;

17-0918 Monday “Daily Bugle”

17-0918 Monday “Daily Bugle”

Monday, 18 September 2017

TOP
The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
here for free subscription.  Contact us
for advertising inquiries and rates.

[No items of interest noted today.] 

  1. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. Commerce/Census: “Tips on How to Resolve AES Fatal Errors”
  4. DHS/CBP Adds Functionality to ACE Production
  5. State/DDTC Posts Name Change for Easat Antenna Limited
  6. President Continues National Emergency with Respect to Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism
  7. EU Amends Restrictive Measures Concerning North Korea, ISIL, and Al-Qaida
  1. Patch.com: “Selling Secrets To ‘Russian Spy’: L.A. County Man Sentenced”
  2. South China Morning Post: “How North Korea Evades UN Sanctions”
  1. Bayside Journal: “How Export Control Software Can Ease Pains for Your Business”
  2. B.D. Linney, B.J. Fleming & P.M. Stewart: “More Mixed Messages on Iran: Latest Sanctions Waivers Accompanied by Additional Sanctions”
  3. E.L. Rubinoff: “President Trump Blocks Canyon Bridge’s Proposed Acquisition Of Lattice Semiconductor: What Does this Action Mean For Chinese Investment In the United States?”
  4. R. Whitten, J.S. Maberry & J. Blanquart: “Growing Pains for Expanding Tech Companies: Uber Investigated for FCPA Violations”
  5. M.T. Gershberg & J.A. Schenck: “UN Security Council Adopts New Sanctions on North Korea”
  6. J. Reeves & K. Heubert: “Range Days and U.S. Export Controls”
  7. Gary Stanley’s ECR Tip of the Day
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings (107 jobs listed — 27 new jobs) 
  1. ECTI Presents “DIY Encryption Classification 2017 Edition” Webinar, 2 Nov 
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Changes: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (28 Jul 2017), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (15 Aug 2017), FACR/OFAC (16 Jun 2017), FTR (19 Apr 2017), HTSUS (25 Jul 2017), ITAR (30 Aug 2017) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMEX/IM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1

 

[No items of interest noted today.]

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a11. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register

* Justice; Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Bureau; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Notification of Change of Mailing or Premise Address [Publication Date: 19 September 2017.]
 
* President; ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS; Terrorism; Continuation of National Emergency With Respect to Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support (Notice of September 18, 2017) [Publication Date: 19 September 2017.]
 
* Treasury; Foreign Assets Control Office; NOTICES; Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Publication Date: 19 September 2017.]

 
(Editor’s Note: The Presidential administrative order is included in today’s Daily Bugle, item #6, and will not be reprinted in tomorrow’s edition.)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

  

 
When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected. If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation. However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received.
 
To help you resolve AES Fatal Errors, here are some tips on how to correct the most frequent errors that were generated in AES for this month.
 
Fatal Error Response Code: 173
 
  – Narrative: Country of Ultimate Destination Outdated
  – Reason: The Country of Ultimate Destination is not an active country code in AES.
  – Resolution: The Country of Ultimate Destination Code must be an active ISO country code listed in Appendix C, ISO Country Codes. Verify the Country of Ultimate Destination Code and the Estimated Date of Export, correct the shipment and resubmit.
 
Fatal Error Response Code: 632
 
  – Narrative: 2nd Unit of Measure Code, Schedule B/HTS Mismatch
  – Reason: The Unit of Measure (2) reported does not match the Unit of Measure (2) required for the Schedule B/HTS Number reported.
  – Resolution: The Unit of Measure (2) must match exactly the Unit of Measure (2) required for the Schedule B/HTS reported. See Appendix K – Units of Measure Codes. Verify the Unit of Measure (2) required for the particular Schedule B/HTS Number, correct the shipment and resubmit.
 
For a complete list of Fatal Error Response Codes, their reasons, and resolutions, see Appendix A – Commodity Filing Response Messages.
 
It is important that AES filers correct Fatal Errors as soon as they are received in order to comply with the Foreign Trade Regulations. These errors must be corrected prior to export for shipments filed predeparture and as soon as possible for shipments filed postdeparture but not later than five calendar days after departure.
 
For further information or questions, contact the U.S. Census Bureau’s Data Collection Branch.
 
  – Telephone: (800) 549-0595, select option 1 for AES
  – Email: askaes@census.gov
  – Online:
www.census.gov/trade

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_a44
. DHS/CBP Adds Functionality to ACE Production

(Source:
CSMS #17-000584, 17 September 2017.)
 
The ACE Production Maintenance window completed at 3:30 AM, Sunday 9/17/2017.
 
The following functionality were successfully implemented in Production.
 
Entry Summary and initial deployment of NAFTA Duty Deferral
 
* CIP-756: NAFTA Duty Deferral
 
* CIP-911: NAFTA Duty Deferral – Online Edit
 
* CES-7543: Exempt HTS chapters 9804-9807 and 9809 from Harbor Maintenance Fees (HMF) when MOT = 12.
 
When the MOT is 12 (Barge) and any HTS number of the line is in HTS chapter 9804-9807 or 9809, HMF is exempt.
 
* CES-7616: Apply 90-Day Future Print Date Restriction for PMS.
 
Currently the validation that ensures that the reported Preliminary Statement Print Date is no more than 90 days in the future is only applied when Payment Type Code is 2, 3, or 5 (daily statement). The same validation needs to be applied when Payment Type Code is 6, 7, or 8 as well (monthly statement – PMS).
 
* CES-7907: Revise PSC (Post-Summary Correction) Collection Restrictions for 21, 22.
 
Currently Entry Summaries of all Entry Types are allowed to be amended via a PSC. Problems, however, have arisen when the types are 21 and 22. This is because the underlying liquidation and collections status settings (all from ACS) are different from all other types. The FAC PSC Collected Revenue Restriction shall change to correctly accommodate PSC processing:
 
Bypassing of validation for types 21 and 22 as they remain in partial payment status until the final withdrawal is collected.
 
* CES-8011: Conventional Rejected ES Statement Window Restrictions.
 
The FAC ‘Conventional Rejected Entry Summary Statement Window Restriction’ (6.2.4) validation is slated to be removed when ACE takes over statements (currently scheduled for December 2017). In the interim, while statements are still being executed in ACS, the validation needs to be in place. This story covers the work needed to enable the validation now, yet can be turned off/disabled when ACE statements takes over.
 
  – Related CSMS No. 17-000576

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a55
. State/DDTC Posts Name Change for Easat Antenna Limited

(Source: State/DDTC) [Excerpts.]
 
Effective immediately, Easat Antenna Limited has changed as follows: Easat Radar Systems Limited. Due to the volume of authorizations requiring amendments to reflect this change, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls is exercising the authority under 22 CFR 126.3 to waive the requirement for amendments to change currently approved license authorizations. The amendment waiver does not apply to approved or pending agreements. …

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a66
. President Continues National Emergency with Respect to Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, Or Support Terrorism

(Source: The White House)
 
On September 23, 2001, by Executive Order 13224, the President declared a national emergency with respect to persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in New York and Pennsylvania and against the Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks against United States nationals or the United States.
 
