.d, 2B350.g, 2B350.h, 2B350.i, 3B001.e, 3D001, 3D002, and 3E001, subject to certain very specific limits. The difference between what is eligible for export to “Warehouse Facilities,” identified by a single asterisk in Supplement No. 7 to part 748, and what is eligible for export to “Sales Offices,” identified by two asterisks in Supplement No. 7 part 748, is in the limitations placed on eligible ECCN 3E001 technology. As explained above, and in the rule text, eligible 3E001 technology for “Warehouse Facilities” will only include certain “development” technology, while eligible 3E001 technology for “Sales Offices” will include certain “development” technology and certain “production” technology. … 
 
  Dated: October 11, 2017.
Richard E. Ashooh, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.

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EXIM_a2

2. Commerce/BIS Denies Export Privileges to 5 Individuals

(Source: Federal Register, 20 Oct 2017.) [Excerpts of 5 separate FR notices.]
 
82 FR 48792-48797: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security [5 Seperate Orders Denying Export Privileges]
 
On 16 October 2017, the Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied export privileges to the following 5 individuals.
 
Adrian Manual Hernandez of Phoenix, AZ
 
On October 13, 2015, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Adrian Manuel Hernandez (“Hernandez”) was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Hernandez was convicted of knowingly and willfully exporting, aiding and abetting the export of, and causing to be exported from the United States to Mexico one or more firearms designated as defense articles on the United States Munition List, without the required U.S. Department of State licenses. Hernandez was sentenced to five years of probation and a $100 assessment. …
  Based upon my review and consultations with BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement, including its Director, and the facts available to BIS, I have decided to deny Hernandez’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of five years from the date of Hernandez’s conviction. I have also decided to revoke all licenses issued pursuant to the Act or Regulations in which Hernandez had an interest at the time of his conviction. …
  [T]his Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect until October 13, 2020.
 
  Issued this 16th day of October 2017.
Karen H. Nies-Vogel, Director, Office of Exporter Services.
 
Jimmy Rojas, a/k/a Jim Rojas, of Miami, FL 33177
 
On September 8, 2016, in the U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida, Jimmy Rojas, a/k/a Jim Rojas (“Rojas”) was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Rojas was convicted of knowingly and willfully attempting to export from the United States to Jordan a 6015/PVS14 Series ITT Monocular Night Vision device and a Trijicon Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight (ACOG) Rifle Scope, both designated as defense articles on the United States Munitions List, without the required U.S. Department of State licenses. Rojas was sentenced to 30 months in prison, 36 months of supervised release, a $100 assessment, and ordered to pay $372,505.14 in restitution to the United States Postal Service. …
  Based upon my review and consultations with BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement, including its Director, and the facts available to BIS, I have decided to deny Rojas’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Rojas’s conviction. I have also decided to revoke all licenses issued pursuant to the Act or Regulations in which Rojas had an interest at the time of his conviction. …
  [T]his Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect until September 8, 2026.
 
  Issued this 16th day of October 2017.
Karen H. Nies-Vogel, Director, Office of Exporter Services.
 
Marleen Rochin of Phoenix, AZ
 
On November 16, 2015, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Marleen Rochin (“Rochin”) was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Rochin was convicted of knowingly and willfully exporting, aiding and abetting the export of, and causing to be exported from the United States to Mexico one or more firearms designated as defense articles on the United States Munition List, without the required U.S. Department of State licenses. Rochin was sentenced to five years of probation and a $100 assessment. …
  Based upon my review and consultations with BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement, including its Director, and the facts available to BIS, I have decided to deny Rochin’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of five years from the date of Rochin’s conviction. I have also decided to revoke all licenses issued pursuant to the Act or Regulations in which Rochin had an interest at the time of her conviction. …
  [T]his Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect until November 16, 2020.
 
  Issued this 16th day of October 2017.
Karen H. Nies-Vogel, Director, Office of Exporter Services.
 
Martin Jan Leff of Bonita Springs, FL
 
On January 6, 2016, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Martin Jan Leff (“Leff”) was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Leff was convicted of knowingly and willfully attempting to export, and causing to be exported, from the United States to Hong Kong, seven F-4 Phantom fighter jet wheel assemblies designated as defense articles on the United States Munition List, without the required U.S. Department of State licenses. Leff was sentenced to three years of probation, a criminal fine of $10,000, and a $100 assessment. …
  Based upon my review and consultations with BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement, including its Director, and the facts available to BIS, I have decided to deny Leff’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Leff’s conviction. I have also decided to revoke all licenses issued pursuant to the Act or Regulations in which Leff had an interest at the time of his conviction. …
  [T]his Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect until January 6, 2026.
 
  Issued this 16th day of October 2017.
Karen H. Nies-Vogel, Director, Office of Exporter Services.
 
Rodrigo Chico-Rodriguez of Pecos, TX
 
On April 18, 2016, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Rodrigo Chico-Rodriguez (“Chico-Rodriguez”) was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Chico-Rodriguez was convicted of intentionally and knowingly conspiring to export, attempt to export, and cause to be exported from the United States to Mexico defense articles designated on the United States Munitions List, namely two rifles, a pistol and 312 rounds of ammunition, without the required U.S. Department of State license. Chico-Rodriguez was sentenced to 60 months in prison and a special assessment of $200. …
  Based upon my review and consultations with BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement, including its Director, and the facts available to BIS, I have decided to deny Chico-Rodriguez’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Chico-Rodriguez’s conviction. I have also decided to revoke all licenses issued pursuant to the Act or Regulations in which Chico-Rodriguez had an interest at the time of his conviction. …
  [T]his Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect until April 18, 2026.
 
  Issued this 16th day of October 2017.
Karen H. Nies-Vogel, Director, Office of Exporter Services.

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OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a13. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register

* DHS/CBP; NOTICES; Revocation of Customs Brokers’ Licenses [Publication Date: 24 Oct 2017.]
 
