17-0619 Monday “The Daily Bugle”

17-0619 Monday “Daily Bugle”

Monday, 19 June 2017

The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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  1. Commerce/BIS Releases Procedures for Attending or Viewing Remotely the Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum 
  1. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. DHS/CBP Announces ACE PRODUCTION Deployment on 20 June
  4. Justice: Former U.S. Naval Attaché and Military Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador in the Philippines Sentenced for Taking Bribes in Massive Navy Corruption Scandal
  5. State/DDTC Announces DTAS System Outage on 22 June
  6. White House Publishes National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba
  7. Australia DEC Announces Export Controls Outreach Program
  1. Haaretz: “Israel Approves 99.8 Percent of All Weapon Export Requests”
  2. Reuters: “EU Agrees to Use Sanctions Against Cyber Hackers”
  3. Reuters: “EU Extends Crimea Sanctions, Same Seen for Curbs on Russia”
  4. ST&R Trade Report: “Trade Enforcement Coordination Center Established in Atlanta”
  1. D.M. Edelman: “OFAC’s Broad Latitude to Impose Iran Sanctions Affirmed by D.C. Circuit”
  2. H. Alavi & T. Khamichonak: “EU and U.S. Export Control Regimes for Dual Use Goods: An Overview of Existing Frameworks”
  3. K.C. Georgi, R.K. Alberda & M.T. Perrin-Steinberg: “Trump’s Cuba Policy: Tough Rhetoric and Modest Regulatory Changes”
  4. K. Anderson & S. Cogman: “U.S. Senate Approves Russia Sanctions Amendment”
  5. R.C. Burns: ” New Cuba Travel Rules: No Place to Stay, No Place to Eat, Nothing to Do While There”
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 94 Jobs Posted 
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Changes: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (27 Jan 2017), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (14 Jun 2017), FACR/OFAC (16 Jun 2017), FTR (19 Apr 2017), HTSUS (7 Mar 2017), ITAR (11 Jan 2017) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 



Commerce/BIS Releases Procedures for Attending or Viewing Remotely the Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum

(Source: Federal Register) [Excerpts.]
82 FR 27798-27799: Notice on Procedures for Attending or Viewing Remotely the Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum
* AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Commerce.
* ACTION: Notice on procedures for attending or viewing remotely the public hearing.
* SUMMARY: On May 9, 2017 (82 FR 21509), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), published the Notice of Request for Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum. The May 9 notice specified that the Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to determine the effects on the national security of imports of aluminum. This investigation has been initiated under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended. (See the May 9 notice for additional details on the investigation and the request for public comments.)
  The May 9 notice also announced that the Department of Commerce will hold a public hearing on the investigation on June 22, 2017 in Washington, DC. Today’s notice provides additional details on the procedures for attending the hearing and for viewing the hearing, via webcast.
* DATES: The hearing will be held on June 22, 2017 at the U.S. Department of Commerce auditorium, 1401 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20230. The hearing will begin at 10:00 a.m. local time and conclude at 1:00 p.m. local time.
  In addition to the May 9 notice, on June 2, 2017 (82 FR 25597), BIS published the notice, Change in Comment Deadline for Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum. The June 2 notice moved the original deadline included in the May 9 notice for all written submissions up by six calendar days. Commenters now are encouraged to submit their comments by June 20, 2017, but all written submissions must be received no later than June 23, 2017 to be considered in the drafting of the final report. (See the June 2 notice for additional details on the change in comment deadline.)
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brad Botwin, Director, Industrial Studies, Office of Technology Evaluation, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce (202) 482-4060, brad.botwin@bis.doc.gov. For more information about the section 232 program, including the regulations and the text of previous investigations, click here.
  For questions regarding the June 22nd public hearing, including registration and foreign national visitor access, please contact aluminum232@bis.doc.gov or (202) 705-9103.
Procedure for Attending the Hearing, or Viewing the Hearing Via Webcast
  Registration: Individuals and entities who wish to attend the public hearing in person are required to pre-register for the hearing on-line here. Anyone wishing to attend this public hearing must register by 5:00 p.m. (EST), Tuesday, June 20, 2017.
  Webcast: The public hearing will be available live via webcast. Registration is not required to view the hearing via webcast. No log-in information is required. Please click here to be directed to the live webcast.
  Visitor Access Requirement: For participants attending in person, please note that federal agencies can only accept a state-issued driver’s license or identification card for access to federal facilities if such license or identification card is issued by a state that is compliant with the REAL ID Act of 2005 (Pub. L. 109-13), or by a state that has an extension for REAL ID compliance. The main entrance of the Department of Commerce is on 14th Street NW., between Pennsylvania Avenue and Constitution Avenue, across from the Ronald Reagan Building. Upon entering the building, please go through security and check in at the guard’s desk. BIS staff will meet and escort visitors to the auditorium. Admittance to the auditorium for the hearing will be available beginning at 9:00 a.m. (EST) on June 22, 2017 and the hearing will start promptly at 10:00 a.m. (EST).
  Non U.S. Citizens Please Note: All foreign national visitors who do not have permanent resident status must register to attend the hearing here and must fax a copy of their passport to (202) 482-5361 by 5:00 p.m. (EST), Tuesday, June 20, 2017. Please also bring a copy of your passport on the day of the hearing to serve as identification. Failure to provide this information prior to arrival will result, at a minimum, in significant delays in entering the facility. Authority to gather this information is derived from United States Department of Commerce Department Administrative Order (DAO) number 207-12. Please click here to register and for more details regarding this requirement.
  Dated: June 6, 2017.
Matthew S. Borman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.

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OGS_a12. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register

* Foreign Assets Control Office; NOTICES; Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Publication Dates: 20 June 2017.]
* State Department; NOTICES; Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act Report [Publication Date: 20 June 2017.] 
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DHS/CBP Announces ACE PRODUCTION Deployment on 20 June

CSMS# 17-000358, 19 June 2017.)
There will be an ACE PRODUCTION deployment on Tuesday morning, 20 June 2017, during the 0500 – 0700 ET window for the ACE Protest module.
To be deployed:
  – CPRT-4324: Modify timeframe for the untimely indicator from 180-days-or-more to greater-than-180 days.
  – CPRT-4325: Date for Deemed Denied is incorrect. Correct date is 30th day.

