;

17-0905 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

17-0905 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

Tuesday, 5 September 2017

TOP
The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
here for free subscription.  Contact us
for advertising inquiries and rates(The Daily Bugle was not published yesterday, 4 September, a U.S. Federal Holiday.)

[No items of interest noted today.]

  1. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. DHS/CBP Suspends Trade Operations at Ports 2101, 5301, and 5309 Due to Hurricane Harvey
  4. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  1. Bloomberg: “EU Drafting Rules to Protect Technology from Foreign Takeovers”
  2. DutchNews: “Dutch Companies Investigated for Supplying Equipment for Russian Bridge”
  3. NRC: “Jail Time for Prohibited Trade with Iranian Company”
  4. The Register: “Australia Reviews Defense Export Controls, Perhaps Easing Cryptography Research”
  5. Reuters: “Moscow Says Schlumberger Russian Oil Services Deal Held Up by U.S Sanctions”
  6. ST&R Trade Report: “E-Commerce Facilitation, Regulation High on Priority List for Customs and Trade”
  1. B. Kalshoven, T. Hesselink & L. Kanters: “Recent Developments Concerning EU and U.S. Export Controls and Sanctions”
  2. J.A. Lee, A.M. Smith & L. Cole: “President Trump Issues New Sanctions Targeting Certain Activities of PdVSA and the Government of Venezuela”
  3. T. McVey: “ITAR For Government Contractors” (Part 3 of 4)
  4. Gary Stanley’s ECR Tip of the Day
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings 
  1. ECTI Presents U.S. Export Control (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) Seminar Series on 13-16 Nov in Wash DC 
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Changes: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (28 Jul 2017), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (15 Aug 2017), FACR/OFAC (16 Jun 2017), FTR (19 Apr 2017), HTSUS (25 Jul 2017), ITAR (30 Aug 2017) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMEX/IM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1

 
[No items of interest noted today.]

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a11. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register

* ITA; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Steel Import License [Publication Date: 6 Sep 2017.]

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a33.

DHS/CBP Suspends Trade Operations at Ports 2101, 5301, and 5309 Due to Hurricane Harvey

(Source:
CSMS# 17-000535, 5 Sep 2017.)
 
Commercial trade operations at the Ports of 2101 (Port Arthur), 5301 (Houston Seaport), and 5309 (Houston Airport), are temporarily suspended for Tuesday, 5 September 2017, due to Tropical Storm Harvey.
 
On 5 September 2017, a local closure day is granted to all who file entries at the Ports of 2101 (Port Arthur), 5301 (Houston Seaport), and 5309 (Houston Airport). CBP is extending an additional day, without penalty, for any entry summaries and payment of duties that will be due on 5 September 2017 in the Ports of 2101 (Port Arthur), 5301 (Houston Seaport), and 5309 (Houston Airport).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS_a44. 
State/DDTC: (No new postings.)

(Source: State/DDTC)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

NWSNEWS

NWS_a15.
Bloomberg: “EU Drafting Rules to Protect Technology from Foreign Takeovers”

(Source: Bloomberg, 2 Sep 2017.) [Excerpts.]
 
European Union regulators are drafting rules to protect European firms with “key technologies” from foreign takeovers, EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager said.
 
  “We’ve heard concerns about foreign — often state-owned — investors taking over European companies that control key technologies,” she said in a speech at the Ambrosetti Forum in Cernobbio, Italy. “This issue isn’t simple. It needs careful consideration before we decide how to act. We’re working on this issue now, and we plan to put forward concrete proposals in the autumn.”
 
Germany put similar rules in place in July, which would allow the government to block foreign acquisitions of cutting-edge technology. The law was drawn up after China’s Midea Group Co. bid for robot maker Kuka AG last year, prompting the German economy minister to call for a European suitor to make a counterbid. The deal was later finalized without any German or EU intervention. … 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a26. 
DutchNews: “Dutch Companies Investigated for Supplying Equipment for Russian Bridge”

(Source: DutchNews, 4 Sep 2017.)
 
International development minister Lilianne Ploumen has ordered an inquiry into two Dutch companies that supplied parts and equipment for a bridge linking Russia to the Crimean peninsula, contravening European sanctions.
 
The 19 kilometre-long Kerch Strait Bridge is intended to cement Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and Sevastopol in March 2014, which the European Union regards as illegal. In June EU foreign ministers extended sanctions against Russia for a further year, banning all imports, investment and real estate purchases as well as some exports.
 
De Gelderlander reported at the weekend that Dematec Equipment, based in Dodewaard, supplied a high-powered piledriver used to build the foundations for the bridge, using parts from Biljard Hydrauliek in Milsbeek.
 
Derk van den Heuvel, director of Dematec, told the newspaper he believed the sanctions had not been breached because the equipment was assembled on Russian territory. “EU sanctions state that we are not allowed to work in Crimea, but we can in Russia,” he said.
 
Marcel Biljard, of Biljard Hydrauliek, said the company was unaware that its parts would be used to build the bridge. “We simply supplied to a customer in the Netherlands. That’s all.”
 
But lawyer Heleen Over den Linden, who specialises in sanctions law, told De Gelderlander that the EU’s terms were deliberately broad to stop companies finding ways round them. “Anything involving the bridge, directly or indirectly, is covered by the sanctions. Otherwise everyone would just distribute the goods via other countries bordering Crimea and send it through.”
 
Labour (PvdA) MP Kirsten van den Hul and Christian Democrat (CDA) counterpart Raymond Knops called for the role of the two companies to be investigated. “This bridge symbolises the Russian annexation,” said Van den Hul.
 
Ploumen said the Dutch government was opposed to anything that amounted to ‘normalising’ Russia’s claim to Crimea. “Even if there has been no breach of the law, the Dutch government expects companies to do their business in a socially responsible way.”

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a37. 
NRC: “Jail Time for Prohibited Trade with Iranian Company” 

(Source: NRC, 4 Sep 2017.) [Translated excerpts; original article in Dutch.]
 
A 54-year old entrepreneur from Leeuwarden, the Netherlands, has been convicted to 20 months in jail, of which 4 months conditional, because he conducted business with an Irian state-owned company, NIGC. Henk M. delivered parts to a gas company listed on a Denied Party List.
 
The court of Den Bosch came to this decision after it found that M. delivered parts to an Iranian company that was part of a business boycott.
 
Sanctions Package
 
Between 2012 and 2015, M. provided oil pipelines to the national Iranian gas company NIGC that was on the EU list of denied Iranian business partners. According to the European Union, the gas company was involved in Iran’s nuclear weapons program and was run by ministers of the Iranian regime. The list of denied companies was drafted as part of a strict international sanctions package.
 
Own Winning
 
The sanctions were imposed in July 2012 due to concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. The punishment is remarkably high because M. wilfully ignored EU sanctions. “The only thing he had in mind was the financial gain of his own company,” the judge said in the verdict.
 