* DoD; NOTICES; Requests for Information: Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations [Publication Date: 24 Oct 2017.]

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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

 

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OGS_a46
.

UK/DIT ECO Publishes Sanctions and Money Laundering Bill

(Source:
UK/DIT
ECO
) [Excerpts.]
 
The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill was introduced in Parliament on Wednesday 18 October 2017, following a public consultation earlier this year. 
More information including the text of the bill can be found
here
.
 
The new legislation will give the UK the necessary legal powers to continue to implement sanctions and introduce tough new measures post-Brexit against states such as North Korea and terrorist organisations including Daesh. It will also enable us to maintain existing sanctions regimes currently imposed through EU law, while providing the necessary legal underpinning for the UK to decide when and how to take action against new threats.
 
This is an important step in ensuring that the UK continues to meet its international obligations and work with allies in tackling shared threats once the UK has left the European Union. … 

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OGS_a57
.

Singapore Customs Revises Security Application Form and Security Extension Form

 
Singapore Customs has revised and merged the security application forms for “Permits” and “Permits & Licensed Premises” into a single Security Application Form. We have also revised the Security Extension Form. You may obtain the latest Security Application/Extension forms from
https://www.customs.gov.sg/
> Eservices > Customs Forms & Service Links > Security Application Form/Security Extension Form.
 
The revised forms are to be used with effect from 23 October 2017. Please note that you cannot extend an existing expiring security that was lodged using the previous security application forms. Instead, you will need to lodge a new security using the new Security Application Form.
 
In November 2017, Singapore Customs will be sending the security renewal letters to all entities that have lodged security expiring in December 2017 based on the contact details of your entity’s Primary Contact and Secondary Contact. To ensure that your entity continues to receive timely notifications from us, the Key Personnel or Authorised Personnel should update the particulars of the Primary Contact and Secondary Contact at
https://www.customs.gov.sg/
> Eservices > Customs Forms & Service Links > Activation of Customs Account.
 
You may refer to the Frequently Asked Questions in
Annex A
for more details.

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NWSNEWS

NWS_a18.
Reuters: “Turkish Banks Could Face Big U.S. Fines Over Iran – Report”

(Source:
Reuters
, 21 Oct 2017.)
 
Six Turkish banks face billions of dollars of fines from U.S. authorities over alleged violations of sanctions with Iran, the Haberturk newspaper reported on Saturday, citing senior banking sources.
 
The report could not be verified by Reuters. Two senior Turkish economy officials told Reuters that Turkey has not received any notice from the United States about such penalties, adding that U.S. regulators would normally inform the finance ministry’s financial crimes investigation board.
 
Turkish authorities are expected to issue a statement to issue the address the issue soon, the senior economy officials said.
 
The report comes as relations between Washington and Ankara have been strained by a series of diplomatic rows, prompting both countries to cut back issuing visas to each other’s citizens.
 
Haberturk did not name the six banks potentially facing the fines. One bank will face a penalty in excess of $5 billion, while the rest of the fines will be lower, it said.
 
U.S. officials will notify the banks of their penalties in the coming days and the banks are likely to be able to negotiate down the fines, Haberturk said.
 
U.S. authorities have hit global banks with billions of dollars in fines over violations of sanctions with Iran and other countries in recent years.
 
U.S. prosecutors last month charged a former Turkish economy minister and the ex-head of a state-owned bank with conspiring to violate Iran sanctions by illegally moving hundreds of millions of dollars through the U.S. financial system on Tehran’s behalf.
 
President Tayyip Erdogan has dismissed the charges as politically motivated, and tantamount to an attack on the Turkish Republic.
 
The charges stem from the case against Reza Zarrab, a wealthy Turkish-Iranian gold trader who was arrested in the United States over sanctions evasion last year. Erdogan has said U.S. authorities had “ulterior motives” in charging Zarrab, who has pleaded not guilty. 

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NWS_a2
9. Reuters: “U.S. Will Not Interfere in EU Trade With Iran: Tillerson”

(Source:
Reuters
, 20 Oct 2017.)
 
The United States does not aim to impede European trade and business transactions with Iran despite President Donald Trump’s decision last week to decertify the 2015 nuclear agreement, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson told the Wall Street Journal.
 
European Union leaders in Brussels on Thursday highlighted the need to protect their companies and investors dealing with Iran from any adverse effects should Washington reinstate sanctions against Iran, officials said.
 
  “The president’s been pretty clear that it’s not his intent to interfere with business deals that the Europeans may have under way with Iran,” Tillerson told the Journal in an interview Thursday. “He’s said it clearly: ‘That’s fine. You guys do what you want to do.'”
 
Trump last week adopted a harsh new approach to Iran by refusing to certify its compliance with the nuclear deal struck with the United States and five other powers including Britain, France and Germany.
 
The Republican president gave Congress 60 days to decide whether to reimpose economic sanctions on Iran, lifted under the pact in exchange for scaling down a program the West fears was aimed at building a nuclear bomb, something Tehran denies.
 
Trump has criticized the nuclear accord as “the worst deal ever” and has vowed to withdraw if Congress and European allies do not address his problems with it. Tillerson’s comments appeared aimed at reassuring the Europeans that Washington is not trying to pressure them into avoiding business with Iran.
 
  “We’ve been working with the Europeans for six months,” Tillerson said. “They have been brought along with this same thought process. It doesn’t mean that they necessarily agree entirely with it. … Now we will start a more formalized process with them now that the policy’s been adopted.”
 
The Journal said Tillerson would not discuss the multibillion-dollar deals reached by Boeing Co (BA.N) under the 2015 accord. Boeing, which was the first major U.S. company to announce a major business venture with Iran, last year agreed to sell dozens of commercial planes to Tehran.

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COMMCOMMENTARY

COMM_a01
10D. Yang & C.N. Curran: “Managing the Export Controls Minefield” (Part 1 of 3)

(Source: Government Contractors Navigator, 21 Feb 2017.)
 