The actions of persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, and the measures adopted on that date to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond September 23, 2017. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency with respect to persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism declared in Executive Order 13224.
 
This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.
 
DONALD J. TRUMP
 
THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 18, 2017.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a77
. EU Amends Restrictive Measures Concerning North Korea, ISIL, and Al-Qaida

 
Regulations
  – Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1568 of 15 September 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
  – Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1571 of 15 September 2017 amending for the 277th time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida organisations
 
Decisions:
  – Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1573 of 15 September 2017 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

NWSNEWS

NWS_a18. Patch.com: “Selling Secrets To ‘Russian Spy’: L.A. County Man Sentenced”

(Source: Patch.com, 18 Sep 2017.) 
 
A Culver City man who worked for a defense contractor was sentenced Monday to five years in prison for his guilty plea to economic espionage and violating the Arms Export Control Act by selling sensitive satellite information to a person he believed to be a Russian spy. Justice faced the possibility of an even longer time behind bars after investigators made the startling conclusion his espionage plans included a plot to murder his ill wife, the Los Angeles Times reported Monday morning.
 
Gregory Allen Justice told an undercover investigator he was enamored with television spy thrillers such as “The Americans,” the Los Angeles Times reported.
 
According to court records, Justice, 49, pleaded guilty in May to charges stemming from an undercover sting operation in which he sold sensitive satellite information to an FBI agent masquerading as a Russian intelligence officer.
 
Although he told the would-be Russian spy he needed money to care for his ailing wife, bank records showed Justice was actually spending his money on another woman who hoodwinked Justice in an online relationship, prosecutors said in remarks reported by The Times. She sent him photos of a European model that she falsely claimed were of herself and persuaded him to send money and gifts through the mail, court records show.
 
Last month, prosecutors filed a brief with U.S. District Judge George H. Wu, recommending he sentence Justice to seven years and three months in prison — a harsher punishment than they would have otherwise requested. They revealed that Justice had asked the undercover agent during one of their final meetings to supply him with Anectine, a powerful muscle relaxant that can cause cardiac arrest in overdoses, The Times reported.
 
Justice told the agent that doctors had administered the drug to his wife in the past and he wanted to use it to help ease her chronic problems breathing during sleep. That excuse, prosecutors wrote in a filing, was a lie.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a2
9. South China Morning Post: “How North Korea Evades UN Sanctions”

(Source: South China Morning Post, 18 Sep 2017.) 
 
The United Nations recently passed its strongest sanctions yet against North Korea following its sixth nuclear test. But critics have expressed doubts as to whether the sanctions would stop Pyongyang from developing nuclear weapons and if the measures would be effectively enforced.
 
The US government and a UN experts panel have published reports on how North Korea evades sanctions to earn the hard currency it needs.
 
Here are eight of the methods used:
 
(1) Swapping goods
 
North Korea directly exchanges its coal and other minerals for the goods it needs, such as weapons components and even luxury items. This avoids the risk of money transfers being traced.
 
A resolution passed by the UN Security Council last November set a cap on North Korea’s coal exports, which generate a significant share of the country’s revenue.
 
Another resolution passed last month banned the coal trade with North Korea, but bulk purchases of the fuel continue.
 
Chinese businessman Chi Yupeng allegedly used his company Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Materials to buy steel and anthracite coal from North Korea in exchange for nuclear and missile components, according to the US Treasury department.
 
(2) Smuggling
 
Smugglers from other countries such as China turn off their ships’ transponders when entering North Korean waters, then take North Korean goods to another country, including Russia. They then claim the goods were made in Russia.
 
Chinese ships loaded with North Korean coal either stay in a Russian port for some time and then return to China, or another vessel picks up the goods and ships them, Assistant Treasury Secretary for Terrorist Financing Marshall Billingslea told a hearing of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee last week.
 
(3) Falsifying shipping registration documents
 
North Korea has registered an unusually large number of ships, including many foreign-owned vessels, as part of its domestic fleet. It also listed 18 of the 21 vessels in its Ocean Maritime Management Company as domestic ships, even though some enter international waters.
 
It allows the vessels to avoid international agency inspections.
 
The Ocean Maritime Management shipping company has also renamed and registered some of its vessels. False documentation was provided to eight ships, according to a UN report.
 
(4) Overseas workers and projects help fund weapons programme
 
Almost 100,000 North Koreans work around the world, generating about US$500 million for Kim Jong-un’s regime, according to the US government.
 
The Mansudae Overseas Projects group of construction companies was named by the UN as one of the North Korean firms that raised revenue for the state.
 
The group carries out building projects overseas using North Korean workers. It also transfers projects and its employees to other contractors, such as the Chinese firm Qingdao Construction’s unit in Namibia in Africa, according to the US Treasury department.
 
A UN resolution passed in November last year called on nations to be vigilant about North Korea’s use of overseas labour.
 
(5) Modifying equipment free of embargo for military use
 
North Korea displayed missiles at a huge parade held in Pyongyang in April. Video and photographs of the trucks used to transport a Pukguksong-1 missile had the “Sinotruk” logo on the fuel tank. At an earlier military parade in October two years ago in Pyongyang, Sinotruk Howo 6×6 series trucks were also seen.
 
Sinotruk is the listed arm of China’s largest state-owned truck manufacturer. It confirmed to a UN investigation that it had exported civilian trucks with three axles to North Korea from 2010 to 2014, but the equipment was not subject to embargo. The company also said the sales contract requested explicitly “the buyer ensure the civilian use of the trucks and comply with concerned provisions of Chinese laws and Security Council resolutions”.
 
(6) Front companies
 
North Korean companies set up bank accounts for front companies overseas to place their earnings.
 
It reduces the risk of wire transfers to banks in Pyongyang being traced.
 
Glocom, a North Korean company manufacturing military communication devices, used a number of front companies in Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong to settle payments with clients and suppliers, according to a UN report. A single invoice was often settled through a series of small transactions, the report said.
 
In another case, Chinese businesswoman Ma Xiaohong was accused of using her company Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development to help Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation settle its overseas customer accounts, according to the US Justice Department.
 
(7) Diplomatic cover
 
North Korea uses its diplomats overseas to open multiple bank accounts. Sometimes they are in their own names, family members’ or front companies.
 
One example was Kim Chol-sam, the representative of Daedong Credit Bank in Dalian in China’s Liaoning province, the US Treasury department alleged. Kim set up at least eight accounts in mainland China and Hong Kong in his own name and for front companies which were used in millions of dollars worth of transactions, it said.
 
(8) Arms sales
 
North Korea continues to sell arms and provide military training overseas, despite UN embargoes. It is particularly active in Africa and the Middle East.
 
A United Nations investigation said buyers included Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Mozambique, Namibia, Syria, Uganda and Tanzania. Benin, Botswana, Mali and Zimbabwe were also investigated for their ties with North Korean companies.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMMCOMMENTARY

COMM_a01
10. Bayside Journal: “How Export Control Software Can Ease Pains for Your Business”

(Source: Bayside Journal)
 
Having efficient and accurately working export control software is a definite must. Automated restricted party screening software will help you check your trading partners against several internationally barred and denied company lists
 
Exporters and importers would certainly prefer their business flourish by mitigating unnecessary risks that may hamper their brand name, reputation and import & export privileges.
 
