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17-0116 Monday “The Daily Bugle”

17-0116 Monday “Daily Bugle”

Monday, 16 January 2017

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[No items today as it is a U.S. Federal Holiday.] 

  1. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions 
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.) 
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings.) 
  4. President Continues National Emergency With Respect to Iran 
  1. Reuters: “Move To Lift Sudan Sanctions Came After Trump Approval, Months of Talks” 
  2. ST&R Trade Report: “Dates and Deadlines: FTZs, Import Certificates, Self-Disclosure, Centers of Excellence” 
  1. C.N. Stinebower, A.W.H. Gourley & C. Greene: “The United States Substantially Relaxes Existing Embargo on Sudan” 
  2. E.J. Krauland, M. Rathbone & P. Jeydel: “Groundbreaking Russia Sanctions Bill Introduced in the Senate” 
  3. R.L. Cassin: “Rolls-Royce Agrees to Pay $809 Million to Settle Bribery Allegations” 
  4. R.C. Burns: “OFAC Expands Prohibitions on Re-Exports by Foreign Persons” 
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 124 Jobs Posted 
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Changes: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (20 Dec 2016), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (10 Jan 2017), FACR/OFAC (23 Dec 2016), FTR (15 May 2015), HTSUS (1 Jan 2017), ITAR (10 Jan 2017) 

EXIMEX/IM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1


[No items today as today is a U.S. Federal Holiday.]
 
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OGSOTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a11. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)


* Commerce; Industry and Security Bureau; RULES; Revisions to Sudan Licensing Policy [Publication Date: 17 January 2017.]

* Commerce; Industry and Security Bureau; NOTICES; Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Voluntary Self-Disclosure of Antiboycott Violations [Publication Date: 17 January 2017.]

* Commerce; Industry and Security Bureau; NOTICES; Orders: Berty Tyloo [Publication Date: 17 January 2017.]

* Treasury; Foreign Assets Control Office; RULES; Sudanese Sanctions Regulations [Publication Date: 17 January 2017.]

* Treasury; Foreign Assets Control Office; NOTICES; Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Publication Date: 17 January 2017.]

* U.S. Customs and Border Protection; PROPOSED RULES; Donations of Technology and Support Services to Enforce Intellectual Property Rights [Publication Date: 17 January 2017.]

* U.S. Customs and Border Protection; NOTICES; Automated Commercial Environments: Sole CBP-Authorized Electronic Data Interchange System for Processing Electronic Drawback and Duty Deferral Entry and Entry Summary Filings [Publication Date: 17 January 2017.]

* U.S. Customs and Border Protection; NOTICES; National Customs Automation Program Tests: Reconciliation, Post-Summary Corrections, and Periodic Monthly Statements [Publication Date: 17 January 2017.] 

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OGS_a44. President Continues National Emergency With Respect to Iran
(Source: The White House)
 
On March 15, 1995, by Executive Order 12957, the President declared a national emergency with respect to Iran to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the actions and policies of the Government of Iran. On May 6, 1995, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 12959, imposing more comprehensive sanctions on Iran to further respond to this threat. On August 19, 1997, the President issued E.O. 13059, consolidating and clarifying the previous orders. I took additional steps pursuant to this national emergency in E.O. 13553 of September 28, 2010, E.O. 13574 of May 23, 2011, E.O. 13590 of November 20, 2011, E.O. 13599 of February 5, 2012, E.O. 13606 of April 22, 2012, E.O. 13608 of May 1, 2012, E.O. 13622 of July 30, 2012, E.O. 13628 of October 9, 2012, and E.O. 13645 of June 3, 2013. 

On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the European Union, and Iran reached a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is and will remain exclusively peaceful. January 16, 2016, marked Implementation Day under the JCPOA, when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report verifying that Iran had completed key nuclear-related steps as specified in the JCPOA, and the Secretary of State confirmed the report’s findings. As a result, the United States lifted nuclear-related sanctions on Iran consistent with its commitments under the JCPOA, including the termination of a number of Executive Orders that were issued pursuant to this national emergency. While nuclear-related sanctions were lifted pursuant to our JCPOA commitments, a number of non-nuclear sanctions remain in place. 

Since Implementation Day, the IAEA has repeatedly verified, and the Secretary of State has confirmed, that Iran continues to meet its nuclear commitments pursuant to the JCPOA. However, irrespective of the JCPOA, which continues to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is and remains exclusively peaceful, certain actions and policies of the Government of Iran continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared on March 15, 1995, must continue in effect beyond March 15, 2017. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency with respect to Iran declared in E.O. 12957. The emergency declared by E.O. 12957 constitutes an emergency separate from that declared on November 14, 1979, by E.O. 12170. This renewal, therefore, is distinct from the emergency renewal of November 2016.

This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.

BARACK OBAMA
THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 13, 2017.
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NWSNEWS

 
The Obama administration’s preliminary decision to ease sanctions on Sudan came with the full approval of the incoming Trump administration and after months of secret meetings, Sudan’s foreign minister said on Saturday.
 
The United States said on Friday it would lift a 20-year-old trade embargo against Sudan, unfreeze assets and remove financial sanctions as a response to Khartoum’s cooperation in fighting Islamic State and other groups.
 
The move will be delayed by 180 days to see whether Sudan acts further to improve its human rights record and resolve political and military conflicts, including in Darfur.
 
This puts the final decision in the hands of President-elect Donald Trump and his secretary of state, who is likely to be Rex Tillerson, a former oil executive.
 