* Authors: David Yang, Esq., DYang@BlankRome.com; and Christian N. Curran, Esq. Both of Blank Rome LLP, Wash DC.
 
[Editor’s Note: the second part of the series will be included in the Daily Bugle of Tuesday, 24 October. The third part has not been published yet.]
 
Despite recent political shifts away from globalization, international trade remains a bedrock of the U.S. economy, and companies doing business in the United States must be cognizant of the intricate set of export control regulations promulgated by the U.S. government. In today’s rapidly changing economy, it is more important than ever for companies to thoroughly assess their connections to the international marketplace. While the Obama Administration took strides toward simplifying the export control process, U.S. export control regulations remain complex due to the multiple government stakeholders involved, resulting in varying interpretations, policies, and agendas. Export control violations can still carry serious ramifications for a company’s business practices both inside and outside the United States. Accordingly, the first of this three part series begins by identifying whether your business may be subject to the U.S. export controls regime. Our next two installments will then, respectively, address: (Part 2) practical strategies for addressing risk mitigation; and (Part 3) enforcement actions by the government.
 
Overview of the U.S. Export Control Regulatory Regime
 
The U.S. export control regulatory regime is generally comprised of three primary, interrelated components-commercial exports governed by Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) and managed by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”); military or defense exports governed by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) and managed by the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”); and sanctions issued by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”). In addition, the Department of Justice National Security Division (“NSD”) may get involved if a violation is potentially criminal.
 
While each of the components has its own specialized application, they each govern the export of controlled items, which includes any transfer, release, or other dissemination of controlled items or information, including shipments, letters, faxes, phone calls, emails, or downloading controlled items and information in connection with a foreign country or national. While U.S.-made items are certainly covered, foreign-produced items that contain some U.S. content may also be covered. Covered items require licenses from the cognizant authority before they can be exported, unless the export relates to an embargoed country or restricted party such as Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”), in which case the export is banned. Violations may result in civil or criminal enforcement actions, costly penalties, and sanctions.
 
Each component of the regulatory regime comes with its own specific issues that companies should be cognizant of.
 
(1) EAR
 
The EAR covers the export of commercial products that have the potential for dual use-meaning the item has both a commercial and military use-and as such, covers a broad range of products, hardware, software, technical information, and data. The EAR’s Commerce Control List identifies controlled items and segregates them based on sensitivity and security considerations and applies more lenient or stringent controls depending on their risk classifications.
 
(2) ITAR
 
The ITAR broadly governs the transfer of all defense articles, hardware, and technical data, including software and defense services, and requires entities involved in such transfers (which can include manufacturers, exporters, and their brokers or financiers) to register with the DDTC. ITAR-governed items are listed on the United States Munitions List, but the list is not exclusive and routinely changes. ITAR-governed entities are also subject to mandatory reporting of payments of fees, commissions, and political contributions above certain amounts.
 
(3) OFAC
 
Finally, the U.S. government, through OFAC, implements various sanctions programs, including asset freezes, against other countries and foreign nationals. OFAC has broad investigatory powers, and determinations issued by OFAC can result in significant monetary penalties, and also impact a company’s professional responsibility and ability to perform government contracts. Unlike the other rules, there are generally no exceptions to the embargoed countries or restricted parties (e.g., SDNs) dictated by OFAC.
 
Key Business Considerations for Your Company
 
While on the surface these rules may appear straightforward, they can be complex and difficult to navigate in practice. Manufacturers who make commercial products sold overseas may unwittingly be subject to the EAR if the goods can be deemed to have a dual use and, thus, fall under the EAR’s list of controlled items. It also may not be obvious to a purely domestic manufacturer that it can be subject to export rules if one of its buyers, though located in the United States, brokers or distributes your product overseas. Moreover, the export control regulations also apply to controlled information, not simply to physical goods, which expands the potential application of the regulations. For example, the regulations may impact cloud service providers whose physical footprints (i.e., their server farms) are located in the United States, if the controlled data residing on the cloud can be accessed overseas or domestically by a foreign national.
 
Too often, companies lack the visibility into their relationships with their customers, business partners, and agents needed to understand whether those relationships raise any issues covered by U.S. export control regulations. Indeed, as U.S. companies continue to expand, any physical or electronic communication with a foreign office or affiliate may constitute an export-for example, even parties who are employed by the same U.S. company and discuss controlled information within the United States are not exempt from the export rules if one or more individuals are foreign nationals. Companies should assess their organization, agents, partners, supply chains, and end users to fully understand the nature of their business, and evaluate whether they may be subject to the export control regulations. Without this assessment, companies run the risk of violating the export control regulations, failing to make appropriate disclosures on a timely basis, and potentially incurring significant penalties and sanctions.
 
Whether you are conducting an export assessment for the first time or reviewing your existing program, counsel should be involved to preserve privilege and assist in navigating this complicated field. Only after a proper assessment has been completed, and your company understands its risk profile, can your company appropriately evaluate a risk mitigation strategy for potential incidents, and implement measures for addressing violations or enforcement actions by the government.

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COMM_a2
11M.A. Gajewski Barnhil: “Trump Administration Unveils Strategy on Iran”

(Source: World Trade Controls Blog, 19 Oct 2017.)
 
* Author: Megan A. Gajewski Barnhill, Esq., Bryan Cave, megan.gajewskibarnhill@bryancave.com, 202-508-6302.
 
After a number of tweets and news articles indicating that President Trump intended to make major changes to U.S. policy regarding Iran, President Trump formally announced on Friday, October 13, his Administration’s strategy on the subject.  The strategy announcement itself resulted in limited changes to U.S. sanctions and no change (for now) with respect to the role of the United States in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”).  While President Trump has on a number of occasions derided the JCPOA as “a bad deal,” his announcement did not withdraw the United States from the agreement or re-impose secondary sanctions on Iran that were lifted in connection with the implementation of the JCPOA.  However, the announcement does create uncertainty with respect to the future of U.S. sanctions against Iran and the United States’ participation in the JCPOA.
 
