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17-0811 Friday “The Daily Bugle”

17-0811 Friday “Daily Bugle”

Friday, 11 August 2017

TOPThe Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events. Subscribe here for free subscription. Contact us for advertising inquiries and rates.

[No items of interest noted today.]

  1. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions 
  2. Commerce/BIS Denies Export Privileges to 7 Individuals 
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  4. EU Amends Restrictive Measures Concerning Libya and North Korea
  1. The Guardian: “UK Criticized Over Sales of Military Equipment to Venezuela”
  2. ST&R Trade Report: “Dates and Deadlines: Preference Claims, CBP Forms, Classification Rulings, Food Facilities”
  3. ST&R Trade Report: “U.S. Faces Challenges Combating Chinese Goods Made with Forced Labor”
  1. L.G. Keane: “With Mira Ricardel Place, it’s Time to Complete Export Control Reforms”
  2. P. Jeydel, B. Egan & M. Rathbone: “A Detailed Look at the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” (Part 1 of 2)
  3. R.C. Burns: “Rafa Marquez Shown Red Card By OFAC”
  1. Friday List of Approaching Events
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Changes: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (28 Jul 2017), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (7 Jul 2017), FACR/OFAC (16 Jun 2017), FTR (19 Apr 2017), HTSUS (25 Jul 2017), ITAR (11 Jan 2017)
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMEX/IM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1

[No items of interest noted today.]

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OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

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. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
 

(Source:
Federal Register)
 

* DHS/CBP: NOTICES;
  – Automated Commercial Environment Export Manifest for Air Cargo Test: Expansion of Test to Include Additional Participants, Modification of Required Data Elements, and Extension of Test [Publication Date: 14 Aug 2017.]
  – Automated Commercial Environment Export Manifest for Rail Cargo Test: Expansion of Test to Include Additional Participants, Modification of Required Data Elements, and Extension of Test [Publication Date: 14 Aug 2017.]
  – Automated Commercial Environment Export Manifest for Vessel Cargo Test: Expansion of Test to Include Additional Participants, Modification of Required Data Elements, and Extension of Test [Publication Date: 14 Aug 2017.]
 
* Treasury/OFAC: NOTICES; Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Publication Dates: 14 Aug 2017.]

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OGS_a22.

Commerce/BIS Denies Export Privileges to 7 Individuals

 
 
* Respondent: Alexandre Dos Anjos Oliveira of McRae Helena, GA.
* Charges: On 9 April 2015, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Alexandre Dos Anjos Oliveira (“Oliveira”) was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Oliveira was convicted of knowingly and willfully attempting to export from the United States to Brazil firearm barrels, cylinders, receivers, components, parts, and accessories designated as defense articles on the United States Munitions List, without the required State Department licenses. Oliveira was sentenced to 38 months in prison, one year of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.
* Debarred: Oliveira has been denied export privileges for a period of 5 years from the date of his conviction. In addition, all licenses issued pursuant to the Act or Regulations in which Oliveira had an interest at the time of his conviction are revoked.
* Date of Order: 10 August 2017.
 
 
* Respondent: David L. Maricola of Joint Base MDL, NJ.
* Charges: On 24 August 2016, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, David L. Maricola (“Maricola”) was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Maricola was convicted of, among other things, 19 counts of knowingly and willfully exporting and attempting to export from the United States to various countries defense articles designated on the United States Munitions List, namely, firearm parts, without the required U.S. Department of State licenses. Maricola was sentenced to 33 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $3,200 assessment.
* Debarred: Maricola has been denied export privileges for a period of 10 years from the date of Maricola’s conviction. In addition, all licenses issued pursuant to the Act or Regulations in which Maricola had an interest at the time of his conviction are revoked.
* Date of Order: 10 August 2017.
 
 
* Jose Luis Benavides-Cira of Hinton, OK.
* Charges: On 30 November 2015, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Jose Luis Benavides-Cira was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Jose Luis Benavides-Cira was convicted of intentionally and knowingly conspiring and agreeing with other persons to knowingly and willfully export, and cause to be exported, from the United States to Mexico defense articles designated on the United States Munitions List, namely, 5.56 caliber rifles, without the required U.S. Department of State licenses.
Jose Luis Benavides-Cira was sentenced to 46 months in prison and a $100 assessment.
* Debarred: Benavides-Cira has been denied export privileges for a period of 5 years from the date of his conviction. In addition, all licenses issued pursuant to the Act or Regulations in which Benavides-Cira had an interest at the time of his conviction are revoked.
* Date of Order: 10 August 2017.
 
 
* Respondent: Richardo Humberto Varela of Bastrop, TX.
* Charges: On 8 February 2016, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Ricardo Humberto Varela (“Varela”) was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Varela was convicted of intentionally and knowingly conspiring and agreeing to knowingly and willfully export and cause to be exported from the United States to Mexico defense articles designated on the United States Munitions List, namely, 5.56 caliber rifles, without the required U.S. Department of State licenses. Varela was sentenced to 46 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $200 assessment.
* Debarred: Varela has been denied export privileges for a period of 5 years from the date of his conviction. In addition, all licenses issued pursuant to the Act or Regulations in which Varela had an interest at the time of his conviction are revoked.
* Date of Order: 10 August 2017.
 
 
* Respondent: Mansour Moghtaderi Zadeh a/k/a Mansour Zadeh, a/k/a Mita Zarek, a/k/a Mita Zadeh of Winton, NC.
* Charges: On 14 December 2016, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Mansour Moghtaderi Zadeh, a/k/a Mansour Zadeh, a/k/a Mita Zarek, a/k/a Mita Zadeh (“Zadeh”), was convicted of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq. (2012)) (“IEEPA”). Specifically, Zadeh was convicted of knowingly and willfully conspiring to export and cause the export of goods from the United States to Iran without the required U.S. Government authorization. The goods involved included aviation course indicators, aerospace metal sheets and rods, specialty paints and adhesives, and a fiber optic video transmitter and receiver. Zadeh’s unlawful conduct included violating an underlying temporary denial order (“TDO”) that the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) had issued. The named respondents under the TDO included, among other parties, Zadeh (under his “Mita Zarek” alias) and Lavantia, Ltd., a Nicosia, Cyprus company that Zadeh owned and/or controlled. Zadeh was sentenced to 18 months in prison, 12 months of supervised release, and a special assessmentof$100.00. Additionally, Zadeh forfeited $69,159.
* Debarred: Zadeh has been denied export privileges for a period of 10 years from the date of his conviction. In addition, all licenses issued pursuant to the Act or Regulations in which Zadeh had an interest at the time of his conviction are revoked.
* Date of Order: 10 August 2017.
 