Addressing a news conference, Sudan Foreign Minister Ibrahim Ghandour said the potential sanctions relief are the result of six months of secret meetings held in Khartoum on issues ranging from combatting the Lord’s Resistance Army to peace in South Sudan and the country’s own warring regions, such as Darfur.
 
Sudan’s director of intelligence said he had met with U.S. Central Intelligence Agency director John Brennan twice to discuss cooperation on combating terrorism and extremism.
 
The measures do not affect Sudan’s label as a state sponsor of terrorism nor does it impact sanctions tied to Khartoum’s role in the conflict in Darfur, where the United Nations says up to 300,000 people have been killed and millions displaced since 2003.
 
Ghandour called the decision the start to improved relations with the United States that would attract foreign investment.
 
Sudan will review its monetary and exchange rate policies in a bid to lure new foreign investment after the United States lifts sanctions, the finance minister said without providing further detail.
 
Sudan’s economic problems have been building since the south seceded in 2011, taking with it three-quarters of oil output, the main source of foreign currency and government income.
 
The sanctions relief is expected to impact businesses that deal with agriculture, import-export services, transportation, technology and medical equipment, and oil.
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NWS_a3
6. ST&R Trade Report: “Dates and Deadlines: FTZs, Import Certificates, Self-Disclosure, Centers of Excellence”
 
Following are highlights of regulatory effective dates and deadlines and federal agency meetings coming up in the next week.
 
  – Jan 17: deadline for comments to FTZ Board on production activity at auto parts, motor vehicle facilities
  – Jan 17: deadline for comments to DOC on revisions to U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service user fees
  – Jan 17: effective date of USDA requirement for import certificates for organic products from Mexico
  – Jan 17: deadline for comments to ITC on potential IPR probe of basketball backboards
  – Jan 17: deadline for comments to ITC on recommended import restrictions on network devices
  – Jan 17: effective date of CBP final rule discontinuing paper notices of liquidation actions
  – Jan 17: effective date of significant new use rule requiring advance notice for imports of 57 chemical substances
  – Jan 17: deadline for comments on BIS information collection on voluntary self-disclosure of export violations
  – Jan 19: deadline for comments to CBP on interim rule on Centers of Excellence and Expertise
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COMMCOMMENTARY

COMM_a1
7. C.N. Stinebower, A.W.H. Gourley & C. Greene: “The United States Substantially Relaxes Existing Embargo on Sudan”

 
* Authors: Cari N. Stinebower, Esq., cstinebower@crowell.com, 202-624-2757; Alan W.H. Gourley; Esq., agourley@crowell.com, 202-624-2561 and +44-20-7413-1342 (London Office); and Carlton Greene, Esq., cgreene@crowell.com, 202-624-2818.  All of Crowell & Morning LLP.
 
On January 13, 2017, the United States suspended most of the comprehensive embargo that it has maintained on Sudan since the Clinton Administration. As described further below, new authorizations have been issued to permit U.S. persons to engage in most commercial activity with Sudan, including the exportation of most goods or services to Sudan and persons in Sudan, and to unblock property previously frozen under these sanctions. However, sanctions relating to the Darfur region of Sudan remain, and these, along with other sanctions programs relating to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, may continue to affect transactions with Sudan.
 
Issuance of New Executive Order
 
On January 13, President Obama issued an (as-yet-unnumbered) Executive Order (EO) which announced the new U.S. policy changes towards Sudan. In recognition of a series of “positive actions” by the Government of Sudan, the EO announced that it would terminate most aspects of the two previous EOs-EO 13067 (Nov. 3, 1997) and EO 13412 (Oct. 13, 2006)-that had authorized the comprehensive embargo on Sudan. Importantly, however, this revocation will only occur on July 12, 2017 and only after the Secretary of State, in consultation with other Administration colleagues, publishes a notice that “the Government of Sudan has sustained the positive actions that gave rise to this order….”
 
Relaxation of OFAC Sanctions
 
In parallel to the new Executive Order, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) dramatically relaxed the existing restrictions imposed in the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR). Specifically, OFAC issued a final rule establishing a new General License (31 C.F.R. 538.540) (which it refers to as the “2017 Sudan Rule”), authorizing all transactions prohibited by the SSR, including transactions in which the Government of Sudan has an interest.
 
As OFAC has clarified in a Fact Sheet on its website, pursuant to the 2017 Sudan Rule, “U.S. persons will generally be able to transact with individuals and entities in Sudan, and the property of the Government of Sudan subject to U.S. jurisdiction will be unblocked.” In particular, this means that U.S. persons can:
 
  – Import goods or services of Sudanese origin.
  – Export most goods, technology, and services to Sudan (a separate licensing requirement may apply to goods or technology subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) as summarized in the subsection below).
  – Engage in transactions with persons blocked pursuant to the SSR (designated by the tag [SUDAN]).
  – Engage in transactions in which the Government of Sudan has an interest.
  – Engage in “all transactions necessary to unblock any property or interests in property that were blocked pursuant to 31 C.F.R. 538.201”.
  – Engage in transactions relating to the petroleum or petrochemical industries in Sudan.
 
OFAC has clarified in a set of Frequently Asked Questions posted on its website that the 2017 Sudan Rule supersedes existing general licenses as well as existing specific licenses or pending specific license applications. U.S. persons need only now comply with the terms of the 2017 Sudan Rule and not with any additional conditions contained in pre-existing and more restrictive general or specific licenses.
 