M. himself said he did not know that he indirectly delivered goods to the Iranian regime. The goods were shipped to Dubai and Turkey. Also, M. did not know that NIGC was the abbreviation of an Iranian state enterprise. The court called M.’s defence “totally unbelievable” because in e-mail correspondence the capital of Tehran was named as a destination of the goods. In 2013, the company of Mr. M. already had been fined for violations of the same sanction regime. The economic sanctions were abolished in 2015 after a nuclear deal with Iran was reached. …

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a48.
The Register: “Australia Reviews Defense Export Controls, Perhaps Easing Cryptography Research”

(Source: The Register, 5 Sep 2017.) 
 
Hacker, white hat or crypto boffin? This is important.
 
Australia’s Department of Defense wants input on proposed changes to “controlled technology” export controls – and the deadline is this coming Friday.
 
Those controls are described in The Defense Trade Controls Act 2012 and are unloved by Australia’s tech sector because their requirements to seek approval before sharing code are felt to have a chilling effect on academic research into cryptography and other advanced technologies.
 
Australia isn’t alone in fighting that battle: internationally, the Wassenaar Arrangement’s impact on crypto research is a touchy topic – especially since December 2016, when talks broke down. White-hats who travel to conferences to show off their exploits are particularly leery of the pact, since its classification of exploit software as a weapon puts the onus on researchers to seek exploit licenses merely to collaborate with researchers overseas.
 
Australian researchers have to worry both about Wassenaar and the local laws that implement it. In 2015, HackerOne’s chief policy officer Katie Moussouris warned that the impasse threatened fixes to big bugs by crimping collaboration.
 
All of which makes the Defence Export Controls branch consultation important.
 
In the e-mail that accompanied the launch of the consultation, the department canvasses the idea of a “specific personal use exemption” for the export of technology.
 
That might not be enough to keep the academic hackers hacking: the department gives the example that “a permit will not be required to take a computer or data storage device overseas that contains controlled software or technology where it is for personal use and will not be transferred”.
 
The department also proposes a change to legislation to clarify “that the physical export of controlled software and technology stored on an uncontrolled good (e.g. computer/data storage device) will require an export permit”.
 
On the upside for researchers, the consultation suggests a more transparent process that would include a right of review, including allowing applicants to request a review of decisions by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_59. 
Reuters: “Moscow Says Schlumberger Russian Oil Services Deal Held Up by U.S Sanctions”

(Source: Reuters, 2 Sep 2017.) [Excerpts.]
 
The acquisition of Russia’s Eurasia Drilling Co (EDC) by U.S. oilfield services giant Schlumberger (SLB.N) has been held up by U.S. sanctions on Russia, Russian Deputy PM Arkady Dvorkovich was quoted as saying by local news services.
 
Schlumberger applied to the watchdog for approval to buy the stake in late July in a deal widely seen as testing the state of relations between Russia and the United States.
 
However, since then the United States has introduced additional sanctions against Russia for its alleged meddling in the U.S. presidential elections in 2016. The sanctions restrict cooperation in the Russian energy sector.
 
Several Russian officials, including the Natural Resources minister and the head of anti-monopoly body, have said the deal had been held up due to the political turmoil.
 
  “I agree that we shouldn’t sell it if in a month the company will stop working (due to sanctions),” Dvorkovich was quoted as saying by RIA news agency late on Friday.
 
Schlumberger has made no comment on the state of the deal. … 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

NWS_a610. 
ST&R Trade Report: “E-Commerce Facilitation, Regulation High on Priority List for Customs and Trade”

 
Facilitating and regulating electronic commerce, particularly in the wake of a 2016 change in U.S. law that effectively allows more products bought online to enter the U.S. duty-free, was a major topic of conversation at a recent meeting of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee. CBP officials said e-commerce has required developing understanding and tools that the agency had not necessarily anticipated and that they welcome input from the trade community as they continue to develop a way forward.
 
E-Commerce Challenges
. Under section 321 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act, the maximum value of goods that can be imported free of duty and tax by one person on one day (the so-called de minimis value) was increased from $200 to $800 as of February 2016. The effect of this change has been compounded by the substantial increase in businesses and consumers purchasing goods online in recent years. Many of these shipments qualify for the de minimis exemption and are not subject to formal entry, which means CBP is not collecting information on an increasing volume of imported goods that would ordinarily be used for targeting and enforcement purposes (e.g., antidumping/countervailing duty liability, intellectual property rights infringement, or compliance with product safety standards), either for itself or for any of the dozens of other government agencies that regulate imports in some manner.
 
CBP Response
. To help address this issue CBP’s Office of Trade created an E-Commerce and Small Business Branch within its IPR and E-Commerce Division in September 2016. This branch drafted an e-commerce strategic plan that outlines education, engagement, and enforcement steps CBP plans to take to coordinate and collaborate with international colleagues, partner government agencies, the trade community, and the public. CBP is working to finalize this plan and make a version available to the public.
 
CBP is also leading an active U.S. participation in e-commerce-focused working groups at the World Customs Organization. With assistance from the U.S. and other customs administrations, these groups have reviewed member countries’ current practices and developed interim recommendations, with final recommendations and guidelines anticipated by June 2018.
 
Trade Response
. In February 2017 COAC formed an E-Commerce Working Group under its Trade Modernization Subcommittee that aims to identify and find workable solutions to the operational challenges associated with the increasing volume of e-commerce shipments, including current and future supply chains, changing business models, complexities for small businesses, and evolving enforcement issues. Customs brokers, carriers, express couriers, importers, suppliers, and e-commerce platforms are among those represented in this group.
 
At their 23 August meeting COAC members considered a number of recommendations intended to improve the import process for section 321-eligible shipments across all modes of transportation with respect to both facilitation and enforcement. COAC members ultimately approved all of the recommendations, though in some cases only by a small margin after substantial discussion.
 
Some of the recommendations are short-term and focus on automating systems and processes and maintaining data integrity. For example, COAC recommended that CBP not limit section 321 filings to a certain class or group of service providers and ensure that such filings can be made electronically through the Automated Commercial Environment or other systems.
 
Other recommendations focused more on exploring long-term opportunities and challenges with respect to collaboration, compliance, and other issues. COAC urged CBP and other government agencies to clarify whether section 321 imports require data sets similar to those required for entry types 01 and 11 for cargo release and whether duties and fees will be required; if so, CBP should work with the trade community to establish filing requirements. COAC also encouraged CBP to avoid identifying specific parties that should be categorically liable for the accuracy of section 321 filings and to instead rely on existing laws and regulations that allow CBP flexibility to consider factors such as knowledge of manufacture or primary benefit from sale in determining responsible parties. In addition, COAC said, CBP should consider benefits such as expedited processing and less targeting for section 321 imports by trusted traders.
 
The most actively debated topic was whether to require a ten-digit HTSUS number for section 321 filings. COAC recommended that CBP ensure that section 321 shipments subject to review by PGAs have the necessary data elements or data sets for CBP and the PGAs to “release cargo consistent with the risk and targeting standards aligned with the agencies’ missions and to safeguard public health and safety of the American consumer.” However, there was some debate as to whether or not a ten-digit HTSUS number is a necessary data element.
 
