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17-0804 Friday “The Daily Bugle”

17-0804 Friday “Daily Bugle”

Friday, 4 August 2017

TOPThe Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events. Subscribe here for free subscription. Contact us for advertising inquiries and rates.

  1. Justice/ATF Revises Form ATF F 6A, Release and Receipt of Imported Firearms, Ammunition and Defense Articles
  2. USTR/TPSC Seeks Comments on Russia’s Implementation of WTO Commitments, Holds Hearing on 28 Sep in Wash DC
  1. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions 
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.) 
  3. DHS/CBP Updates Harmonized Tariff Schedule in the Automated Export System
  4. Justice: “Texas Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Illegally Export Radiation Hardened Integrated Circuits to Russia and China”
  5. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  6. EU Amends Restrictive Measures Concerning Situation in the Ukraine 
  1. ST&R Trade Report: “Dates and Deadlines: Expedited Imports, CBP Ruling, Import Restrictions, FTZs”
  2. ST&R Trade Report: “U.S. Expands Economic Sanctions Against Russia, Iran, North Korea”
  1. L.P. Carnegie & W.M. McGlone: “Expanded Russia, Iran, and North Korea Sanctions: Top 10 Takeaways”
  2. Gary Stanley’s ECR Tip of the Day
  3. R.C. Burns: “Touch a U.S. Dollar Anywhere, Go Directly to U.S. Jail”
  1. Friday List of Approaching Events
  1. U.S. Senate Confirms Presidential Nominees to Dept. of Commerce
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Changes: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (28 Jul 2017), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (7 Jul 2017), FACR/OFAC (16 Jun 2017), FTR (19 Apr 2017), HTSUS (25 Jul 2017), ITAR (11 Jan 2017)
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 

EXIMEX/IM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1

1. Justice/ATF Revises Form ATF F 6A, Release and Receipt of Imported Firearms, Ammunition and Defense Articles

(Source: Federal Register) [Excerpts.]
 
82 FR 36420-36421: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed eCollection eComments Requested; Revision of a Currently Approved Collection; Release and Receipt of Imported Firearms, Ammunition and Defense Articles; ATF F 6A (5330.3C)
* AGENCY: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Department of Justice
* ACTION: 60-Day notice.
* SUMMARY: … The proposed collection 1140-0007 is being revised to change all references from “Implements of War” to “Defense Articles” including the title of the collection, which will be changed to Release and Receipt of Imported Firearms, Ammunition, and Defense Articles.
* DATES: Comments are encouraged and will be accepted for 60 days until October 3, 2017.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Desiree M. Dickinson, ATF Firearms and Explosives Imports Branch either by mail at 244 Needy Road, Martinsburg, WV 25405, or by email at desiree.dickinson@atf.gov.
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: …
  – The Title of the Form/Collection: Release and Receipt of
Imported Firearms, Ammunition, and Defense Articles. …
  – Form number (if applicable): ATF F 6A (5330.3C).
  – Component: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,
U.S. Department of Justice.
  – Abstract: The data provided by this information collection request
is used by ATF to determine if articles imported meet the statutory and
regulatory criteria for importation and if the articles shown on the
permit application have been actually imported. …
  If additional information is required contact: Melody Braswell, Department Clearance Officer, United States Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, Policy and Planning Staff, Two Constitution Square, 145 N Street NE., 3E.405A, Washington, DC 20530.
 
 Dated: August 1, 2017.
Melody Braswell, Department Clearance Officer for PRA, U.S. Department of Justice.

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EXIM_a2

2. USTR/TPSC Seeks Comments on Russia’s Implementation of WTO Commitments, Holds Hearing on 28 Sep in Wash DC

(Source: Federal Register) [Excerpts.]
 
82 FR 36521-36522: Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning Russia’s Implementation of Its WTO Commitments
* AGENCY: Office of the United States Trade Representative.
* ACTION: Notice and request for comments.
* SUMMARY: The interagency Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) will convene a public hearing and seeks comments to assist the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in the preparation of its annual report to Congress on Russia’s implementation of its obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
* DATES:
  – September 22, 2017: Deadline for filing a summary of testimony and requests to appear at the September 28, 2017 public hearing, and for submitting public comments.
  – September 28, 2017: The TPSC will convene a public hearing on Russia’s implementation of its obligations as a member of the WTO at 9:30 a.m. in Rooms 1 & 2, 1724 F Street NW., Washington, DC 20508. …
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For procedural questions concerning written comments or participating in the public hearing, contact Yvonne Jamison at (202) 395-3475. Direct all other questions regarding this notice to Betsy Hafner, Deputy Assistant United States Trade Representative for Russia and Eurasia, at (202) 395-9124.
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: …
  USTR must receive written comments no later than 11:59 p.m. on Friday, September 22, 2017. USTR invites written comments and/or oral testimony on Russia’s implementation of the commitments made in connection with its accession to the WTO, including, but not limited to, commitments in the following areas:

  (a) Import regulation (e.g., tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, quotas,
import licenses).
  (b) Export regulation.
  (c) Subsidies.
  (d) Standards and technical regulations.
  (e) Sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
  (f) Trade-related investment measures.
  (g) Taxes and charges levied on imports and exports.
  (h) Other internal policies affecting trade.
  (i) Intellectual property rights (including intellectual property rights enforcement).
  (j) Services.
  (k) Rule of law issues (e.g., transparency, judicial review, uniform administration of laws and regulations).
  (l) Trade-related investment measures.
  (m) Other WTO commitments.
  