The 2017 Sudan Rule did not remove all restrictions on transactions with Sudan. In particular, the following restrictions remain:
 
  – Export of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, or Medical Devices: Due to a statutory restriction, exports or re-exports of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices eligible for export under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) “must be shipped within the 12 month period beginning on the date of the signing of the contract for export or reexport.”
  – Transactions with Other SDNs: While U.S. persons may now engage in transactions with persons designated pursuant to the SSR (identified with a [SUDAN] tag), the changes did not remove any other designations. U.S. persons, therefore, remain prohibited from engaging in virtually all transactions with persons remaining on the SDN list designated pursuant to other programs, including inter alia, Darfur ([DARFUR]), South Sudan ([SOUTH SUDAN]), terrorism ([SDGT]), or proliferation ([NPWMD]).
  – Other Agency Restrictions: OFAC’s 2017 Sudan Rule also did not affect any restrictions administered by other agencies, including but not limited to the export restrictions administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) (see below).
 
BIS Relaxations
 
Simultaneously, BIS issued a new review policy for certain limited Sudan-related exports. BIS will continue to require a license for the export or re-export to Sudan of nearly all goods, technology, or software subject to the EAR that are specified on the Commerce Control List, and will continue to maintain its general policy of denial for applications to export or reexport most controlled items when intended for any end-user or end-use in Sudan, with two exceptions. BIS has now adopted a general policy of approval for the following two types of exports or reexports:
 
  – Civil Aircraft: items controlled only for AT reasons and “that are intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation or the safe operation of fixed-wing commercial passenger aircraft.”
  – Railroads: items controlled only for AT reasons that “will be used to inspect, design, construct, operate, improve, maintain, repair, overhaul or refurbish railroads in Sudan.”

This general policy of approval, however, does not apply to transactions involving “sensitive” end-users, including Sudan’s “military, police, and/or intelligence services and persons that are owned by or are part of or are operated or controlled by those services.”
 
Additional Risk Factors
 
In addition to the lingering sanctions and export control restrictions summarized above, there are additional risk factors to consider before undertaking any transactions with Sudan. These include, inter alia:
 
  – State Sponsor of Terrorism: These relaxations did not affect Sudan’s current designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
  – Skepticism from the New Administration and the Hill: The continuation of the relaxations will be heavily dependent on the views of the incoming Administration. President Trump’s administration will be responsible for making the notification required in the EO and it could revoke these changes as quickly as President Obama’s administration implemented them.
  – Corruption Risks: Sudan currently ranks 165th out of 168 in Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index.

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COMM_a2
8. E.J. Krauland, M. Rathbone & P. Jeydel: “Groundbreaking Russia Sanctions Bill Introduced in the Senate”

 
* Authors: Edward J. Krauland, Esq., ekrauland@steptoe.com, 202-429-8083; Meredith Rathbone, Esq., mrathbone@steptoe.com, 202-429-6437; and Peter Edward Jeydel, Associate, pjeydel@steptoe.com, 202-429-6291.  All of Steptoe & Johnson LLP.
 
On January 11, 2017, a bipartisan group of US Senators introduced a bill – the Countering Russian Hostilities Act of 2017 – to impose unprecedented sanctions on Russia and persons and entities conducting certain types of business involving Russia. The bill would codify into statute most of the existing sanctions on Russia, making it more difficult (though not impossible) for the incoming administration to reverse those measures through executive action. It would also impose broad new sanctions aimed at both US and non-US persons that would target broad swaths of activity involving the Russian oil/gas, technology, financial, defense/intelligence, construction, engineering, and civil nuclear sectors.
 
The new sanctions contemplated by this bill are much broader than the current US sanctions regime targeting Russia. For example, rather than focusing more narrowly on the emerging fields of Russia’s oil and gas development (deepwater, Arctic offshore and shale), as current sanctions do, this bill targets the entirety of Russia’s oil and gas sector, among other sectors. Similarly, rather than targeting only debt of certain maturity periods issued by certain Russian entities, this bill targets all debt issued by the Russian government or by any entity owned or controlled by the Russian government, along with Russia’s efforts to privatize its state-owned sector. Moreover, the statute adopts a “secondary sanctions” approach by extending the sanctions regime to the activities of non-US persons, whereas current US sanctions are focused on the activities of US persons. If enacted, there would be a significant question about how the incoming Trump Administration would implement these measures, mandatory though they are under the language of this bill.
 
The bill is co-sponsored by a senior and bipartisan group of senators (Cardin, McCain, Menendez, Graham, Shaheen, Rubio, Klobuchar, Sasse, Durbin, and Portman). It was introduced in response to Russia’s reported cyber intrusions involving the 2016 US elections and its other “aggressive” activities around the world, including in Syria and Ukraine/Crimea.
 
If enacted into law, this bill has the potential to be a game-changer for sanctions policy, diplomacy and security policy involving Russia. Even if not enacted into law, it shows strong congressional opposition to any move by the incoming administration to change drastically the course of US-Russia relations or to lift existing Russia sanctions.
 
The bill’s focus on the activities of non-US persons could put pressure on EU states and others to maintain their own sanctions on Russia – in fact, it could reignite a debate in those countries about whether to ratchet up their sanctions on Russia in order to prevent their companies and nationals from crossing the lines set by this bill, which goes much further than any major country’s existing sanctions on Russia. Alternatively, it could have the opposite effect, creating diplomatic tension between the United States and its major trading partners that may not want their companies and nationals to face restrictions that go beyond their own domestic law and policy.
 
Ultimately, it remains to be seen whether this bill will be enacted and in what form, and, if enacted, how the Trump Administration and the rest of the world will react. What is clear is that this bill sets a new foundation for the debate on Russia policy and challenges many of the preexisting assumptions about the future course of Russia sanctions under President-elect Trump. Below we summarize the detailed provisions of this bill and discuss their possible impact.
 