Some COAC members said such a requirement would be premature, characterizing it as a solution in search of a problem. Others pointed out that HTSUS numbers provide limited value in assessing risk and said requiring them for section 321 filings would add complexity and cost for businesses. On the other side, some members said HTSUS numbers are preferable to product descriptions because they can be automated, provide better information to track goods coming into the U.S., and can help overcome language barriers.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMMCOMMENTARY

COMM_a0111.
B. Kalshoven, T. Hesselink & L. Kanters: “Recent Developments Concerning EU and U.S. Export Controls and Sanctions”
(Source: KMPG Meijburg & Co)
 
* Author: Bart-Jan Kalshoven, Esq., Kalshoven.Bart-Jan@kpmg.com; Tim Hesselink, Esq., Hesselink.Tim@kpmg.com; and Leon Kanters, Esq., Kanters.Leon@kpmg.com. All of KPMG Meijburg & Co, the Netherlands.
 
Being compliant with export control and sanctions legislation is of great importance for companies engaged in international trade as violation of this legislation can lead to severe penalties as well as reputational damage. Companies should therefore be well aware of the risks related to export control and sanctions and take measures to mitigate these risks.
 
Below are some interesting recent developments concerning EU and U.S. export controls and sanctions.
 
Expansion of EU Sanctions Against Russia
 
Recently the EU Commission expanded EU sanctions against Russia by adding six companies / entities to the EU sanctions list, due to their alleged role in the supply of gas turbines to the Crimea (EU Regulation 2017/1417). This supply from Russia breached the contractual provisions for the original sale of the turbines from an EU established company to Russia.
 
The reaction of the EU Commission demonstrates that the EU closely monitors the strict observance of EU sanctions against Russia and is willing and able to act on short notice in case of suspected violations of these sanctions. EU companies with business interests or operations in Russia should particularly be aware of this risk and make sure they mitigate the risk of indirect/direct non-compliance.
 
Criminal Prosecution in the Netherlands as a Result of Alleged Violation of Iran Sanctions
 
On 21 August 2017, the Public Prosecution Service in the Netherlands announced that they have asked for a two-year prison sentence for the director of a Dutch company who is alleged to have violated EU sanctions against Iran before these were lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
 
Between 2012 and 2015 the Dutch company supplied seals and packings used in the gas industry to the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC). This supply was prohibited under EU sanctions legislation. In addition, the company is accused of falsifying their accounts and records in order to disguise these transactions.
 
The District Court in Den Bosch will render judgment in this case on 4 September 2017.
 
U.S. sanctions Against Venezuela
 
On 24 August 2017, President Trump signed an Executive Order imposing additional sanctions on Venezuela. These sanctions, which expand the sanctions already in place as of 9 March 2015, target the Government of Venezuela and the Venezuelan oil industry for “serious abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the deepening humanitarian crisis in Venezuela”.
 
The new sanctions prohibit US persons from engaging in certain transactions (e.g. bonds or new debts) on the financial market with the Government of Venezuela.
 
EU companies with indirect/direct business interests in Venezuela should carefully assess the possible impact of these sanctions in view of the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. sanctions.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a2
12. J.A. Lee, A.M. Smith & L. Cole: “President Trump Issues New Sanctions Targeting Certain Activities of PdVSA and the Government of Venezuela”

 
* Authors: Judith A. Lee, Esq., jalee@gibsondunn.com; Adam M. Smith, Esq., asmith@gibsondunn.com; and Laura R. Cole, Esq., lcole@gibsondunn.com. All of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Wash DC
 
Continuing an active month of increased sanctions pressure on Venezuela, on August 24, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order imposing a unique set of sanctions targeting transactions involving debt and equity of the Venezuelan government, including Venezuela’s state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA). [FN/1]  The new sanctions, which appear to be modeled in part on the Russian sectoral sanctions, impose substantial restrictions on U.S. persons but do not require U.S. persons to block Venezuelan government or PdVSA assets entirely.  Notably, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued four General Licenses alongside the EO, and one of these licenses effectively carves out PdVSA’s U.S. subsidiary CITGO from most of the new restrictions.
 
The policy basis for these sanctions also shares much with the Russian sectoral measures.  As with Russia, the goal of these measures is to avoid blacklisting PdVSA entirely due to the significant collateral effects that may come from such an action.  In the Russian context, there was similar concern about the impact on the United States and Europe of blacklisting major energy and financial sector companies.  However, while these measures are meant to allow PdVSA to continue operating, as with the Russia measures they are meant to prevent the company from receiving funds on the international markets and consequently limit its ability to grow.
 
Much like the Russia sectoral sanctions, these new measures are complicated, and include nuanced restrictions on dealings with complex financial instruments and significant, and equally nuanced, exceptions to the measures.  More broadly, there remain significant questions regarding how OFAC will interpret various provisions.
 
Overview of New Sanctions

The following activities are prohibited by the EO.  As under other sanctions programs, the prohibitions apply not only to the entities specifically targeted in the EO (i.e. the Government of Venezuela and PdVSA), but also to any entity that is at least 50% owned or controlled by the targeted entities (for example, subsidiaries of PdVSA or entities owned or controlled by the Government of Venezuela). [FN/2]
 
(1) Transactions involving new debt of PdVSA with a maturity of greater than 90 days,
[FN/3] or involving new debt of the Government of Venezuela (other than PdVSA) with a maturity of greater than 30 days. [FN/4]
 
The EO prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions involving new debt of PdVSA with a maturity of greater than 90 days, or new debt of the Government of Venezuela (other than PdVSA) with a maturity of greater than 30 days.
 
OFAC has issued “FAQs” that clarify that “debt includes bonds, loans, extensions of credit, loan guarantees, letters of credit, drafts, bankers acceptances, discount notes or bills, or commercial paper.” [FN/5] In addition, this prohibition is applicable to the rollover of existing debt, if the rollover results in the creation of a new debt instrument with a prohibited maturity. [FN/6] This prohibition applies to transactions where PdVSA or the Government of Venezuela is the “direct or indirect” borrower. [FN/7]
 
U.S. persons may transact in debt (including debt with longer maturities) in which PdVSA or the Government of Venezuela has extended credit to a non-sanctioned third party and may participate in transactions in which the Government of Venezuela acts as an “underwriter on new debt of a non-sanctioned third party.”  U.S. persons may also extend credit to a non-sanctioned party for the purpose of purchasing goods from PdVSA or the Government of Venezuela. [FN/8]  Though the OFAC FAQs indicate that the Government of Venezuela (or PdVSA) must not be the “indirect borrower,” they do not provide clarity on what being “the indirect borrower” would entail. [FN/9]
 
(2) Transactions involving new equity of the Government of Venezuela (including PdVSA)
[FN/10]
 
U.S. persons are also prohibited from transacting in new equity of the Government of Venezuela, including PdVSA.  The term “equity,” as described in OFAC’s FAQs, “includes stocks, share issuances, depositary receipts, or any other evidence of title or ownership.” [FN/11] This prohibition covers only equity “directly or indirectly” issued by the Government of Venezuela-including PdVSA-after the effective date of the sanctions, but, as described below, transactions involving equity issued by third parties may also be prohibited, if the Government of Venezuela is the seller. [FN/12] This limitation on purely secondary market sales of debt is new and was not implemented in the Russia program.
 