  (6) Wenxia Man
 
* Respondent: Wenxia Man a/k/a Wency Man of Dublin, CA.
* Charges: On 19 August 2016, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Wenxia Man, a/k/a Wency Man (“Wenxia Man”), was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Wenxia Man was convicted of knowingly and willfully conspiring to export and cause the export from the United States to the People’s Republic of China of defense articles designated on the United States Munitions List, namely, fighter jet engines and an unmanned aerial vehicle, without the required U.S. Department of State licenses. Wenxia Man was sentenced to 50 months in prison, two years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.
* Debarred: Wenxia Man has been denied export privileges for a period of 10 years from the date of Wenxia Man’s conviction. In addition, all licenses issued pursuant to the Act or Regulations in which Wenxia Man had an interest at the time of his conviction are revoked.
* Date of Order: 10 August 2017.
 

* Respondent: Yasser Ahmad Obeid of Yazoo City, MS.
* Charges: On 17 December 2014, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, Yasser Ahmad Obeid (“Obeid”) was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Obeid was convicted of knowingly and willfully attempting to export and attempting to cause to be exported firearms designated as a defense article on the United States Munition List, without the required U.S. Department of State license. Obeid was sentenced to 51 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $300 assessment.
* Debarred: Obeid has been denied export privileges for a period of 10 years from the date of his conviction. In addition, all licenses issued pursuant to the Act or Regulations in which Obeid had an interest at the time of his conviction are revoked.
* Date of Order: 10 August 2017.

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OGS_a4
4.

EU Amends Restrictive Measures Concerning Libya and North Korea

 
  Regulations
 
* Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1456 of 10 August 2017 amending Council Regulation (EU) 2016/44 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya
* Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1457 of 10 August 2017 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
 
  Decisions
 
* Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1458 of 10 August 2017 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya
* Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1459 of 10 August 2017 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

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NWSNEWS

NWS_1
5.

The Guardian: “UK Criticised Over Sales of Military Equipment to Venezuela”

(Source:
The Guardian, 11 Aug 2017.) [Excerpts.]
 
Britain has sold military equipment worth millions of pounds to Venezuela in the last decade, it has emerged, prompting calls for Theresa May to suspend controlled export licenses while the country in is the grip of violent clashes between police and protesters.
 
Government figures show military equipment was approved for sale from UK-based companies to Venezuela’s armed forces as recently as September last year, despite the Foreign Office listing the country as “of concern” regarding human rights. …
 
Overall, £2.5m of military goods have been sold to the country
 
The revelations will prompt questions about why the government continues to allow arms sales to countries the Foreign Office lists as having a poor human rights record, from Venezuela to Saudi Arabia. …
 
Andrew Smith, from Campaign Against the Arms Trade, said: “These licences should never have been agreed in the first place, particularly not considering Venezuela is on the UK government’s own countries of concern list for human rights and democracy.”
 
A spokeswoman for the Department for International Trade said: “The government takes its export control responsibilities extremely seriously and operates one of the most robust defense export control regimes in the world. … 

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NWS_a2
6.

ST&R Trade Report: “Dates and Deadlines: Preference Claims, CBP Forms, Classification Rulings, Food Facilities”

 
Following are highlights of regulatory effective dates and deadlines and federal agency meetings coming up in the next week.
 
14 Aug:
  – effective date of EPA final rule on nanoscale material imports
  – deadline for comments to FTZ Board on requests for production authority, new subzone
  – deadline for comments on CBP information collections on broker exams, import costs, duty-free goods, FTZs
 
15 Aug:
  – deadline for comments to FTZ Board on proposed expansion of Miami zone
  – deadline for comments to USDA on proposal to allow imports of cooked poultry from China
  – deadline for comments to BIS on import, end-user, and delivery verification certificates
 
18 Aug:

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7.

ST&R Trade Report: “U.S. Faces Challenges Combating Chinese Goods Made with Forced Labor, Report Says”

 
An 8 August report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission finds that the U.S. faces challenges in identifying and preventing the entry of goods imported from China that are produced with forced labor despite a 2015 law that enhanced U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s authorities in this area.
 
19 USC 1307 prohibits the importation of goods mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in part, in any foreign country by forced labor, including convict labor, forced child labor, and indentured labor. Effective March 1, 2016, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act closed a loophole in this law that had allowed imports of certain forced labor-produced goods if they were not produced domestically in such quantities as to meet consumptive demands. When information reasonably but not conclusively indicates that goods within the purview of 19 USC 1307 are being imported, CBP may issue withhold release orders requiring detention of those goods at all U.S. ports of entry.
 
Since the enactment of the TFTEA CBP has acted on its new authority four times, issuing WROs against soda ash, calcium chloride, caustic soda, potassium, potassium hydroxide, potassium nitrate, stevia and its derivatives, and peeled garlic, all from China. The USCC report states that these WROs were the first to be issued against Chinese companies since 1996 and that two of the companies in question appear to have since closed.
 
In June 2016, then-Commissioner Gil Kerlikowske officials told Congress CBP was also taking a number of other steps to enforce the TFTEA’s provisions on forced labor, including establishing a 24-member task force focusing on this issue, working to place more agents in other countries, reaching out to non-governmental organizations to find leads, and cooperating with State Department personnel posted overseas to monitor forced labor and other issues. Kerlikowske said CBP expected to be proactive in issuing WROs when warranted by the information gathered from these sources, noting that the standard for reasonable suspicion is “pretty low.”
 
However, no WROs have been issued since September 2016 despite the fact that “China maintains a network of prison labor facilities that use forced labor to produce goods intended for export,” in violation of U.S. law and U.S.-China trade agreements. According to information from the Department of labor, Chinese goods known to be associated with forced labor include artificial flowers, bricks, Christmas decorations, coal, cotton, electronics, fireworks, footwear, garments, and construction nails.
 