Codifying Existing Sanctions
 
Section 104 of the bill codifies into statute Executive Order 13694, on which we have previously commented, and requires that the sanctions imposed under that order remain in effect until the president certifies to Congress that the Russian government “has ceased cyberattacks against United States official and unofficial entities.” Presumably, the bill’s use of the word “cyberattacks” rather than cyber “intrusions” or other broader language would set a high bar for activities that would complicate the president’s ability to terminate these sanctions, such as activities that involve publicly releasing hacked information, damaging facilities, etc.
 
Section 206 codifies into statute various current sanctions regimes targeting Russia through executive action, including all of the executive orders relating to Ukraine and Crimea (specifically, Executive Orders 13660, 13661, 13662, and 13685). It also codifies into statute the “sanctions imposed pursuant to” those orders, which would presumably include the directives issued by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the designations on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) and Sectoral Sanctions Identifications (SSI) lists that were made under those orders and directives, along with the Entity List designations made by the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Some export controls on Russia probably would not be codified into law by this provision because they do not appear to have relied on the authority of those executive orders, such as the restrictions imposed by BIS on transactions involving Russia’s deepwater, Arctic offshore and shale oil and gas resources, and those involving military end-users or end-uses in Russia. However, all of these questions will be important for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to clarify during the bill’s markup. It is worth keeping in mind that there are other sanctions impacting Russia, not affected by this bill, that are imposed under other authorities, many of which have a statutory basis, such as the Magnitsky Act, Syria-related sanctions, nonproliferation sanctions, and others.
 
It is noteworthy that there is no presidential waiver authority applicable to Section 206, although the bill provides for the termination of all of the sanctions imposed under Title II upon a certification by the president that the Russian government has “(1) ceased ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, supporting, or financing, significant acts intended to undermine the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, including through an agreement between the appropriate parties; and (2) halted military operations in Syria.” Unlike the provision allowing for the termination of the sanctions under Section 104, this is a very high bar.
 
New Secondary Sanctions
 
Section 103 requires the president to block the assets and ban the entry into the United States of any person that the president determines knowingly engaged in significant activities on behalf of Russia undermining cybersecurity and either having a detrimental effect on infrastructure or compromising democratic institutions of the US or an ally. It also requires the president to impose those sanctions on any party that materially assists with such activity, along with agents, affiliates, etc. of the actor. This section is noteworthy in that it expands the cyber-related sanctions of Executive Order 13694 to include impacts on US allies, rather than being limited to impacts on the United States itself, likely, at least in part, in anticipation of upcoming elections in Europe and concerns about possible Russian interference. Any business with any entity linked to Russia that may have a role in such activity would be subject to sanctions risk – that could potentially include large portions of the technology sector, along with the Russian government/security sector.
 
Section 105 requires the president, within 180 days after the bill’s enactment, to impose five or more measures from a menu of available sanctions against persons knowingly engaging in significant transactions with a person that is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the Russian defense or intelligence sectors, including the GRU and FSB, which, as we previously discussed, are already sanctioned. The menu of sanctions includes:
 
  (1) Prohibiting “any person” from conducting any transactions or dealings involving property in which the sanctioned person has any interest;
  (2) Prohibiting payments and transfers of credit through financial institutions subject to US jurisdiction, in which the sanctioned person has an interest;
  (3) Prohibiting transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to US jurisdiction, in which the sanctioned person has an interest;
  (4) Prohibiting US persons from investing in or purchasing “significant amounts” of equity or debt instruments of the sanctioned person;
  (5) Prohibiting US financial institutions from providing loans or credit to the sanctioned person above $10 million in any 12-month period (with an exception for activities to relieve human suffering);
  (6) Denying export licenses for exports or reexports to the sanctioned person;
  (7) Excluding the corporate officers, principals or controlling shareholders of the sanctioned person from entry into the United States;
  (8) Cutting off loans from international financial institutions that would benefit the sanctioned person;
  (9) Cutting off assistance from the Export-Import Bank of the United States for exports to the sanctioned person; and
  (10) Prohibiting the US Government from procuring goods or services from the sanctioned person.
 
For financial institutions, the menu also includes:
 
  (1) Precluding the sanctioned person from being designated as a primary dealer in US Government debt; and
  (2) Prohibiting the sanctioned person from serving as an agent of the US Government or as a repository for US Government funds.
 
The president is also authorized to impose any of these sanctions on the “principal executive officer or officers” of the sanctioned person, or on persons “performing similar functions and with similar authorities as such officer or officers.”
 
The bill allows the president to waive the mandatory sanctions in Sections 103 and 105 with a determination that the waiver is “vital to the national security interests of the United States” or that it “will further the enforcement” of these provisions. However, in order to waive the applicability of Sections 103 and 105, the president must also certify that the Russian government “has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of the cyber intrusions conducted by that government.”
 