(3) Transactions involving bonds of the Venezuelan government, including PdVSA, that were issued before the executive order.
[FN/13]
 
The EO prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions relating to Venezuelan government (or PdVSA) bonds, even if issued prior to the effective date of the sanctions, with the exception of those covered by the general license described below.  OFAC explains this provision (and others in the EO) as an effort to “prevent U.S. persons from contributing to the Government of Venezuela’s corrupt and shortsighted financing schemes,” including the sale of bonds and other securities “for much less than they are worth at the expense of the Venezuelan people and using proceeds from these sales to enrich supporters of the regime.” [FN/14]
 
(4) Transactions involving “dividend payments or other distributions of profits to the Government of Venezuela from any entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the government of Venezuela,” including PdVSA.
[FN/15]
 
The EO also prohibits the involvement of U.S. persons in transactions relating to dividend payments to the Government of Venezuela from entities owned or controlled by the Government of Venezuela.  This provision restricts the flow of dividends from subsidiaries-including CITGO-up to PdVSA and the Venezuelan government.
 
(5) Transactions involving the purchase of securities from the Government of Venezuela, including PdVSA.
[FN/16]
 
U.S. persons are prohibited from purchasing any securities, including those issued by non-sanctioned third parties, directly or indirectly from the Government of Venezuela, except for new debt with maturities of less than 90 days (for PdVSA) or 30 days (for all other portions of the Venezuelan government).
 
General Licenses
 
In connection with these sanctions, OFAC issued a four general licenses, which provide important exceptions and clarifications to the sanctions.
 
General License 1
provides for a “wind-down” period of 30 days-until September 24, 2017-to carry out transactions that are “ordinarily incident and necessary to wind down contracts or other agreements that were in effect prior to August 25, 2017.” [FN/17]  Persons engaging in such wind-down transactions must file a detailed report with OFAC.  The wind-down period does not apply to the prohibitions relating to dividends and distributions of profits.
 
General License 2
authorizes transactions involving the new debt or new equity issued by, or securities sold by, CITGO Holding, Inc. or its subsidiaries, provided that no other Government of Venezuela entity is involved in the transaction.  This very significant general license effectively carves CITGO out of the new sanctions, provided that U.S. persons are careful not to permit any other involvement by PdVSA or the Government of Venezuela in the transaction.
 
General License 3
exempts certain bonds, listed in an annex, from the prohibition on transactions involving Venezuelan bonds. [FN/18] Several bonds issued by PdVSA are listed in the annex. General License 3 also exempts bonds issued by U.S. persons (e.g., CITGO) prior to the issuance of the EO.
 
General License 4
authorizes certain transactions relating to new debt involving agricultural commodities (including food), medicine, or medical devices. [FN/19]
 
Comparison to Russian Sectoral Sanctions
 
The new sanctions against the Venezuelan government and PdVSA have significant structural similarities to the existing sectoral sanctions against Russia.  The Russian sectoral sanctions, which were initially imposed in 2014 through four directives under Executive Order 13662 and were recently codified and tightened by the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATS) (August 2, 2017), impose restrictions on dealings in the new debt beyond certain maturities or new equity of particular entities in the financial services, energy, and defense sectors of the Russian economy, as well as restrictions on participation in certain kinds of activities relating to oil exploration and production.  Due to the structural similarities between the restrictions on transactions relating to new debt and new equities under the new Venezuela-related sanctions and parallel restrictions in the Russian sectoral sanctions, companies can expect OFAC to approach the new Venezuela-related sanctions in a similar way.
 
The new Venezuela-related sanctions are, however, broader in certain respects than the Russian sectoral sanctions, and narrower in others.  As noted, the prohibitions on transactions involving any bond issued by the Venezuelan government or PdVSA (and not authorized by General License 3), even those issued before sanctions were imposed, and on the purchase of securities issued by third parties from the Venezuelan government and PdVSA are unique to the new Venezuela-related sanctions and may significantly limit the possibility of finding legal funding alternatives to short-maturity debt.  Unlike the Russia sectoral sanctions, however, the new Venezuela-related sanctions do not impose any restrictions on oil exploration or production-related activities, provided that the funding for the transaction does not involve prohibited transactions, and provided that the transaction does not involve participation by Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs).
 
Alongside these structural similarities, there is also a similarity in tack.  Borrowing a page from Obama Administration and, Congress in the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 and CAATS, these sanctions target particular sectors and sources of revenue for a ruling party in the hopes of achieving certain near term political objectives.  While the new EO cites a number of justifications for the new sanctions, it appears most driven by heightened concerns that the Maduro Administration’s recent efforts to pack Venezuela’s Supreme Court with supporters and to form the Constituent Assembly will enable him to make structural changes to Venezuela’s Constitution that will make it all the more difficult for anti-Maduro forces to achieve change through democratic means.
 
Implications
 
Several years out from the imposition of Russia’s sectoral sanctions, the results are mixed at best as to whether they have helped the U.S. achieve its desired outcomes in Ukraine and Russia.  Even given the centrality of PdVSA’s revenue to the Venezuelan Government, it is unclear whether these new sectoral sanctions will be enough to leverage desired outcomes in Venezuela.
 
What is clear, however, is that new sanctions will likely have significant effects on U.S. companies in two key respects.
 
First, the sanctions place material limitations on transactions relating to PdVSA, particularly with respect to funding.  Given the prominent role of PdVSA in the Venezuelan economy, limitations will likely have a noticeable practical, economic effects on companies that do business in Venezuela.
 
Second, the sanctions environment with respect to Venezuela is highly complex.  Many activities, including clearing transactions in U.S. dollars, importing or exporting oil, and providing goods or services to the Venezuelan oil industry (including PdVSA), remain legal.  However, companies must maintain strong compliance practices, including enhanced diligence on counterparties, in order to navigate the sanctions environment successfully.  For example, companies must consider the new prohibitions, not only with respect to the Government of Venezuela and PdVSA, but also with respect to any other companies that may be covered by the “50-percent rule.”
 
Companies must also screen carefully for involvement by SDNs, particularly in light of the designation earlier this summer of several Venezuelan officials and in light of OFAC’s guidance against negotiating with, or entering contracts signed by, an SDN official of an otherwise unlisted company. [FN/20] In recent months, OFAC has broken new ground by assessing penalties against an American multinational oil and gas company on this theory, in connection with contracts with a non-blocked Russian firm that were signed on behalf of the entity by an individual on the SDN list. [FN/21]
 
Although the new sanctions apply specifically to U.S. persons, non-U.S. companies should also consider their potential compliance obligations in light of OFAC’s aggressive approach toward non-U.S. companies in recent enforcement actions.  For example, in July 2017, OFAC imposed penalties on two related Singaporean companies for “causing” financial institutions to violate the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations by initiating wire transfers relating to business in Iran, without identifying the transfers as relating to Iran and in contravention of representations that it had made to its bank that it would not route any transactions related to Iran through the bank. [FN/22]  Last week, OFAC announced a settlement with a non-U.S. entity that provides oil rigs under time charter arrangements to third-party drilling companies on the basis that its supply of spare parts for the rigs had involved shipping U.S.-origin goods to oil rigs operating in Iranian waters. [FN/23] These recent enforcement actions suggest that OFAC will take an expansive view of what touchpoints could bring activities by non-U.S. companies within the scope of the regulations and their enforcement.
 