The report cites as a major challenge the opacity of China’s forced labor industry, which is “exacerbated by the use of middlemen companies to market the products in question for export, by U.S. inspectors’ lack of access to suspected sites, and by the Chinese government’s refusal to agree with the U.S. government on what constitutes forced labor and thus which products are governed by relevant bilateral agreements.” The report notes that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents have not been permitted to make site inspections in China since 2009 and that Chinese officials still routinely deny that suspected forced labor is occurring, instead claiming that the factories in question do not exist or do not make the products in question.
 
The report concludes that one way to reduce the United States’ vulnerability to forced labor exports from China could be federal legislation mandating not only disclosure of corporate anti-forced labor efforts but also taking certain steps to eliminate forced labor components from supply chains based on internal corporate investigations.

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COMMCOMMENTARY

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L.G. Keane: “With Mira Ricardel Place, it’s Time to Complete Export Control Reforms”

(Source:
The Hill, 10 Aug 2017.)  [Excerpts.] 
 
* Author: Lawrence G. Keane, senior vice president and general counsel for the National Shooting Sports Foundation, the trade association for the firearms industry.
 
The Senate’s confirmation of Mira Ricardel as Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration is yet another excellent appointment by President Trump. Ricardel brings years of experience in the public and private sectors to this key position.
 
With Ricardel now in place, the Trump administration can get to work on completing much needed, and long overdue, export control reforms – changes that are pro-manufacturing, pro-jobs and directly in line with the president’s economic goals.
 
Cold War era export controls, such as: the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) have been hurting U.S. businesses by giving foreign companies a competitive advantage over U.S. companies in the global marketplace. Due to controls under the AECA and ITAR, U.S. firearm and ammunition manufacturers and distributors are required to obtain licenses from the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) in order to export sporting firearms and ammunition.  …

[Editor’s Note: Due to copyright restrictions, we are not authorised to include the entire commentary. To read the remaining parts, click on the source link below the item title.]

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P. Jeydel, B. Egan & M. Rathbone: “A Detailed Look at the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” (Part 1 of 2)

 
* Authors: Peter Jeydel, Esq., pjeydel@steptoe.com; Brian Egan, Esq., began@steptoe.com; and Meredith Rathbone, Esq., mrathbone@steptoe.com. All of Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Washington DC and London, respectively.
 
[Editor’s Note: Due to space limitations, this commentary has been divided into two parts. The second part, containing sections on the sanctions on North Korea and Iran, will be published in the Daily Bugle of Monday, 14 August 2017.]
 
On August 2, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, targeting Russia, North Korea, and Iran.  This law is a forceful, bipartisan statement that the US Congress continues to view robust economic sanctions as a cornerstone of US foreign policy, in which Congress will play a leading role in restricting trade, sometimes in conflict with the president’s authority to conduct diplomacy.  The Russia section of the law significantly expands the scope of the US sanctions regime and requires careful review by both US and non-US companies.  The North Korea and Iran sections do not materially affect most US companies, which already face broad restrictions in those countries, but the North Korea section in particular includes additional secondary sanctions that create new risk areas for non-US companies.
 
SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA
 
The Russia section of the law, called the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA), expands existing restrictions on US persons doing business with Russia, and adds some potentially significant secondary sanctions targeting non-US person activity involving Russia and certain operations outside of Russia.  Most of the new Russia sanctions are mandatory, which means that the president must impose them (subject to possible waivers, discussed below).  This is the first time the United States has implemented mandatory secondary sanctions targeting Russia – Iran and North Korea have been the primary targets of recent US secondary sanctions – which is a possible turning point that non-US persons should watch carefully.  While CRIEEA does not go as far as the proposed Russia sanctions legislation on which we previously advised, CRIEEA imposes considerable new complexity and risk for any future economic engagement with Russia.
 
In addition to imposing new sanctions and tightening existing measures, CRIEEA enshrines in statute the presidential executive orders imposing sanctions on Russia, as well as the designations of individuals and entities under those orders.  CRIEEA also requires congressional review of any decision by the president to terminate Russia sanctions provisions, waive the applicability of Russia sanctions with respect to a particular person, or take any “licensing action that significantly alters United States’ foreign policy” on Russia.  The requirement for congressional review of licensing actions could discourage (or at least delay) favorable review by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of any potentially significant Russia-related license applications.
 
Under the congressional review provisions, if the president seeks to terminate or modify Russia sanctions, he must first submit a report to Congress, after which Congress has 30 days to hold hearings on the matter.  The president is prohibited from proceeding with the proposed action during that 30-day review period, unless Congress passes a joint resolution of approval.  While there are many other details set out for this review process, the key point is that the president can proceed after 30 days unless both chambers of Congress are able to agree on and pass a resolution of disapproval, and even in such a case the president can veto that resolution, subject to additional waiting periods and a possible veto override.  But if a resolution of disapproval is enacted, CRIEEA states that the president “may not take” the proposed action to terminate or modify Russia sanctions.  Whether the president has the independent constitutional authority to take action in the interests of US foreign policy and national security, despite congressional disapproval, is a separate question.
 
CRIEEA provides the president the authority to waive each of the new sanctions mandates, subject to presidential determinations that the relevant waiver standard has been met, and in some cases subject to congressional review.  Many of CRIEEA’s waiver provisions require a finding by the president that the waiver would be in the US national security interest or would “further enforcement” of CRIEEA, coupled with more specific factual findings.  For example, waiver of many of the secondary sanctions in CRIEEA requires a certification that “the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine,” along with the Minsk Protocol “and any successor agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.”  Congress must be notified in advance of any proposed waiver, and, in at least some circumstances, may disapprove and prevent it from taking effect, as discussed above.  (By identifying implementation of the Minsk Agreement as a condition for waiver, CRIEEA potentially sets up a policy clash with Secretary of State Tillerson, who, as we have previously discussed, has said that he is considering other ways to resolve the Ukraine crisis outside of the Minsk framework.)
 
Below, we analyze the key sanctions provisions of CRIEEA.
 
(1) MANDATORY CHANGES TO THE RUSSIA SANCTIONS REGIME
 
Most of the sanctions provisions contained in CRIEEA are mandatory, in that they require the president to implement the new sanctions (even if, by necessity, these statutory mandates leave some implementation and enforcement discretion with the president).
 