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Justice: Former U.S. Naval Attaché and Military Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador in the Philippines Sentenced for Taking Bribes in Massive Navy Corruption Scandal

Justice) [Excerpts.]
A Retired U.S. Navy Captain was sentenced in federal court today to 41 months in prison for his role in a massive bribery and fraud scheme involving foreign defense contractor Leonard Glenn Francis and his firm, Singapore-based, Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA). …
In addition to the 41-month prison sentence, U.S. District Judge Janis L. Sammartino ordered Michael Brooks, 59, of Fairfax Station, Virginia, to pay a $41,000 fine and $31,000 in restitution to the U.S. Navy.  Brooks pleaded guilty in November 2016 to one count of conspiracy to commit bribery.
Brooks, who served as the U.S. Naval Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Manila, Philippines, from 2006 to 2008, has admitted accepting bribes of travel and entertainment expenses, hotel rooms and the services of prostitutes. In return, Brooks admitted that he used his power and influence to benefit GDMA and Francis, including by securing quarterly clearances for GDMA vessels, which allowed GDMA vessels to transit into and out of the Philippines under the diplomatic imprimatur of the U.S. Embassy. Neither GDMA nor any other defense contractor has ever been granted such unfettered clearances.
Brooks admitted that he also allowed Francis to ghostwrite official U.S. Navy documents and correspondence, which Brooks submitted as his own. For example, Brooks admitted allowing GDMA to complete its own contractor performance evaluations. A November 2007 evaluation, drafted by GDMA and submitted by Brooks, described the company’s performance as “phenomenal,” “unsurpassed,” “exceptional” and “world class.” Brooks also admitted providing Francis with sensitive, internal U.S. Navy information, including U.S. Navy ship schedules and billing information belonging to a GDMA competitor, at times using a private Yahoo! e-mail account to mask his illicit acts.
Twenty-one current and former Navy officials have been charged so far in the fraud and bribery investigation; 10 have pleaded guilty and 10 cases are pending. In addition, five GDMA executives and GDMA the corporation have pleaded guilty. … 

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State/DDTC Announces DTAS System Outage on 22 June

(Source: State/DDTC)
The DTAS information systems will be unavailable from 22 June 2017 at 6:00 PM through 8:00 PM for scheduled routine maintenance and patching. The DTAS systems will be available 22 June 2017 after 8:00 PM.

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White House Publishes National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba

(Source: White House) [Excerpts.]
Section 1.  Purpose.
The United States recognizes the need for more freedom and democracy, improved respect for human rights, and increased free enterprise in Cuba.  The Cuban people have long suffered under a Communist regime that suppresses their legitimate aspirations for freedom and prosperity and fails to respect their essential human dignity.
My Administration’s policy will be guided by the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, as well as solidarity with the Cuban people.  I will seek to promote a stable, prosperous, and free country for the Cuban people.  To that end, we must channel funds toward the Cuban people and away from a regime that has failed to meet the most basic requirements of a free and just society.
In Cuba, dissidents and peaceful protesters are arbitrarily detained and held in terrible prison conditions.  Violence and intimidation against dissidents occurs with impunity.  Families of political prisoners are not allowed to assemble or peacefully protest the improper confinement of their loved ones.  Worshippers are harassed, and free association by civil society organizations is blocked.  The right to speak freely, including through access to the internet, is denied, and there is no free press.  The United States condemns these abuses.
The initial actions set forth in this memorandum, including restricting certain financial transactions and travel, encourage the Cuban government to address these abuses.  My Administration will continue to evaluate its policies so as to improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy in Cuba.
Sec. 2. Policy.
It shall be the policy of the executive branch to:
      (a)  End economic practices that disproportionately benefit the Cuban government or its military, intelligence, or security agencies or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people.
      (b)  Ensure adherence to the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba.
      (c)  Support the economic embargo of Cuba described in section 4(7) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (the embargo), including by opposing measures that call for an end to the embargo at the United Nations and other international forums and through regular reporting on whether the conditions of a transition government exist in Cuba.
      (d)  Amplify efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services, free press, free enterprise, free association, and lawful travel. 
      (e)  Not reinstate the “Wet Foot, Dry Foot” policy, which encouraged untold thousands of Cuban nationals to risk their lives to travel unlawfully to the United States.
      (f)  Ensure that engagement between the United States and Cuba advances the interests of the United States and the Cuban people.  These interests include: advancing Cuban human rights; encouraging the growth of a Cuban private sector independent of government control; enforcing final orders of removal against Cuban nationals in the United States; protecting the national security and public health and safety of the United States, including through proper engagement on criminal cases and working to ensure the return of fugitives from American justice living in Cuba or being harbored by the Cuban government; supporting United States agriculture and protecting plant and animal health; advancing the understanding of the United States regarding scientific and environmental challenges; and facilitating safe civil aviation.
Sec. 3. Implementation.
The heads of departments and agencies shall begin to implement the policy set forth in section 2 of this memorandum as follows:
      (a)  Within 30 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate and in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation, shall initiate a process to adjust current regulations regarding transactions with Cuba.
           (i)    As part of the regulatory changes described in this subsection, the Secretary of State shall identify the entities or subentities, as appropriate, that are under the control of, or act for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel (such as Grupo de Administracion Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), its affiliates, subsidiaries, and successors), and publish a list of those identified entities and subentities with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.
           (ii)   Except as provided in subsection (a)(iii) of this section, the regulatory changes described in this subsection shall prohibit direct financial transactions with those entities or subentities on the list published pursuant to subsection (a)(i) of this section.
           (iii)  The regulatory changes shall not prohibit transactions that the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of State, determines are consistent with the policy set forth in section 2 of this memorandum and:
                 (A)  concern Federal Government operations, including Naval Station Guantanamo Bay and the United States mission in Havana;
                 (B)  support programs to build democracy in Cuba;
                 (C)  concern air and sea operations that support permissible travel, cargo, or trade;
                 (D)  support the acquisition of visas for permissible travel;
                 (E)  support the expansion of direct telecommunications and internet access for the Cuban people;
                 (F)  support the sale of agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical devices sold to Cuba consistent with the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.) and the Cuban Democracy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6001 et seq.);
                 (G)  relate to sending, processing, or receiving authorized remittances;
                 (H)  otherwise further the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States; or 
                 (I)  are required by law.
      (b)  Within 30 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall initiate a process to adjust current regulations to ensure adherence to the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba.
           (i)    The amended regulations shall require that educational travel be for legitimate educational purposes.  Except for educational travel that was permitted by regulation in effect on January 27, 2011, all educational travel shall be under the auspices of an organization subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and all such travelers must be accompanied by a representative of the sponsoring organization. 
           (ii)   The regulations shall further require that those traveling for the permissible purposes of non academic education or to provide support for the Cuban people:
                 (A)  engage in a full-time schedule of activities that enhance contact with the Cuban people, support civil society in Cuba, or promote the Cuban people’s independence from Cuban authorities; and
                 (B)  meaningfully interact with individuals in Cuba.
           (iii)  The regulations shall continue to provide that every person engaging in travel to Cuba shall keep full and accurate records of all transactions related to authorized travel, regardless of whether they were effected pursuant to license or otherwise, and such records shall be available for examination by the Department of the Treasury for at least 5 years after the date they occur.
           (iv)   The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Transportation shall review their agency’s enforcement of all categories of permissible travel within 90 days of the date the regulations described in this subsection are finalized to ensure such enforcement accords with the policies outlined in section 2 of this memorandum.
      (c)  The Secretary of the Treasury shall regularly audit travel to Cuba to ensure that travelers are complying with relevant statutes and regulations.  The Secretary of the Treasury shall request that the Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury inspect the activities taken by the Department of the Treasury to implement this audit requirement.  The Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury shall provide a report to the President, through the Secretary of the Treasury, summarizing the results of that inspection within 180 days of the adjustment of current regulations described in subsection (b) of this section and annually thereafter.
      (d)  The Secretary of the Treasury shall adjust the Department of the Treasury’s current regulation defining the term “prohibited officials of the Government of Cuba” so that, for purposes of title 31, part 515 of the Code of Federal Regulations, it includes Ministers and Vice-Ministers, members of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers; members and employees of the National Assembly of People’s Power; members of any provincial assembly; local sector chiefs of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution; Director Generals and sub-Director Generals and higher of all Cuban ministries and state agencies; employees of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT); employees of the Ministry of Defense (MINFAR); secretaries and first secretaries of the Confederation of Labor of Cuba (CTC) and its component unions; chief editors, editors, and deputy editors of Cuban state-run media organizations and programs, including newspapers, television, and radio; and members and employees of the Supreme Court (Tribuno Supremo Nacional).
      (e)  The Secretary of State and the Representative of the United States to the United Nations shall oppose efforts at the United Nations or (with respect to the Secretary of State) any other international forum to lift the embargo until a transition government in Cuba, as described in section 205 of the LIBERTAD Act, exists.
      (f)  The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, shall provide a report to the President assessing whether and to what degree the Cuban government has satisfied the requirements of a transition government as described in section 205(a) of the LIBERTAD Act, taking into account the additional factors listed in section 205(b) of that Act.  This report shall include a review of human rights abuses committed against the Cuban people, such as unlawful detentions, arbitrary arrests, and inhumane treatment.
      (g)  The Attorney General shall, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, issue a report to the President on issues related to fugitives from American justice living in Cuba or being harbored by the Cuban government.
      (h)  The Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall review all democracy development programs of the Federal Government in Cuba to ensure that they align with the criteria set forth in section 109(a) of the LIBERTAD Act.
      (i)  The Secretary of State shall convene a task force, composed of relevant departments and agencies, including the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and appropriate non-governmental organizations and private-sector entities, to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba, including through Federal Government support of programs and activities that encourage freedom of expression through independent media and internet freedom so that the Cuban people can enjoy the free and unregulated flow of information.
      (j)  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall continue to discourage dangerous, unlawful migration that puts Cuban and American lives at risk.  The Secretary of Defense shall continue to provide support, as necessary, to the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security in carrying out the duties regarding interdiction of migrants.
      (k)  The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall annually report to the President regarding the engagement of the United States with Cuba to ensure that engagement is advancing the interests of the United States.
      (l)  All activities conducted pursuant to subsections (a) through (k) of this section shall be carried out in a manner that furthers the interests of the United States, including by appropriately protecting sensitive sources, methods, and operations of the Federal Government.
Sec. 4.  Earlier Presidential Actions.
      (a)  This memorandum supersedes and replaces both National Security Presidential Directive-52 of June 28, 2007, U.S. Policy toward Cuba, and Presidential Policy Directive-43 of October 14, 2016, United States-Cuba Normalization.
      (b)  This memorandum does not affect either Executive Order 12807 of May 24, 1992, Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, or Executive Order 13276 of November 15, 2002, Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning Undocumented Aliens Interdicted or Intercepted in the Caribbean Region.
Sec. 5.  General Provisions.
      (a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
           (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
           (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
      (b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable laws and subject to the availability of appropriations.
      (c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
      (d)  The Secretary of State is hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