———

  [FN/1] E.O. 13808 (Aug. 24, 2017) (“EO”), available
here.

  [FN/2] OFAC FAQs at Question 513, available here.
  [FN/3] E.O. 13808 § 1(a)(i).
  [FN/4] E.O. 13808 § 1(a)(ii).
  [FN/5] OFAC FAQs at Question 511, available here.
  [FN/6] Id.
  [FN/7] Id. at Question 516.
  [FN/8] Id. at Question 518.
  [FN/9] Id.
  [FN/10] E.O. 13808 § 1(a)(ii).
  [FN/11] OFAC FAQs at Question 511, available here.
  [FN/12] Id. at Question 515.
  [FN/13] E.O. 13808 § 1(a)(iii).
  [FN/14] OFAC FAQs at Question 512, available here.
  [FN/15] E.O. 13808 § 1(a)(iv).
  [FN/16] E.O. 13808 § 1(b).
  [FN/17] General License 1, available here
  [FN/18] General License 3, available here.
  [FN/19] General License 4, available here.
  [FN/20] OFAC, Venezuela-related Designations (July 26, 2017), available here; OFAC FAQs at Question 505, available here.
  [FN/21] OFAC (July 20, 2017), available here.
  [FN/22] OFAC (July 27, 2017), available here.
  [FN/23] OFAC (Aug. 24, 2017), available here.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_a3
13T. McVey: “ITAR For Government Contractors” (Part 3 of 4)

(Source: Williams Mullen)
 
* Author: Thomas B. McVey, Chair of the International Practice Group of Williams Mullen, tmcmcvey@williamsmullen.com.
 
[Editor’s Note: Due to space limitations, Thomas B. McVey’s ITAR Guide for Government Contractors has been divided into four parts. The four parts will be published in the Daily Bugle of 31 August, and 1, 5 and 6 September 2017. On 10 August 2017, the Guide was revised for recent amendments.]
 
Introduction
 
One of the most important areas of regulation for defense contractors is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). ITAR are the State Department controls that regulate the defense industry. [FN/2] Companies regulated under ITAR are subject to a number of requirements including registration, licensing, restrictions on transferring controlled technical data and performing defense services, among others. Following recent amendments, a second set of regulations – the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) [FN/3] – impose related requirements for government contracts firms and must be considered alongside ITAR. Contrary to popular belief, these apply beyond export transactions to many domestic activities of U.S. defense firms – they can apply even if the company’s only customer is the U.S. Government. Due to the potential civil and criminal liability involved, it is imperative for defense firms to have a clear understanding of these laws. The following provides an overview of these requirements and strategies for complying with them.
 
(Part 3) Specialized ITAR Requirements for Government Contracts Firms
 
ITAR/EAR compliance is important for firms that perform work for the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies including U.S. intelligence agencies, Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security. A significant portion of the products and services provided by contractors for military agencies are listed on the USML or the CCL. As such, companies that deal in such items will be subject to these controls, both in the U.S. and overseas, and contractors must adopt processes in their business operations to comply with them.
 
  (1) DFARS §225.79 and 252.225-7048. DFARS §225.79 provides that it is the contractor’s responsibility to comply with all applicable export control laws in performing under contracts for the DOD. The contract clause at DFARS 252.225-7048 states: “The Contractor shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations regarding export-controlled items, including, but not limited to, the requirement for contractors to register with the Department of State in accordance with the ITAR.” (emphasis added.) In addition, §252.225-7048(e) requires that contractors “flow down” this clause to their subcontractors. The adoption of these provisions is part of the DOD’s efforts to alert every DOD contractor to its obligations under ITAR and EAR – contractors are responsible for learning about and complying with these laws in activities performed under their contracts.
 
Based on these DFARS provisions, many prime contractors are requiring their subcontractors to register with DDTC under ITAR and demonstrate knowledge of the requirements under ITAR and EAR. Many prime contractors are also assessing the capabilities of their subcontractors regarding ITAR compliance – if a prime perceives a weakness in a subcontractor, the prime may be reluctant to hire the subcontractor due to fear of potential liability for the prime in the event of an ITAR violation. Thus strong ITAR compliance can create a significant competitive advantage for second and third tier subcontractors and suppliers who are looking to build close relationships with their prime contractors.
 
  (2) Performing Contracts for U.S. Government Customers. Examples of obligations that arise for companies that provide products and services to U.S. Government customers include:
 
  – Contractors that produce or hold ITAR-controlled technical data or software are not permitted to disclose such items to foreign nationals, either in the U.S. or abroad – including to foreign national employees of the contractor. Companies must adopt procedures to limit foreign national employees’ access to ITAR-controlled products and technical data. (Under ITAR, if a person is a US citizen or permanent resident alien (i.e., has a green card), he/she is considered a “US Person;” if the person is present in the US on a visa, he/she is considered a “Foreign Person.” [FN/23])
 
 – If a company is exporting products or transferring controlled technical data to DOD customers overseas – the company may be required to obtain an export license or otherwise comply with the ITAR requirements in certain transaction unless an exemption applies. (See the discussion below regarding certain limited license exemptions that may apply in providing products or services to U.S. Government agencies.)
 
  – If in performing a contract for a U.S. government agency a U.S. company performs a service for a foreign party related to an ITAR-controlled item (including a foreign military organization such as NATO or a foreign country’s military agency), or discloses controlled technical data to such party (such as in a joint briefing to a US government official and a foreign military official), the U.S. company may be required to obtain an export license or TAA.
 
  – Companies that provide training, intelligence, security services or military advice to foreign military forces under contracts with the DOD may be required to obtain TAA’s or other license authorizations from the State Department.
 
  – If a U.S. company transfers or discloses an ITAR-controlled product or technical data to a representative of a foreign government in the U.S. (including embassies, diplomatic mission or agencies of a foreign government), this constitutes an export and the company is required to obtain a license unless an exemption applies. Similarly, transferring registration, control or ownership of an ITAR-controlled vessel or aircraft to a foreign person in the U.S. is considered an export and the U.S. company is required to obtain a license.
 
  – One of the most important obligations of companies that create or store ITAR- controlled technical data and software is to create adequate controls within their IT systems to prevent foreign nationals (including company employees) from having access to such items. Most defense contractors create and/or store some form of ITAR-controlled technical data or software in their company IT systems, such as electronic drawings, technical specifications, operating instructions, installation manuals or similar documents. If a foreign national employee logs on to the company’s computer system and accesses those materials, this will constitute an ITAR violation unless a license is obtained or an exemption applies. Similar risks arise for access by foreign national IT administrators, foreign based outsourced IT contractors and use of “cloud” resources where controlled data is stored in servers located overseas. Contractors are advised to adopt controls within their IT systems to provide adequate security for access by foreign nationals to controlled information.
 