  (A) Mandatory Sanctions Focused on US Person Activity
 
Expansion of prohibitions on supplying Russian oil projects
. Under CRIEEA, US persons will be prohibited from providing goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production for “new” deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale oil projects involving a sanctioned Russian oil firm or individual with a controlling interest or a 33% or more non-controlling ownership interest.  This will significantly expand the geographic scope of the current prohibitions (under OFAC’s “Directive 4”), which apply only to deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects “that have the potential to produce oil in the Russian Federation, or in maritime area claimed by the Russian Federation and extending from its territory.”  One question for the executive branch to address through implementation is whether “new” projects include expansions of existing projects, new developments of existing exploration prospects, etc., or only projects initiated in their entirety after CRIEEA’s enactment.  The US Senate’s original version of CRIEEA, which generated significant opposition from the oil and gas industry, was not limited only to “new” such projects, and would have applied more broadly to any such project in which a sanctioned Russian energy firm was “involved” (rather than applying the narrower 33% or more ownership test).
 
Expansion of prohibitions on transactions involving new debt of sanctioned Russian energy companies: CRIEEA also expands the existing prohibitions (under OFAC’s “Directive 2”), on US persons’ transacting in “new debt” of sanctioned Russian energy companies.  Rather than allowing dealings in these companies’ new debt of 90 days maturity or less, as is currently the case, CRIEEA would allow only dealings in their new debt of 60 days maturity or less.  (The June version of CRIEEA would have further lowered this period to 30 days.)  This change will further limit Russian energy companies’ ability to obtain short-term financing in international markets, and will impact the sales terms that US companies can offer these Russian customers.
 
Expansion of prohibitions on transactions involving new debt of sanctioned Russian financial institutions.
CRIEEA also expands the existing prohibitions (under OFAC’s “Directive 1”), on US persons’ transacting in “new debt” of sanctioned Russian financial institutions.  CRIEEA will only allow dealings in their new debt of 14 days’ maturity or less, versus 30 days currently (while maintaining the current restriction on dealings in their new equity).  This change could have a real impact on the liquidity and health of the Russian financial sector.
 
Delayed effective dates
. OFAC has up to 60 days after August 2 (or October 1, 2017) to implement the changes to Directives 1 and 2; it has up to 90 days for Directive 4 (or October 31, 2017).  After OFAC issues the implementing rules, the changes to Directives 1 and 2 do not become effective for another 60 days (or November 30, 2017), and another 90 days for Directive 4 (or January 29, 2018).  These 120 to 180-day implementation delays are intended to give US businesses time to adjust to the newly tightened prohibitions.
 
CRIEEA did not amend or modify the “new debt” restrictions, with a current maturity limitation of 30 days, applicable to the Russian defense sector under Directive 3.
 
  (B) Mandatory Sanctions Targeting Non-US Person Activity
 
For the first time, CRIEEA sets out a number of mandatory secondary sanctions on Russia-related activities of non-US persons.
 
Investments in “Special” Russian Crude Oil Projects
. CRIEEA requires the president to impose at least three measures from a menu of sanctions on “foreign” persons (which include an entity’s principal executive officers), that the president determines “knowingly” make a “significant investment” in a “special Russian crude oil project,” which means deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale.  The menu of sanctions includes the following:
 
  – Directing the US Export-Import Bank not to issue any guarantee, insurance, credit, etc. for the export of goods or services to the sanctioned person;
  – Ordering the US government not to issue any specific license or other authority to export goods or technology to the sanctioned person that would be subject to US export controls;
  – Prohibiting US financial institutions from extending most types of loans or credit to the sanctioned person of more than $10,000,000 in a 12-month period;
  – Opposing any loan from international financial institutions benefitting the sanctioned person;
  – Prohibiting US government procurement of any goods or services from the sanctioned person
  – Broader property-based and financial sanctions that are similar to being placed on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list; and
  – Additional possible sanctions for financial institutions.
 
To date, foreign investment in Russia’s frontier oil exploration and production has continued (particularly in projects predating the imposition of sanctions by the US, EU and others in 2014).  This new provision could impact that investment activity.  Although the executive branch will have discretion in determining which investments are “significant” (there is some potentially applicable guidance on that point in OFAC’s Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations), this new sanctions provision likely will make non-US oil companies more hesitant to make additional investments in these areas in Russia, and could also impact the viability of existing projects of these specific types.
 
Foreign Financial Institutions
. CRIEEA requires the president to impose restrictions on US correspondent and payable-through accounts (which could include terminating or suspending such accounts) for foreign financial institutions that “knowingly” engage in “significant” transactions 1) on behalf of Russian persons designated on OFAC’s SDN list under the Ukraine-related authorities or certain other sanctioned persons, or 2) in connection with significant investments in a Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale oil project.  Foreign banks and other financial institutions will need to review this provision closely, as there are important Russian companies and individuals on the SDN list, and this would also impose risk for any significant financial activity in the Russian energy sector.  While the executive branch will have discretion in determining whether a transaction is “significant,” this provision is expansive.
 
Sanctions Evasion
. CRIEEA requires the president to impose blocking sanctions (i.e., designation on OFAC’s SDN list) on a “foreign person” that the president determines “knowingly” does either of the following:
 
  – “Materially violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of” any Russia sanctions executive order or statute;
  – “Facilitates a significant transaction or transactions, including deceptive or structured transactions, for or on behalf of” any person subject to Russia sanctions or their immediate family members.
 
These provisions are remarkably broad and, depending on how the executive branch interprets terms like “materially” and “significant,” could have a wide-ranging deterrent effect on non-US person dealings involving sanctioned Russian persons and their families, business partners, and associates.  It is particularly noteworthy that the “facilitation” provision does not apply on its face only to transactions that would be inconsistent with US sanctions on Russia, but appears to apply to any significant transaction on behalf of sanctioned persons or their immediate family.  This provision may represent a new development in the course of aggressive attempts by the United States to target offshore activity through secondary sanctions.  For example, Executive Order 13608 (May 1, 2012), targeting “foreign sanctions evaders with respect to Iran and Syria,” only includes, in relevant part, facilitating “deceptive transactions” for or on behalf of sanctioned persons.  Depending on how it is interpreted and applied, this provision could deter many international companies from doing any significant business with sanctioned Russian persons, which includes major Russian companies.
 