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Australia DEC Announces Export Controls Outreach Program

(Source: Australia DEC)
Australia Defense Export Controls (DEC) is conducting an outreach program to cover the requirements exporters must meet when exporting goods and technology that are controlled, have a potential military end use or could be used in a weapon of mass destruction program. This year we will be visiting Melbourne, Brisbane, Sydney and Adelaide.
Our first program will be in Melbourne, on 12 and 13 July at RMIT City Campus.
The program will be delivered over two days, and participants are welcome to register for one or two days, or any elements of those days.
Day One:
  (1) Introduction to export controls
  (2) Export controls for defence industry OR Export controls for academia and research organisations
  (3) Presentations from other government agencies in Australia’s export landscape OR one-on-one sessions with DEC representatives
Day Two:
  (1) International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR) training
  (2) One-on-one sessions with DEC representatives
The program for the day is available for download here. Please click here to register your attendance.

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UK/DIT Tests OGEL Registration Service

UK/DIT Blog)
We haven’t blogged for a few weeks because of the election. But progress on the new licensing service to replace SPIRE has carried on throughout, not least on the open general export licence (OGEL) registration process.
Registration, Not Application
OGELs are reusable licences that don’t require you to declare the recipient of the items when you export them. Instead you complete returns once a year, detailing your use of the licence.
Crucially, you don’t need to apply for an OGEL. You simply register for it, and use it without needing to wait for approval.
We’re now asking for your help with the new version of the OGEL registration service. Hopefully it’s a simplified version of what you’ll find in SPIRE, but we’ll let you be the judge.
How You Can Help
It’s important to mention that this is just a test. You won’t be registering for a real OGEL.
We’re asking people to run through our classification code service to begin with. When the new service is live you won’t need to do this each time you want to register for an OGEL. At this stage we haven’t yet made OGEL registration a standalone service, but we will.
Email lite.feedback@digital.trade.gov.uk if you want to be part of the test and we’ll send you instructions.
You can email us at the same address if you have any questions about this or any of the other elements of our development.
Thanks in advance for your help. There’s no substitute for testing our new systems with real exporters and we’re hugely grateful for those of you willing to get involved.

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Haaretz: “Israel Approves 99.8 Percent of All Weapon Export Requests”

Haaretz, 12 June 2017.) [Excerpts.]
The Defense Ministry approved 99.8 percent of requests from local manufacturers to export weapons over the past five years, according to data being revealed here for the first. 
Exports of arms, military know-how and technology require permits from the Defense Ministry, including a marketing license, which has be obtained before negotiations with a foreign client begins, and an export license, which is sought once the contract is in hand.
The Defense Ministry says it processes around 40,000 marketing permit requests a year, for exports to 190 countries. The number of export requests is much smaller, about 8,300 a year to 130 countries. 
Based on figures given to the Movement for Freedom of Information, between 2012 and 2016, a total of 98 applications for export permits were refused. That amounts to a 99.8 percent approval rate for applications to export arms, military know-how and technology. …
Ministry presentations by the Defense Export Control Agency tell exporters that the considerations underlying its policy are Israeli national security and foreign policy, international commitments, aspects of technological exposure regarding advanced armaments, international supervision over arms trading, but also the interests of the Israeli military manufacturing industry. … 

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Reuters: “EU Agrees to Use Sanctions Against Cyber Hackers”

(Source: Reuters, 19 June 2017.)
The European Union can levy economic sanctions on anyone caught attacking EU states’ computer networks, EU foreign ministers said on Monday, the bloc’s latest step to deter more attacks following incidents in Britain and France.
With German national elections in September, interference in democratic votes is a concern for the bloc after accusations of Russian meddling in the U.S. presidential election last November and the French election in May.
EU foreign ministers agreed that so-called restrictive measures including travel bans, assets freezes and blanket bans on doing business with a person, company or government could be used for the first time.
  “A joint EU response to malicious cyber activities would be proportionate to the scope, scale, duration, intensity, complexity, sophistication and impact of the cyber activity,” the bloc said in a statement.
U.S. intelligence agencies concluded last year that Russia hacked and leaked Democratic Party emails as part of an effort to tilt the presidential election in favor of President Donald Trump, which Russia denies.
A British intelligence agency has told political parties to protect themselves against potential cyber attacks, while the French government dropped plans to let its citizens abroad vote electronically in Sunday’s legislative elections because of the risk of cyber attacks.