A central aspect of President Trump’s announcement was his refusal to certify to the U.S. Congress that Iran is abiding by the requirements of the deal and that continued suspension of sanctions is appropriate.  This failure to certify does not automatically result in a “snap back” or any other changes.  What it does do is permit the U.S. Congress to use an expedited process to reinstate statutory sanctions against Iran, should Congress wish to do so.  If Congress chooses to use the expedited process, it must do so by December 12, 2017-within sixty (60) days of the President’s refusal to certify.
 
Whether any such sanctions will be re-imposed and what those sanctions might include is unclear.  In his remarks, President Trump called on Congress to address perceived weaknesses in the JCPOA and also directed his administration to work with America’s allies to improve the JCPOA to address additional considerations.  Whether such allies will be willing to do so also remains uncertain, if not doubtful; it is being reported that some allies have said they do not intend to re-open or change the terms of the JCPOA.
 
President Trump threatened to terminate the U.S.’s commitments under the JCPOA in the event that Congress and the Administration are unable to improve the JCPOA to address the Administration’s concerns.  Whether the President ultimately would take such an action remains to be seen.  Since President Trump’s announcement, several senior Trump administration officials (including the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, the U.S. Secretary of State, and the U.S. National Security Adviser) have made statements to tone down some of Trump’s rhetoric, including by stating that the United States will likely remain in the deal, at least in the short term.
 
Separately, the U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) added three Iranian entities and one Chinese entity to the U.S. List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”) and also designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”). The IRGC is already listed on the SDN List and is subject to secondary sanctions.  OFAC also indicated that it plans to designate additional persons who are “officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC” as SDNs later this month.
 
For now, the U.S. remains a party to the JCPOA, and the secondary sanctions relief that was granted with the implementation of the JCPOA remains in place.  Uncertainty regarding the continued role of the United States vis-a-vis the JCPOA continues.  Companies may wish to consider putting into place contractual protections in the event that additional sanctions are imposed.  It can also be expected that OFAC will continue to designate as SDNs persons engaging in transactions with individuals subject to secondary sanctions.  Hence, companies should continue to ensure that they know all parties involved in transactions involving Iran and consider conducting due diligence to guard against the risk of secondary sanctions exposure by virtue of conducting business with the IRGC or others identified by OFAC as targets of secondary sanctions.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a3
12. M. Volkov: “ISO 37001: Training, Employee Concerns, and Internal Investigations (Part V of V)”

(Source: Volkov Law Group Blog, 20 Oct 2017. Reprinted by permission.)
 
* Author: Michael Volkov, Esq., Volkov Law Group, mvolkov@volkovlaw.com, 240-505-1992.
 
[Editor’s Note: Part 1,2, 3, and 4 of this series were included in in the 17, 18, 19, and 20 Oct Daily Bugles, respectively.]
 
In my final posting on ISO 37001, I review requirements for training, raising concerns and internal investigations as part of a company’s anti-bribery risk management system.
 
I could certainly write more on ISO 37001 because there are other issues that I have not addressed, including audits, assessments and reviews of the anti-bribery risk management system.
 
In this posting, it is important to identify and tailor training to the company’s specific risk profile.  Again, this is nothing new, but it is the specific requirements set forth in the ISO 37001 guidance that provides more meat on the bones of an otherwise general requirement in other guidance sources.
 
A company is required to provide adequate and appropriate anti-bribery awareness and training to personnel on a regular basis (at planned intervals determined by the company), as appropriate for their respective roles in the company. Such training should address, depending on the company’s risk profile, the following:
 
   – The company’s anti-bribery policy, procedures and anti-bribery management system and their duty to comply;
   – The bribery risk and damage to employees and the company that can result from bribery;
   – The circumstances in which bribery can occur in relation to their duties and how to recognize them;
   – How to recognize and respond to solicitations or offers of bribes;
   – How they can help prevent and avoid bribery and recognize key bribery indicators;
   – Their contribution to the effectiveness of the anti-bribery management system, and the benefits of improved anti-bribery performance and of reporting suspected bribery;
   – The implications and potential consequences of not conforming with the anti-bribery management system;
   – How and to whom to report any concerns; and
   – Information on available training and resources.
 
Companies shall also implement (directly or through the business associate) training and awareness programs for business associates that act on its behalf or for its benefit, and which could cause more than a low bribery risk.
 
Raising Bribery Concerns
 
A company is required to implement procedures to encourage and enable persons to report in good faith or on the basis of a reasonable belief, attempted, suspected or actual bribery, or any violation of weakness in the anti-bribery management system, to the anti-bribery compliance function or to appropriate personnel. Such reports shall be treated confidentially to protect the identity of the reporter and of others involved or referenced in the report.

The reporting system also should permit anonymous reporting, and prohibit retaliation against those making reports. Finally, the reporting system should enable personnel to receive advice from an appropriate person on what to do if faced with a concern or situation which could involve bribery.
 
Investigating Potential Bribery
 
A company is required to create an internal investigation system that assesses and, where appropriate, investigates any bribery, or violation of its anti-bribery policy or anti-bribery management system that is reported, detected or reasonably suspected.
 
If the investigation reveals bribery, or violation of the company’s anti-bribery policy or anti-bribery management system, the company shall take appropriate action.
 
The company’s internal investigation system should empower and enable investigators; require cooperation by relevant personnel; require that the status and results of the investigation are reported to the anti-bribery compliance function (and other compliance functions as appropriate); require that the investigation is carried out confidentially and the results reported confidentially; and require that the investigation be carried out by and reported to personnel who are not part of the role or function being investigated. 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a4
13. M. Herron: “UK Government Consults on Proposals to Expand National Security Review of Foreign Investments Beyond Current Merger Control Regime”

(Source: Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, 18 Oct 2017.)
 
* Author: Molly Herron, Esq., Molly.Herron@hsf.com, Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, London.
 
In the short term, for transactions in the military/dual use sector and parts of the advanced technology sector it plans to reduce the UK turnover threshold for reviewable transactions from £70m to £1m, to enable national security review of acquisitions of smaller companies.
 