Investments in Russian State-Owned Assets
. CRIEEA requires the president to impose five or more of the menu-based sanctions listed above on “a person,” who, “with actual knowledge…makes an investment of $10,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments of not less than $1,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals or exceeds $10,000,000 in any 12-month period), or facilitates such an investment, if the investment directly and significantly contributes to [Russia’s ability to] privatize state-owned assets in a manner that unjustly benefits – (1) officials of the Government of the Russian Federation; or (2) close associates or family members of those officials.” 
 
The impact of this new sanctions provision is harder to assess, in light of the “actual knowledge” requirement combined with the subjective nature of the “unjustly benefits” determination.  These factors may be refined by further guidance from the executive branch.  Still, any investment or related activity involving Russia’s state-owned assets (including infrastructure and other sectors that may not necessarily operate as commercial entities) may carry increased sanctions risk.
 
Corruption
. CRIEEA requires the president to impose blocking sanctions on “any official of the Government of the Russian Federation, or a close associate or family member of such an official, that the president determines is responsible for, or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, acts of significant corruption in the Russian Federation or elsewhere, including the expropriation of private or public assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, bribery, or the facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of corruption to foreign jurisdictions.”  The same sanctions are to be imposed on “any individual who has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of,” such activity.  Law firms, financial institutions, and other service providers should take note of the provision on materially assisting international transfers of corrupt proceeds.  Even persons that may not fall within the jurisdiction of US foreign anti-corruption laws now face sanctions risk for corruption-related activity involving Russia or Russian officials (or their family or associates) outside of Russia.
 
CRIEEA also mandates reporting to Congress with detailed information on Russian officials and their families, including net worth, sources of income and “indices of corruption” for them, along with their “non-Russian business affiliations.”  This reporting could eventually lead to additional sanctions or law enforcement action involving these individuals or their business partners.
 
Cyber Sanctions
. CRIEEA requires the president to impose blocking sanctions on “any person” determined to “knowingly” engage in “significant activities undermining cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic institution, or government on behalf of” the Russian government, or to be owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, such a person.  The law also requires the president to impose five or more of the menu-based sanctions on “any person that the president determines knowingly materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services (except financial services) in support of” such activity.  Finally, CRIEEA requires the president to impose menu-based sanctions on “any person that the president determines knowingly provides financial services in support of” such activity.  This provision significantly expands OFAC’s existing cyber-related sanctions program, in particular by applying to cyber activity that does damage anywhere in the world, as opposed to only that which impacts the United States.
 
Russian Intelligence or Defense Sectors
. CRIEEA requires the president to impose five or more of the menu-based sanctions 180 days after CRIEEA’s enactment  on “a person” that the president determines “knowingly…engages in a significant transaction with a person that is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors” of Russia.  This provision expands on the existing sectoral sanctions, prohibiting certain US person transactions involving sanctioned Russian defense entities, under OFAC’s Directive 3, along with the SDN designations of Russia’s primary intelligence agencies.  Unlike the June version of CRIEEA, the enacted law allows the president to delay implementation of these sanctions against a particular person, with continuing certifications to Congress every 180 days that the person is “substantially reducing the number of significant transactions” in which it engages that would be sanctionable.  CRIEEA also requires the president to issue regulations or other guidance within 60 days after its enactment to specify the persons that are part of, or operate for or on behalf of, the Russian defense and intelligence sectors.  This provision adds to other Russia sanctions risks in the technology and defense sectors, among others.
 
“Serious Human Rights Abusers” in Russia
. CRIEEA requires the president to impose blocking sanctions on a “foreign person” that the president determines meets any of the following criteria:
 
  – “Is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled” by Russia;
  – “Materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to” such a person;
  – Is owned or controlled by or acts for or on behalf of such a person.
 
This provision similarly adds to the existing level of sanctions risk in sectors such as technology and defense and may call for an additional level of due diligence.
 
Transferring Arms and Related Materiel to Syria
. In light of Russia’s involvement in Syria, CRIEEA requires the President to impose blocking sanctions on a “foreign person” that the President determines has “knowingly exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Syria significant financial, material, or technological support that contributes materially to the ability of the Government of Syria to” acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies, ballistic or cruise missile capabilities, “destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons,” or “significant defense articles, defense services, or defense information” (as defined under US export control law), or to acquire items controlled under the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  These sanctions also apply to entities that are successors to, owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, persons engaged in this sanctionable activity.
 
(2) NON-MANDATORY CHANGES TO THE RUSSIA SANCTIONS REGIME
 
CRIEEA also includes a few new non-mandatory authorities, which the president is not required to implement.  These provisions are essentially a signal from Congress that it is important for the president to consider taking action in these areas.
 
Non-mandatory pipeline sanctions
. CRIEEA authorizes the president to impose five or more of the menu-based sanctions on “a person” that the president determines “knowingly” engages in either of the following types of activity on or after August 2, 2017, with “a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more” or, during a 12-month period, “an aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or more:”
 
  – Makes an “investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement” of Russia’s ability to construct “energy export pipelines”;
  – Sells, leases, or provides to Russia, for the construction of “Russian energy export pipelines,” goods, services, technology, information, or support “that could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the construction, modernization, or repair of energy export pipelines” by Russia.
 
Unlike the Senate’s earlier version of CRIEEA, the enacted provision specifies that these sanctions are to be imposed “in coordination with allies of the United States” (without further elaboration).  This enacted provision also clarifies that these sanctions only apply to energy “export” pipelines, as opposed to pipelines that only run within Russia.  CRIEEA also states that “it is the policy of the United States” to “continue to oppose the NordStream 2 pipeline given its detrimental impacts on the European Union’s energy security…”  Such a congressional policy declaration does not, however, have any direct impact on sanctions implementation.  Given the discretionary nature of this provision and the strong backlash against unilateral US pipeline sanctions in Europe and elsewhere, it appears to be unlikely that the president will impose these sanctions at this time.  Still, the existence of this discretionary authority could chill investment in Russian pipeline projects.  Given the apparent level of congressional interest in this type of sanctions authority, it is not inconceivable that Congress could in the future modify this provision to make it mandatory for the president.
 