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Reuters: “EU Extends Crimea Sanctions, Same Seen for Curbs on Russia”

Reuters, 19 June 2017.) [Excerpts.]
The European Union on Monday extended for another year its trade sanctions on the Black Sea peninsula of Crimea, annexed by Russia from Ukraine in 2014, and diplomats said they expected the bloc to do the same for its sanctions on Moscow soon.
Moscow’s annexation of Crimea is not internationally recognized. Along with Moscow’s subsequent backing of an armed separatist rebellion in Ukraine’s industrial east, it has prompted the bloc to impose sanctions on the peninsula and on Moscow, in sync with the United States.
EU sanctions on Crimea will now remain in place until at least June 23, 2018.
They include a ban on all imports from Crimea and exports to the peninsula that relate to transport, energy and telecoms. The sanctions also prohibit EU investment and the provision of tourism services there.
The bloc’s sanctions on Moscow restrict the Russian banking sector’s access to international money markets and ban most arms trading with Russia, as well as the sale of some energy-related equipment and technology.
These are due to expire at the end of July but sources in Brussels said they would be rolled over for another six months after the EU leaders’ summit on June 22-23. …
[T]he EU has so far been able to uphold its unity on sanctions. Its resolve would be tested further should the new U.S. President Donald Trump deliver on his early promises of a broad detente with Russia.
However, in May the United States joined its fellow members in the G7 group of major industrialized states in their stance that the duration of sanctions depended on Russia’s complete implementation of a peace deal for Ukraine.
The implementation of the agreement has been stuck for more than two years.
  “[T]he duration of sanctions is clearly linked to Russia’s complete implementation of its commitments in the Minsk Agreements and respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty,” the G7 leaders said, adding that the punitive measures “can be rolled back when Russia meets its commitments”.
Diplomats said they expected the move to extend sanctions to be formally finalised within days after the EU leaders’ summit. Such a decision requires unanimous support of all 28 EU states.

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ST&R Trade Report: “Trade Enforcement Coordination Center Established in Atlanta”

Officials with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations recently signed a memorandum of agreement to implement the Atlanta Trade Enforcement Coordination Center. The TECC will bring the two agencies’ commercial fraud units together to identify, inspect, and investigate foreign trade suspected of being fraudulently imported through Atlanta.
There are now eleven TECCs around the U.S. promoting interagency collaboration, information sharing, and more efficient communication about foreign imports and commercial fraud investigations in an effort to enhance the trade enforcement mission of the member agencies. Through the TECCs CBP and HSI initiate joint investigations aimed at stopping unfair trade practices that threaten the U.S. economy, restrict the competitiveness of U.S. industries, and place public health and safety at risk.

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14. D.M. Edelman: “OFAC’s Broad Latitude to Impose Iran Sanctions Affirmed by D.C. Circuit”

* Author: Doreen M. Edelman, Esq., Baker Donelson LLP, 202-508-3460, dedelman@bakerdonelson.com.
A D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal’s panel recently issued a key opinion affirming the U.S. Treasury Department’s broad ability to enforce sanctions regulations through its Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).  While the court ultimately set aside a $4.07 million penalty, the decision established critical precedent for export compliance and future OFAC enforcement actions.  Significantly, the court ruled that OFAC does not have to prove that a company’s exports actually reached a sanctioned destination in order to impose penalties for sanctions violations. Rather, OFAC simply has to show that a company knew or had reason to know that through its third-party distributor, the company’s exported goods would ultimately end up in a sanctioned country.
In reviewing OFAC’s penalty imposition, the D.C. Circuit first addressed the threshold question of whether OFAC was required to prove Epsilon’s electronics actually reached Iran in order to hold them liable under the ITSR.  The court affirmed OFAC’s interpretation of the ITSR and held that an exporter could be found liable without proof of an actual sale or shipment of goods to end users in Iran.  The panel found that 34 Epsilon shipments to Asra International violated the ITSR because Epsilon knew or had reason to know of Asra’s Iranian business ties, which were publicized world-wide on its English-language website. Further, the court concluded there was direct evidence Epsilon had actual knowledge of Asra’s website and distribution practice in Iran.
However, the opinion also concluded that the 5 latest Epsilon shipments included in OFAC’s allegations were completely unsupported by evidence and even rose to a level of arbitrary and capricious.  For these shipments, Epsilon had presented evidence to OFAC of email exchanges with Asra International indicating those particular shipments were specifically intended for a Dubai retail store and not Iran.  While the $4.07 million penalty was temporarily set aside, the case was remanded to district court and Epsilon still likely faces substantial civil fines for its export conduct despite the evidentiary concerns with its five latest shipments.
The Epsilon case provides valuable insight for U.S. exporters and highlights the importance of maintaining a robust trade compliance program to mitigate potential risks. Thus, companies must conduct due diligence on all potential distributors, particularly if they are likely to re-export your goods.  Exporters should seek to find all publicly available information on a potential distributor to limit potential OFAC liability, particularly information about the distributor’s prospective links with sanctioned countries.  As the Epsilon holding shows, it is simply irrelevant that your goods actually reach such a sanctioned destination for liability to attach.

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H. Alavi & T. Khamichonak: “EU and U.S. Export Control Regimes for Dual Use Goods: An Overview of Existing Frameworks”

Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1, June 2017)
The Romanian Journal of European Affairs has published an article written by Hamed Alavian academic researcher in the field of International Business and International Business Law, currently pursuing a PhD in Law at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain, and Tatsiana Khamichunak, a LLM Candidate at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
: The systems of EU and US export controls of dual-use items have periods of shared history, where the regulatory e orts were directed at a common adversary and with regard to a common array of critical goods and technologies. Despite certain similarities, the current export control regimes warrant awareness of the mutual policies and procedures for EU and US companies engaged in export and re-export of sensitive items. The differing approaches EU Member States take in implementing export controls and the overall complexity of the US system, now bearing the results of the Export Control Reform, make it di cult to navigate one’s way and not lose one’s sight of the forest for the trees. The article seeks to draw the changing export control frameworks in both jurisdictions and evaluate their interactions from a business perspective.
To read the entire article, click here

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K.C. Georgi, R.K. Alberda & M.T. Perrin-Steinberg: “Trump’s Cuba Policy: Tough Rhetoric and Modest Regulatory Changes”