Sections 207 through 211 require the president to impose five or more measures from a substantially identical menu of available sanctions against persons who knowingly:
 
  (1) Make an investment of $20 million or more (or a combination of investments that equal or exceed $20 million over a 12-month period, but only if each such investment is of $5 million or more) that would “directly and significantly” contribute to the “enhancement” of Russia’s ability to develop oil or gas resources; (It is noteworthy that the bill does not limit this to oil/gas resources located in Russia, given that Russian state-owned companies are involved in oil/gas developments in several other countries.)
  (2) Sell, lease or provide to Russia goods, services, technology, information, or support valued at $1 million or more (or $5 million over a 12-month period) that could “directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion” of oil or gas production in Russia, including constructing, modernizing or repairing oil refineries and natural gas infrastructure;
  (3) Make “an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement” of Russia’s ability to construct energy export pipelines, or sell, lease or provide to Russia goods, services, technology, information or support “that could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the construction, modernization, or repair of energy pipelines” by Russia, when either such type of activity is valued at $1 million or more (or $5 million over a 12-month period);
  (4) Make “an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement” of Russia’s ability to construct civil nuclear power plants, or sell, lease or provide goods, services, technology, information or support that “could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the construction, modernization, or repair of civil nuclear plants” by Russia, when either such type of activity is valued at $1 million or more (or $5 million over a 12-month period);
  (5) Purchase, subscribe to, or facilitate the issuance of Russian sovereign debt or the debt of any entity owned or controlled by the Russian government, if issued on or after the date of enactment; or
  (6) Make or facilitate an investment of $10 million or more (or several investments each of $1 million or more aggregating to $10 million or more in any 12-month period) that “directly and significantly contributes” to Russia’s ability to privatize state-owned assets. (It is noteworthy that this last provision requires that the person act with “actual knowledge.”)
 
The bill authorizes the president to waive the sanctions in Sections 207 through 211 with a determination that doing so would be “vital to the national security interests of the United States” or would “further the enforcement” of these provisions, but only if he first certifies that the Russian government “is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreements [involving the conflict in Ukraine] and to substantially decrease its military activities in Syria.”
 
Section 212 requires the president to block the assets and ban entry into the United States of a foreign person determined, based on credible information, to be “responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled” by Russia, or to have provided material assistance to such a person, along with agents, affiliates, etc. of such a person. This could affect any dealings with Russian entities operating in Crimea, and possibly also eastern Ukraine, the Russia-supported regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in northern Georgia and potentially elsewhere (e.g., the Transnistria region of Moldova). The bill allows the president to waive these sanctions with a determination that doing so would be “vital to the national interests of the United States,” along with a certification that Russia has “made efforts to reduce serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by” Russia.
 
Other Measures
 
On the diplomatic front, the bill prohibits US federal agencies from recognizing Russian sovereignty over Crimea or the independence of two Russian-supported regions of Georgia, although it is not clear how far such a legislative mandate would curtail the president’s constitutional power to “receive ambassadors” and recognize states. Among other measures, it prohibits US vessels and aircraft from taking any action that would implicitly recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea or the independence of the two regions of Georgia, presumably including seeking overflight rights and related requirements. It also states that it is “the policy of the United States . . . to ensure that any relevant sanctions relief” for Russia “is contingent on” Russia’s recognizing Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea and restoring Ukraine’s control “of the entirety of its eastern border” with Russia in the conflict zone.
 
The bill also purports to require the US government to provide lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine to “contain, reverse, and deter” Russian “aggression,” although such a provision could conflict with the president’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief.
 
Title III of this bill makes several findings regarding corruption in Russia that could lead to increased enforcement of anti-corruption, money laundering, forfeiture and related laws against Russian government officials. In this context, it is noteworthy that the bill specifically requires the US Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to establish a “high-level task force” along with OFAC and other agencies to focus on Russian financial crimes, including by issuing additional real estate geographic targeting orders. It also requires public reporting on Russian-supported media activities, to include naming US companies that advertise in such media outlets. Further, it would authorize a $100 million two-year appropriation for an anti-corruption fund to combat Russian influence and other rule of law issues in Europe and Eurasia.
 
Conclusion
 
The bill is supported by a number of senior senators, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain (R-AZ) and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Ben Cardin (D-MD). Notably absent among the co-sponsors is Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker (R-TN), who co-sponsored the Ukraine Freedom Support Act in 2014. He and other Senate Republican leaders, such as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and Senate Majority Whip John Cornyn (R-TX) have been careful not to wade too deeply into the US-Russia fray before President-elect Trump is inaugurated. Moreover, Chairman Corker may not schedule a markup of the bill until the nomination for President-elect Trump’s Secretary of State, former ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson, is successfully voted out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and reported to the full Senate. Even if that occurs, the House is in recess the week of January 16; therefore, the likelihood of either chamber voting on the bill and sending it to President Obama before President-elect Trump is inaugurated becomes more remote by the day. Once President-elect Trump takes office, supporters of the bill may need to whip a veto-proof majority that includes Republicans Republicans willing to vote against their new president in order to advance the legislation.
 
Whatever the outcome of this or any other legislation concerning Russia, the mere introduction of such a strongly anti-Russia bill by a senior and bipartisan group of senators illustrates the intensity of the environment that the new administration will confront as it seeks to formulate its approach to US-Russia relations. 

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COMM_a3
9. R.L. Cassin: “Rolls-Royce Agrees to Pay $809 Million to Settle Bribery Allegations”

(Source: FCPA Blog)

* Author: Richard L. Cassin, Publisher and Editor FCPA Blog, rlc@cassinlaw.com.
 
Rolls-Royce PLC said Monday it has reached agreements in principle with prosecutors in the UK, the United States, and Brazil to settle bribery allegations and will pay about $809 million for the global resolution.
 
In the UK, Rolls-Royce and the Serious Fraud Office reached agreement in principle for a deferred prosecution agreement that requires payment of £497 million ($599 million) plus interest and the SFO’s costs. The payments will be made under a schedule lasting up to five years.
 
The proposed DPA needs court approval. A hearing has been set for January 17 in London.
 
In the United States, Rolls-Royce said it agreed to pay the Justice Department about $170 million.
 
And in Brazil, it will pay the Ministério Público Federal $25.5 million.
 
Rolls-Royce announced the settlements in a release Monday. It said its total payments under the agreements will be about £671 million ($809 million).
 
