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16-1025 Tuesday “The Daily Bugle”

16-1025 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

Tuesday, 25 October 2016

TOPThe Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events. Subscribe 
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  1. President Continues National Emergency With Respect to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
  1. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.) 
  3. DoD/DSS Releases “Getting Started with Risk Management Framework” Job Aid 
  4. State/DDTC: (No new postings.) 
  1. Reuters: “U.S. House to Vote on Iran Sanctions Act Renewal as Soon as November”
  2. ST&R Trade Report: “Commodity Jurisdiction Application for Defense Goods Exports to Shift Platforms”
  3. ST&R Trade Report: “Produce Importers Report CBP Valuation Inquiries”
  1. J.P. Barker, J.B. Bellinger III & A. Jeffress: “DOJ Guidance on Voluntary Self-Disclosures of Criminal Violations of Export Control and Sanctions Laws” 
  2. Gary Stanley’s ECR Tip of the Day 
  3. R.C. Burns: “Just What Part of ‘Executory’ Don’t You Understand?” 
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Changes: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (26 Aug 2016), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (17 Oct 2016), FACR/OFAC (17 Oct 2016), FTR (15 May 2015), HTSUS (30 Aug 2016), ITAR (12 Oct 2016) 

EXIMEX/IM ITEMS FROM TODAY’S FEDERAL REGISTER

EXIM_a1

1. President Continues National Emergency With Respect to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(Source: Federal Register)
 
81 FR 74277: Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
 
On October 27, 2006, by Executive Order 13413, the President declared a national emergency with respect to the situation in or in relation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706), ordered related measures blocking the property of certain persons contributing to the conflict in that country. The President took this action to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in or in relation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has been marked by widespread violence and atrocities that continue to threaten regional stability. I took additional steps to deal with this national emergency in Executive Order 13671 of July 8, 2014.
 
The situation in or in relation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13413 of October 27, 2006, as amended by Executive Order 13671 of July 8, 2014, and the measures adopted to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond October 27, 2016. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency with respect to the situation in or in relation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo declared in Executive Order 13413, as amended by Executive Order 13671.
 
(Presidential Sig.)
THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 21, 2016.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

OGS
OTHER GOVERNMENT SOURCES

OGS_a12. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register)

* Commerce; Industry and Security Bureau; NOTICES; Denials of Export Privileges; Junaid Peerani [Publication Date: 26 October 2016.]

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a23. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)

(Source: Commerce/BIS)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a34. DoD/DSS Releases “Getting Started with Risk Management Framework” Job Aid

(Source: DoD/DSS)
 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OGS_a45. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)

(Source: State/DDTC)
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NWSNEWS

 
The Republican leaders of the U.S. House of Representatives plan a vote as soon as mid-November on a 10-year reauthorization of the Iran Sanctions Act, congressional aides told Reuters on Tuesday.
 
The act, which expires on Dec. 31, is one of the major pieces of unfinished business facing lawmakers when they return to Washington on Nov. 14 for the first time after the Nov. 8 election.
 
Aides said the reauthorization of a “clean” bill, unchanged from the current legislation, was likely to pass the House, but its fate in the Senate was less certain, given Obama administration concerns.
 
The Iran Sanctions Act, or ISA, was first adopted in 1996 to punish investments in Iran’s energy industry and deter Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
 
But President Barack Obama’s administration and other world powers reached an agreement with Iran last year in which Tehran agreed to curb its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.
 
The White House has warned Congress repeatedly that it would oppose any new sanctions that interfere with the nuclear deal. But every Republican in Congress and many Democrats opposed the nuclear agreement and do not want the sanctions act to expire.
 
They say a “clean” renewal of the ISA would not violate the nuclear pact.
 
The Obama administration asked Congress to hold off on renewing the act, saying it has enough power to reimpose economic sanctions if Iran violates the nuclear agreement.
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NWS_a2
7. ST&R Trade Report: “Commodity Jurisdiction Application for Defense Goods Exports to Shift Platforms”

 
The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has announced that effective at 5 p.m. EST on Nov. 16 it will no longer use the Electronic Form Submission application to accept commodity jurisdiction (DS-4076) applications. Beginning at 8 a.m. EST on Nov. 21 users will instead submit CJ applications via the Defense Export Control and Compliance CJ application.
 