* Authors: Kay C. Georgi, Esq., kaygeorgi@arentfox.com; Regan K. Alberda, Esq.; Michelle T. Perrin-Steinberg, Esq., michelle.perrin-steinberg@arentfox.com. All of Arent Fox LLP.
On Friday, June 16, 2017, President Donald Trump announced changes to the US-Cuba policy for individual travel to the island nation and engaging in transactions with entities associated with the Cuban military, intelligence or security services.
Although the announcement of the changes included tough talk on Cuba’s human rights record and continued lack of political and economic freedom, the changes in policy really are more akin to a tightening up of existing regulations to better achieve pre-existing policy goals. However; the changes, particularly those related to Cuban military, intelligence or security service entities, will impact the ability of US individuals and businesses to pursue some business opportunities and does create an ongoing level of uncertainty in the market.
Limitations on Individual Travel to Cuba
The President instructed the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to issue regulations that will end individual “people-to-people” travel, which is educational travel that does not involve academic study pursuant to a degree program and does not take place under the auspices of an organization that is subject to US jurisdiction that sponsors such exchanges to promote people-to-people contact.
Under the Obama administration, individual people-to-people travel was permitted provided the individuals ensured that they met the conditions of the OFAC general license for people-to-people travel to Cuba. Now, individual people-to-people travel will end and instead, only group people-to-people travel will continue to be authorized.
Group people-to-people travel is educational travel not involving academic study pursuant to a degree program that takes place under the auspices of an organization that is subject to US jurisdiction that sponsors such exchanges to promote people-to-people contact.
Travelers utilizing the group people-to-people travel authorization will be required to maintain a full-time schedule of educational exchange activities that are intended to enhance contact with the Cuban people, support civil society in Cuba, or promote the Cuban people’s independence from Cuban authorities, and that will result in meaningful interaction between the traveler and those in Cuba. An employee, consultant, or agent of the group must accompany each group to ensure that each traveler maintains a full-time schedule of educational exchange activities.
The revocation of the individual people to people authorization addresses concerns that the requirements of the authorization were not being followed resulting in individuals engaging in prohibited general tourist travel. The Administration’s policy statement frames the revision in part as enhancing compliance with US law.
This new policy will not result in changes to any of the other (non-individual people-to- people) authorizations for travel.
Restrictions on Commercial Activities with GAESA, Potentially other Entities
The Administration also stated that it intends to shift economic activity away from the Cuban military monopoly, Grupo de Administración Empresarial (GAESA), including travel related transactions. While under the current regulations, activities with the Cuban military, intelligence and security services are subject to restrictions, the reach of those restrictions was not clarified and particular entities, such as GAESA, were not identified either by OFAC or the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), as being of concern. The Administration indicated it will continue to support US individuals and businesses in developing ties to the private, small business sector in Cuba.
OFAC has indicated that the State Department will soon publish a list of additional entities with which direct transactions generally will not be permitted in conjunction with the issuance of new regulations. OFAC has also indicated it will be issuing guidance to accompany the regulations.
Impact of the Announcement
The new policy does not take effect until new regulations are issued via amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations for OFAC-specific changes and the Export Administration Regulations for any BIS-specific changes. OFAC has stated in FAQs relating to the policy announcement that the changes will be prospective, and thus will not affect existing contracts and licenses. The new regulations are expected in the coming months. The full list of FAQs from OFAC can be found here.
Any travel-related arrangements that include direct transactions with entities related to the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services that may be implicated by the new Cuba policy will be permitted provided that those travel arrangements were initiated prior to the issue of the forthcoming regulations.
With respect to individual people-to-people travel however, the traveler must have already completed at least one travel-related transaction (such as purchasing a flight or reserving accommodation) prior to June 16, 2017, and the travel-related transactions must be consistent with OFAC’s regulations as of June 16, 2017, to qualify under the old individual people-to-people travel authorization.
Similarly, any Cuba-related commercial engagement that includes direct transactions with entities related to the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services that may be implicated by the new Cuba policy will also be permitted, provided that those commercial engagements were in place prior to the issuance of the forthcoming regulations and are in compliance with the current regulations.
It appears from the language used by OFAC that there may be some ability under the new regulations to engage in indirect transactions with GAESA and other restricted entities, although the scope of such authorization may be quite limited.
Individuals and companies currently engaging in business in Cuba will need to consider the impact of these revisions on their ongoing and future business – in particular as existing contracts end and specific licenses expire. Due diligence procedures may need to be enhanced to ensure GAESA or other companies restricted by the State Department are not involved in or benefiting from a transaction. Finally, it is unclear if the intent is to allow new Cuban companies of concern to be identified on an ongoing basis by the State Department, which if the case, would certainly create added uncertainty with respect to any otherwise licensed business transaction in Cuba.
[Editor’s Note: OFAC’s full list of New Cuba-Related FAQs was included in the Daily Bugle of Friday, 16 June 2017, item #10.] 

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K. Anderson & S. Cogman: “U.S. Senate Approves Russia Sanctions Amendment”