The TPSC will convene a public hearing on Thursday, September 28, 2017, in Rooms 1 & 2, 1724 F Street NW., Washington, DC 20508. …

  Edward Gresser, Chair, Trade Policy Staff Committee, Office of the United States Trade Representative.

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OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a13
. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
 

(Source:
Federal Register)
 
[No items of interest noted today.] 

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Effective immediately, all recent additions to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (“HTS”) are now available for use in the Automated Export System (“AES”).
 
* Note: There have been no additions to the Schedule B.
 
The ACE AESDirect program has been updated with these new HTS codes.
 
The full 2017 Schedule B and HTS tables are available for downloading here.
 
The current list of HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.
 
For further information or questions, contact the U.S. Census Bureau’s International Trade Indicator Micro Analysis Branch.
 
  – Telephone: (800) 549-0595, select option 2 for International Trade Indicator Micro Analysis Branch
  – Email: 
eid.scheduleb@census.gov
  –
Online
  – Blog
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(Source:
Justice, 3 August 2017) [Excerpts.]
 
Peter Zuccarelli, 62, of Plano, Texas pleaded guilty today to conspiring to smuggle and illegally export from the U.S., radiation hardened integrated circuits (RHICs) for use in the space programs of China and Russia, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). …
 
Zuccarelli pleaded guilty to engaging in a conspiracy to smuggle and illegally export from the U.S. items subject to IEEPA, without obtaining licenses from the Department of Commerce. According to the allegations contained in the Information filed against Zuccarelli and statements made in court filings and proceedings, including today’s guilty plea:
 
Between approximately June 2015 and March 2016, Zuccarelli and his co-conspirators agreed to illegally export RHICs to China and Russia. RHICs have military and space applications, and their export is strictly controlled.
 
In furtherance of the conspiracy, Zuccarelli’s co-conspirator received purchase orders from customers seeking to purchase RHICs for use in China’s and Russia’s space programs. Zuccarelli received these orders from his co-conspirator, as well as payment of approximately $1.5 million to purchase the RHICs for the Chinese and Russian customers. Zuccarelli placed orders with U.S. suppliers, and used the money received from his co-conspirator to pay the U.S. suppliers. In communications with the U.S. suppliers, Zuccarelli certified that his company, American Coating Technologies was the end user of the RHICs, knowing that this was false. Zuccarelli received the RHICs he ordered from U.S. suppliers, removed them from their original packaging, repackaged them, falsely declared them as “touch screen parts,” and shipped them out of the U.S. without the required licenses. He also attempted to export what he believed to be RHICs. In an attempt to hide the conspiracy from the U.S. government, he created false paperwork and made false statements. …
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Regulations:
  – Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1417 of 4 August 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine
 
Decisions:
  – Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1418 of 4 August 2017 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine
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NWSNEWS

 
Following are highlights of regulatory effective dates and deadlines and federal agency meetings coming up in the next week.
 
  – 7 Aug: deadline for comments to FTZ Board on request to expand Miami-area FTZ
  – 7 Aug: deadline for comments to FTZ Board on subzone applications
  – 7 Aug: deadline for requests for judicial review of CBP origin determination on x-ray system
  – 7 Aug: deadline for comments to ITC on IPR import restrictions on semiconductor devices
  – 11 Aug: deadline for comments to DEA on removing import restrictions on controlled substance
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

 
U.S. economic sanctions against Russia, Iran, and North Korea have been expanded under a new law signed Aug. 2 by President Trump after passing both the House and Senate with overwhelming support. This law is expected to significantly expand the lists of entities with which U.S. persons are limited or prohibited from doing business. In addition, these prohibitions could be extended to a substantial number of other entities due to the Office of Foreign Assets Controls’ so-called 50 percent rule, which provides that any entity owned 50 percent or more by a listed entity is subject to the same prohibitions as the listed entity. Finally, the law limits the president’s ability to remove entities from the sanctions lists by requiring Congress to review any proposed removals.
 
RUSSIA
 
The new law is likely to result in a substantial number of Russian entities being added to OFAC’s specially designated nationals or sectoral sanctions identifications lists because it requires the imposition of economic sanctions on (1) persons that engage in a significant transaction with a person that is part of, or operates on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Russian government; (2) entities identified as engaging in activities that undermine cybersecurity; and (3) parties that have knowingly exported, transferred, or otherwise provided material support to Syria’s acquisition of arms.
 
The law also allows (but does not require) sanctions on entities investing in or selling, leasing, or providing items for Russian pipelines as well as persons making certain investments of $10 million or more that unjustly benefit Russian officials.

Further, the law expands sanctions previously imposed on specified persons operating in certain sectors of the Russian economy as follows:
 
  – allows for sanctions on state-owned entities in the railway sector (previously limited to those in the financial services, energy, metals and mining, engineering, and defense sectors)
  – lowers from 30 days to 14 days the maximum maturity period of new debt assumed by a specified entity in the Russian finance sector
  – lowers from 90 days to 60 days the maximum maturity period of new debt assumed by a specified entity in the Russian energy sector
  – expands the prohibition on U.S. persons providing goods, services (except financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production for new deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil to any such project, wherever located, and to any specified entity or any entity that has a 33 percent or more controlling or ownership interest in such a party
 
NORTH KOREA
 
A number of Chinese banks and other entities are likely to be added to a U.S. restricted party list, such as the SDN list or the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network list, under a provision imposing sanctions against entities that facilitate or support certain trade or investments in North Korea.
 