The SFO confirmed the UK portion of the global resolution in its own statement Monday. In the United States, federal agencies were closed Monday for Martin Luther King Day and will reopen Tuesday.
 
Rolls-Royce said Monday it has “co-operated fully with the authorities and will continue to do so.”
 
It said the settlements “relate to bribery and corruption involving intermediaries in a number of overseas markets, concerns about which the company passed to the SFO from 2012 onwards.”
The company said its payments in the first year of all three agreements would be £293 million ($353 million).
 
The SFO launched a formal investigation into Rolls-Royce in late 2013.
 
The UK-based firm is Europe’s largest manufacturer of aircraft engines.
 
The investigation at first centered on Rolls-Royce’s business in China and Indonesia and reports that the company paid bribes through intermediaries there and in other markets.
 
In December 2012, in response to a request from the SFO, Rolls-Royce provided information about third-party vendors that handled sales, distribution, repair and maintenance work.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

COMM_a4
10. R.C. Burns: “OFAC Expands Prohibitions on Re-Exports by Foreign Persons”

(Source:
Export Law Blog
. Reprinted by permission.)
 
* Author: R. Clifton Burns, Esq., Bryan Cave LLP, Wash DC,
Clif.Burns@bryancave.com
, 202-508-6067)
 
Yesterday (Thursday, 12 January, ed.) the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced that it had levied a $17,500 fine against Aban Offshore Ltd. (“AOL”), an Indian oil rig company, because AOL’s subsidiary in Singapore arranged to have oil rig equipment, presumably U.S. origin although not stated as such, re-exported from Saudi Arabia to Iran. This was alleged to have been in violation of section 560.204 of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (“ITSR”) which prohibits re-exportations from the United States to Iran.
 
The OFAC action is more than a little peculiar. Both AOL and its Singapore subsidiary are not U.S. persons, and so it would seem that section 560.205 of the ITSR, which covers “reexportation of goods … by persons other than United States persons” would be the applicable provision. Of course, that section only penalizes re-exports of items that require a license from BIS for export to Iran. See § 560.205(a)(2). The oil rig equipment was almost certainly EAR99, although the OFAC document is oddly silent on this point, and would not have required a license under either sections 742.8 or 746.7 of the EAR.
 
It looks like what OFAC is doing here is pretending that section 560.205 does not limit section 560.204 at all. On its face, and without reference to section 560.205, section 560.204 prohibits re-exports by anyone, U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons alike, from the United States to Iran without regard to whether the item would require a BIS license. But if section 560.204 is intended to be read that broadly, there is no reason for section 560.205 to exist at all. It would simply be swallowed up by the breadth of section 560.204 rather than serve as a qualification of the scope of 560.204 for non-U.S. persons.
 
Granted agencies have broad latitude to interpret their own regulations, but that latitude does not go so far as to allow an agency to read one rule in a way as to render another rule absolutely meaningless. As it stands, OFAC has read section 560.205 out of its rules and held that non-U.S. persons can now be held liable for re-exports of U.S. origin EAR99 items to Iran.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

MSEX/IM MOVERS & SHAKERS

MS_a111. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 124 Jobs Posted

(Source: Editor)  
 
Published every Monday or first business day of the week.  Send openings in the following format to
apbosch@fullcirclecompliance.eu
.
 
COMPANY; LOCATION; POSITION TITLE (WEBLINK); CONTACT INFO; REQ ID
 
#” New listing this week:
 
* Aerospace Industries Association; Arlington VA;
International Affairs Director
;
Remy.Nathan@aia-aerospace.org
* Amazon; London, UK;
Senior Trade Compliance Program Manager (M/F)
; Requisition ID: 429019

* Amazon; Luxembourg, Luxembourg;
Trade Compliance Project Integration Manager (M/F)
; Requisition ID: 479077
# Amazon; Mexico City, Mexico;
Mexico Trade Compliance Program Manager
; Requisition ID: 481541
# Amazon; Mexico City, Mexico;
Mexico Trade Compliance Program Manager
; Requisition ID: 481542

* Amazon; Seattle WA;
Compliance Investigator
; Requisition ID: 432564

* Amazon; Seattle WA;
Sanctions Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 467576
* Amazon; Seattle WA;
NA Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 256357
* Amazon; Seattle WA;
Prime Air Trade Compliance Program Manager
; Requisition ID: 395658
* Amazon; Seattle WA;
Senior Compliance Audit Specialist
; Requisition ID: 473466
* Amazon; Seattle WA;
Sr. Trade Compliance PM, Fashion
; Requisition ID: 475927
* Amazon; Singapore;
Sr. Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 441734
* Amazon; Tokyo, Japan;
JP Export Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 464733

# Amazon; Tokyo, Japan;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 481891

* Apple; Singapore;
APAC Trade Compliance Analyst / Manager
; Requisition ID: 52327703

* AstraZeneca; Wilmington DE;
Sr. Import Analyst
; Requisition ID: R-001528
* Avigilon; Plano, TX;
Global Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 2016-2551

* Bank of America; London, UK;
Trade Control Analyst
; Requisition ID: 16046883

* Bayer; Leverkusen, Germany;
Head of Customs & International Trade Classification (m/f)
; Requisition ID: 0000180456

* Boeing; Englewood CO;
Intern – International Trade Regulations
; Requisition ID: 794168