* Authors: Karen Anderson, Esq., karen.anderson@hsf.com; and Susannah Cogman, Esq., susannah.cogman@hsf.com.  Both of Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, London.
A bipartisan US Senate coalition has approved a wide-ranging package of new Russia-related sanctions as an amendment to the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 (“S.722” or “Iran Sanctions Bill”) currently pending before Congress. The changes contemplated by these provisions-dubbed-Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (“CRIEEA” or the “Amendment”) would codify existing Russia-related sanctions and mandate congressional review of any attempts by the President to modify or terminate them.
If enacted, CRIEEA would impose significant new restrictions on carrying out Russia-related business in targeted sectors, including many applicable to non-US companies. However, it is less sweeping than prior proposals, such as Sen. Ben Cardin’s (D-MD) Counteracting Russian Hostilities Act of 2017 (“S.94” or “Cardin Bill”). CRIEEA would constrain, but not eliminate, the President’s traditional discretion in this area.
The Senate approved the CRIEEA amendment to the Iran Sanctions Bill by a wide 97-2-margin. However, the shape of any legislative changes to Russia sanctions may continue to evolve as the United States House of Representatives considers similar legislation and as the White House provides further input regarding these issues. Although House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) expressed support for codifying existing Russia-related sanctions in February, he sounded a more cautious note as recently as last week. Moreover, the Trump Administration has reportedly not taken an active part in the negotiation of CRIEEA, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was equivocal in his comments on the measure during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 13, noting that the Administration wished to maintain “flexibility” in its posture towards Russia and keep channels of communication open. The provisions of CRIEEA demonstrate, however, that there is significant potential for changes to the US-Russia sanctions environment in the near and medium term.
New Mechanism for Congressional Review of Presidential Action
Section 216 of CRIEEA imposes a congressional review regime with respect to any Presidential “action” that would modify or terminate the existing sanctions regime against Russia. CRIEEA defines “action” broadly to include efforts (i) to terminate sanctions regulations, (ii) waive the application of sanctions to specific persons (such as Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”) designated under the Russia sanctions programs), or (iii) to take any “licensing action that significantly alters United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.” This mechanism would enable Congress to block changes to the existing sanctions regime through legislation, but it does not require Congressional approval before the imposition of new sanctions.
The scope of the sanctions that would trigger review extends to all designations made under the authority of the four Executive Orders (“EOs”) related to the events in Ukraine (EOs 13660, 13661, 13662, 13685), as well as the two EOs related to the cybersecurity of the United States (EOs 13694, 13757). Section 216 would not appear to apply to Russian persons or entities sanctioned under the Magnitsky Act or under non-Russia-related sanctions programs.
If the President sought to engage in any of the three categories of action listed above, he would be obligated to submit a report to Congress, and a mandatory period of congressional review would be triggered. In the event that both houses of Congress passed a Joint Resolution of Disapproval of the President’s proposed action, and such legislation became law, the President would be barred from taking the proposed action.
Codification of Existing Executive Orders and Sanctions Regime
The Amendment also codifies six existing, Russia-related EOs, which would have the effect of barring the President from altering them without affirmative Congressional action.
The President would have no authority to terminate the sanctions imposed under the listed EOs or otherwise repeal the sanctions created under the EOs. Moreover, the new sanctions regime imposed by CRIEEA is, in many cases, mandatory, subject only to the President’s discretion with regard to whether an individual or entity warrants inclusion on an applicable sanctions list. While the President would retain authority to waive the application of the EOs and the numerous “mandatory” provisions of the new sanctions regime with respect to specific individuals and entities, the Amendment imposes a cumbersome, three-stage process of certification and Congressional review before Presidential waivers would be given effect. With respect to the Ukraine-related and cybersecurity-related sanctions, any waiver would require a certification by the President that the Russian Federation is, respectively, “taking significant steps to implement the Minsk Agreement”; or “has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions” conducted by the Russian Government.
Imposition of a New, Wide-Ranging Sanctions Regime
The balance of the Amendment imposes a broad range of sanctions spanning a number of sectors of the Russian economy, or tightens specific components of the existing sanctions regime (§§ 224-234). Significant changes include the following:
  – New sanctions authority under EO 13662 to reach SOEs in the “shipping, metals, railway, or mining sector”: Section 223 expands the scope of persons who may be designated under section 1(a) of EO 13662 to any state-owned entities (“SOE”) “operating in the railway, shipping, or metals or mining sector[s].” These terms are all undefined, and a potentially broad range of SOEs may therefore be affected.
  – Shortening of SSI debt maturity periods: Section 223 also directs the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) to modify the SSI regulations to tighten restrictions on the financing of or transactions in debt issued by any person named on a related sanctions list. Directive 1 (September 12, 2014) will be modified to impose a 14-day maturity limit (from 30 days); while Directive 2 (March 20, 2014) will be modified to impose a 30-day maturity limit (from 90 days).
  – Mandatory report on expanding SSI under Directive 1 to include sovereign debt and derivatives: Section 242 mandates the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a report to Congress within 180 days of its enactment into law that details the “potential effects” of expanding the scope of application of Directive 1 under EO 13662 to include “sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products.”
  – Modification of Directive 4 to expand scope of application: Section 223 would modify the scope of Directive 4, applying its restrictions to the provision of any goods, services, or technology supporting the “exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects” in which “a Russian energy firm [is] involved,” even if the project is outside of Russia.
  – Making UFSA crude oil and financial institution sanctions mandatory: The Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (“UFSA”) created two tiers of Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia: (i) sanctions relating to the Russian defence sector that the President was required to impose (subject to waiver authority); and (ii) sanctions relating to other economic sectors, such as the energy sector and the financial sector, which the Act merely authorized the President to impose. Section 225 of the proposed Amendment would have the effect of making the latter category of sanctions mandatory (subject to waiver authority). With regard to Russia’s energy sector, UFSA authorized the imposition of three of nine categories of sanctions against any person determined by the President to have made a “significant investment” in projects related to the extraction of crude oil from Russian territory. The UFSA further authorized the President to impose sanctions on OAO Gazprom, if Gazprom were determined by the President to have withheld “significant” natural gas supplies from a number of countries, including members of NATO, Ukraine, Georgia, or Moldova. Additionally, UFSA authorized sanctions on foreign financial institutions, where the President determines that they “knowingly” engaged in “significant” transactions related to targeted entities or individuals within the defence or energy sectors; or where the foreign financial institution, on behalf of a Russian SDN, facilitated a “significant” financial transaction.
  – Making corruption sanctions mandatory: Section 9 of the Sovereign, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (“SUA”) “authorized and encouraged” the President to impose sanctions provided for in the Act on “persons in the Russian Federation” that the President has determined are “complicit in or responsible for significant corruption.” Section 227 of the proposed Amendment would render this provision of SUA mandatory, and eliminate the Russian territorial nexus required under SUA.
  – New mandatory secondary sanctions on “facilitat[ors]” of proscribed transactions: Section 228 significantly expands the scope of sanctions under SUA by introducing mandatory secondary sanctions against persons that the President has determined have knowingly “facilitate[]” significant deceptive or structured transactions,” and do so “on behalf of” any person currently included on Russia-related sanctions lists or any child, spouse, parent, or sibling of such persons.
   – New mandatory human rights sanctions: Section 229 further expands the scope of SUA to include mandatory sanctions against persons that the President has determined are responsible for or materially assisted in the commission of “serious human rights abuses.”
  – New mandatory sanctions on those “engaging in transactions” with Russian intelligence or defence personnel: Section 231 requires the President to impose five or more items from the menu of sanctions provided under Section 235 to any person determined by the President to have “knowingly” engaged in a “significant transaction” with members or persons acting on behalf of members of the Russian defence or intelligence sectors.
  – New authorization for elective sanctions related to development of pipelines: Section 232 authorizes the President to impose secondary sanctions on any person determined by the President to have “knowingly” made an investment exceeding $1,000,000 in fair market value, or exceeding $5,000,000 in aggregate fair market value over a 12-month period, in the export-pipeline infrastructure of Russia. The investment must either “directly and significantly contribute[] to the enhancement” of Russia’s ability to construct such pipelines, or must consist in “goods, services, technology, information, or support” that could “directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the construction, modernization, or repair of energy pipelines” by Russia. The President is authorized to impose, at his discretion, a selection of five out of the menu of sanctions provided for under Section 235.
  – New mandatory sanctions related to privatization of state-owned assets: Section 233 requires the President to impose secondary sanctions on any person determined by the President to have, with “actual knowledge,” (i) made an investment exceeding $10,000,000 (or a combination of investments, each greater than $1,000,000, where the aggregate exceeds $10,000,000 in a 12-month period) or (ii) “facilitate[d]” such an investment. To fall within the scope of the sanctions, the investment must “directly and significantly contribute[]” to Russia’s ability to privatize state assets and must “unjustly benefit[]” either government “officials” or their “close associates or family members.” The potential scope of the application of this provision is uncertain, as the phrase “unjustly benefits” is nowhere defined by the proposed Amendment.
  – New mandatory sanctions on the transfer of arms and materiel to Syria: Section 234 requires the President to impose sanctions on any person determined by the President to have “knowingly exported, transferred, or otherwise provided . . . significant financial, material, or technological support” to the Government of Syria. The sanctions apply only to support that promotes the Syrian Government’s ability to acquire certain classes of weapons and munitions, including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and related technologies, but also extending to articles, services and information defined under the Arms Export Control Act.
While the provisions of CRIEEA are not law at present, and may be modified or abandoned during further stages of the legislative process, the Amendment demonstrates that there is significant support in the US Congress for a tightening of Russia-related sanctions, and suggests that large-scale relaxation of the current Russia-related sanctions is unlikely in the near term. 