The law also (1) expands the U.S. ban on imports of goods manufactured in North Korea to significant goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part by the labor of North Korean nationals or citizens and (2) allows the imposition of sanctions on foreign persons employing North Korean labor. 
 
IRAN
 
New sanctions are imposed on parties contributing to Iran’s ballistic missile program, parties related to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iranian entities involved in human rights abuses, and foreign entities that materially contribute to the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer of arms to Iran. These sanctions will likely be in the form of adding a party to one or more U.S. government restricted party lists, which will generally prohibit U.S. persons from dealing with the listed entity.
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COMMCOMMENTARY

COMM_a211
. L.P. Carnegie & W.M. McGlone: “Expanded Russia, Iran, and North Korea Sanctions: Top 10 Takeaways”

 
* Authors: Les P. Carnegie, Esq.,
les.carnegie@lw.com, 202-637-1096; and William M. McGlone, Esq., william.mcglone@lw.com, 202-637-2202
 
President Trump signs the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act,” which – among other measures – requires Congressional review to ease Russia-related sanctions.
 
On Wednesday, August 2, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (the Act). The Act significantly expands and codifies US sanctions targeting Russia, and it adds several measures to the already comprehensive US sanctions on Iran and North Korea. The Act passed both houses of Congress last week, with a vote of 419-3 in the House of Representatives and 98-2 in the Senate.

The Act is particularly significant because it codifies many of the Russia-related sanctions measures introduced by President Obama through executive orders, effectively requiring President Trump to secure Congressional approval before easing the targeted US sanctions relating to Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced his intention to impose retaliatory sanctions in response to the Act, and the Russian Foreign Ministry reportedly ordered a more than 60% cut in US diplomatic staff and suspended use of two US facilities in Russia.

Here are the top 10 takeaways from the Act:
 
RUSSIA-RELATED SANCTIONS
 
(1) Codifying and Expanding Existing Sanctions. 
 
The Act codifies the following Executive Orders issued by President Obama: Executive Orders 1366013661136621368513694, and 13757. Among other measures, these Executive Orders imposed a virtual embargo on the Crimea region of Ukraine; imposed sanctions against perpetrators of malicious cyber activity and designated Russian and Ukrainian individuals, including government officials and oligarchs; and provided the underlying authority for Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Directive 1Directive 2Directive 3, and Directive 4.
 
The first three OFAC Directives prohibit US persons from extending medium- to long-term credit, or otherwise dealing in “new” debt (and in some cases “new” equity), of designated Russian financial institutions, energy firms, and companies in the defense sector. Directive 4 prohibits US persons from providing goods, software, technology, and services in support of certain non-conventional oil projects in Russia.

The Act expands certain of these Executive Orders and Directives:
 
* The Act gives the US Treasury Secretary the power to impose sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13662, including the financing-type sanctions found in the OFAC Directives, against state-owned parties in Russia in the railways, metals, and mining sectors of the Russian economy. Prior to the Act, the targeted sectors were limited to the financial, energy, and defense sectors.
 
* No later than 60 days after enactment of the Act (or approximately the beginning of October), the US Treasury Secretary must modify Directive 1 to reduce the “new” debt prohibition to 14 days, down from the current 30 days, and Directive 2 from the current 90 days to 60 days. These 14-day and 60-day changes will be effective 60 days after the Directives are modified, which provides some time for US parties to adjust to this change. Notably, current OFAC interpretation (see OFAC FAQ # 419) is that extending payment terms of more than 30 days to a Directive 1 target violates the “new debt” prohibition, meaning that payment terms to Directive 1 parties will need to be reduced to no more than two weeks. The same is the case with respect to Directive 2 targets, for which the payment term requirement will be reduced to 60 days.
  – The Act also requires the US Treasury Secretary to, within 180 days of enactment, submit to Congress a report “describing in detail the potential effects of expanding sanctions under Directive 1 … to include sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products.”
 
* No later than 90 days after the Act’s enactment (or approximately the beginning of November), the US Treasury Secretary must modify Directive 4, to prohibit US persons not only from providing goods, services (other than financial services), and technology to projects in Russia relating to the exploration or production for oil for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects, but to such projects anywhere in the world. Notably, the Directive’s expansion appears to reach non-conventional exploration and production beyond Russia, applies only to “new” deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects, and only those projects where the Directive 4 target “has a controlling interest or a substantial non-controlling ownership interest in such a project defined as not less than a 33 percent interest.”
  – This “new” and “substantial non-controlling ownership interest” language was added by the House to the Senate version, in an attempt to ease concerns raised by US energy firms and European allies regarding the breadth of the provision. This new provision will be effective 90 days after the US Treasury Secretary modifies Directive 4.
 
(2) Congressional Oversight of the President’s Russia-Related Actions
.
 
Notably, the Act gives the US Congress the opportunity during a 30-day review period to disapprove of any effort by the President to reduce, waive, or eliminate US sanctions relating to Russia. Section 216 of the Act gives Congress the power to review (i) any action to terminate the application of the sanctions in the Act, the codified Executive Orders mentioned above, and certain other statutes; (ii) any action to waive the application of sanctions targeted at certain persons, such as parties added to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (SDN List) or the List of Sectoral Sanctions Identifications parties (SSI List), or (iii) any “licensing action that significantly alters United States’ foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.”
 
(3) Energy Pipeline Secondary Sanctions.
 