* Choice Logistics; New York NY;
Manager, Global Trade Operations

* Ciena; Hanover MD;
Global Logistics Cost Leader
; Requisition ID: R005158

*
Cobham Advanced Electronic Solutions; Exeter NH, Plainview, NY; Eatontown, NJ; and Lansdale, PA;
Export Compliance Manager
; Craig Beronja,
craig.beronja@cobham.com
; Requisition ID: 00LR5
* Colony Brands, Inc.; Monroe WI;
Assistant Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 16-0954
* Crane Aerospace and Electronics; Chandler AZ;
Sr. Export Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 4725
* Crane Aerospace and Electronics, West Caldwell NJ;
Export Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 5411
* Cummins Inc.; Daventry, United Kingdom;
Lead Export Controls Analyst
* DRS Technologies; Germantown MD;
Senior Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 54749
* ED & F Man; London, UK;
Trade Support Specialist
* Edgewell Personal Care; Milford CT; 
Export Compliance And Security Lead
; Requisition ID: NAM00808
* Emerson; Cluj, Romania;
International Trade Compliance Assistant
; Requisition ID: 16006899
* Esterline Technologies Corporation; Bellevue WA;
Audit Manager – Compliance
; Requisition ID: 8215BR
* Esterline Technologies Corporation; Bellevue WA;
Sr. Trade Compliance Manager – Sensors & Systems (Engineering)
; Requisition ID: 8791BR
* Esterline Technologies Corporation; Brea, CA;
Logistics Coordinator
; Requisition ID:
8887BR
* Esterline Technologies Corporation; Brea CA;
Sr. Trade Compliance Manager;
Requisition ID: 7333BR
* Esterline Technologies Corporation; Buena Park, CA;
Manager, Shipping and Inventory Control
; Requisition ID:
9046BR

* Esterline Technologies Corporation; Frankenmuth MI;
Trade Compliance & Contracts Administrator
; Requisition ID: 9307BR

* Esterline Technologies Corporation; Paso Robles CA;
Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 6148BR

* Expeditors; Manila, The Philippines;
Regional Trade Compliance Manager – Indochina & Philippines
# Expeditors; Roma, Italy;
Ocean Export Manager
# Expeditors; San Francisco CA;
Export Compliance Specialist
# Expeditors; Sunnyvale CA;
Customs Compliance Specialist

* Export Solutions Inc.; Melbourne FL; 
Trade Compliance Specialist II

info@exportsolutionsinc.com

* Facebook; Menlo Park CA;
Head of Global Trade Compliance Operations

* Facebook; Singapore;
Export Compliance Manager, APAC 

*
FLIR; Billerica MA; 
Sr. Defense Trade Licensing & Compliance Analyst
;
Requisition ID: 8008
* General Dynamics; South Wales, UK;
Senior Trade Compliance Officer
; Requisition ID: 6079
* Givaudan; Bogor, Indonesia;
Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 68063
* Google; San Francisco CA;
Associate Counsel, Customs Compliance
* Honeywell; Moscow, Russia;
Integrity & Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 00330983

# Illumina; San Diego CA;
Import/Export Analyst
; Requisition ID: 6294BR
# Illumina; San Diego CA;
SAP Business Solution Analyst, Trade Compliance & Logistics
; Requisition ID: 6890BR

*
Ingersoll Rand; San Diego, CA;
Latin America Trade Compliance Manager (Trilingual: English, Spanish, and Portuguese)
; Requisition ID: 1610632

* Intel; Santa Clara, CA;
Global Export Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: JR0814909
* Intel; Santa Clara, CA;
Export Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: JR0005160

#
L3 Technologies, Platform Integration Division; Waco TX;
Export/Import Administrator 3
; Requisition ID 086435

* Lam Research Corporation; Fremont CA:
Foreign Trade Analyst 6
; Requisition ID: 12079BR

* Lumber Liquidators; Toano VA;
Intern, Compliance
; Requisition ID: 2227

* Lutron; Coopersburg PA;
Trade Manager-Export
; Requisition ID: 2926

* Lutron; Coopersburg PA;
Trade Compliance Coordinator
; Requisition ID: 2834
* Medtronic; Heerlen, The Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Analyst
; 16000DYY
* Meggitt Control Systems; North Hollywood CA;
Trade Compliance Officer
;
jenn.avritt@meggitt.com
; Requisition ID: 23720
* Meggitt PLC; Los Angeles CA;
Export Control/Trade Compliance Administrator
; Requisition ID: 22591
* Meggit PLC; Los Angeles CA;
Trade Compliance Officer
* Merck KGaA; South West England, UK;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 153405

# Merck & Co, Inc.; West Point PA;
Assoc. Director Global Trade Compliance – Export Control, Exports and US Foreign Trade Zones
; Requisition ID: 8728162

* Moog; East Aurora NY;
Export Compliance Manager
;
anihill@moog.com
; Requisition ID: 161913

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Annapolis Junction MD;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 4
; Requisition ID: 16028623
* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Falls Church VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3/4
; Requisition ID: 16026961
* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Falls Church VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3/4
; Requisition ID: 16027133

# Northrop Grumman Corporation; Herndon VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 2
; Requisition ID: 17000653
# Northrop Grumman Corporation; Herndon VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3/4
; Requisition ID: 17000198
# Northrop Grumman Corporation; Herndon VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3/4
; Requisition ID: 17001180

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Linthicum MD;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 1
; Requisition ID: 16028160

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Redondo Beach CA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 4
; Requisition ID: 16024309
* Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine; New Malden, UK;
Trade Compliance Coordinator
; Apply via
careers.uk@sperry.ngc.com
* NXP Semiconductors; Nijmegen, The Netherlands;
Export Control Officer, Requirements Manager
; R-10001504

#
Orbital ATK; Mesa AZ;
International Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: MGK20162212-37731

* Pall Corporation; Portsmouth, UK;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: SHA000201