On the other hand, the companies which failed to comply with export control regulations ended up with heavy fines and penalties. In fact, some companies still remain unaware of the set of laws codified as the US export control regulation, until they fall into the non-compliant companies and organizations situation when the U.S. government export enforcement office investigates them for violations.
 
The governmental agencies, particularly, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Office of Export Enforcement, U.S. DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Department of Justice request exporters to conduct certain safeguarding activities, widely known as checks and verifications under “Know Your Customer”, as in the following:
 
  – Check customers, suppliers, and other trade partners thoroughly prior to completing any business transactions with them;
  – Check if ordered products match the customer’s businesses practice or not;
  – Verify about modes of transportation and packaging requests;
  – Check for the red flags in the routing of shipment through multiple countries;
  – Deny high-value transactions in cash; and 
  – Carefully screen their names and addresses against Denied party lists.
 
The aforementioned methods would also be great steps in the implementation of good export compliance posture. Several U.S. Government agencies and other country government agencies, including the International organizations, regularly publish red flags and lists of banned, prohibited and denied persons, entities, and companies. Periodically referring to those large numbers of lists, one can discover whether an entity is acceptable to do business from the U.S. export control regulations perspective or not. But, would this be effective enough for you? Does it make easier or faster for you? Absolutely not! Unless there’s something as efficient as automated export control software, the fact-checking against restricted party lists will be quite difficult, cumbersome and labor intensive.
 
How can the software help your business?
 
In the current scenario, if you don’t keep up with the recent technological trends and the speed of international trading you may hinder your business’ progress. Having efficient and accurately working export control software is a definite must. Automated restricted party screening software will help you check your trading partners against several internationally barred and denied company lists. Not only that, it will also help you keep a tab over ever changing international and national import and export control regulations. You can request top software providers for a complete software package that also helps you with ECCN and HTS classification as quickly as possible. The advantages of using this software include:
 
Reliable trade partner screening prevents long hours of manual search operations. With greatly improved flexible searching capabilities, such as phonetic search and fuzzy logic search, screening software in the market today allow users to find accurate results in a fraction of seconds.
 
Batch/bulk screening of lists makes it highly efficient for businesses that have got a lot of work to do. You will have a cost-effective solution at work, which helps you with compliance measures and saves money at the same time.
 
Some companies were severely misguided when they’re told that verifying only BIS and OFAC lists were sufficient. But, that’s not it. Companies operating globally would be bound by screening their trade partners against 100-120 U.S. and international denied party lists.
 
Under the defense export control regulations, achieving a high level of ITAR compliance prior to importing and exporting defense articles is a major requirement. Unauthorized trading will invite an application of criminal and civil penalties. Per violation may impose a fine up to $500,000 and debarment under criminal penalties.
 
Therefore, you should utilize robust compliance automation software in your business transactions that help you in complying with US export regulations while you focus on your core business processes.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a2
11. B.D. Linney, B.J. Fleming & P.M. Stewart: “More Mixed Messages on Iran: Latest Sanctions Waivers Accompanied by Additional Sanctions”

 
* Authors: Barbara D. Linney, Esq., blinney@milchev.com, 202-626-5806; Brian J. Fleming, Esq., bfleming@milchev.com, 202-626-5871; and Patrick M. Stewart, Esq., pstewart@milchev.com, 202-626-1582. All of Miller & Chevalier Chartered.
 
On September 14, 2017, the Trump administration announced the extension of waivers of various secondary sanctions against Iran while simultaneously sanctioning an additional 11 entities and individuals for activities in support of Iran. At the same time, administration officials emphasized that the U.S. Iran policy remains under review and declined to predict how the United States intends to handle the upcoming October deadline for certifying to Congress that Iran is in compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to with Iran in 2015.
 
The waivers, which originally took effect on January 16, 2016 (“Implementation Day” under the JCPOA), have been renewed every 180 days since that time. The secondary sanctions waived were imposed under various pieces of legislation enacted in 2012 and were due to “spring back” into force absent a further waiver. Failure to extend the waivers would have exposed non-U.S. persons doing business with Iran to sanctions (including asset “blocking” or “freezing”) for continuing to engage in transactions with Iran now permitted by the laws of their own countries as a result of the JCPOA.
 
Implementation of the JCPOA was accompanied by sanctions under authorities not impacted by the JCPOA and the Trump administration has continued that tradition by imposing additional sanctions simultaneously with both the May 17 and September 14 waiver renewals. The May renewal was accompanied by designations of Iranian defense officials and a China-based network as Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDNs) for supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program. SDNs are cut off from the U.S. financial system and U.S. persons are prohibited from having any dealings with them. The September 14 waiver renewals were accompanied by designations of supporters of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and networks responsible for engaging in cyber-attacks on the U.S. financial system. These designations, pursuant to sanctions authority related to non-nuclear-related weapons proliferation, terrorism, and cyber-attacks, is consistent with the terms of the JCPOA, under which the United States agreed to lift only those sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
 
In announcing the waivers and new designations, administration officials emphasized that their Iran policy remains under review. Some in the administration, including President Trump himself, continue to express frustration with the JCPOA and have left open the possibility that the United States will withdraw from the deal. Although the latest waiver buys the administration some additional time to review and develop its Iran policy, the next test for the JCPOA is already on the horizon. By October 15, 2017, the administration must certify to Congress that Iran remains in compliance with the JCPOA. Failure to certify Iran’s compliance could lead to the re-imposition of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. The impact of such an outcome will fall heavily on non-U.S. entities that have re-entered the Iranian market post-Implementation Day.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a3
12. E.L. Rubinoff: “President Trump Blocks Canyon Bridge’s Proposed Acquisition Of Lattice Semiconductor: What Does this Action Mean For Chinese Investment In the United States?”

(Source: Author)
 
* Author: Edward L. Rubinoff, Esq., Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, ed.rubinoff@nelsonmullins.com, 202-689-2810.
 
President Trump issued an order on September 13, 2017 prohibiting the acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor Corporation (“Lattice”) by Canyon Bridge Capital Partners LLC (“Canyon Bridge”), its limited partner, Yitai Capital Limited (“Yitai”), and Yitai’s parent company, China Venture Capital Fund Corporation Limited (“CVCF”), based on the recommendation from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”), an interagency panel which is authorized to review transactions that could result in the control of a U.S. business by a foreign person in order to determine the effect of such transactions on U.S. national security. The President’s decision is based in large part on the involvement of the Chinese government in the transaction. While this outcome is not unprecedented and appears to be consistent with prior actions involving attempted Chinese investment in the U.S. semiconductor industry, at the same time it may represent an evolving Trump Administration policy to restrict Chinese takeovers of U.S. companies for a variety of reasons.    
 