 
The Act gives the President the power to impose, but does not require, secondary sanctions on foreign persons that knowingly (i) make an investment of US$1 million or more (or US$5 million or more over a 12-month period) that directly and significantly contributes to enhancing Russia’s ability to construct energy export pipelines or (ii) sell, lease, or provide to the Russian Federation, goods, services, technology, information, or support (valued at US$1 million or more, or during a 12-month period with an aggregate value of US$5 million or more) that could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the construction, modernization, or repair of energy pipelines. 
 
* The Act appears to require the President to impose any such sanctions “in coordination with allies of the United States.” This language was added to the House version of the Act in response to concerns raised by European allies, in light of such projects as the proposed Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany.
 
(4) Cybersecurity Sanctions. 
 
On or after 60 days of enactment, the Act requires the President, subject to a national security interest waiver, to impose asset-blocking as well as travel sanctions, including certain secondary sanctions, on any person who knowingly engages in significant activities that undermine the cybersecurity of any person or government, including a democratic institution, on behalf of the Russian government. Any national security interest waiver submitted by the President to avoid the imposition of sanctions must be accompanied by a certification that the Russian government has “made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.” The Act includes a definition of what constitutes “significant activities undermining cybersecurity,” which includes, among other activities, significant destructive malware attacks.
 
(5) Secondary Sanctions Targeting Certain Activities Relating to Russian Intelligence and Defense Sectors, Sanctions Evaders, and Privatizations. 
 
The Act requires the President to impose secondary sanctions on those (including non-US persons) who he determines:
 
* Have knowingly engaged in a significant transaction with “a person that is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation, including the Main Intelligence Agency of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.” Secondary sanctions are to be imposed 180 days after enactment of the Act. The Act requires the President to issue guidance or regulations no later than 60 days after the date of the Act’s enactment to “specify the persons that are part of, or operate for or on behalf of, the defense and intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation.”

* Are responsible for, complicit in, or have supported serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by the Russian government. The Act also requires sanctions on foreign persons that (i) knowingly have materially violated, attempted to violate, or conspired to violate or caused a violation of US sanctions or the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, or (ii) “facilitates a significant transaction or transactions, including deceptive or structured transactions” for or on behalf of a person that is a target of US sanctions, or for that person’s child, spouse, parent, or sibling.

* With actual knowledge make an investment of US$10 million or more (or any combination of investments not less than US$1 million each, which in the aggregate equals or exceeds US$10 million in a 12-month period), or facilitate such an investment, if the investment “directly and significantly” contributes to the ability of the Russian government to “privatize state-owned assets in a manner that unjustly benefits” Russian government officials or “close associates” or family members of those officials. The Act does not define the terms “investment,” “unjustly benefit,” and “close associates.” 
 
(6) Sanctions Targeting Crude Oil Projects and Corruption.
 
 
The Act limits the discretion of the President under the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 by requiring the President to impose secondary sanctions on a foreign person that knowingly makes a “significant investment” in a “special Russian crude oil project” as well as foreign financial institutions that support such investments. The Ukraine Freedom Support Act does not define the term “significant investment” and defines a “special Russian crude oil project” to be a crude oil extraction project in Russian deepwater (i.e., more than 500 feet deep), Arctic offshore locations, or shale formations. The President can waive the imposition of such secondary sanctions by invoking a national interest waiver. 
 
* The Act also limits the President’s discretion under the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, requiring him to impose secondary sanctions against a Russian government official or close associate or family member involved in an act of significant corruption in Ukraine, Russia, or elsewhere.
 
(7) Sanctions Relating to Support for the Syrian Government. 
 
The President is required to impose asset-blocking and travel sanctions on any person determined by the President to have knowingly exported, transferred, or otherwise provided significant financial, material, or technological support to the Syrian government in acquiring or developing advanced conventional weapons, ballistic, or cruise missile capabilities, as well as biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons and related technologies.
 
(8) Secondary Sanctions Described. 
 
The so-called “secondary sanctions” described in the Act target the activities of non-US persons. These secondary sanctions can be applied to parties beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, and they effectively take the form of a denial of US benefits, as opposed to monetary penalties available under US “primary” sanctions (which apply to US persons).

* In the context of the Act, the menu of secondary sanctions from which the President can select (generally, he must select up to five) includes the following:
 
  – Denial of export-import bank financing and assistance
  – Denial of US export licensing
  – Prohibition against US financial institution making loans or providing credits of more than US$10 million in any 12-month period
  – Use of US government power to oppose a loan from a non-US financial institution to the sanctioned party
  – Denial of US Government procurement
  – Prohibition against transactions in foreign exchange that are within US jurisdiction
  – Prohibition against transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, if within US jurisdiction
  – For foreign financial institutions, (i) loss of designation as a primary dealer in US Government debt instruments by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and/or (ii) revocation of right to serve as an agent of the US Government or to serve as repository for US Government funds
  – Effect on the property rights of sanctioned persons for property within US jurisdiction (i.e., asset blocking similar to those on OFAC’s SDN List
  – Prohibition against US persons investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of the sanctioned persons
  – Travel prohibitions directed at corporate officers, principals, or controlling shareholders or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling interest in
  – Placement of any of these secondary sanctions on the principal executive officer or similar officers of the sanctioned person
 
IRAN
 
Largely in response to Iran’s ballistic missile tests, the Act imposes new sanctions targeting Iran’s defense sector and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
 
(9) Asset-Freezing and Terrorism-Related Sanctions. 
 