In the longer term, BEIS is proposing a more significant overhaul: the extension of the current national security regime to a wider category of transactions, regardless of sector, and/or the introduction of a new mandatory notification regime for transactions involving specified “essential functions” in key sectors (including civil nuclear, telecommunications, defence, energy and transport).
 
The BEIS proposals come against a backdrop of an increase in public interest intervention in the M&A process globally, spurred in part by high levels of outbound investment by Chinese companies. Whilst the Green Paper stresses that the UK is open to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), the proposals clearly have at least the potential to deter FDI, in particular as a result of uncertainties about the scope of any new regime and the application of the substantive test. Much will depend on the design details of the regime under the second tranche of reforms (on which the Green Paper is relatively light) and how the test is applied in practice – in particular whether intervention is rigorously limited to genuine national security concerns, or whether this process allows other public interests to be introduced by the back door.
 
(1) Background
 
Current merger control regime
 
The Enterprise Act 2002 (EA02) largely removed politics from the UK merger control regime and, to date, the UK has not had a separate FDI screening regime. For transactions falling within the jurisdictional scope of the EA02 (where the target’s UK turnover exceeds £70m and/or the transaction will create or enhance a share of supply in the UK of 25% or more), the vast majority of merger control decisions are taken by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) applying a pure competition test.
 
This is subject to a number of limited exceptions where the Secretary of State retains the power to intervene on specified public interest grounds (which can be expanded by statutory instrument). These grounds are currently national security, media plurality/accurate presentation of news, and maintenance of the stability of the UK financial system (added in order to clear the Lloyds/HBOS merger at the height of the financial crisis). None of these are specifically related to foreign investment. Intervention is possible only in relation to transactions which fall within the jurisdictional scope of the EA02, i.e. which meet the turnover or share of supply test, with the exception of certain defence and media mergers.
 
In relation to transactions falling within the jurisdictional scope of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), the scope for intervention is limited by Article 21 EUMR, which allows Member States to intervene to prohibit or impose conditions on such transactions to protect narrow legitimate interests only: public security, media plurality and prudential rules (further interests may be invoked, but only with the consent of the European Commission). Under the EA02 regime, ministers can intervene in EUMR cases only on the grounds of national security and media plurality.
 
Interventions under the existing regime have been relatively limited, although there are a number of recent examples, both on the grounds of national security (which led to the acceptance of undertakings in Hytera/Sepura) and media plurality (in the ongoing 21st Century Fox/Sky review).
 
Both the prospect of release from the limitations of Article 21 EUMR and the EU law rules on free movement of capital and freedom of establishment as a result of impending Brexit, and wider trends in M&A across Europe and beyond, have prompted the UK Government to revisit its powers of intervention.
 
Changing M&A landscape
 
The BEIS proposals come against a backdrop of increased public interest intervention in the M&A process globally, including the recent proposals by the European Commission for a FDI screening framework following pressure from France, Germany and Italy (see our ebulletin here), the expansion of the German FDI regime, and the upswing in the intervention rate of the Committee on Foreign Investments in the US (CFIUS) (including most recently the blocking by President Trump of the bid by China-backed Canyon Bridge for Lattice Semiconductors), and of increased protectionist rhetoric in the US and beyond. This has resulted in part from high levels of outbound investment by Chinese companies, in particular acquisitions of key strategic technologies (such as the Midea/KUKA transaction and the abortive acquisition of Aixtron by Fujian Grand Chip).
 
Even before these most recent trends, disquiet had been raised in the UK about foreign takeovers of strategically important UK businesses, and their impact on employment, R&D and other national interests, but no concrete proposals for reform were put forward until 2016.
 
Just prior to becoming Prime Minister in July 2016, Theresa May referred to the attempted bid by Pfizer for AstraZeneca and the earlier takeover of Cadbury by Kraft and the need for a “proper industrial strategy” enabling Government to step in to defend key sectors. The intention to introduce wider national security controls on foreign investment in critical national infrastructure specifically (see our ebulletin here) was announced alongside the September 2016 approval for the Hinkley Point C new nuclear project (including China General Nuclear’s stake), which was not subject to a formal review under EA02. This plan was repeated in the Conservative Party general election Manifesto in May 2017, together with high level proposals for reform in relation to public takeovers (see our article here).
 
The Takeover Panel launched a consultation in September 2017 on proposed changes to the Takeover Code in respect of statements of intention, timing, and post-offer undertakings (see here), and the detailed proposals in relation to national security have now finally been published within the Green Paper.
 
(2) Green Paper
 
The Green Paper (see here) stresses the benefits of FDI and that the UK is open to investment, but states that it is necessary to update the UK’s arrangements for safeguarding national security, in line with other “developed and open economies” with national security screening procedures (citing regimes in the US, Canada, Australia and France). It flags the risk that ownership or control of critical businesses or infrastructure could provide opportunities to “undertake espionage, sabotage or exert inappropriate leverage”, and states that foreign nationality is considered a risk factor when making assessments of the threat to national security.
 
Overall BEIS states that the UK’s current approach to national security protection appears less developed than in other jurisdictions, and proposes short- and long-term steps to remedy this.
 
Proposed short term changes – military/dual use and advance technology sectors
 
BEIS proposes to amend the EA02 jurisdictional tests, which it considers are not appropriate for Government intervention in mergers on national security grounds, given that niche businesses with relatively low turnover can be involved in activities which raise national security risks.
 
It proposes to amend these tests to close the perceived “loophole” for transactions in:
 
  – The military and dual-use sectors (by reference to products or technology on the Strategic Export Control Lists); and
  – Parts of the “advanced technology” sector (namely businesses involved in multi-purpose computing hardware and quantum-based technology).
 
BEIS proposes that for transactions in these sectors:
 
  – The UK turnover threshold be reduced to £1m; and
  – The share of supply test will not require any aggregation (and therefore could be met if the target alone has a share of supply of 25% or more in the UK).
 