Non-mandatory “sectoral sanctions.”
CRIEEA authorizes the US Secretary of the Treasury to impose sectoral sanctions on any “state-owned entity operating in the railway or metals and mining” sectors of Russia.  The statute does not list the shipping sector or other sectors as targets.  Note: to date, sectoral sanctions have been imposed on the energy, financial and defense sectors of Russia, and OFAC already has the authority to impose sanctions on other sectors of the Russian economy.
 
(3) OTHER RUSSIA PROVISIONS
 
CRIEEA calls for a variety of studies and reports into the exposure of the US economy to certain Russia-related risk areas, presumably with an eye towards assessing the feasibility of yet another major expansion of Russia sanctions down the road.  One example is a mandatory report on “the exposure of key economic sectors of the United States to Russian politically exposed persons and parastatal entities, including, at a minimum, the banking, securities, insurance, and real estate sectors,” along with “the likely effects of imposing” debt and equity restrictions, blocking sanctions or secondary sanctions on Russian parastatal entities, including the impact on the Russian economy, the US economy and those of US allies.  Financial institutions and others should also take note of the detailed reporting requirement on the potential effects of expanding sectoral sanctions on the Russian financial sector – to include “sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products.”
 
CRIEEA sets out a broad exception (which was not included in the Senate’s earlier version), covering activities of NASA, including “the supply by any entity of the Russian Federation of any product or service, or the procurement of such product or service by any contractor or subcontractor of the United States or any other entity, relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for” NASA or “any other non-Department of Defense customer.”  The law also has an exception covering the use of rocket engines for national security purposes provided for under existing US law, and the procurement of related components.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

COMM_a3
10. R.C. Burns: “Rafa Marquez Shown Red Card By OFAC”

(Source:
Export Law Blog
. Reprinted by permission.)
 
* Author: R. Clifton Burns, Esq., Bryan Cave LLP, Wash DC,
Clif.Burns@bryancave.com
, 202-508-6067).
 
Yesterday the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) designated legendary Mexican footballer Rafael Márquez under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations. According to the press release accompanying the designations Márquez allegedly acted as a front man for, and held assets for, Flores Hernandez and his “drug trafficking organization.”
 
The press release takes specific note, if not some scarcely concealed glee, that Márquez is a “Mexican professional soccer player.” In fact, Rafa Márquez is not just any professional player. He is arguably the best defender in Mexican history and certainly its most decorated. He currently plays for the Mexican club Atlas and captains the Mexican national soccer team. All of which makes you wonder why on earth he would waste time fronting for a drug kingpin and whether OFAC’s charges that he did so are even credible.  Tom Brady may have deflated a few footballs but it is unimaginable that he would ever go full Walter Heissenberg and involve himself with a methamphetamine distribution network.
 
Márquez, as you have probably guessed, is vigorously denying these charges.
 
So by now you’re probably wondering this: where’s the red card that OFAC has shown Márquez? We all know, don’t we, that blocking an employee doesn’t block the organization. The Mexican national team isn’t blocked just because Márquez is on it. When Mexico and the United States play in the 2018 World Cup, the U.S. team won’t get in trouble, will they, if Márquez is playing for Mexico?
 
Well, that’s not clear. Section 598.406 of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations prohibits any U.S. person from providing any “services . . . for the benefit of” Márquez. You can’t play soccer without two teams, so the U.S. players are performing a service for Márquez by playing (and not just if they lose). Maybe even Mexico will insist on playing Márquez in that game hoping that the U.S. will have to forfeit the game.
 
Of course, there’s always the possibility that OFAC will issue a general license – analagous to Iran General License F which permits U.S. athletes to compete in professional sporting events in and with Iran (although even that license carves out blocked persons). Or maybe OFAC will issue a specific license for the World Cup.
 
Another possibility is that by the time of the World Cup Márquez will have successfully challenged the designation and will have been unblocked. Márquez is unlikely to prevail if his argument before OFAC is that he didn’t have anything to do with Flores. OFAC will no doubt say that it has evidence that he did and that such evidence is classified because disclosing it would reveal intelligence sources and methods. The more fruitful course for Márquez, and the one most often used for getting OFAC to undesignate a party, would be to argue to OFAC (if true) that he no longer has any dealings with Flores and that he will commit not to have any in the future. He might propose a compliance monitor to the agency to back up that promise. And he could promise to use his megastar status to make PSAs and visit schools and engage in other good works.
 
Another possibility is that Mexico will impose blocking sanctions on Buster Posey, Bryce Harper, and Anthony Rizzo, and promise to lift them only if the sanctions on Rafa are lifted by OFAC. Stay tuned. ¡El miedo no anda en burro!

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TEEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

TE_a211
. Friday List of Approaching Events

(Sources: Event Sponsors) 
 
Published every Friday or last publication day of the week. Send events to
jwbartlett@fullcirclecompliance.eu
, composed in the below format:

* DATE: PLACE; “TITLE;” SPONSOR; WEBLINK; CONTACT (email and phone number)

#” New listing this week:   
 
Continuously Available Training:
 
* E-Seminars: “
US Export Controls” / “Defense Trade Controls
;” Export Compliance Training Institute;
danielle@learnexportcompliance.com
 
* On-Line: “
Simplified Network Application Process Redesign (SNAP-R)
;” Commerce/BIS; 202-482-2227
* E-Seminars: “
Webinars On-Demand Library
;” Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.
 
Training by Date:

* Aug 14-16: McLean, VA; “
Basics of Government Contracting
;” Federal Publications Seminars
*
Aug 17: Webinar; ”
Export Controls in the Cloud;” Shipman & Goodwin LLP
# Aug 22: Webinar; ”
New Sanctions on Russia, Iran, and North Korea: What Every Compliance Practitioner Needs to Know;” Sandler, Travis, & Rosenberg, P.A.