  – Most defense contractors will be required to register under 22 CFR Part 122.
 
 
ITAR and EAR contain certain license exemptions that may reduce compliance obligations in providing products and services for federal government agencies, depending upon the details of the activity involved. For example, ITAR §126.4(a) – the “by and for exemption” – provides an exemption from certain licensing requirements for temporary imports and temporary exports by or for an agency of the US Government for official use by such agency, subject to certain conditions. [FN/24] Other exemptions may also be available. [FN/25] However these exemptions are often narrowly drafted and have detailed conditions and hence do not apply in all instances, [FN/26] Similarly, exemptions often have compliance obligations such as certification and recordkeeping requirements. [FN/27] In addition, the exemptions under ITAR and EAR are different – a company may be able to rely on an ITAR exemption for a certain activity but that exemption may not necessarily apply under EAR. Contractors should use care in reviewing the details of any license exemptions that they intend to rely upon. On May 22, 2015 DDTC issued a proposed regulation that would significantly expand the scope of the license exception set forth at 22 CFR §126.4, however this regulation has not yet been adopted in final form as of the date of this article. [FN/28]
 
  (3) Performing Contracts for Foreign Defense Agencies. If a contractor provides products or services to foreign defense agencies, either as a prime or subcontractor, ITAR/EAR requirements will often apply. In such cases, the contractor will be subject to many of the requirements described above under ITAR and EAR, including in connection with the export of hardware, transfer of controlled technical data to foreign parties, performance of defense services, brokering, reporting and recordkeeping requirements, unless exemptions apply. It should be noted that these requirements may apply even if activities are performed solely within the U.S. For example, if a foreign customer hires a U.S. contractor to analyze a defense system that is regulated under ITAR and the contractor performs the analysis in the U.S. and sends the results to the customer overseas, this constitutes a “defense service” that will require a TAA (even if the service is performed in the U.S.). Similarly providing military training or military advice to foreign military forces will most likely require a license or TAA. In many instances providing security, executive protection, intelligence services or other technical services to foreign parties will in many instances require a TAA.
 
  (4) The Section 126.1 “Proscribed Countries.” DDTC maintains a list of countries that are subject to U.S. or U.N. arms embargoes which are subject to heightened export restrictions under ITAR. These countries are set forth in 22 CFR §126.1 and are referred to as the “Section 126.1 Proscribed Countries.” These countries are subject to a State Department licensing policy of denial, i.e., if a U.S. company requests export authorization to engage in a transaction with one of these countries involving ITAR- controlled items, the authorization will be denied except in exceptional circumstances. In addition, U.S. companies are not permitted to submit marketing proposals or presentations involving ITAR-controlled activities to such countries (including their embassies or consulates in the US) or perform brokering activities related to such countries unless the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) has authorized such activity in advance. [FN/29] Under ITAR §126.1(e)(2), if a person knows or has reason to know of a proposed, final or actual sale, export or other transfer of ITAR-controlled items involving one of the Section 126.1 Proscribed Countries they are required to immediately inform DDTC of such event. The list of Section 126.1 Proscribed Countries is amended by DDTC periodically so companies should review the list on a regular basis for changes. Contractors are advised to use a high degree of caution when contemplating dealing with Section 126.1 Proscribed Countries in defense-related transactions.
 
  (5) Contracts With NATO, United Nations and NATO Member Countries. We are frequently asked about the status of NATO, United Nations and NATO Member Countries under ITAR. NATO and the United Nations are considered foreign persons under ITAR and hence U.S. companies are required to comply with ITAR and EAR requirements when entering transactions with such parties, unless a specific exemption applies. Similarly, the foreign country members of NATO are considered foreign persons and ITAR and EAR controls apply unless a license exemption is available. [FN/30]
 
  (6) Brokering of Defenses Articles. ITAR Part 129 regulates “brokering activities” related to ITAR-controlled items. Brokering is defined generally as assisting or facilitating another party’s activities involving ITAR-controlled items even if the broker is not a principal in the transaction (and even if the broker is not paid in the transaction). [FN/31] Parties that engage in brokering activities are subject to a number of requirements including DDTC registration, [FN/32] obtaining advance authorization for brokering certain defense articles, prohibitions from engaging in transactions with the “Section 126.1 Proscribed Countries,” reporting and recordkeeping.
 
  (7) Foreign Military Sales Contracts. ITAR §126.6(c) provides a license exemption for certain exports under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. However, in order for the exemption to apply the parties must have entered into a Letter of Offer and Acceptance which meets certain requirements under §126.6(c). In addition, §126.6(c) contains a number of additional conditions and limitations and the exemption does not apply unless all of the conditions are met. Hence in some instances ITAR requirements may apply to U.S. contractors under FMS contracts. Contractors are advised to review the provisions of §126.6(c) carefully to determine if any ITAR requirements apply to their FMS sales.
 
  (8) Cyber-Security, Cloud Computing and Reporting of Cyber-Intrusions. On August 26, 2015, the DOD adopted an Interim Rule that provides updated data security requirements for DOD contractors. [FN/33] Under this regulation, certain DOD contractors that process “covered defense information” [FN/34] in their data systems are required to comply with specified data security requirements set out in the regulation. See e.g., DFARS 204.7300 [FN/35] and 252.204-7012. “Covered defense information” includes information that is controlled under ITAR or EAR. Consequently, DOD contractors that are subject to this regulation that process or transmit ITAR-controlled or EAR-controlled technical data or software under their DOD contracts will be required to adopt the data security measures set out in the regulation. The regulation also provides additional requirements including: (i) the requirement for contractors to report cyber-intrusions and malicious software in their data systems to the DOD; (ii) security requirements when using “cloud” computing resources; and (iii) the requirement to “flow down” these requirements to certain subcontractors. In a subsequent Interim Rule issued on December 30, 2015, [FN/36] portions of the regulation were subject to a delayed implementation date provided that the contractor provides notification to the DOD as set forth in the rule. [FN/37] Contractors should review their contracts with their DOD customers and consult with their contracting officers to determine the precise data security requirements that will apply to them under their contracts.
 