The Act requires the President to impose asset-freezing sanctions (and for non-US persons, a travel ban) against any US or foreign person that knowingly engages “in any activity that materially contributes to the activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its ballistic missile program” or programs to develop, deploy, or maintain weapons of mass destruction. Subject to his exercise of a national security interest waiver, the President must also impose asset-freezing sanctions (and for non-US persons, a travel ban) against any US or foreign person who knowingly contributes to the “supply, sale, or transfer” to Iran of “battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems … or related materiel, including spare parts.”
 
* The Act also requires the President to impose the same sanctions on those who knowingly provide “technical training, financial resources or services, advice” or other services in supporting the use of the material listed. 90 days after the Act’s enactment, the President must impose terrorism-related sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13224 against the IRGC and its “officials, agents or affiliates.” Notably, significant transactions with the IRGC can already subject non-US persons to US secondary sanctions, which survived the implementation of the Nuclear Agreement with Iran in January 2016. 
 
NORTH KOREA
 
Largely in response to North Korea’s successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile on July 4, 2017, the House of Representatives recently introduced certain North Korea-related provisions to the Act. Among other measures, the Act requires the US Secretary of State to provide Congress, within 90 days of enactment, a determination as to whether North Korea should be considered a state sponsor of terrorism. 
 
(10) Additional Designation Authority and Human Rights Provisions.
 
 
The Act broadens the list of persons the President must impose asset-blocking measures under the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (NKSPEA). These additional targets include those who knowingly procure certain precious metals from North Korea; sell or transfer rocket, aviation or jet fuel to North Korea; provide fuel or supplies for designated North Korean vessels or aircraft; provide insurance services to vessels owned or controlled by the North Korean government; or maintain a correspondent account with any North Korean financial institution.
 
* The Act also expands the President’s discretionary authority to designate parties under the NKSPEA, including parties who knowingly acquire coal, iron, or iron ore from the North Korean government; purchase significant amounts of textiles from North Korea; or sell or transfer significant amounts of crude oil, condensates, petroleum products, or natural gas resources to the North Korean government, among other activities. Under the human rights-related provisions, the Act prohibits most goods produced by North Korean labor from entering the US and allows for the imposition of sanctions on most parties who knowingly employ North Korean labor.

* These new North Korea sanctions presumptively increase the prospects of designations of parties from China in the coming weeks.

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COMM_JEB12
. Gary Stanley’s ECR Tip of the Day

 
* Author: Gary Stanley, Esq., Global Legal Services, PC, (202) 352-3059,
gstanley@glstrade.com.
 
Paragraph (b)(5) of the EAR definition of “specially designed” ‘releases’ a general purpose commodity or software where the “part,” “component,” “accessory,” “attachment” or “software,” was “developed” with no “knowledge” that it was for a particular item or type of item. So, for example, if you develop a “part,” or “component” for use in different types of commodities, such as machine tools, medical equipment and aircraft, it may be eligible for “release” under paragraph (b).

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COMM_a3
13.
R.C. Burns: “Touch a U.S. Dollar Anywhere, Go Directly to U.S. Jail”

(Source:
Export Law Blog
. Reprinted by permission.)
 
* Author: R. Clifton Burns, Esq., Bryan Cave LLP, Wash DC,
Clif.Burns@bryancave.com
, 202-508-6067).
 
Two companies in Singapore, CSE Global and CSE Transtel,
agreed
to pay the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) $12,027,066 to settle charges that they violated the Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (“ITSR”). The charges arose from CSE Transtel supplying telecommunications goods and services to energy projects in Iran. OFAC did not allege that these goods and services originated in the United States. Rather, OFAC alleged that because the vendors were paid in U.S. Dollars that CSE had caused the export of financial services from U.S. Banks to Iran in violation of section 560.204 of the ITSR.
 
Now we’ve been through this U.S. dollar business with OFAC before. In the typical case, OFAC’s claim of jurisdiction over the foreign company is based on the fact that the foreign company’s bank and the foreign company’s customer’s bank would have used correspondent accounts denominated in dollars and held in U.S banks to effectuate the transaction. Of course, whether the transfer of dollars between U.S. banks in connection with a foreign company’s sale of goods to Iran is the export of a financial service to Iran is not entirely clear. But at least in this scenario you can see a direct flow of dollars related to a specific Iranian transaction.
 
But the Singapore situation is different because Singapore is authorized to engage in offshore dollar clearing transactions. And, as the OFAC release admits, the transactions in question were effectuated through U.S. Dollar accounts held in Singapore banks. The way that U.S. Dollar transactions are cleared in Singapore is described here. Suffice it to say, there are cases where U.S. Dollar transactions can be cleared in Singapore under this system without a U.S. bank ever being involved. If, for example, CSE and its vendor had U.S Dollar accounts at the same bank, or were the only dollar transactions between two Singapore banks on a clearing day, the Singapore clearing house would clear the transactions without the need for either bank to make up a dollar deficit as part of the clearing process.
 
But in the other possible (and more likely) situations where the dollars clear in Singapore but dollar transfers are needed to make up differences between banks, it still can’t be said that the dollar transfers to settle the dollar position of the Singapore bank is the export of a financial service to Iran. Say a bank in Singapore pays $10,000 for a customer’s Iran transaction but during the day pays out $200,000 and receives $100,000 where none of these other dollar transactions have anything to do with Iran. It will need to transfer $100,000 to the Singapore clearing house, which will be effectuated through a U.S. Dollar correspondent account in the United States. In that case the bank in the United States has not transferred any financial service to Iran because the payment relates to an aggregate of transactions valued at $300,000, almost all of which have nothing to do with Iran.
 