Overview of CFIUS Case and Presidential Order
 
Lattice is an Oregon company that manufactures semiconductors for the consumer, communications and industrial markets. Its primary semiconductor products are programmable logic devices, which customers can program to provide functionality for specific applications. Canyon Bridge is a U.S.-based private equity firm with offices in Palo Alto and Beijing. CVCF is a Chinese company, owned by Chinese state-owned entities, that manages industrial investments and venture capital. The proposed transaction went through three CFIUS review and investigation cycles, during which the parties reportedly proposed mitigation measures to address national security concerns that CFIUS would not accept as conditions to clearing the transaction. In such circumstances, the parties typically opt to terminate the transaction and withdraw their notice, but in this case Canyon Bridge, its partners, and Lattice chose to seek presidential review, as provided by the CFIUS statute.
 
In rejecting the Canyon Bridge-Lattice deal, President Trump concluded that the national security risk posed by the transaction cannot be resolved through mitigation. The order indicated that the national security risk posed by the transaction relates to (1) the potential transfer of intellectual property to the foreign acquirer; (2) the Chinese government’s role in supporting the transaction; (3) the importance of semiconductor supply chain integrity to the U.S. government; and (4) the use of Lattice products by the U.S. government.
 
Key Takeaways from the Canyon Bridge-Lattice Decision
 
This is only the fourth time a president has blocked a transaction following a CFIUS investigation, but it is the third in the last five years. While this outcome was widely anticipated, it nevertheless reflects several trends in CFIUS reviews of foreign investment in the United States, especially those transactions involving China.
 
  (1) Proposed acquisitions of U.S. companies in the semiconductor industry by foreign investors, particularly from China, will continue to receive intense scrutiny.
 
The U.S. semiconductor industry has been the subject of numerous foreign investment efforts in recent years, and given the strategic importance of those products and related technology to U.S infrastructure and defense, CFIUS clearly has jurisdiction to review transactions where a foreign person would gain control of a U.S. company in this business sector. Most of the attention in this area has been directed towards attempted Chinese investment, given reports that China has plans to commit $150 billion over 10 years to build a domestic semiconductor industry. A number of those reported efforts have failed, largely because of direct or indirect CFIUS influence. In 2015, China Resources Microelectronics Ltd., a state-owned conglomerate, rescinded its offer for Micron, a major U.S. chip manufacturer, reportedly because of concerns that the deal would not clear CFIUS review. Similarly, in 2016, Fairfield Semiconductor International turned down another offer by China Resources and Hua Capital Management Co. Ltd., purportedly due to a belief that CFIUS would block the transaction.  
 
The U.S. government’s scrutiny of China’s semiconductor objectives gained momentum late last year when President Obama in December blocked a Chinese investment fund’s purchase of German semiconductor-equipment supplier Aixtron SE, which has a factory and offices in the U.S., after it failed to secure CFIUS clearance. In January 2017, an Obama administration advisory panel published a report warning of the economic and military dangers posed by China’s efforts to develop a semiconductor sector, and called for new policies to ensure that the United States remains a global leader in semiconductors.  
 
In this context, the Canyon Bridge-Lattice deal became a lightning rod in the struggle between the U.S and China over semiconductors. A bipartisan group of House members wrote to CFIUS objecting to the proposed transaction, expressing concern that it could provide China with critical military technology (notwithstanding the fact that Lattice sold its military design unit in 2012). President Trump’s decision, which, unlike CFIUS decisions following a review or investigation, was required by statute to be announced, reflects a number of concerns about the implications of Chinese access to semiconductor technology and products achieved through investment in a U.S. company. For this reason, semiconductor transactions involving Chinese investors will continue to receive the highest level of attention and face enormous hurdles.  
 
  (2) Chinese investment in the United States may face increased challenges in the CFIUS review process.
 
CFIUS has long been accused of being hostile towards Chinese investment in the United States, based on several high profile, controversial deals that either failed to receive CFIUS clearance or were blocked. However, both the legal framework of CFIUS and the available data on its decisions demonstrate that this reputation is undeserved. The stated policy of the United States is still to be open to foreign investment and the CFIUS structure reflects this policy, as its members represent a combination of both national security and economic development responsibilities. Member agencies and their delegates take their CFIUS roles seriously and historically have reviewed each case based on its merits. The vast majority of transactions involving Chinese investors have been cleared by CFIUS, even when requiring mitigation to address concerns about perceived threats to national security.  
 
Yet the Canyon Bridge-Lattice decision is the latest in a series of developments which suggest that CFIUS may increasingly pose an impediment to Chinese investment in the United States. Although the number of announced Chinese acquisitions of U.S. companies in 2017 is reportedly the highest on record, a number of those have collapsed after failing to obtain clearance from CFIUS or have been mired in extended reviews. See, e.g., Ant Financial Services Group’s acquisition of MoneyGram International Inc., HNA Group Co.’s investment in Global Eagle Entertainment Inc., Zhingwang USA LLC’s acquisition of Aleris Corp., China Oceanwide Holdings Group Co.’s acquisition of Genworth Financial Inc., and Unic Capital Management’s acquisition of Xcerra Corp.  
 
These difficulties may reflect an evolving Trump Administration policy regarding Chinese investment in the United States. President Trump campaigned on promises to confront China on public policy and commercial matters, particularly trade and investment issues. While the first months of the Trump Administration tilted towards a reset of diplomatic and economic relations with China, recent developments involving North Korea and Chinese trade practices have appeared to swing the pendulum back to challenging China on a number of fronts. Congress is also under pressure to act aggressively on China, including on trade matters. While its role with CFIUS is largely advisory, selected members can be expected to voice concern and even opposition to more Chinese investment in the United States, thereby ramping up the pressure on CFIUS.
 
  (3) CFIUS reviews are becoming lengthier and more complicated, and proposed legislation may exacerbate the problem.
 
The CFIUS review process is taking far longer than in the past. There are number of factors contributing to the delay. CFIUS is on track to review a record number of transactions in 2017, with Chinese investment accounting for a large portion of the increase. However, there are key vacancies in a number of CFIUS member agencies, and this lack of essential resources to review applications, resolve policy and legal issues, and approve mitigation measures has prevented CFIUS from resolving cases expeditiously, causing a backlog of cases. This forces CFIUS to push more cases into the investigation stage following its initial review and then request parties to withdraw and refile their applications when it unable to complete an investigation in the time allotted by statute, thereby triggering a new cycle of review.  
 
CFIUS has expanded its concept of what constitutes “national security” over the years by focusing on economic security and data access issues in addition to traditional areas of national defense. President Trump’s campaign raised claims of a range of perceived threats to the United States, further expanding the definition of national security. As a result of these developments, CFIUS appears to be far more inclined to identify national security concerns in proposed transactions, thereby requiring the parties to negotiate with CFIUS on mitigation conditions to clear the transactions. All of these factors prolong the review process and often require multiple review cycles to resolve cases. These problems appear to be exacerbated for transactions involving Chinese investors.
 