* Aug 24: Webinar; ”
Understanding Brazil’s AEO Program;”


Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.; webinarorganizers@strtrade.com

* Sep 4-9: Galveston, TX; “ICPA Conference at Sea;”

International Compliance Professionals Association; wizard@icpainc.org

* Sep 4: Glasgow, UK; ”
Intermediate Seminar;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Sep 5: Glasgow, UK; ”
Beginners Workshop;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Sep 5: Glasgow, UK; ”
Licenses Workshop;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Sep 5: Glasgow, UK; ”
Control List Classification – Combined Dual Use and Military;” UK Department for International Trade;

* Sep 6: Nashville, TN; ”
AES Compliance Seminar;” Dept. of Commerce/Census
Bureau;
itmd.outreach@census.gov

* Sep 7: Marina Del Ray CA: ”
Strategizing for Dealing with the Government Under the New Administration;” Crowell and Moring

* Sep 7: Webinar; ”
Understanding Mexico’s AEO Program;”


Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.; webinarorganizers@strtrade.com

* Sep 12-13: Annapolis, MD; “ITAR/EAR Boot Camp;” spalmer@exportcompliancesolutions.com; 866-238-4018 / 410-757-1919

* Sep 12-13: Louisville, KY; ”
Complying with U.S. Export Controls;” Dept. of Commerce/Bureau of Industry and Security

* Sep 12-13: Milpitas, CA; ”
Complying with U.S. Export Controls;” Dept. of Commerce/Bureau of Industry and Security

* Sep 12-13: Wash, DC; “Interactive Export Controls Workshop;” ECTI; jessica@learnexportcompliance.com; 540-433-3977

* Sep 12: Webinar; ”
Meeting CBP’s Informed Compliance and Reasonable Care Standards;”
Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.; webinarorganizers@strtrade.com

* Sep 13: Webinar; ”
Definition of ‘Firearm’ Under the Gun Control Act;” Reeves & Dola LLP; Teresa Ficaretta;
tficaretta@reevesdola.com; 202-715-9183

* Sep 14: Milpitas, CA; “
Encryption Controls;”
Dept. of Commerce/Bureau of Industry and Security

* Sep 18-19: Huntsville, AL; ”
NAITA Export Control Update;” North American International Trade Association

* Sep 18-21: Austin, TX; “ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar; ECTI; jessica@learnexportcompliance.com; 540-433-3977

* Sep 18-20: Las Vegas NV; “
Basics of Government Contracting
;” Federal Publications Seminars

* Sep 19: Amsterdam, Netherlands; ”
Amsterdam International Trade and Compliance Conference;” Register
here, OR contact
Sue Menon, 202-887-4375; Akin Gump


* Sep 21: 
Webinar; “
US Export Administration Regulations
;
” Foreign Trade Association 

* Sep 20-22: Houston, TX; ”
Advanced Topics in Customs Compliance Conference;” Deleon Trade LLC
# Sep 25: Wash DC; ”
1st Advanced Forum on Customs and Trade Enforcement, Washington, DC;” American Conference Institute

* Sep 26: Cupertino, CA; ”
11th CompTIA Global Trade Compliance Best Practices Conference;” CompTIA; OR contact
Ken Montgomery, 202-682-4433
* Sep 27: Tysons Corner, VA; ”
IT Capabilities and Solutions for the Trade Compliance Community;” Society for International Affairs (“SIA”)
* Sep 27: Oxford, UK; ”
Intermediate Seminar;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Sep 27-28: Rome, Italy; “Defence Exports 2017;” SMi

* Sep 28: Oxford, UK; ”
Beginners Workshop;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 
* Sep 28: Oxford, UK; ”
Licenses Workshop;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk

* Oct 2-5: Columbus OH; “
University Export Controls Seminar
;” ECTI;
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977

* Oct 4: Webinar; ”
Exports – New Incentives, Old Rules;” 
Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.;
webinarorganizers@strtrade.com
* Oct 4: Toronto, Canada; ”
2nd National Institute on US-Canadian Securities Litigation;” American Bar Association

* Oct 4-5:  Miramar (Miami/Fort Lauderdale), FL; ”
9th Maritime Logistics Training Course
“; Contact ABS Consulting, phone:
 
(954) 218-5285


* Oct 5-6: London, UK; ”
The World ECR Forum 2017;” World ECR 


* Oct 10: Aberdeen, UK; ”
UK Strategic Export Controls: Control List Classification – Combined Dual Use and Military;” Code Coct2017; or contact
Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; 
UK Department for International Trade
* Oct 10: Aberdeen, UK; “UK Strategic Export Controls: Licenses Workshop;” Code Loct2017; or contact Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; UK Department for International Trade;
*
 Oct 10: Rotterdam, the Netherlands; “
Awareness Training Export Control, Dual-Use, and Sanctions
” day I/3 [in Dutch]; Fenex 

* Oct 10-12: Dallas, TX; “
‘Partnering for Compliance™’ West Export/Import Control Training and Education Program
;” Partnering for Compliance
 
* Oct 11: Aberdeen, UK; “UK Strategic Export Controls: Intermediate Oil and Gas Seminar;” Code loct2017-2; or contact Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; UK Department for International Trade;

* Oct 11: Webinar; ”
Basics of Importation Under the Gun Control Act;” Reeves & Dola LLP; Teresa Ficaretta;
tficaretta@reevesdola.com; 202-715-9183

* Oct 12-13: Boston, MA; “Automated Export System Compliance Seminar and Workshop;” Commerce/Census, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, State/DDTC, Treasury 

* Oct 13: Dallas, TX; “
Customs/Import Boot Camp
;” Partnering for Compliance

# Oct 16: Toronto; ”
3rd Canadian Forum on Economic Sanctions Compliance and Enforcement, Toronto;” American Conference Institute and Canadian Institute

* Oct 22-24: Grapevine, TX; “
Annual ICPA Fall Conference
;” International Compliance Professional Association;
Wizard@icpainc.org

* Oct 23-24: Arlington, VA; “
2017 Fall Advanced Conference
;” Society for International Affairs

*
 Oct 24: Rotterdam, the Netherlands; “
Awareness Training Export Control, Dual-Use, and Sanctions
” day 2/3 [in Dutch]; Fenex 