———-
  [FN/23] See 22 CFR §120.15 and 120.16.
  [FN/24] If a contractor uses the exemption under §126.4, §126.4(c) provides that the exporter is required to submit an Electronic Export Information (EEI) filing as required under 123.22 and a written statement by the exporter certifying that the requirements under §126.4 have been met and must present these to Customs and Border Protection or the DOD transmittal authority, and a copy of the EEI filing and the written certification statement must be provided to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls immediately following the export.
  [FN/25] See also ITAR license exemptions set forth at 22 CFR §125.4(b)(1), §125.4(b)(3), §125.4(b)(9), §125.4(b)(11) and §125.4(b)(13), and BIS license exceptions set forth at 15 CFR§740.11(b).
  [FN/26] Examples of conditions that frequently apply in connection with the use of ITAR license exemptions include that the exemption cannot be used for: (i) transactions involving § 126.1 Proscribed Countries; (ii) exports for which Congressional notification is required (see 22 CFR §123.15); (iii) Missile Technology Control Regime articles; (iv) significant military equipment; (v) exports by persons who are “ineligible” under 22 CFR §120.1(c). In addition, DDTC regularly advises parties that companies must be registered in order to take advantage of most license exemptions.
  [FN/27] For example, to claim an exemption for the export of technical data under §§125.4 and 125.5, the exporter must certify that the proposed export is covered by a relevant section of this subchapter, to include the paragraph and applicable subparagraph. Certifications consist of clearly marking the package or letter containing the technical data “22 CFR [insert ITAR exemption] applicable.” This certification must be made in written form and retained in the exporter’s files for a period of 5 years. For exports that are oral, visual, or electronic the exporter must also complete a written certification as indicated in paragraph (a) of this section and retain it for a period of 5 years. See ITAR §125.6.
  [FN/28] See 80 Federal Register 29565, May 22, 2015.
  [FN/29] See 22 CFR §126.1(e)(1).
  [FN/30] See, e.g., 22 CFR §126.14 and §125.4(c).
  [FN/31] The definition of “broker” is set forth at 22 CFR § 129.2(a) and “brokering activities” at 22 CFR §129.2(b).
  [FN/32] Registration as a broker under 22 CFR Part 129 is separate from registration as a defense manufacturer or exporter.
  [FN/33] See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Network Penetration Reporting and Contracting for Cloud Services (DFARS Case 2013-D018), Interim Rule, Federal Register Vol. 80, No. 165, August 26, 2015. See also related Interim Rule issued on December 30, 2015: Federal Register Vol. 80, No. 250, December 30, 2015.
  [FN/34] See DFARS §204.7301.
  [FN/35] See generally DFARS Subpart 204.73 – Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident
Reporting. 
  [FN/36] See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Network Penetration Reporting and Contracting for Cloud Services (DFARS Case 2013-D018), Interim Rule, Federal Register Vol. 80, No. 250, December 30, 2015.
  [FN/37] Under the December 30, 2015 Interim Rule, if the contractor is unable to implement these standards at the time of the contract award the contractor is required to notify the Department of Defense, within 30 days of contract award, of any security requirements specified by NIST SP 800-171 not implemented at the time of contract award.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

COMM_4
14Gary Stanley’s ECR Tip of the Day

(Source: Defense and Export-Import Update; available by subscription from
gstanley@glstrade.com
)
 
* Author: Gary Stanley, Esq., Global Legal Services, PC, (202) 352-3059,
gstanley@glstrade.com
.
 
ITAR § 127.5 provides that in the case of exports involving classified technical data or defense articles, the Defense Security Service may take appropriate action to ensure compliance with the Department of Defense National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (unless such requirements are in direct conflict with guidance provided by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, in which case the latter guidance must be followed). Upon a request to the Defense Security Service regarding the export of any classified defense article or technical data, the Defense Security Service official or a designated government transmittal authority may require the production of other relevant documents and information relating to the proposed export. 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

MSEX/IM MOVERS & SHAKERS

MS_a215. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings

(Source: Editor)  
 
Published every Monday or first business day of the week. Please send openings in the following format to jobs@fullcirclecompliance.eu.
 
* COMPANY; LOCATION; POSITION TITLE (WEBLINK); CONTACT INFORMATION; REQUISITION ID
 
#” New or amended listing this week.
 
 
* Advanced Micro Devices (AMD); Austin TX; 
Import/Export Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 24061

* Amazon; Seattle WA; NA Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 256357
# American Science & Engineering; Billerica, MA OR Andover, MA; Senior Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID 12285

* American Showa, Inc.; Columbus, OH (Rickenbacker); 
Import/Export Clerk
; Please contact 
Mattie Robinson
 for details.

* Ansell; Iselin NJ;
Senior Specialist NA Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: IRC6513

* Autodesk; San Rafael CA; 
Export Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 17WD24183

# BAE Systems; Los Angeles, CA;
International Program Manager; Job ID: 30539BR

# BAE Systems; California, MD; Subcontracts Manager; Job ID 28240BR

#
BAE Systems; Nasua, NH; Contracts Summer Internship Program; Job ID: 30621BR
BAE Systems; Wayne, NJ; Contracts Summer Internship Program; Job ID: 30622BR

#
BAE Systems; Arlington, VA; Import Export Analyst II; Job ID: 29824BR

# BAE Systems; Nashua, NH: Import Export Analyst II; Job ID: 26285BR

* Baylor University; Waco, TX;
Manager/Director of Export Compliance; Vacancy ID S030428

* Carpenter Technology Corporation; Reading, PA;
Senior Specialist, International Trade Compliance

* Columbia Helicopters; Aurora, Oregon;
Trade Compliance Specialist; 17-0080

* Elbit Systems of America; NH, TX, AL;
Licenses and Agreement Officer; 2017-5671

*
 Esterline Technologies Corporation;
Bellevue, WA;
 
Manager, Trade Compliance Investigations and Disclosures


* Expeditors; Sunnyvale CA;
Customs Compliance Specialist
* Export Solutions Inc.; Melbourne FL; Trade Compliance Specialist;
info@exportsolutionsinc.com
* FLIR;
Wilsonville, OR; Billerica, MA
Director, Global Customs Compliance
* FLIR;
Wilsonville, OR; Billerica, MA; Arlington, VA; 
Sr. Corporate Counsel, Global Trade Compliance
* FLIR;
Wilsonville, OR/Billerica, MA; 
Senior Director, Dual-Use Licensing

* Fluke; Everett WA; 
Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: FLU005544


* General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.; San Diego CA; 


International Trade Compliance Analyst (ITC) / Export Import Specialist / Global Trade Administrator
; Requisition ID: 12252BR


General Dynamics Land Systems; Sterling Heights, MI; Compliance Officer

SHC-LC-17-19648

* George Washington University; Washington DC; 
Research Compliance Officer, Export Control
; Requisition ID: PI97906765


Harris Corporation; Clifton, New Jersey;
Trade Compliance Analyst
;
lsolomon@harris.com
; Requisition ID: ES20171608-20394 


Harsco; Columbia, SC; 
Import/Export Specialist

* Henderson Group Unlimited, Inc.; Alexandria, VA;
Defense Controls Analyst – Office of Defense Trade Controls Licensing

* Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc.; Westfield, IN;
International Trade Compliance Manager 

*
Intel Corporation; Gdansk, Poland or Swindon/High Wycombe, England, UK;
EMEA Export Project Manager / Trade Specialist
; Job ID JR0033212; OR contact 
Joy Robins
* Jet Propulsion Laboratory; Pasadena, CA;
Export Compliance Advisor III

* Johnson and Johnson; Skillman, NJ;
Export Trade Compliance Lead

* KPMG; Antwerp, Brussels;
Manager Global Trade & Customs – SAP GTS
; 122756BR
# Lockheed Martin; Fort Worth, TX; International Trade Compliance Export Advisor; Requisition ID: 402827BR
# Lockheed Martin; Fort Worth, TX; International Trade Compliance Empowered OfficialRequisition ID: 401582BR
# Lockheed Martin; Grand Prarie, TX; International Trade Compliance Senior Manager; Requisition ID: 405533BR
# Lockheed Martin; Moorestown, NJ; International Licensing Analyst; Requisition ID: 398636BR