Legislation is expected to be introduced in Congress this year to amend the CFIUS process in certain areas, including adding special procedures for transactions involving sensitive technologies, such as semiconductors, and countries of concern, i.e., China. It is also possible that the bills will seek to expand CFIUS’s authority to consider economic factors, such as whether a proposed transaction will result in a “net benefit” for the U.S. economy. Any such changes are likely to add to the already enormous burdens on CFIUS and possibly chill investment from countries such as China.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a4
13. R. Whitten, J.S. Maberry & J. Blanquart: “Growing Pains for Expanding Tech Companies: Uber Investigated for FCPA Violations”

 
* Authors: Reid Whitten, Esq., rwhitten@sheppardmullin.com; J. Scott Maberry, Esq., smaberry@sheppardmullin.com; and Julien Blanquart, Summer Associate.  All of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, Wash DC.
 
On August 29, it was announced that the U.S. Department of Justice is considering an investigation into Uber, the San Francisco-based technology company that has expanded its ride-sharing service abroad to more than 70 countries. Press reports indicate that DOJ may investigate potential violations by company personnel of the U.S. law against foreign bribery, known as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). On the same day, the company confirmed the review and said that it was cooperating with the Justice Department on the matter.
 
A Wall Street Journal article alleged that “the eight-year-old company spread rapidly to more than 70 countries around the world in part by giving regional teams authority to adapt to local markets and expand as quickly as possible, sometimes flouting local laws.”
 
In our experience, once DOJ begins learning about a particular industry in such an investigation, the investigation will expand to other players within the industry. It’s called an “industry sweep,” and it’s a thing.
 
The case illustrates a question for tech startups:
When do I get my compliance house in order?
 
A startup generally will not have significant resources to spend on compliance initially, which is fine: the risk profile is typically low as a company gets its feet under it locally. But as the company expands to international markets, it will face a rapidly expanding series of compliance challenges, even as its success draws more scrutiny from regulators.
 
The Growth
 
Because a typical startup begins as a small local company, the risk of violating the FCPA is slight. However, as the company’s growth curve takes it into foreign markets, new compliance obligations may not always be clear. First and most obviously, the company must understand the host country laws and regulations. At the same time, the company must clearly address U.S. regulatory restrictions on its new foreign business, which can tend to be more obscure.
 
The Pain
 
Regulated Industries
. The growth can be particularly dangerous for a company attempting to disrupt established regulated industries. Playing abroad in a regulated industry requires constant interaction with foreign government officials. Each of those interactions creates a risk that some payment, offer, or business hospitality could be considered an FCPA violation. As an example, taxi services are heavily regulated by local government agencies in the areas of driver qualifications, licensing, vehicle maintenance, fares, and myriad other areas. An illicit payment to any one of those regulators can be an FCPA violation. Players in this industry should be aware that DOJ is now looking at such payments.
 
Similarly, companies disrupting other regulated industries should be aware that DOJ will very likely soon be looking at their business models. This would likely include the following industries, among others:
 
  – Telecommunications;
  – Power generation and transmission;
  – Pharmaceuticals and medical services;
  – Financial technologies;
  – Hospitality;
  – Insurance; and
  – Any company playing in the sharing economy.
 
Geographic Risk
. When the company expands internationally, its risk and exposure can expand exponentially. Particularly in developing companies, the rules are not always clear and the local culture does not always deter corruption. The company needs a strong compliance infrastructure to hold out against the pressure to engage in bribery.
 
Industry Sweeps
. We have seen industries such as oil and gas, medical devices, pharma, and telecom ravaged by DOJ industry sweeps. FCPA enforcers in the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission (and, more recently, the UK Serious Fraud Office) catch one big player in an industry red-handed and, in return for mitigated penalties, that big company starts pointing the finger at competitors. Small, domestic startups are not a likely target, but those companies that have begun to cross international borders may look like fish in the proverbial barrel: exposed and unaware of the risks they face.
 
The Prevention
 
Typically, startups do not have the budget for platinum standard compliance programs. Nevertheless, compliance programs are now considered core business processes; startups operating without those are putting their business at risks. And certainly before setting foot in a foreign jurisdiction, those compliance programs need solid anti-bribery components.
 
By investing early in a light and flexible compliance program, then updating that program as you expand, you can be protected against the potential costly investigations, painful penalties, and damaging reputational harm that that have buffeted entire industries caught up in DOJ industry sweeps.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a5
14. M.T. Gershberg & J.A. Schenck: “UN Security Council Adopts New Sanctions on North Korea”

 
* Authors: Michael T. Gershberg, Esq.,
michael.gershberg@friedfrank.com
; and Justian A. Schenck, Esq.,
justin.schenck@friedfrank.com
. Both of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Wash DC.
 
On 11 September 2017, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2375 imposing new sanctions on North Korea in response to its recent nuclear test. The new sanctions significantly restrict trade with the country and are intended to block most of its revenue. Specifically, the UN agreed to cap the amount of crude oil and petroleum products sold to North Korea, ban the sale of natural gas to North Korea, prohibit the export of North Korean textiles, and ban the use of North Korean labor overseas. Additionally, the resolution requires the end of most joint ventures with North Korea, bans transfers of additional dual-use items to North Korea, and imposes asset freezes on sections of the North Korean government and military.
 
This resolution reflects increased international agreement to further isolate North Korea from the global economy and force the rogue nation to the negotiating table. It comes on the heels of other UN sanctions banning North Korean natural resource exports, and U.S. sanctions
designations
and
legislation
targeting North Korea. However, news reports also indicate that the UN resolution was a compromise between the United States and Russia and China. The United States had called for a complete ban on oil exports to North Korea and the designation of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Russia and China both opposed these extreme measures, but were willing to register their disapproval of North Korea’s actions, while still preserving an economic lifeline for the country.
 
The central elements of the new UN sanctions are the following, as detailed in a
fact sheet
issued by the U.S. Mission to the UN:
 
  – Caps worldwide exports of refined petroleum products to North Korea at 2 million barrels per year;
  – Freezes the current amount of crude oil provided to North Korea at existing levels;
  – Prohibits the supply of natural gas and natural gas condensates to North Korea;
  – Bans the exports of North Korean textiles;
  – Prohibits issuance of work authorizations for North Korean nationals in most situations;
  – Allows for member states to interdict cargo ships suspected of smuggling goods to or from North Korea, and provides for asset freezes and denial of port access for vessels that do not cooperate;
  – Prohibits all new joint ventures with North Korea and closing of all existing joint ventures with North Korea that do not relate to certain energy and port projects; and
  – Designates the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the Organization and Guidance Department, the Propaganda and Agitation Department, and Pak Yong Sik (a member of the Central Military Commission) as sanctioned persons subject to asset freezes. A travel ban is also imposed against Mr. Sik.
 
The comprehensive North Korean sanctions currently in place in the United States already prohibit the business contemplated by the new UN sanctions. Other countries with less comprehensive sanctions against North Korea, such as Russia and China, are required to implement these sanctions. There is no indication as to when these countries will do so, although the resolution requires UN member states to report on their implementation measures within 90 days. China implemented the August 2017 UN sanctions against North Korea within the same month.
 