The only scenario in the Singapore clearing situation where the U.S. bank would transfer a financial service to Iran would be where the Iran payment by the Singapore bank is the only U.S. dollar transaction by the Singapore bank during the clearing day. In that case, the transaction looks like a traditional one where the dollar payment is cleared through the U.S. bank. But there is no reason to believe that any or all of the CSE Iran transaction were the only dollar transactions during that clearing day. But that doesn’t stop OFAC from inaccurately claiming that every dollar transaction conducted by CSE through its Singapore accounts caused a transfer of financial services from the United States to Iran.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

TEEX/IM TRAINING EVENTS & CONFERENCES

TE_a214
. Friday List of Approaching Events

(Sources: Event Sponsors) 
 
Published every Friday or last publication day of the week. Send events to
jwbartlett@fullcirclecompliance.eu
, composed in the below format:

* DATE: PLACE; “TITLE;” SPONSOR; WEBLINK; CONTACT (email and phone number)

#” New listing this week:   
 
Continuously Available Training:
 
* E-Seminars: “
US Export Controls” / “Defense Trade Controls
;” Export Compliance Training Institute;
danielle@learnexportcompliance.com
 
* On-Line: “
Simplified Network Application Process Redesign (SNAP-R)
;” Commerce/BIS; 202-482-2227
* E-Seminars: “
Webinars On-Demand Library
;” Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.
 
Training by Date:

 

* Aug 7: Webinar; “Is Your Company ‘At-Risk’ for a Government Enforcement Action?;” The Volkov Law Group

* Aug 8: Webinar; ”
FDA’s Expedited Import Program: How to Join and Why You Should;” Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.;
webinarorganizers@strtrade.com 

* Aug 9: Webinar; ”
Introduction to the Gun Control Act;” Reeves & Dola LLP; Teresa Ficaretta;
tficaretta@reevesdola.com; 202-715-9183

* Aug 14-16: McLean, VA; “
Basics of Government Contracting
;” Federal Publications Seminars

*
Aug 17: Webinar; ”
Export Controls in the Cloud;” Shipman & Goodwin LLP

* Aug 24: Webinar; ”
Understanding Brazil’s AEO Program;”


Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.; webinarorganizers@strtrade.com

* Sep 4-9: Galveston, TX; “ICPA Conference at Sea;”

International Compliance Professionals Association; wizard@icpainc.org

* Sep 4: Glasgow, UK; ”
Intermediate Seminar;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Sep 5: Glasgow, UK; ”
Beginners Workshop;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Sep 5: Glasgow, UK; ”
Licenses Workshop;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Sep 5: Glasgow, UK; ”
Control List Classification – Combined Dual Use and Military;” UK Department for International Trade;

* Sep 6: Nashville, TN; ”
AES Compliance Seminar;” Dept. of Commerce/Census
Bureau;
itmd.outreach@census.gov

* Sep 7: Marina Del Ray CA: ”
Strategizing for Dealing with the Government Under the New Administration;” Crowell and Moring

* Sep 7: Webinar; ”
Understanding Mexico’s AEO Program;”


Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.; webinarorganizers@strtrade.com

* Sep 12-13: Annapolis, MD; “ITAR/EAR Boot Camp;” spalmer@exportcompliancesolutions.com; 866-238-4018 / 410-757-1919

* Sep 12-13: Louisville, KY; ”
Complying with U.S. Export Controls;” Dept. of Commerce/Bureau of Industry and Security

* Sep 12-13: Milpitas, CA; ”
Complying with U.S. Export Controls;” Dept. of Commerce/Bureau of Industry and Security

* Sep 12-13: Wash, DC; “Interactive Export Controls Workshop;” ECTI; jessica@learnexportcompliance.com; 540-433-3977

* Sep 12: Webinar; ”
Meeting CBP’s Informed Compliance and Reasonable Care Standards;”
Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.; webinarorganizers@strtrade.com

* Sep 13: Webinar; ”
Definition of ‘Firearm’ Under the Gun Control Act;” Reeves & Dola LLP; Teresa Ficaretta;
tficaretta@reevesdola.com; 202-715-9183

* Sep 14: Milpitas, CA; “
Encryption Controls;”
Dept. of Commerce/Bureau of Industry and Security

# Sep 18-19: Huntsville, AL; “NAITA Export Control Update;” North American International Trade Association

* Sep 18-21: Austin, TX; “ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar; ECTI; jessica@learnexportcompliance.com; 540-433-3977

* Sep 18-20: Las Vegas NV; “
Basics of Government Contracting
;” Federal Publications Seminars

* Sep 19: Amsterdam, Netherlands; ”
Amsterdam International Trade and Compliance Conference;” Register
here, OR contact
Sue Menon, 202-887-4375; Akin Gump


* Sep 21: 
Webinar; “
US Export Administration Regulations
;
” Foreign Trade Association 

* Sep 20-22: Houston, TX; ”
Advanced Topics in Customs Compliance Conference;” Deleon Trade LLC
# Sep 26: Cupertino, CA; ”
11th CompTIA Global Trade Compliance Best Practices Conference;” CompTIA; OR contact
Ken Montgomery, 202-682-4433
* Sep 27: Tysons Corner, VA; ”
IT Capabilities and Solutions for the Trade Compliance Community;” Society for International Affairs (“SIA”)
* Sep 27: Oxford, UK; ”
Intermediate Seminar;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Sep 27-28: Rome, Italy; “Defence Exports 2017;” SMi