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R.C. Burns: “
New Cuba Travel Rules: No Place to Stay, No Place to Eat, Nothing to Do While There”

Export Law Blog, 26 Jun 2017.
 Reprinted by permission.)
* Author: R. Clifton Burns, Esq., Bryan Cave LLP, Washington DC,
, 202-508-6067.
President Trump today (16 June) announced new sanctions on Cuba, effectively rolling back many, if not most, of the changes made by the Obama administration to loosen the sanctions.  The most significant changes will make travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens to Cuba more difficult, if not virtually impossible.
The executive order signed by Trump has not yet been released, but FAQs on the new policy have been posted to OFAC’s website. The biggest change will be with respect to individual people-to-people travel that was permitted starting March 15, 2016. Under the new rules, educational travel under the people-to-people exception will only be permitted if organized “under the auspices of an organization that is subject to U.S. jurisdiction that sponsors such exchanges.” What organizations will meet this test is not clarified in the new FAQs.
OFAC says that the individual people-to-people license remains in effect until OFAC issues new regulations, but there is a wrinkle, actually more a tectonic fault than a wrinkle. If you  purchased a ticket or hotel room before today, you can rely on the old license even after the new rules are formally adopted by OFAC. The flip side of this, however, is that you make individual travel arrangements after today at your own risk.  This is because in that case if the new rules are adopted before you complete your travel to Cuba, you’re out of luck and the individual general license no longer applies. In the worst case scenario, if the rules are changed while you’re in Cuba and you have made your travel arrangements after today, you will be in violation of the new rules unless you can instantly teleport yourself off the island.
The other change that will significantly impact travel is the prohibition on all transactions by U.S. travelers in Cuba with “entities related to the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services.” This is directed at Grupo de Administración Empresarial, S.A. (“GAESA”) which controls a large portion, probably around 60 percent, of the Cuban economy and most of the tourist sector. Almost all of the shops, hotels and restaurants in Old Havana are run by GAESA, as are most of the hotels elsewhere in Cuba. U.S. tourists who buy a bottle of cold water from a supermarket run by GAESA anywhere on the island will risk getting in hot water with OFAC when they return home.
This obviously poses problems for every traveler in Cuba whether they are on a specific license or are traveling under any of the twelve general license categories. Certainly one cannot expect GAESA to warn U.S. tourists or to plaster its name over all of its properties, hotels, restaurants, gas stations, supermarkets and stores. Never fear, however – the FAQs say that when the new regulations are adopted the State Department will publish a list of GAESA entities. So, all tourists will have to do is carry the twenty-page list around with them and check the list before ordering a dacquiri, buying a cigar, checking into a hotel, or eating in a restaurant, or doing anything else on their travels. (That sounds like fun.)
You might think that private rentals, like those handled by AirBNB, will be spared the GAESA taint. But you would be wrong. VaCuba, which handles remittances for AirBNB, is owned by GAESA.
The good news is this: if you can somehow manage to get to Cuba under the new rules and find a legal place to stay, you can still buy cigars and bring them back with you. At least, if you haven’t bought them from a store owned by GAESA.

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MS_a119. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 94 Jobs Posted

(Source: Editor)  
Published every Monday or first business day of the week. Please send openings in the following format to jobs@fullcirclecompliance.eu.
  “#” New listing this week:
* Abcam; Cambridge, United Kingdom;
Trade Compliance Coordinator; Requisition ID: CAM-012-996
* Acteon Group Ltd.; Norwich, Suffolk, or London, UK;
Head of Compliance; or email
Mike Pay
* Advanced Micro Devices (AMD); Austin TX; 
Import/Export Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 24061

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP; Washington DC; 
International Trade and Customs Specialist
; Requisition ID: 147

* Amazon; Mexico City, Mexico; Mexico Trade Compliance Program Manager; Requisition ID: 520481

* Amazon; Mexico City, Mexico;
Senior Manager, Mexico Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 520460

* Amazon; Seattle WA; NA Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 256357

* Amazon; Seattle WA;
U.S. Export Compliance PM
; Requisition ID: 475927

* Amazon; Tokyo, Japan;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 481891

* Ansell; Iselin NJ;
Senior Specialist NA Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: IRC6513
* Applied Materials; Alzenau, Germany;
Europe Trade Manager
; Requisition ID: (M3)-1701376

# Arthrex; Naples FL;
Senior Compliance Officer;

* ASML; Veldhoven, the Netherlands;
Senior Manager Trade & Customs;
Requisition ID: RC05619
* Babcock; Portsmouth, United Kingdom; 
Divisional Trade & Compliance Manager

* Bemis Company; Neenah WI;
Director – Global Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: REQ_13735
* Berry Plastics Corporation; Evansville IN;
International Trade Compliance Administrator
; Requisition ID: 4054

* Boeing; Sydney, Australia, and other locations;
Global Trade Control Manager; Requisition ID: 1700006067

* Boeing; Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and Brussels, Belgium;

Trade Control Specialist
; Requisition ID: 1700006121

* Brunswick Corporation; Lake Forest IL;
Trade Compliance Auditor
; Becky Longrie, 847-735-4755,
; Requisition ID: 22999

* Cobham Advanced Electronic Solutions; Exeter, NH, Plainview, NY, Eatontown, NJ, or Lansdale, PA;
Export Compliance Manager
; Charles Trokey

* CSRA Inc.; Falls Church VA;
Global Trade & Compliance Principal
; Alan Strober 571-375-4890; Requisition ID: 17002RN
Cubic Corporation; San Diego, CA; 
Senior Export Compliance Analyst

Requisition ID: 5982

* Danaher; Wash DC (Other locations possible);
Global Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: DAN000510

* DB Schenker (2 positions); Atlanta GA, and Long Beach CA;
Area Customs Director
; Requisition ID: 17P009

* Eaton; Titchfield, United Kingdom;
Global Trade Manager (Trade Compliance); Requisition ID: 020681

* Erickson Inc.; Portland OR;
Trade Compliance Manager
Joanna Rafiner-Jarboe
; Requisition 2017-2267

# Esterline CMC Electronics; Montreal, Quebec, Canada;
Senior Manager Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 9971BR

* Expeditors; Sunnyvale CA;
Customs Compliance Specialist
* Export Solutions Inc.; Melbourne FL; Trade Compliance Specialist;

* FlightSafety International; Oklahoma; Trade Compliance Advisor; Requisition ID 16480

FLIR; Billerica MA; 
Sr. Defense Trade Licensing & Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 8008

* Fluke; Everett WA; 
Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: FLU005544

* General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.; San Diego CA; 

International Trade Compliance Analyst (ITC) / Export Import Specialist / Global Trade Administrator
; Requisition ID: 12252BR

* George Washington University; Washington DC;
Research Compliance Officer, Export Control; Requisition ID: PI97906765

* Givaudan; Bogor, Indonesia;
Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 68063
* Harris Corporation; Clifton NJ; 
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: ES20172404-18675

 Huntington Ingalls Industries, Newport News Shipbuilding Division; Newport News, VA; International Trade Compliance Analyst 3; Requisition ID:  18350BR

* KPMG; Antwerp, Brussels;
Manager Global Trade & Customs – SAP GTS
; 122756BR

* Lam Research Corporation; Fremont CA;
Foreign Trade Intern 1

* Lam Research Corporation; Shanghai, China;
Foreign Trade Analyst 

* Lutron; Coopersburg PA;
Trade Manager-Export
; Requisition ID: 2926
Livingston International; Western Region (TX, CA, OR, WA preferred)

Trade Ad

Livingston International; Western Region (TX, CA, OR, WA preferred);
Research Consultant