* Lutron; Coopersburg PA;
Trade Manager-Export
; Requisition ID: 2926
* Medtronic; Heerlen, The Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requsition ID: 16000DYY

* Medtronic; Wash DC; Global Trade Lawyer;  
stacy.m.johnson@medtronic.com
; Requisition ID: 170002ON

* Meggitt PLC; Simi Valley, CA;
Trade Compliance Officer
* Meggitt PLC; Akron, OH;
Import Specialist;
# National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); Gaithersburg, MD;
Operations Research Analyst; Vacancy Numbe
r: NISTLP-2017-0003

*
 
NetApp; Singapore; Trade Compliance Mananger – APAC; Requisition ID 43338BR

* Nissan/Kelly Services; Franklin, TN;
CONTRACT Position – Contract Customs Compliance Analyst;
frankie.bryson@nissan-usa.com; Requisition ID: 55224BR

* North Dakota State University; Fargo ND;
Director for Research Integrity Compliance; Requisition ID: 1700372

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Herndon VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3/4; Requisition ID: 17001180

* Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine; New Malden, UK;
Trade Compliance Coordinator
;
careers.uk@sperry.ngc.com
* Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
International Trade Compliance 5; Requisition ID: 17018159
* Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
Manager, International Trade Compliance 2; Requisition ID: 17017794
* Northrop Grumman; Herndon, VA;
Manager, International Trade Compliance 2; Requisition ID: 17014690
* Northrop Grumman; Rolling Meadows, IL;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3; Requisition: 17015695
* Northrop Grumman; Huntsville, AL;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3; Requisition ID: 17013824
* 
OSI Optoelectronics; Hawthorne, CA; Manager, Global Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 12235; or contact Kim Butcher, Senior Talent Acquisition Partner;

* Raytheon; Arlington, VA;
Export License and Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 97599BR
* Raytheon; Tucson, AZ;
Export Compliance – Agreements Authorization Owner; Requisition ID: 99909BR

* Raytheon; McKinney, TX;
Principal Global Trade Licensing; Requisition ID: 101234 BR

* Saab Defense and Security USA LLC; Syracuse NY;
Senior Import/Export Analyst
; Requisition ID: USA_00413

* The Safariland Group; Jacksonville, FL; 
Import/Export Director
;  
amber.hobble@safariland.com
; Requisition ID: 2017-1855

* Science and Engineering Services, LLC; Huntsville AL;
Export Compliance Specialist
bob.davis@ses-i.com; Requisition ID: 157

* Sierra Nevada Corporation; Arlington, VA; 
International Trade Compliance Analyst I
 ; Req ID: 
R0003446
 

* Sierra Nevada Corporation; Arlington, VA; 
International Trade Compliance Manager I
; Req ID: 
R0003497
 

* SIRE: Noord-Brabant province, the Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Expert; Requisition ID: 33934

* Tesla Motors; Fremont CA; 
Global Supply Manager – International Logistics
; Requisition ID: 49362

* Ultra Electronics; Loudwater, United Kingdom;
International Trade Manager

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CA; 
ITC Operational Excellence Manager
; Requisition ID: 49904BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Troy OH;
Sr. Manager, Intl Trade Compliance
Requisition ID: 44065BR 


United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CA; 
ITC Specialist
; Requisition ID: 51240BR


United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CA;
ITC Specialist
; Requisition ID: 51710BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CA; 
Sr Eng, ITC
; Requisition ID: 48780BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Westford MA;


Sr Analyst, ITC
; Requisition ID: 51450BR

* University of North Carolina; Chapel Hill, NC;
Export Control Officer 

* VAG; Mannheim, Germany;
Trade Compliance Manager (m/w)
; Contact: Mr. Florian Uhl, +49 621 749 – 1870

* Vigilant; Unknown location in the U.S.;
BioTech/Pharmaceutical Global Trade Analyst

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

TECEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

TEC_a116
.

ECTI Presents U.S. Export Control (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) Seminar Series on 13-16 Nov in Wash DC

 
* What: U.S. Export Control (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) Seminar Series in Washington, DC
* When: ITAR Seminar:  November 13-14, 2017; EAR/OFAC Seminar: November 15-16, 2017
* Where: Washington, DC: Embassy Suites Alexandria Old Town
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker Panel: Scott Gearity, Greg Creeser, Christopher Tafe and Melissa Proctor
* Register: Here, or Jessica Lemon, 540-433-3977, jessica@learnexportcompliance.com

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ENEDITOR’S NOTES

* Louis XIV
(5 Sep 1638 – 1 Sep 1715, known as Louis the Great or the Sun King, was a monarch of the House of Bourbon who reigned as King of France from 1643 until his death in 1715. His reign of 72 years and 110 days is the longest recorded of any monarch of a sovereign country in European history.)
  – “Every time I appoint someone to a vacant position, I make a hundred unhappy and one ungrateful.”
 
* Sarah Orne Jewett (3 Sept 1849 – 24 Jun 1909; was an American novelist, short story writer and poet, best known for her local color works set along or near the southern seacoast of Maine.)
  – “Tact is after all a kind of mind reading.”
 
Monday was Pun Day.
  (But we didn’t publish Monday, so this week Tuesday is Pun Day.)
 
Q. What was the first car ever driven?
A. It must have been a Plymouth.  It says in Genesis that God drove Adam and Eve from the garden in His fury.
  – Dan Strong, Elk Mound, Wisconsin

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a318
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  Changes to applicable regulations are listed below.
 
*
ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
 
*
CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 28 Jul 2017: 82 FR 35064-35065: Technical Corrections to U.S. Customs and Border Protection Regulations
 
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2
: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary 
here
.)


EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR)
: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  
– Last Amendment: 15 Aug 2017: 
82 FR 38764-38819: Wassenaar Arrangement 2016 Plenary Agreements Implementation

  
*
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR)
: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
  – Last Amendment: 16 Jun 2017: 82 FR 27613-27614: Removal of Burmese Sanctions Regulations 
 
*
FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR)
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 19 Apr 2017: 82 FR 18383-18393: Foreign Trade Regulations: Clarification on Filing Requirements 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
  – The latest edition (18 July 2017) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and to many errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR.
 
*
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA)
, 1 Jan 2017: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 25 Jul 2017: Harmonized System Update 1706, containing 834 ABI records and 157 harmonized tariff records.
  – HTS codes for AES are available
here
.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130.
  – Last Amendment: 30 Aug 2017: 82 FR 41172-41173: Temporary Modification of Category XI of the United States Munitions List
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 30 Aug 2017) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated 

ITAR
(“BITAR”)
, by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text. Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.
 The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
 
website
. BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please
contact us
to receive your discount code.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a0319. 
Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 
here

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

* SUBSCRIPTIONS: Subscriptions are free.  Subscribe by completing the request form on the Full Circle Compliance website.

* TO UNSUBSCRIBE: Use the Safe Unsubscribe link below.

Scroll to Top