* Sep 28: Oxford, UK; ”
Beginners Workshop;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 
* Sep 28: Oxford, UK; ”
Licenses Workshop;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk

* Oct 2-5: Columbus OH; “
University Export Controls Seminar
;” ECTI;
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977

* Oct 4: Webinar; ”
Exports – New Incentives, Old Rules;” 
Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.;
webinarorganizers@strtrade.com
# Oct 4: Toronto, Canada; ”
2nd National Institute on US-Canadian Securities Litigation;” American Bar Association
# Oct 4-5:  Miramar (Miami/Fort Lauderdale), FL; “
9th Maritime Logistics Training Course
“; Contact ABS Consulting, phone:
 
(954) 218-5285


* Oct 5-6: London, UK; ”
The World ECR Forum 2017;” World ECR 


* Oct 10: Aberdeen, UK; ”
UK Strategic Export Controls: Control List Classification – Combined Dual Use and Military;” Code Coct2017; or contact
Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; 
UK Department for International Trade
* Oct 10: Aberdeen, UK; “UK Strategic Export Controls: Licenses Workshop;” Code Loct2017; or contact Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; UK Department for International Trade;
*
 Oct 10: Rotterdam, the Netherlands; “
Awareness Training Export Control, Dual-Use, and Sanctions
” day I/3 [in Dutch]; Fenex 

* Oct 10-12: Dallas, TX; “
‘Partnering for Compliance™’ West Export/Import Control Training and Education Program
;” Partnering for Compliance
 
* Oct 11: Aberdeen, UK; “UK Strategic Export Controls: Intermediate Oil and Gas Seminar;” Code loct2017-2; or contact Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; UK Department for International Trade;

* Oct 11: Webinar; ”
Basics of Importation Under the Gun Control Act;” Reeves & Dola LLP; Teresa Ficaretta;
tficaretta@reevesdola.com; 202-715-9183

* Oct 12-13: Boston, MA; “Automated Export System Compliance Seminar and Workshop;” Commerce/Census, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, State/DDTC, Treasury 

* Oct 13: Dallas, TX; “
Customs/Import Boot Camp
;” Partnering for Compliance

*
 Oct 16-17: Washington, DC; “The World ECR Forum 2017;” World ECR 

* Oct 16-19: Amsterdam, Netherlands “
US Export Controls for EU/NL and other Non-US Companies/How US Controls Impact Non-US Companies, Affiliates and Transactions, PLUS Other Country Controls Comparison to US Seminar
;” ECTI;
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977

* Oct 22-24: Grapevine, TX; “
Annual ICPA Fall Conference
;” International Compliance Professional Association;
Wizard@icpainc.org 

* Oct 23-24: Arlington, VA; “
2017 Fall Advanced Conference
;” Society for International Affairs

*
 Oct 24: Rotterdam, the Netherlands; “
Awareness Training Export Control, Dual-Use, and Sanctions
” day 2/3 [in Dutch]; Fenex 

* Oct 30-Nov 2: Phoenix, AZ; “
ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar
;” ECTI;
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977
* Oct 31: Manchester, UK; “UK Strategic Export Controls: Intermediate Seminar;” Code loct2017; or contact Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; UK Department for International Trade;
* Nov 1: Manchester, UK; “UK Strategic Export Controls: Beginner’s Workshop;” Code Bnov2017-1; or contact Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; UK Department for International Trade; 
* Nov 1: Manchester, UK; “UK Strategic Export Controls: Licenses Workshop;” Code Lnov2017-1; or contact Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; UK Department for International Trade; 
* Nov 1: Manchester, UK; “UK Strategic Export Controls: Control List Classification – Combined Dual Use and Military;” Code Cnov2017-1; or contact Denise Carter at 020-7215-4459; UK Department for International Trade; 
* Nov 2-3: Las Vegas, NV; “The 22nd National M&A Institute;” American Bar Association
* Nov 5-7: Singapore; ”
ICPA Singapore Conference;”
International Compliance Professionals Association;
wizard@icpainc.org
*
 Nov 6: Rotterdam, the Netherlands; “
Awareness Training Export Control, Dual-Use, and Sanctions
” day 3/3 [in Dutch]; Fenex 

* Nov 6-8: Chicago, IL; “Basics of Government Contracting;” Federal Publications Seminars

* Nov 7: Norfolk, VA; “
AES Compliance Seminar
;
” Dept. of Commerce/Census
Bureau;
itmd.outreach@census.gov

* Nov 8: Webinar; “Introduction to the National Firearms Act;” Reeves & Dola LLP; Teresa Ficaretta; tficaretta@reevesdola.com; 202-715-9183

* Nov 9-10: Shanghai, China; ”
ICPA China Conference;”
International Compliance Professionals Association;
wizard@icpainc.org 

* Nov 13-16: Wash DC; “ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar;” ECTI; jessica@learnexportcompliance.com; 540-433-3977

* Nov 15: Leeds, UK; ”
Intermediate Seminar;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Nov 16: Leeds, UK; ”
Beginners Workshop;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Nov 16: Leeds, UK; ”
Licenses Workshop;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Nov 16: Leeds, UK; ”
Control List Classification – Combined Dual Use and Military;” UK Department for International Trade;
denise.carter@trade.gsi.gov.uk 

* Nov 16: Nijkerk, the Netherlands; “Training Export Control” [in Dutch]; Fenedex
* Dec 4-7: Miami FL; “
ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar;” ECTI; jessica@learnexportcompliance.com; 540-433-3977