* L-3 Technologies; Arlington VA;
Sr. Mgr. Corporate Customs Compliance
; Requisition ID: 087862

* L-3 Technologies, Platform Integration Division; Waco TX;
Import/Export Compliance Administrator 3
; Requisition ID 

* Lockheed Martin; Orlando FL;
International Trade Compliance Sr Staff / ITAR / EAR / Export Control Officer
; Requisition ID: 387435BR

* ManTech International; Herndon VA; 
Director of Corporate Export Control
; Requisition ID: 90965BR

* Mars – Wrigley; Chicago IL; 
Global Trade Compliance Analyst (Corporate Export)
; Requisition ID: 69452

* Maxim Integrated; Dallas TX;
Manager, Global Trade
; 3304BR

* Medtronic; Heerlen, The Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requsition ID: 16000DYY

* Medtronic; Wash DC;
Global Trade Lawyer
; Requisition ID: 170002ON

* Meggitt PLC; Maidenhead, UK;
Trade Compliance Officer 

* North Dakota State University; Fargo ND;
Director for Research Integrity Compliance; Requisition ID: 1700372
# Northrop Grumman; Falls Church VA; 
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3/4
; Patricia Vives, 
; Requisition ID: 17011893

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Herndon VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 2
; Requisition ID: 17010105

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Herndon VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3/4; Requisition ID: 17001180

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Linthicum MD;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 1
; 17003433
* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Linthicum MD;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3
; 17005262

* Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine; New Malden, UK;
Trade Compliance Coordinator

* Panduit; Tinley Park IL;
Global Trade Compliance Agent
; Requisition ID: PAND-03297

* Plexus Corporation; Neenah Wi;
Manager – Export Compliance
; Requisition ID: 14645BR
* Plexus Corporation; Neenah Wi;
Manager – Import Compliance
; Requisition ID: 14593BR
* Premier Farnell Organisation; Leeds, UK;
Trade Compliance Specialist – Europe
; Requisition ID: 4301
* Raytheon; (El Segundo CA, McKinney TX, Dallas TX, Marlborough MA, or Washington D.C.);
Senior Manager of Global Trade Management
; Requisition ID: 98724BR

* Roanoke Insurance Group; Schaumburg IL; 
Carnet Service Representative
; Requisition ID: 1019

* Saab Defense and Security USA LLC; Syracuse NY;
Senior Import/Export Analyst
; Requisition ID: USA_00413

* SIRE: Noord-Brabant province, the Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Expert; Requisition ID: 33934

* Talbots; Hingham MA;
Sr Mgr Global Trade & Customs Compliance
; Requisition ID: 1077
* Talbots; Lakeville MA;
Dir., Global Logistics & Customs Com
; Requisition ID: 1085

* Teledyne Microwave Solutions; Mountain View CA;

Trade Compliance Administrator 2
; Requisition ID: 2017-4111

* Tesla Motors; Fremont CA;
Global Supply Manager – Logistics
; Requisition ID: 38153

* Thales Defense and Security, Inc.; Clarksburg MD; Senior Manager Trade Compliance
; William.Denning@thalesdsi.com; Requisition ID: 2592

* ThermoFisher Scientific; Breda, the Netherlands;
Import/Export Specialist – EMEA CMD Commercial Offices
; Requisition ID: 44930BR

* UBC; Monheim, Germany;
Manager Customs and Trade Compliance 
* Ultra Electronics; Greater London, United Kingdom;
International Trade and Export Compliance Specialist

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Brea CA;
Sr. Anlst, Intl Trade Compl
; Requisition ID: 46798BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Burnsville MN;

Senior International Trade Compliance Analyst- Imports
; Requisition ID:33469BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Burnsville MN;

ITC Tech Manager- SIS
; Requisition ID:38565BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CT;
International Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 46876BR

United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Rockford IL;
Specialist, International Trade Compliance- Operations and Licensing
; Requisition ID: 50118BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Troy OH;
Sr. Manager, Intl Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 44065BR 

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Windsor Locks CT;
Sr. Anlst, Intl Trade Compl
; Requisition ID: 48594BR

* VAG; Mannheim, Germany;
Trade Compliance Manager (m/w)
; Contact: Mr. Florian Uhl, +49 621 749 – 1870

* Varex Imaging Corp; Salt Lake City UT; 
Senior Customs Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 11402BR

Vertiv (formerly Emerson Network Power); Columbus, OH,  
International Trade Management (ITM) Senior Specialist
; Req #1700001087

* Vigilant; Unknown location in the U.S.;
BioTech/Pharmaceutical Global Trade Analyst

# Xilinx, Inc.; San Jose, CA, US;
Global Trade Compliance Program Manager; Requisition ID: 153811

* XPO Logistics; Greenwich CT;
Global Trade Compliance Analyst

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* Blaise Pascal (19 Jun 1623 – 19 Aug 1662, was a French mathematician, physicist, inventor, writer, and Catholic theologian.  A child prodigy, he published a treatise on the projective geometry at the age of 16, and soon after, a book on probability theory, strongly influencing the development of modern economics and social science. Pascal’s earliest work was in the natural and applied sciences, making important contributions to the study of fluids.)
  – “We view things not only from different sides, but with different eyes; we have no wish to find them alike.”
* King James I (James VI and I, 19 Jun 1566 – 27 Mar 1625, was King of Scotland as James VI from 24 July 1567 and King of England and Ireland as James I, from the union of the Scottish and English crowns on 24 March 1603 until his death.)
  – “I can make a lord, but only God can make a gentleman.”
Monday is pun day:
Q. Why was Egypt considered the richest country in the ancient world?
A. Because it had banks all along the Nile.
  – Chris Collman, Englishtown, NJ

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. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  Changes to applicable regulations are listed below.
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 27 Jan 2017: 82 FR 8589-8590: Delay of Effective Date for Importations of Certain Vehicles and Engines Subject to Federal Antipollution Emission Standards; and 82 FR 8590: Delay of Effective Date for Toxic Substance Control Act Chemical Substance Import Certification Process Revisions.

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and canceled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM  (Summary here.)

  – Last Amendment: 14 Jun 2017: 82 FR 27108-271: Wassenaar Arrangement 2015 Plenary Agreements Implementation, Removal of Foreign National Review Requirements, and Information Security Updates; Corrections

: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
  – Last Amendment: 16 Jun 2017: 82 FR 27613-27614: Removal of Burmese Sanctions Regulations 
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 19 Apr 2017: 82 FR 18383-18393: Foreign Trade Regulations: Clarification on Filing Requirements 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – The latest edition (19 Apr 2017) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, and Census/AES guidance.  Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR.
, 1 Jan 2017: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 7 Mar 2017: Harmonized System Update 1702, containing 1,754 ABI records and 360 harmonized tariff records. 
  – HTS codes for AES are available
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – Latest Amendment: 11 Jan 2017: 82 FR 3168-3170: 2017 Civil Monetary Penalties Inflationary Adjustment
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition 10 Jun 2017) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III.  The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text.  Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.  The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.

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Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published

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* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., edited by James E. Bartlett III and Alexander Bosch, and emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

* SUBSCRIPTIONS: Subscriptions are free.  Subscribe by completing the request form on the Full Circle Compliance website.

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