U.S. businesses should review the new UN sanctions and ensure that their non-U.S. subsidiaries and affiliates are in compliance. It may also be appropriate to update global compliance policies. Although the United States maintains an embargo against North Korea, it is still important to watch this space, as the United States may impose additional unilateral sanctions, most likely against third countries doing business with North Korea.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a6
15. J. Reeves & K. Heubert: “Range Days and U.S. Export Controls”

(Source: Reeves & Dola LLP Alert,
info@reevesdola.com
)
 
* Authors: Johanna Reeves, Esq.,
jreeves@reevesdola.com
, 202-715-9941; and Katherine Heubert, Esq.,
khebuert@reevesdola.com
, 202-715-9940. Both of Reeves & Dola LLP.
 
Planning a Range Day for customers or industry partners requires a lot of coordination. Of course, you want to ensure that your visitors have an enjoyable day full of demonstrations that showcase your products, and discussions that promote business opportunities and foster relationships. However, while making your plans, it is important not to overlook the laws and regulations that could potentially impact the event.
 
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) may be one of the first U.S. Government Agency that comes to mind when considering which set of laws and regulations could impact activities during a Range Day. After all, ATF is in charge of regulating the transfer, possession, and transport of firearms and ammunition in interstate commerce pursuant to the Gun Control Act and the National Firearms Act. However, if you are hosting non-U.S. person visitors, the U.S. Department of State’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 C.F.R. Chapter I, Subchapter M, Parts 120-130) (ITAR) should also play a role in your planning. Specifically, a review of Range Day activities should be done prior to the event to determine whether an export may occur, and if so, whether a license will be required for that activity. In this article, we explore some considerations of U.S. export controls compliance that are pertinent in planning a successful Range Day with foreign person attendees.

THE BASICS
 
In order to determine whether an ITAR-controlled export may occur, you must first determine (1) whether the activity will involve a “defense article,” “technical data,” and/or a “defense service,” and, if so (2) whether the activity meets the definition of “export” for ITAR purposes.
 
The ITAR defines “defense article” in 22 C.F.R. § 120.6 as any item or technical data designated on the U.S. Munitions List (USML) in 22 C.F.R. § 121.1. It is important to note that a defense article includes “forgings, castings, and other unfinished products, such as extrusions and machined bodies, that have reached a stage in manufacturing where they are clearly identifiable by mechanical properties, material composition, geometry, or function as defense articles.” Firearms up to and including .50 caliber, except so-called non-combat shotguns, are controlled as a defense article because they are specifically enumerated in USML Category I – Firearms, Close Assault Weapons and Combat Shotguns. Of likely most relevance to activities during a Range Day are the following subcategories of USML Category I:
 
*(a) Nonautomatic and semi-automatic firearms to caliber .50 inclusive (12.7 mm).
*(b) Fully automatic firearms to .50 caliber inclusive (12.7 mm).
*(c) Firearms or other weapons (e.g. insurgency-counterinsurgency, close assault weapons systems) having a special military application regardless of caliber.
*(d) Combat shotguns. This includes any shotgun with a barrel length less than 18 inches.
*(e) Silencers, mufflers, sound and flash suppressors for the articles in (a) through (d) of this category and their specifically designed, modified or adapted components and parts.
 
USML Category I(i) also controls technical data and defense services directly related to the defense articles enumerated in Category I. The ITAR defines technical data in 22 C.F.R. § 120.10, in relevant part, as “information…which is required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles.” [Emphasis added]. Technical data can take many forms, including blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, or oral instructions. It is important to note that technical data does not include “information concerning general scientific, mathematical, or engineering principles commonly taught in schools, colleges, and universities, or information in the public domain as defined in § 120.11.” Further, it does not include basic marketing information on function or purpose or general system descriptions of defense articles.
 
The ITAR defines defense services in 22 C.F.R. § 120.9 as “(1) the furnishing of assistance (including training) to foreign persons, whether in the United States or abroad in the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation, demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of defense articles; (2) the furnishing to foreign persons of any technical data controlled under this subchapter (see §120.10), whether in the United States or abroad; or (3) Military training of foreign units and forces, regular and irregular, including formal or informal instruction of foreign persons in the United States or abroad or by correspondence courses, technical, educational, or information publications and media of all kinds, training aid, orientation, training exercise, and military advice.” [Emphasis added].
 
WILL AN EXPORT OCCUR?
 
Since firearms are enumerated in USML Category I, the Range Day will, at the very least, involve a defense article, but what about an export? Section 120.17 of the ITAR defines the term “export”, in relevant part, as: “(1) an actual shipment or transmission out of the United States, including the sending or taking of a defense article out of the United States in any manner; (2) releasing or otherwise transferring technical data to a foreign person in the United States (a “deemed export”);…(4) releasing or otherwise transferring a defense article to an embassy or to any of its agencies or subdivisions, such as a diplomatic mission or consulate, in the United States; (5) performing a defense service on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a foreign person, whether in the United States or abroad…” It is important to note that § 120.17(b) instructs that “any release in the United States of technical data to a foreign person is deemed to be an export to all countries in which the foreign person has held or holds citizenship or holds permanent residency.”
 
So, is allowing a foreign person visitor to handle a firearm during a Range Day an export? The short answer is “no.” Simply allowing a foreign person visitor to handle a firearm under close supervision during a Range Day (e.g., allowing the visitor to fire a firearm at a gun range) does not constitute an export of the firearm, presuming title to the item is not transferring. However, there may be applicable restrictions under the Gun Control Act and ATF regulations at 27 C.F.R. Pt. 478, such as the prohibitions on possession of a firearm or ammunition by certain persons identified in § 478.32. We will address such ATF prohibitions in a separate alert.
 
What about allowing a foreign person visitor to watch a demonstration, or engage in discussions regarding the firearms that are being handled during the day? Generally speaking, keeping discussions to basic marketing information on the function or purpose, or general system descriptions of the firearms being handled likely would not constitute an export of technical data or the provision of a defense service. Similarly, simply observing someone fire a weapon would not constitute an export of technical data or provision of defense service either.
 
However, this can often be a slippery slope. A conversation that begins with a basic marketing pitch could very easily evolve into a discussion that transfers technical data or provides a defense service to the foreign person visitor. For example, during the Range Day, the foreign visitor asks detailed questions about the design of the particular firearm or requests instruction on how to use the particular firearm in a certain tactical situation. Answering such inquiries may require providing the foreign visitor with information that goes beyond basic function or purpose, or general system descriptions, and may require export authorization.
 
HOW TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL EXPORTS
 
It is essential to ensure that company export compliance personnel are involved early and often during the planning of a Range Day. Discussions between compliance personnel and employees hosting the event should occur to clarify the scope of activities in order to determine whether export authorization is needed. A good way to protect against potential exports of technical data during the Range Day is to properly train staff attending the event. Providing a briefing to employees prior to the Range Day, which reminds attendees of what they are and are not allowed to discuss is a great way to raise awareness. This would include ensuring foreign visitors do not access areas of the facility that may be restricted. Identifying potential regulatory compliance concerns before they happen will go a long way to having a smooth day.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a7
16
Gary Stanley’s ECR Tip of the Day

(Source: Defense and Export-Import Update; available by subscription from
gstanley@glstrade.com
)
 
* Author: Gary Stanley, Esq., Global Legal Services, PC, (202) 352-3059,
gstanley@glstrade.com
.
 