* Dec 5: Brussels, Belgium; ”
Dual Use For Beginners
” [In Dutch]; Flemish Department of Foreign Affairs

* Dec 5: San Juan, PR; “AES Compliance Seminar in Spanish;” Dept. of Commerce/Census Bureau; itmd.outreach@census.gov

* Dec 6: Webinar; ”
Introduction to Firearms and Ammunition Excise Tax (FAET);” Reeves & Dola LLP; Teresa Ficaretta;
tficaretta@reevesdola.com; 202-715-9183

* Dec 6: Wood Ridge, NJ; “
AES Compliance Seminar
;” Dept. of Commerce/Census Bureau;
itmd.outreach@census.gov 

* Dec 7: Laredo, TX; “AES Compliance Seminar in Spanish;” Dept. of Commerce/Census Bureau; itmd.outreach@census.gov 

* Dec 11-13: Sterling, VA; “
Basics of Government Contracting
;” Federal Publications Seminars
                                                2018

* Jan 22-25: San Diego CA; “
ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar
;” ECTI; 
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977

* Feb 19-22: Huntsville AL; “
ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar
;” ECTI; 
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977 * Mar 11-14: San Diego, CA; ”
ICPA Annual Conference;”
International Compliance Professionals Association;
wizard@icpainc.org

* Apr 16-19: Las Vegas NV; “
ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar
;” ECTI; 
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977
* Apr 30-May 3: Wash DC; “
ITAR Defense Trade Controls / EAR Export Controls Seminar
;” ECTI; 
jessica@learnexportcompliance.com
; 540-433-3977

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

MSEX/IM MOVERS & SHAKERS

MS_a115
. U.S. Senate Confirms Presidential Nominees to Dept. of Commerce

(Source:
U.S. Senate
) 

The following Presidential nominees have been confirmed for appointment to the indicated office: 


  – Ms. Mira Radielovic Ricardel, of California, to be Under Secretary for Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
  – Mr. Richard Ashooh, of New Hampshire, to be Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ENEDITOR’S NOTES

EN_a116
. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)

* Percy Bysshe Shelley (4 Aug 1792 – 8 Jul 1822; was one of the major English Romantic poets, regarded by some as among the finest lyric poets in the English language, and one of the most influential. A radical in his poetry as well as in his political and social views, Shelley did not see fame during his lifetime, but recognition for his poetry grew steadily following his death. Shelley was a key member of a close circle of visionary poets and writers that included Lord Byron, Leigh Hunt, Thomas Love Peacock, and his own second wife, Mary Shelley, the author of Frankenstein.)
  – “Nothing wilts faster than laurels that have been rested upon.”

* Guy de Maupassant (Henri René Albert Guy de Maupassant; 5 Aug 1850 – 6 Jul 1893; was a French writer, remembered as a master of the short story form, writing over a hundred short stories, and as a representative of the naturalist school of writers, who depicted human lives and destinies and social forces in disillusioned and often pessimistic terms.)
  – “Patriotism is a kind of religion; it is the egg from which wars are hatched.”

Friday Funnies:
A well-worn $1 bill and a similarly distressed $20 bill arrived at a Federal Reserve Bank to be retired. As they moved along the conveyor belt to the shredder, they struck up a conversation. The $20 bill reminisced about its travels all over the country. “I’ve had pretty good life,” the 20 proclaimed.  “I’ve been to casinos in Las Vegas and Atlantic City, the finest restaurants in New York, performances on Broadway, and even a cruise to the Caribbean.” “Wow!” said the one-dollar bill. “You’ve really had an exciting life!” “So, tell me,” says the 20, “where have you been throughout your lifetime?” The $1 bill replies, “Oh, I’ve been to the Methodist church, the Baptist church, the Lutheran church, the Catholic church, the …” The $20 bill interrupts, “What’s a church?”
  — Bruce Garcia, Moreno Valley, California

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a217. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  Changes to applicable regulations are listed below.
 


ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 
81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
 

CUSTOMS REGULATIONS: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – 
Last Amendment: 28 Jul 2017: 82 FR 35064-35065: Technical Corrections to U.S. Customs and Border Protection Regulations
 
DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM  (Summary here.)


EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774 
  – Last Amendment: 7 July 2017: 
82 FR 31442-31449: Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations Based on the 2016 Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Agreements [Effective Date: 7 July 2017.] 

  

FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
 
 – Last Amendment: 16 Jun 2017: 82 FR 27613-27614: Removal of Burmese Sanctions Regulations 
 

FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 
19 Apr 2017: 
82 FR 18383-18393: Foreign Trade Regulations: Clarification on Filing Requirements 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 
here.
  – The latest edition (18 Jul 2017) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, and Census/AES guidance.  Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance 
website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR.
 

HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA), 1 Jan 2017: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 25 Jul 2017: 
Harmonized System Update 1704, containing 
2,564 ABI records and 463 harmonized tariff records. 
  – HTS codes for AES are available 
here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available 
here.
 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130.
  – Last Amendment: 11 Jan 2017: 82 FR 3168-3170: 2017 Civil Monetary Penalties Inflationary Adjustment
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 10 Jun 2017) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III.  The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text.  Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.  The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a318
. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor)
 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of Daily Bugle Top Stories” posted here.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

* SUBSCRIPTIONS: Subscriptions are free.  Subscribe by completing the request form on the Full Circle Compliance website.

* TO UNSUBSCRIBE: Use the Safe Unsubscribe link below.

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