The proposed reforms do not distinguish between foreign and other acquirers (although in practice national security concerns may only arise in relation to the former), or make any changes to the level of ownership or control which triggers the EA02 regime (which covers both acquisition of control and the lesser “material influence” threshold).
 
Although driven by national security concerns, the proposed amendments will also apply to the CMA’s powers of review on competition grounds, and therefore will significantly extend its jurisdiction in these sectors. While the UK merger control regime is voluntary and merging parties are not obliged to make a notification, given the CMA’s powers to review unnotified mergers (and impose stringent “hold separate” requirements while it investigates) this change may well lead to a significant increase in notifications to the CMA in these sectors, even in relation to transactions that do not raise competition (or national security) concerns, by parties keen to ensure legal certainty.
 
BEIS states that the Government would publish guidance on its approach to public interest review in the sectors, and that it would engage with any business wishing to discuss whether a proposed or actual merger might raise national security issues.
 
The consultation on these proposals closes on 14 November 2017.
 
Proposed longer term reform – options for wider national security review
 
BEIS canvasses a number of different options for a more significant overhaul of the regime, which it states could be adopted alone or combined as a package. It seeks views on how best to achieve “targeted and proportionate” reforms, given the merits and demerits of voluntary versus mandatory systems in terms of burdens on business, transparency and legal certainty, and the potential for gaps in the Government’s awareness of potentially relevant transactions.
 
The consultation on these proposals closes on 9 January 2018.
 
  
Option 1: voluntary notification regime and “call-in” power
 
Under this option the EA02 regime would be retained in terms of structure, allowing the Secretary of State to intervene in qualifying transactions (within a specified time window), whether notified to the CMA or not, on national security grounds. However, the range of transactions susceptible to national security interventions (as opposed to competition review) would be expanded beyond those currently covered.
 
The Green Paper is not precise on this point, but it appears that the intention is to extend the concept of qualifying transactions for national security review to:
 
  – Acquisitions which would not qualify as a “merger” under the current EA02 regime, for example acquisitions which do not involve the acquisition of control or material influence over a business, but do involve the acquisition of control or “significant influence” (as to which it is not entirely clear whether this would be defined by reference only to a 25% stake or more widely) over a business or assets in the UK (for example an investor obtaining unrestricted access to sensitive sites or data), potentially extending to bare assets and greenfield projects; and
  – Transactions which do not meet the EA02 turnover or share of supply jurisdictional tests (it is not clear whether any alternative jurisdictional test is envisaged – as under the short term reforms – or whether this will be truly unlimited).
 
The proposed reforms under this option do not distinguish between foreign and other acquirers (although in practice national security concerns may only arise in relation to the former), and are not limited to specific sectors.
 
BEIS states that the Government could provide informal advice to businesses about whether it has national security concerns in particular cases.
 
  
Option 2: mandatory notification regime for “essential functions” in “key sectors”
 
Under this option a mandatory notification regime would be introduced under which prior approval would need to be obtained from the UK Government before a qualifying transaction (defined as under Option 1) could be completed, and sanctions could be imposed for failure to comply.
 
Such a review would apply only to companies which undertake specified “essential functions” (a proposed list of which is annexed to the Green Paper, for example civil nuclear fuel production, the operation of broadcast infrastructure that carry national radio or television services, upstream oil and gas infrastructure of a specified size, and power generation above a specified capacity), within specified key sectors. Key sectors would include civil nuclear, defence, energy, telecommunications and transport (together with military and dual-use items and advanced technology), and potentially also the government and emergency services sectors (and would be extendable by secondary legislation). BEIS is also considering whether specified individual businesses/assets which do not fall within those functions/sectors, and certain acquisitions of land, which nevertheless raise potential national security concerns, should also be specifically covered.
 
It appears that such a regime would apply only to the acquisition of foreign ownership or control.
 
Design details
 
The Green Paper provides relatively little detail on how such a new regime would operate, for example in terms of notification procedures, timing, or which departments or agencies would be involved, other than to state that the Government would aim to set out a “clear, short timeframe” within which investors would receive a decision and that an effective mechanism for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision would be available. It does make it clear that the Government would have the power to impose conditions on a deal or ultimately block it (and to unwind transactions implemented without approval).
 
BEIS states that it wishes to retain the independence of the CMA and maintain a clear separation between competition and national security assessments, which is to be welcomed (although the extent to which the expanded security review would sit within current EA02 processes is not entirely clear).
 
No further detail is provided on the substantive grounds for intervention, i.e. whether national security would be interpreted as under the current regime or more widely, although the Green Paper does state more generally that the focus is firmly on national security review and would not be used for protectionist purposes.
 
BEIS indicates that the Government would publish the outcomes of its reviews, in the interest of transparency and clarity, except where to do so would harm national security or other public interests.
 
Other measures
 
In relation to national security, the Green Paper notes that the Government will also implement reforms to require companies in the civil nuclear sector to inform the Office for Nuclear Regulation about specified changes in ownership. The Green Paper also states that where the UK Government provides public funding to companies, for example in respect of R&D, it will include change of control provisions in funding agreements allowing it to claw back funding in certain circumstances.
 
(3) Impact
 
The Green Paper emphasises the UK’s openness and commitment to investment and to FDI in particular, and that any changes will be limited to necessary and proportionate steps to safeguard national security. It recognises the need for new rules to be transparent and to provide as much clarity and certainty to investors as possible. BEIS is also careful to draw a distinction between screening to prevent national security threats and screening to control market access for protectionist reasons.
 