Form DS-4076 is used to evaluate whether a particular defense article or defense service is covered by the U.S. Munitions List and therefore is subject to the DDTC’s export licensing jurisdiction. This form may also be used to request a change in USML category designation, request the removal of the defense article from the USML, or request the reconsideration of a previous CJ determination.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

NWS_a38. ST&R Trade Report: “Produce Importers Report CBP Valuation Inquiries”
 
A growing number of importers of fruits and vegetables are receiving from U.S. Customs and Border Protection letters requesting specific information about the relationships between buyer and seller and the nature of the transactions resulting in the shipments. There is some concern that this effort could presage a tougher CBP enforcement effort, possibly including audits, focusing on the valuation of produce imports.
 
In these letters CBP is seeking to ascertain (1) whether the shipments are purchased directly from the seller or exported to the U.S. on consignment, (2) which sellers are related parties (if any), (3) which producers or suppliers sell directly to the importer and which export to the importer on consignment, and (4) if the shipment is on consignment, the value declared at the time of entry, whether the company files reconciliation entries and, if not, the actions the importer will take if the amount remitted to its suppliers is greater or less than the value declared at the time of entry. The letters also refer importers to CBP’s informed compliance publications on customs value and reasonable care and CBP’s valuation encyclopedia.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

COMMCOMMENTARY

COMM_a19
. J.P. Barker, J.B. Bellinger III & A. Jeffress: “DOJ Guidance on Voluntary Self-Disclosures of Criminal Violations of Export Control and Sanctions Laws”

 
* John. P. Barker, Esq., john.barker@aporter.com, 202-942-5328; John B. Bellinger III, Esq., john.bellinger@aporter.com, 202-942-6599; and Amy Jeffress, Esq., amy.jeffress@aporter.com, 202-942-5968. All of
Arnold & Porter LLP.
 
The US Department of Justice’s National Security Division (NSD) recently issued guidance on how DOJ’s approach to cooperation from business organizations will apply in the national security context. The guidance reiterates DOJ’s commitment to pursue willful violations of export control and sanctions laws by corporate entities and their employees, and clarifies that the directives to hold corporate entities criminally liable and to prosecute culpable employees individually in criminal cases will apply with equal force in cases involving threats to national security. What is new in this guidance is the listing of “aggravating circumstances” involving potential threats to national security that may justify a more stringent outcome for companies in these types of cases. Despite this potentially more stringent treatment, the October 2, 2016 guidance nonetheless seeks to encourage business organizations voluntarily to self-disclose, cooperate, and remediate in investigations of criminal violations of export control and sanctions laws.
 
This guidance follows other recent DOJ initiatives to encourage corporate compliance and self-disclosure through incentive programs.  
The success of these programs will depend on how companies and counsel respond to these directives over the next several years.
 
Business organizations must determine whether to self-disclose potential export control or sanctions violations that could be considered willful to NSD’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section (CES) and must be prepared to meet NSD’s requirements in order to receive credit for voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation.
 
NSD’s guidance does not delineate how much credit a company may receive, but states that NSD will evaluate companies’ efforts on a case-by-case basis when considering the appropriate disposition of the case, fine amount, and monitoring requirements.
 
NSD’s voluntary self-disclosure process is not intended to change the existing practice of companies submitting voluntary self-disclosures to regulatory agencies, including the US Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) for violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) for violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), and the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for violations of US sanctions regulations. NSD’s guidance anticipates that companies will file voluntary self-disclosures concurrently with NSD and the appropriate regulatory agency, and notes that a voluntary self-disclosure to NSD is necessary only for those violations that may be considered willful criminal acts.
 
This guidance applies the Deputy Attorney General’s memorandum on Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, dated September 9, 2015 (Yates Memo), to DOJ investigations of export control and sanctions violations.

Under the strict language of the Yates Memo, to receive any cooperation credit, a company must provide all facts relevant to its employees’ wrongdoing, so that NSD and US Attorneys’ Offices may prosecute individual conduct which might otherwise have gone undiscovered or been impossible to prove.

This advisory outlines the guidance’s criteria for voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation credit, and offers insight and practical advice on whether voluntarily to self-disclose and how to minimize risks of export control and sanctions violations in light of this guidance.
 