General Prohibition Ten set forth at EAR § 736.2(b)(10) provides that you may not sell, transfer, export, reexport, finance, order, buy, remove, conceal, store, use, loan, dispose of, transport, forward, or otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item subject to the EAR and exported or to be exported with knowledge that a violation of the Export Administration Regulations, the Export Administration Act or any order, license, License Exception, or other authorization issued thereunder has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to occur in connection with the item. Nor may you rely upon any license or License Exception after notice to you of the suspension or revocation of that license or exception. There are no License Exceptions to this General Prohibition Ten in EAR Part 740.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

MSEX/IM MOVERS & SHAKERS

MS_a217. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 107 Jobs Listed

(Source: Editor)  
 
Published every Monday or first business day of the week. Please send openings in the following format to jobs@fullcirclecompliance.eu.
 
* COMPANY; LOCATION; POSITION TITLE (WEBLINK); CONTACT INFORMATION; REQUISITION ID
 
#” New or amended listing this week. (27 new jobs)
 
* Advanced Micro Devices (AMD); Austin TX; 
Import/Export Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 24061

* Amazon; Seattle WA; NA Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 256357 

* American Science & Engineering; Billerica, MA OR Andover, MA; 

Senior Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID 12285

* American Showa, Inc.; Columbus, OH (Rickenbacker); 
Import/Export Clerk
; Please contact 
Mattie Robinson
 for details.
# Amscan; Elmsford, NY; Customs Compliance Mananger; or apply here.

* Ansell; Iselin NJ;
Senior Specialist NA Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: IRC6513

* Autodesk; San Rafael CA; 
Export Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 17WD24183

*
BAE Systems; California, MD; Subcontracts Manager; Requisition ID 28240BR

*
BAE Systems; Nasua, NH; Contracts Summer Internship Program; Requisition ID: 30621BR


BAE Systems; Wayne, NJ; Contracts Summer Internship Program; Requisition ID: 30622BR

*
BAE Systems; Arlington, VA; Import Export Analyst II; Requisition ID: 29824BR

*
BAE Systems; Nashua, NH: Import Export Analyst II; Requisition ID: 26285BR

* Baylor University; Waco, TX;
Manager/Director of Export Compliance; Vacancy ID S030428

* Carpenter Technology Corporation; Reading, PA;
Senior Specialist, International Trade Compliance 
* Columbia Helicopters; Aurora, Oregon;
Trade Compliance Specialist; 17-0080

* Elbit Systems of America; NH, TX, AL;
Licenses and Agreement Officer; 2017-5671

*
 Esterline Technologies Corporation;
Bellevue, WA;
 
Manager, Trade Compliance Investigations and Disclosures

* Expeditors; Sunnyvale CA;
Customs Compliance Specialist
* Export Solutions Inc.; Melbourne FL; Trade Compliance Specialist;
info@exportsolutionsinc.com
* FLIR;
Wilsonville, OR; Billerica, MA
Director, Global Customs Compliance 
* FLIR;
Wilsonville, OR; Billerica, MA; Arlington, VA; 
Sr. Corporate Counsel, Global Trade Compliance 
* FLIR;
Wilsonville, OR/Billerica, MA; 
Senior Director, Dual-Use Licensing 
# FLIR; Multiple Locations;
Senior Director, Global Regulatory Affairs 
# FLIR; Meer, Belgium;
Global Trade Compliance Administrator 
# FLIR; Arlington, VA;
Manager of Defense Trade Licensing 
# FLIR; Billerica, MA;
International Export/Import Analyst 

* Fluke; Everett, WA; 
Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: FLU005544

# General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.; San Diego, CA; Government Regulatory Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 13055BR 
# General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.; San Diego, CA; International Contracts Manager; Requistion ID: 13583BR 
# General Atomics; San Diego, CA; Sr. Director of Import/Export Compliance; Job ID: 13892BR
# General Atomics; San Diego, CA; Contracts Compliance Specialist; Requistion ID: 12839BR 
# General Atomics; San Diego, CA; International (Import/Export) Trade Compliance Administrator; Requisition ID: 12690BR 
# General Atomics; San Diego, CA; Subcontracts Manager; Job ID: 13837BR 


General Dynamics Land Systems; Sterling Heights, MI; Compliance Officer
; Requisition ID: 
SHC-LC-17-19648

#
General Dynamics; Falls Church, VA;
 Manager, Trade Licensing
;
careers@gd.com
#
General Dynamics Information Technology; Herndon, VA;
Subcontracts Administrator
; Requisition ID: 
2017-28792

* George Washington University; Washington DC; 
Research Compliance Officer, Export Control
; Requisition ID: PI97906765


Harris Corporation; Clifton, New Jersey;
Trade Compliance Analyst
;
lsolomon@harris.com
; Requisition ID: ES20171608-20394
# Harris Corporation; Melbourne, FL; IT Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 
CHQ20171608-20395
# Harris Corporation; Rochester, NY; Technical Export Compliance Specialist; Job ID: 
CS20172308-20513


Harsco; Columbia, SC; 
Import/Export Specialist

* Henderson Group Unlimited, Inc.; Alexandria, VA;
Defense Controls Analyst – Office of Defense Trade Controls Licensing 

* Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc.; Westfield, IN;
International Trade Compliance Manager 

*
Intel Corporation; Gdansk, Poland or Swindon/High Wycombe, England, UK;
EMEA Export Project Manager / Trade Specialist
; Requisition ID JR0033212; OR contact 
Joy Robins 
*
Jet Propulsion Laboratory; Pasadena, CA;
Export Compliance Advisor III 

* Johnson and Johnson; Skillman, NJ;
Export Trade Compliance Lead

* KPMG; Antwerp, Brussels;
Manager Global Trade & Customs – SAP GTS
; Requisition ID: 122756BR
# Lennox International; Richardson, TX; Manager, Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 2017-11661

* Lockheed Martin; Fort Worth, TX;
International Trade Compliance Export Advisor; Requisition ID: 402827BR

* Lockheed Martin; Grand Prarie, TX; 
International Trade Compliance Senior Manager; Requisition ID: 405533BR

* Lockheed Martin; Moorestown, NJ;
International Licensing Analyst; Requisition ID: 398636BR

* Lutron; Coopersburg, PA;
Trade Manager-Export
; Requisition ID: 2926
* Medtronic; Heerlen, The Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 16000DYY

#
Medtronic; Minneapolis, MN; Global Trade Supply Chain Director; Requisition ID: 17000FU4
#
Medtronic; Minneapolis, MN; Global Trade Compliance Director; Requisition ID: 17000FC1

* Medtronic; Wash DC; Global Trade Lawyer;  
stacy.m.johnson@medtronic.com
; Requisition ID: 170002ON