However, whether these aims are met, and whether there is an impact on investment activity, depends in large part on the design details of any new regime. Whilst the short term steps are relatively clear in scope, many aspects of the longer term proposals lack clarity at this stage (in particular precisely which transactions will fall in the scope of the new regime), and therefore give rise to real concerns about legal certainty. This is in addition to potential concerns about the prospect of dual competition and national security review, and the impact on deal costs and timetables arising from this. Despite the Government’s assurances, wider questions will also remain about the predictability and consistency of a more extensive national security review process, and the risk of protectionism or other political motivations (such as those highlighted by Theresa May in July 2016) entering the process by the back door. The outcome of the consultation will therefore be hotly anticipated.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

MSEX/IM MOVERS & SHAKERS

MS_a214. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings; 99 Jobs Posted This Week, Including 11 New Jobs

(Source: Editor)  
 
Published every Monday or first business day of the week. Please, send job openings in the following format to jobs@fullcirclecompliance.eu.
 
* COMPANY; LOCATION; POSITION TITLE (WEBLINK); CONTACT INFORMATION; REQUISITION ID
 


#
” New or amended listing this week (
11
new jobs)

* Aerojet Rocketdyne; Huntsville, AL, or Camden, AR; 
Senior International Trade and Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 12620

*
Airbus; Barajas, Spain;
Export Control Officer 

* Airbus; Sevilla, Spain;
Export Control Officer
* Airbus; Getafe, Spain;
Export Control Officer

* Amazon; Seattle, WA; NA Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 256357

* American Eagle; Pittsburgh, PA;
Manager – Trade and Regulatory Compliance; Requisition ID: 180981

* American Science & Engineering; Billerica, MA OR Andover, MA; 

Senior Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID 12285

* Amscan; Elmsford, NY;
Customs Compliance Mananger; or apply
here.

* Autodesk; San Rafael CA; 
Export Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 17WD24183

*
BAE Systems; California, MD; Subcontracts Manager; Requisition ID 28240BR

*
BAE Systems; Nasua, NH; Contracts Summer Internship Program; Requisition ID: 30621BR


BAE Systems; Wayne, NJ; Contracts Summer Internship Program; Requisition ID: 30622BR

*
BAE Systems; Nashua, NH: Import Export Analyst II; Requisition ID: 26285BR

* Baylor University; Waco, TX;
Manager/Director of Export Compliance; Vacancy ID S030428


* Boeing Australia; Brisbane, Australia; 
Trade Control Specialist 2; Requisition ID: 1700014199
* Boeing Australia; Melbourne, Australia; 
Trade Control Specialist 3; Requisition ID: 
1700015249

* Carpenter Technology Corporation; Reading, PA;
Senior Specialist, International Trade Compliance 

* Caterpillar; Peoria, IL;
Trade Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 170008AY
* Caterpillar; Jiangsu, China;
Customs and Trade Compliance Supervisor/Manager; Requisition ID: 170008XY

* DynCorp International; Springfield, VA;
Logistics Analyst Senior (ITAR/CCI Officer) 

*
 Esterline Technologies Corporation;
Bellevue, WA;
 
Manager, Trade Compliance Investigations and Disclosures

* Esterline Technologies Corporation; Paso Robles, CA;
Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 10827BR
* Esterline Technologies Corporation; Everett, Washington; 
Contracts Manager; Requisition ID: 11398BR

* Expeditors; Sunnyvale CA;
Customs Compliance Specialist
* Export Solutions Inc.; Melbourne FL; Trade Compliance Specialist;
info@exportsolutionsinc.com

* EY; Netherlands; 
Manager, Global Trade; Requisition ID: NET0016K

* EY; Belgium; 
Senior Consultant, Global Trade; Requisition ID: BEL000PT

* FLIR;
Wilsonville, OR; Billerica, MA
Director, Global Customs Compliance 
* FLIR;
Wilsonville, OR/Billerica, MA; 
Senior Director, Dual-Use Licensing 
* FLIR; Multiple Locations;
Senior Director, Global Regulatory Affairs 
* FLIR; Meer, Belgium;
Global Trade Compliance Administrator 
* FLIR; Arlington, VA;
Manager of Defense Trade Licensing 
* FLIR; Billerica, MA;
International Export/Import Analyst 

* Fluke; Everett, WA; 
Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: FLU005544

*
 
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.; San Diego, CA; International Contracts Manager; Requistion ID: 13583BR

*
 
General Atomics; San Diego, CA; Sr. Director of Import/Export Compliance; Job ID: 13892BR

*
 
General Atomics; San Diego, CA; Contracts Compliance Specialist; Requistion ID: 12839BR
 

*
 
General Atomics; San Diego, CA; International (Import/Export) Trade Compliance Administrator; Requisition ID: 12690BR

*
 General Atomics; San Diego, CA; 
Senior Import Export Administrator
; Requisition ID: 14438BR


General Dynamics Land Systems; Sterling Heights, MI; Licensing Officer
; Requisition IDSHC-LC-17-20056


General Dynamics Corporate Office; Falls Church, VA; Manager, Trade Licensing and Compliance
; Requisition ID: 
 

* George Washington University; Washington DC; 
Research Compliance Officer, Export Control
; Requisition ID: PI97906765

* Georgia Institute of Technology; Atlanta, GA; Research Associate I; Requisition ID: PVA37002

*
 Georgia Institute of Technology; Atlanta, GA; Research Associate II; Requisition ID: PVA37001
 


Harris Corporation; Clifton, New Jersey;
Trade Compliance Analyst
;
lsolomon@harris.com
; Requisition ID: ES20171608-20394

* Harris Corporation; Melbourne, FL;
IT Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 


CHQ20171608-20395

* Harris Corporation; Rochester, NY;
Technical Export Compliance Specialist; Job ID: 
CS20172308-20513

* Henderson Group Unlimited, Inc.; Alexandria, VA;
Defense Controls Analyst – Office of Defense Trade Controls Licensing 

* Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc.; Westfield, IN;
International Trade Compliance Manager 

* Johnson and Johnson; Skillman, NJ;
Export Trade Compliance Lead

* Lennox International; Richardson, TX; 
Manager, Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 2017-11661

Livingston International; El Segundo, CA; Research Consultant – ECCN Classification

# Livingston International; Taylor, Michigan;
Manager, Service Delivery
# Livingston International; El Segundo, CA;
ECCN Classification;
# Livingston International; El Segundo, CA;
HTS Classification;