Criteria for Voluntary Self-Disclosure, Cooperation, and Remediation Credit
 
NSD’s guidance intends to provide greater transparency about what is required from companies that are seeking credit. It states that if a company voluntarily self-discloses criminal violations of US export control and sanctions laws, fully cooperates with the government’s investigation, and appropriately remediates, in accordance with the NSD standards described below, the company may be eligible for a significantly reduced penalty, including possibly a non-prosecution agreement (NPA), a reduced period of supervised compliance, a reduced fine and forfeiture, and no requirement for a monitor. The government will evaluate the totality of the circumstances in each case to determine the ultimate resolution.
 
NSD’s guidance does not supplant the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations in the US Attorneys’ Manual (USAM Principles) regarding what prosecutors should consider when determining how to resolve criminal investigations of business organizations, but instead sets forth how NSD and US Attorneys’ Offices will evaluate credit for companies that voluntarily self-disclose, cooperate, and remediate in export control and sanctions cases.
 
Voluntary Self-Disclosure
 
To constitute a voluntary self-disclosure, the company’s disclosure must:
 
  – occur “prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation”;
  – be disclosed to NSD and the appropriate regulatory agency “within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the offense,” with the burden on the company to demonstrate timeliness; and
  – include all relevant facts known to it, including all relevant facts about the individuals involved in any export control or sanctions violation.
 
Full Cooperation
 
The guidance acknowledges that cooperation is case specific and encourages prosecutors to assess the scope, quantity, quality, and timing of cooperation to determine how much credit to award a company. The Yates Memo provides the threshold requirements for cooperation, namely that companies must provide all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct in order to qualify for any cooperation credit.
 
Specifically, in addition to the USAM Principles, full cooperation requires:
 
  – Timely disclosure of all relevant facts, including all facts related to the involvement in the criminal activity by the corporation’s officers, employees, or agents;
  – Proactive cooperation-i.e., disclosing relevant facts even if not specifically requested to do so and identifying opportunities for the government to obtain relevant evidence not in the company’s possession and not known to the government;
  – Preserving and disclosing relevant documents to the government;
  – Providing timely updates on the company’s internal investigation with rolling disclosures of information;
  – Ensuring (if the government requests) that the company’s internal investigation does not conflict with the government’s investigation;
  – Providing all relevant facts about third-party companies and individuals’ potential criminal conduct;
  – Making the company’s officers and employees, including those located abroad, available for government interviews, subject to the individuals’ Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination;
  – Disclosing all relevant facts gathered during the company’s independent investigation, including attribution of facts to specific sources where such attribution does not violate the attorney-client privilege;
  – Disclosing documents located abroad, including providing where and by whom the documents were found, unless foreign law prohibits such disclosure, which the company has the burden to prove;
  – Facilitating third-party production of documents and witnesses from foreign jurisdictions, unless prohibited by foreign law; and
  – Translating relevant documents upon request.
Companies should be eligible for some cooperation credit even if they do not satisfy all the above components of full cooperation (as long as they meet the criteria specified in the Yates Memo), but the benefits generally will be “markedly less” than for full cooperation, depending on the extent to which cooperation is lacking.
 
Even if a company does not voluntarily self-disclose, but fully cooperates and appropriately remediates the practices that led to the violations after learning of the violations from the government, the company may still be eligible to receive some credit, including the possibility of a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), a reduced fine and forfeiture, and an outside auditor as opposed to a monitor. A company that does not voluntarily self-disclose its export control and sanctions violations will rarely qualify for a NPA.
 
Remediation
 
NSD views remediation as an important step to reducing corporate recidivism and detecting and deterring individual wrongdoing. If a company fails to cooperate with the government’s investigation, then the company is likely not eligible for remediation credit. NSD will consider providing credit for timely and appropriate remediation (beyond the credit available under the Sentencing Guidelines) if the company:
 
  – Implements an effective compliance program, which includes fostering a culture of compliance within the company, instituting and dedicating sufficient resources to an independent compliance function, retaining qualified and experienced compliance personnel, performing risk assessments and tailoring the compliance program based on those assessments, implementing a technology control plan, requiring regular employee compliance training, auditing the compliance program to ensure its effectiveness, and establishing a reporting structure for compliance personnel;
  – Disciplines employees, including those responsible for the criminal conduct, and develops a disciplinary system for employees with oversight over the responsible individuals; and
  – Takes any additional steps to demonstrate recognition of the seriousness of the company’s criminal conduct, acceptance of responsibility for it, and the implementation of measures to identify and prevent future misconduct.
 