* Meggitt PLC; Simi Valley, CA;
Trade Compliance Officer
* National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); Gaithersburg, MD;
Operations Research Analyst; Vacancy Numbe
r: NISTLP-2017-0003

*
 
NetApp; Singapore; Trade Compliance Mananger – APAC; Requisition ID 43338BR

* Nissan/Kelly Services; Franklin, TN;
CONTRACT Position – Contract Customs Compliance Analyst;
frankie.bryson@nissan-usa.com; Requisition ID: 55224BR

* North Dakota State University; Fargo, ND;
Director for Research Integrity Compliance; Requisition ID: 1700372

* Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine; New Malden, UK;
Trade Compliance Coordinator
;
careers.uk@sperry.ngc.com
* Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
International Trade Compliance 5; Requisition ID: 17018159
* Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
Manager, International Trade Compliance 2; Requisition ID: 17017794
* Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
Manager, International Trade Compliance 2; Requisition ID: 17014690
* Northrop Grumman; Rolling Meadows, IL;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3; Requisition: 17015695
* Northrop Grumman; Huntsville, AL;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3; Requisition ID: 17013824
* 
OSI Optoelectronics; Hawthorne, CA; Manager, Global Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 12235; or contact Kim Butcher, Senior Talent Acquisition Partner;
Raytheon; El Segundo, CA; Global Trade Manager; Requisition ID: 
97898BR
# Raytheon; El Segundo, CA; Global Trade Authorization Owner; Requisition ID: 100859BR
# Raytheon; El Segundo, CA; Principal Global Trade Licensing; Requisition ID: 102832BR

Raytheon; El Segundo, CA; Sr. Regulatory Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 101593BR

* Raytheon; Tucson, AZ;
Export Compliance – Agreements Authorization Owner; Requisition ID: 99909BR

* Raytheon; McKinney, TX;
Principal Global Trade Licensing; Requisition ID: 101234 BR

* The Safariland Group; Jacksonville, FL; 
Import/Export Director
;  
amber.hobble@safariland.com
; Requisition ID: 2017-1855

* Sierra Nevada Corporation; Arlington, VA; 
International Trade Compliance Analyst I
 ; Req ID: 
R0003446
 

* Tesla Motors; Fremont CA; 
Global Supply Manager – International Logistics
; Requisition ID: 49362

* Ultra Electronics; Loudwater, United Kingdom;
International Trade Manager


* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Charlotte NC; 


Authorization Manager, ITC
;
Requisition ID: 53243BR

#
United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Charlotte NC; 


Specialist, ITC IT Systems
; Requisition ID: 33792BR

United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CA;


ITC Specialist
; Requisition ID: 51240BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CA;  
ITC Program Senior Manager
; Requisition ID: 52640BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CA; 
ITC Operational Excellence Manager
; Requisition ID: 49904BR


United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CA;
ITC Specialist
; Requisition ID: 51710BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Fairfield CA; 


Sr. Eng, Intl Trade Compl;
Requisition ID: 48780BR
  

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Westford MA;


Sr Analyst, ITC
; Requisition ID: 51450BR

* VAG; Mannheim, Germany;
Trade Compliance Manager (m/w)
; Contact: Mr. Florian Uhl, +49 621 749 – 1870

# Vigilant; Remote Opportunity;
Classification Specialist
Vigilant; Bhudapest, Hungary; Jr. Compliance Specialist;
# Vigilant; Unknown Location, USA; Global Trade Compliance Analyst;
# Vista Outdoor; Overland Park, KS;
Import Specialist; Requisition ID: 
R0002750 or contact holly.greenwood@vistaoutdoor.com

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

TECEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

 
* What: DIY Encryption Classification 2017 Edition Webinar
* When: November 2, 2017; 1:00 p.m. (EDT)
* Where: Webinar
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker: Felice Laird
* Register: Here or Danielle McClellan, 540-433-3977, danielle@learnexportcompliance.com.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ENEDITOR’S NOTES

* Warren E. Burger (Warren Earl Burger; 17 Sep 1907 – 25 Jun 1995; was the 15th Chief Justice of the United States, serving from 1969 to 1986. Although Burger was a conservative, appointed by Republican president Eisenhower, the Burger court delivered notable liberal decisions regarding abortion, capital punishment, religious establishment, and school desegregation.)
 – “There can be no assumption that today’s majority is ‘right’ and the Amish and others like them are ‘wrong.’ A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.”
 
* Samuel Johnson (18 Sep 1709 – 13 Dec 1784, often referred to as Dr. Johnson, was an English writer who made lasting contributions to English literature as a poet, essayist, moralist, literary critic, biographer, editor and lexicographer.  Dr. Johnson is described by the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography as “arguably the most distinguished man of letters in English history”. He is the subject of the most famous biography in English literature, The Life of Samuel Johnson, by James Boswell.”
  – “Praise, like gold and diamonds, owes its value only to its scarcity.”
  – “What is written without effort is in general read without pleasure.”
 

* Francisco de Quevedo (Francisco Gómez de Quevedo y Santibáñez Villegas; 18 Sep 1580 – 8 Sep 1645; was a Spanish nobleman, politician and writer of the Baroque era. Quevedo was one of the most prominent Spanish poets of the age.)
  – “We all wish to reach a ripe old age, but none of us is prepared to admit that he are already there.”

 
Monday is pun day:
 
Q. Why don’t buffalos use cell phones?
A. Because of the roaming charges.
  — Pam Mills, Pensacola, FL
 
Q. What’s the first question a comedian asks when walking into a party?
A. “Where’s the punch line?” 
  — Scott Morrow, Baltimore, MD

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a320
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  Changes to applicable regulations are listed below.
 
*
ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
 
*
CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 28 Jul 2017: 82 FR 35064-35065: Technical Corrections to U.S. Customs and Border Protection Regulations
 
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 
here
.)


EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR)
: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  
– Last Amendment: 15 Aug 2017: 
82 FR 38764-38819: Wassenaar Arrangement 2016 Plenary Agreements Implementation

  
*
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR)
: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
  – Last Amendment: 16 Jun 2017: 82 FR 27613-27614: Removal of Burmese Sanctions Regulations 
 
*
FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR)
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 19 Apr 2017: 82 FR 18383-18393: Foreign Trade Regulations: Clarification on Filing Requirements 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
  – The latest edition (18 July 2017) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and to many errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR.
 
*
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA)
, 1 Jan 2017: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 25 Jul 2017: Harmonized System Update 1706, containing 834 ABI records and 157 harmonized tariff records.
  – HTS codes for AES are available
here
.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130.
  – Last Amendment: 30 Aug 2017: 82 FR 41172-41173: Temporary Modification of Category XI of the United States Munitions List
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 12 Sep 2017) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated 

ITAR
(“BITAR”)
, by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.
 The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
 
website
. BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please
contact us
to receive your discount code.
 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a0321. 
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 
here

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

* SUBSCRIPTIONS: Subscriptions are free.  Subscribe by completing the request form on the Full Circle Compliance website.

* TO UNSUBSCRIBE: Use the Safe Unsubscribe link below.

Scroll to Top