* Parexel; Buenos Aires, Argentina;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: pare-10055899
* Questrade; Toronto ON, Canada;
Compliance Analyst, Trade Conduct Compliance
; Requisition ID: 724
* Raytheon; Arlington VA;
Export Licensing Manager I
; Requisition ID: 87321BR
* Raytheon; Cambridge MA;
Export Compliance Agreement Owner
; Requisition ID: 87607BR
* Raytheon; Fullerton CA;
Global Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 85521BR
* Raytheon; Indianapolis IN;
Principal SC Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 84932BR

# Raytheon Space & Airborne Systems; McKinney TX;
Sr Exp License & Compliance Adv;
Jennifer.a.martindale@raytheon.com; 310-334-7499; Requisition ID: 91155BR

# Raytheon Space & Airborne Systems; McKinney TX;
Sr Exp License & Compliance Adv;
Jennifer.a.martindale@raytheon.com; 310-334-7499; Requisition ID: 91155BR

* Smith and Wesson; Springfield MA;
International Sales Administrator
; Requisition ID: SCB-1223

* State Department; Wash DC;
Supervisory Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: HRSC/T/PM-2017-0003
* Tenneco; Edenkoben, Germany;
Global Trade Compliance Manager (m/w)
; Requisition ID: 176871-846
* Tesla Motors; Fremont CA;
International Tax Lead/Senior International Tax Counsel
; Requisition ID: 35593
* Tesla Motors; Fremont CA;
Global Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 40738
* Tesla Motors; Fremont CA;
Global Supply Manager – Logistics
; Requisition ID: 38153
* Tesla Motors; Fremont CA;
Group Manager – Logistics Sourcing
; Requisition ID: 38574
* Textron Systems; Wilmington MA;
Principal Export Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 242857

# ThermoFisher Scientific; Chelmsford MA;
Import/Export Coordinator
; Requisition ID: 40647BR

* ThermoFisher Scientific; Matamoros, Mexico;
Import/Export Supervisor
; Requisition ID: 39750BR
* ThermoFisher Scientific; Shanghai, China;
Compliance Director, Greater China
; Requisition ID: 38520BR

* ThermoFisher Scientific; Shanghai, China;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 42875BR

* ThermoFisher Scientific; Shanghai, China;
Trade Compliance Specialist – CMC
; Requisition ID: 42143BR

* Tractor Supply Company; Brentwood TN;
Customs Process Manager
;
nknott@tractorsupply.com
; Requisition ID: 16-986

# United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Charlotte NC;
International Trade Compliance Auditor
; Requisition ID:
34285BR
# United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Charlotte NC;
# United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Charlotte NC;
# United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Charlotte NC;
Program Manager, Customs
; Requisition ID:
31331BR
# United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Charlotte NC;
Specialist, ITC IT Systems
; Requisition ID: 33792BR
# United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Charlotte NC;
Sr Mgr, Intl Trade Compl
; Requisition ID: 30525BR
# United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Windsor Locks CT;
# United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Windsor Locks CT;

* XPO Logistics; Greenwich CT;
Global Trade Compliance Analyst

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ENEDITOR’S NOTES

(Source: Editor) 

 
*
Vittorio Alfieri (Count Vittorio Alfieri, 16 Jan 1749 – 8 Oct 1803, was an Italian dramatist and poet, considered the “founder of Italian tragedy.”)

  – “To err is human; but contrition felt for the crime distinguishes the virtuous from the wicked.”

 

*
Moliere (Jean-Baptiste Poquelin, 15 Jan 1622 – 17 Feb 1673), was a French playwright and actor who is considered to be one of the greatest masters of comedy in Western literature. Among Molière’s best known works are
The Misanthrope,
The School for Wives,
Tartuffe,
The Miser,
The Imaginary Invalid, and
The Bourgeois Gentleman.)

  – “It is not only for what we do that we are held responsible, but also for what we do not do.”

 

Monday is Pun Day.

Q. What did the airline attendant say to the turkey vulture who was boarding an airplane, carrying two dead squirrels?

A.  “I’m sorry, but we only allow one carrion per passenger.”

  — Eric Krantz, Lake George, NY 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EN_a313
. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  Changes to applicable regulations are listed below.
 
*
ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm 
 
*
CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 20 Dec 2016: 81 FR 92978-93027: Regulatory Implementation of the Centers of Excellence and Expertise 

* DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M
  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and canceled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM  (Summary here.)

* EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774 
  – Last Amendment: 10 Jan 2017: 82 FR 2883-2889: Addition of Certain Persons and Revisions to Entries on the Entity List; and Removal of a Person From the Entity List; and 82 FR 2875-2883: Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Control of Spacecraft Systems and Related Items the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions List (USML) 

  
*
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR)
: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
  – Last Amendment: 23 Dec 2016: 81 FR 94254-94259: Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations  
 
*
FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR)
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 15 May 2015; 80 FR 27853-27854: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Reinstatement of Exemptions Related to Temporary Exports, Carnets, and Shipments Under a Temporary Import Bond 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
  – The latest edition (9 Mar 2016) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, and Census/AES guidance.  Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR.
 
*
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA)
, 1 Jan 2017: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 1 Jan 2017: 2017 Basic HTS 
  – HTS codes for AES are available
here
.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR): 22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130.
  – Latest Amendment: 10 Jan 2017: 82 FR 2889-2892: International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Revision of U.S. Munitions List Category XV
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition 15 Jan 2017, released 13 Jan) of the ITAR is Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III.  (The GPO’s “e-CFR” has not yet been updated to include the amendments effective 15 January.) The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 750 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text.  Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.  The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.  

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., edited by James E. Bartlett III and Alexander Bosch, and emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

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