* Lockheed Martin; Fort Worth, TX;
International Trade Compliance Export Advisor; Requisition ID: 402827BR

* Lockheed Martin; Grand Prarie, TX; 
International Trade Compliance Senior Manager; Requisition ID: 405533BR
* Lockheed Martin; Fort Worth, TX;
Aeronautics International Trade Compliance Senior Manager; Requisition ID: 407329BR

* Lutron; Coopersburg, PA;
Trade Manager-Export
; Requisition ID: 2926
* Medtronic; Heerlen, The Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 16000DYY

*
Medtronic; Minneapolis, MN; Global Trade Supply Chain Director; Requisition ID: 17000FU4
*
Medtronic; Minneapolis, MN; Global Trade Compliance Director; Requisition ID: 17000FC1

* Medtronic; Wash DC; Global Trade Lawyer
; stacy.m.johnson@medtronic.com
; Requisition I
D: 170002ON


* Meggitt PLC; Simi Valley, CA;
Trade Compliance Officer

* Meggit PLC; San Diego, CA; 
Trade Compliance Officer; Requisition ID: 28255

* National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); Gaithersburg, MD;
Operations Research Analyst; Vacancy Numbe
r: NISTLP-2017-0003

*
 
NetApp; Vienna, VA; Industrial Security Program Officer;

* Nissan/Kelly Services; Franklin, TN;
CONTRACT Position – Contract Customs Compliance Analyst;
frankie.bryson@nissan-usa.com; Requisition ID: 55224BR

* North Dakota State University; Fargo, ND;
Director for Research Integrity Compliance; Requisition ID: 1700372

# Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
Manager, International Trade Compliance 2; Requisition ID: 17014690
# Northrup Grumman; Herndon, VA; Manager, International Trade Compliance 3; Requisition ID: 17020346


* Northrop Grumman; Rolling Meadows, IL;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3; Requisition: 17015695


# Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA; 
Contracts Manager 2; Requisition ID:
 
17022426

OSI Optoelectronics; Hawthorne, CA; Manager, Global Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 12235; or contact Kim Butcher, Senior Talent Acquisition Partner;

# Raytheon; Andover, MA; 
Global Trade Principal Advisor/Manager; Requisition ID: 103111BR

Raytheon; El Segundo, CA;
Global Trade Manager; Requisition ID: 
97898BR
* Raytheon; El Segundo, CA;
Global Trade Authorization Owner; Requisition ID: 100859BR
* Raytheon; El Segundo, CA;
Principal Global Trade Licensing; Requisition ID: 102832BR

Raytheon; El Segundo, CA; 
Sr. Regulatory Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 101593BR

* Raytheon; Tucson, AZ;
Export Compliance – Agreements Authorization Owner; Requisition ID: 99909BR

* Raytheon; McKinney, TX;
Principal Global Trade Licensing; Requisition ID: 101234 BR

* Ultra Electronics; Loudwater, United Kingdom;
International Trade Manager
# United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CA;
International Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 54684BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CA; 
Supply Chain International Trade and Compliance Focal
;
 Requisition ID: 53794BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CA; 
ITC Specialist
; Requisition ID: 51240BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Everett WA; 
International Trade Compliance (ITC) Specialist
;
 Requisition ID: 52787BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Foley AL; 
ITC Program Manager
; Requisition ID: 54577BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Foley AL; 
ITC Site Lead;
Requisition ID: 54820BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Phoenix AZ;
Senior Manager, International Trade Compliance
;
 Requisition ID: 48093BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Troy OH; 
Director, International Trade Compliance
;
 Requisition ID: 53693BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Westford MA;
Senior International Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 54366BR

* Vigilant; Remote Opportunity; 
Classification Specialist


Vigilant; Bhudapest, Hungary; Jr. Compliance Specialist;

* Vigilant; Negotiable Location, USA; Global Trade Compliance Analyst;


Varian Medical Systems; Palo Alto, CA, Washington, D.C., or Atlanta, GA; Export/Sanctions Compliance Analyst; Req ID 12270BR


V
arian Medical Systems; 
Palo Alto, CA, Washington, D.C., or Atlanta,
 
GA; Export/Sanctions Counsel;eq ID 12271BR

* Vista Outdoor; Overland Park, KS;
Import Specialist; Requisition ID: 
R0002750 or contact holly.greenwood@vistaoutdoor.com
* Wurth Logistics; Indianapolis, IN;
Customs Brokerage Manager; Requisition ID: 1248

* Wurth Industry of North America; Sanford, FL; 
International Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 473-720

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ENEDITOR’S NOTES


* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a316
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  Changes to applicable regulations are listed below.
 
*
ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
 
*
CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 28 Sep 2017: 82 FR 45366-45408: Changes to the In-Bond Process [Effective Date: 27 Nov 2017.]
 
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 
here
.)


EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR)
: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  – Last Amendment: 23 Oct 2017: 82 FR 48925-48931: Amendments to Existing Validated End-User Authorization in the People’s Republic of China: Lam Research Service Co., Ltd

  
*
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR)
: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
  – Last Amendment: 16 Jun 2017: 82 FR 27613-27614: Removal of Burmese Sanctions Regulations 
 
*
FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR)
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment:
20 Sep 2017:
 
82 FR 43842-43844
: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on Filing Requirements; Correction
 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
  – The latest edition (20 Sep 2017) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and to many errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR.
 
*
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA)
, 1 Jan 2017: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 20 Oct 2017: Harmonized System Update 1707, containing 27,291 ABI records and 5,164 harmonized tariff records.

  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130.
  – Last Amendment: 30 Aug 2017: 82 FR 41172-41173: Temporary Modification of Category XI of the United States Munitions List
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 12 Sep 2017) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated 

ITAR
(“BITAR”)
, by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.
 The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
 
website
. BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please
contact us
to receive your discount code.

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EN_a0317. 
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 
here

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EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

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