* Oct 30-Nov 2: Phoenix, AZ; “
ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar
;” ECTI;
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977
* Oct 31: Manchester, UK; “UK Strategic Export Controls: Intermediate Seminar;” Code loct2017; or contact Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; UK Department for International Trade;
* Nov 1: Manchester, UK; “UK Strategic Export Controls: Beginner’s Workshop;” Code Bnov2017-1; or contact Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; UK Department for International Trade; 
* Nov 1: Manchester, UK; “UK Strategic Export Controls: Licenses Workshop;” Code Lnov2017-1; or contact Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; UK Department for International Trade; 
* Nov 1: Manchester, UK; “UK Strategic Export Controls: Control List Classification – Combined Dual Use and Military;” Code Cnov2017-1; or contact Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; UK Department for International Trade; 
* Nov 2-3: Las Vegas, NV; “The 22nd National M&A Institute;” American Bar Association
* Nov 5-7: Singapore; ”
ICPA Singapore Conference;”
International Compliance Professionals Association;
wizard@icpainc.org
*
 Nov 6: Rotterdam, the Netherlands; “
Awareness Training Export Control, Dual-Use, and Sanctions
” day 3/3 [in Dutch]; Fenex 

* Nov 6-8: Chicago, IL; “Basics of Government Contracting;” Federal Publications Seminars

* Nov 7: Norfolk, VA; “
AES Compliance Seminar
;
” Dept. of Commerce/Census
Bureau;
itmd.outreach@census.gov

* Nov 8: Webinar; “Introduction to the National Firearms Act;” Reeves & Dola LLP; Teresa Ficaretta; tficaretta@reevesdola.com; 202-715-9183

* Nov 9-10: Shanghai, China; ”
ICPA China Conference;”
International Compliance Professionals Association;
wizard@icpainc.org 

* Nov 13-16: Wash DC; “ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar;” ECTI; jessica@learnexportcompliance.com; 540-433-3977

* Nov 15: Leeds, UK; ”
Intermediate Seminar;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Nov 16: Leeds, UK; ”
Beginners Workshop;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Nov 16: Leeds, UK; ”
Licenses Workshop;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Nov 16: Leeds, UK; ”
Control List Classification – Combined Dual Use and Military;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Nov 16: Nijkerk, the Netherlands; “Training Export Control” [in Dutch]; Fenedex

# Nov 29: Wash DC; ”
4th U.S. Customs Compliance Boot Camp, Washington, DC;” American Conference Institute

# Dec 4: NYC; “8th Annual New York Forum on Economic Sanctions, New York“, American Conference Institute

 * Dec 4-7: Miami FL; “ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar;” ECTI; jessica@learnexportcompliance.com; 540-433-3977

* Dec 5: Brussels, Belgium; ”
Dual Use For Beginners
” [In Dutch]; Flemish Department of Foreign Affairs

* Dec 5: San Juan, PR; “AES Compliance Seminar in Spanish;” Dept. of Commerce/Census Bureau; itmd.outreach@census.gov

* Dec 6: Webinar; ”
Introduction to Firearms and Ammunition Excise Tax (FAET);” Reeves & Dola LLP; Teresa Ficaretta;
tficaretta@reevesdola.com; 202-715-9183

* Dec 6: Wood Ridge, NJ; “
AES Compliance Seminar
;” Dept. of Commerce/Census Bureau;
itmd.outreach@census.gov 

* Dec 7: Laredo, TX; “AES Compliance Seminar in Spanish;” Dept. of Commerce/Census Bureau; itmd.outreach@census.gov 

* Dec 11-13: Sterling, VA; “
Basics of Government Contracting
;” Federal Publications Seminars
                                                2018

* Jan 22-25: San Diego CA; “
ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar
;” ECTI; 
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977

* Feb 19-22: Huntsville AL; “
ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar
;” ECTI; 
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977 * Mar 11-14: San Diego, CA; ”
ICPA Annual Conference;”
International Compliance Professionals Association;
wizard@icpainc.org

* Apr 16-19: Las Vegas NV; “
ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar
;” ECTI; 
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977
* Apr 30-May 3: Wash DC; “
ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar
;” ECTI; 
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

ENEDITOR’S NOTES

EN_a112
. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)

* Robert Green Ingersoll (11 Aug 1833 – 21 Jul 1899, was an American lawyer, a Civil War veteran, political leader, and orator of the United States during the Golden Age of Free Thought, noted for his broad range of culture and his defense of agnosticism.)
  – “The greatest test of courage on earth is to bear defeat without losing heart.”
  – “Anger is a wind which blows out the lamp of the mind.”
 
Friday funnies:
 
On the first day of school, the children brought gifts for their teacher. The florist’s son brought the teacher a bouquet of flowers. The candy store owner’s daughter gave the teacher a pretty box of candy. Then the liquor store owner’s son brought up a big, heavy box. The teacher, expecting a bottle from the liquor store, lifted it up and noticed that it was leaking a little bit. She touched a drop of the liquid with her finger and tasted it. “Let me guess… Is it wine?” she asked. “No,” the boy replied. She tasted another drop and asked, “Hmm, an unusual liqueur?” “No…” said the little boy. “It’s a puppy!” 
   — Rich Molyneux, Manhattan Beach, CA

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a213. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  Changes to applicable regulations are listed below.
 


ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 
81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
 

CUSTOMS REGULATIONS: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – 
Last Amendment: 28 Jul 2017: 82 FR 35064-35065: Technical Corrections to U.S. Customs and Border Protection Regulations
 
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM  (Summary here.)


EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774 
  – Last Amendment: 7 July 2017: 
82 FR 31442-31449: Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations Based on the 2016 Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Agreements [Effective Date: 7 July 2017.] 

  

FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
 
 – Last Amendment: 16 Jun 2017: 82 FR 27613-27614: Removal of Burmese Sanctions Regulations 
 

FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 
19 Apr 2017: 
82 FR 18383-18393: Foreign Trade Regulations: Clarification on Filing Requirements 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 
here.
  – The latest edition (18 Jul 2017) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, and Census/AES guidance.  Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance 
website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR.
 

HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), 1 Jan 2017: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 25 Jul 2017: 
Harmonized System Update 1704, containing 
2,564 ABI records and 463 harmonized tariff records. 
  – HTS codes for AES are available 
here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 
here.
 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130.
  – Last Amendment: 11 Jan 2017: 82 FR 3168-3170: 2017 Civil Monetary Penalties Inflationary Adjustment
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 10 Jun 2017) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III.  The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text.  Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.  The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a314
. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor)
 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of Daily Bugle Top Stories” posted here.

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* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

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