These remediation measures are similar to those encouraged by the regulatory agencies in their assessments of companies’ voluntary self-disclosures. NSD intends to coordinate with the regulatory agencies in assessing a company’s remediation efforts and compliance program.
 
Aggravating Circumstances
 
The guidance also provides a non-exhaustive list of aggravating circumstances that pose an increased threat to national security and could result in a more stringent resolution of criminal export control and sanctions violations:
 
  – Exports of items controlled for nuclear nonproliferation or missile technology reasons to a proliferator country;
  – Exports of items known to be used in the construction of weapons of mass destruction;
  – Exports to a terrorist organization;
  – Exports of military items to a hostile foreign power;
  – Repeated violations, including similar administrative or criminal violations in the past;
  – Knowing involvement of upper management in the criminal conduct; and
  – Significant profits from the criminal conduct, including disproportionate profits or margins, whether intended or realized, compared to lawfully exported products and services.

Even if one or more aggravating circumstances requiring a more stringent resolution are present, the guidance advises that companies that voluntarily self-disclose, cooperate, and remediate misconduct would still be in a better position than if they had not done so.

Hypothetical Examples
 
The guidance provides four hypothetical examples to assist federal prosecutors in exercising their discretion in prosecuting export control and sanctions cases. The hypothetical cases describe corporate action and inaction in response to potential export control and sanctions violations and the corresponding penalties and fines. The examples show that even if a company cooperates, the case still may result in a stringent resolution, including significant periods of supervision or monitoring, substantial fines, and profit forfeiture. See NSD Guidance, at 9-11.
 
Concurrent Voluntary Self-Disclosures to NSD and Regulatory Agencies
 
NSD does not intend to alter the current practice of organizations voluntarily self-disclosing violations of US export controls and sanctions to the appropriate regulatory agency, including DDTC, BIS, and OFAC, but instead intends to utilize an “all-tools” approach by working in partnership with the regulatory agencies and US Attorneys’ Offices to combat and deter export control and sanctions violations. This guidance encourages an organization to submit a voluntary self-disclosure to NSD, in addition to the appropriate regulatory agency, when an organization becomes aware that a violation may have been willful-defined as an act done with the knowledge that it is illegal-and thus potentially criminal.
 
Deciding Whether Voluntarily to Self-Disclose
 
Business organizations remain free to decline voluntarily to self-disclose, cooperate, and remediate, but risk losing out on potentially significant reductions in penalties and fines. NSD’s guidance strives to balance dual goals of encouraging voluntary self-disclosures of illegal export control and sanctions conducts and deterring these offenses through criminal prosecution and penalties. The guidance does not describe how much credit a company may receive for voluntarily self-disclosing, cooperating, and remediating, and the guidance’s hypothetical examples describe stringent resolutions despite corporate cooperation. Companies will have to consider whether the benefits of voluntary self-disclosure outweigh the increased risks of criminal corporate and individual prosecutions.
 
Companies also will have to consider whether to disclose potential export control and sanctions violations only to the appropriate regulatory agency or also to NSD. The guidance places the burden on companies to determine whether the misconduct may be a willful criminal act. Moreover, regulatory agencies have ongoing discretion to refer cases to DOJ, which would render a company ineligible to receive DOJ’s voluntary self-disclosure credit. Companies will have to consider this interagency context when deciding the timing of potential voluntary self-disclosures.
 
Companies that decide voluntarily to self-disclose should be prepared to provide all relevant facts regarding the wrongdoing, including all facts related to individual officers, employees, or agents’ involvement, to receive cooperation credit. The Yates Memo on individual accountability provides the threshold requirements for a company to receive cooperation credit. NSD expects that a company’s voluntary self-disclosure will include all culpable information of individual wrongdoing if the company seeks to receive cooperation credit.
 
Practical Advice for Handing Export Control and Sanctions Risks in Light of NSD’s Guidance
 
NSD’s guidance increases transparency regarding its expectations for companies seeking credit for voluntary self-disclosures, cooperation, and remediation in investigations of criminal export control and sanctions violations.
 
To mitigate risks of export control and sanctions violations, companies should consider:
 
  – Implementing a strong export control and sanctions compliance program and hiring skilled and experienced compliance personnel to prevent and detect such violations;
  – Developing a culture of compliance within the company and training employees to identify and escalate potential issues;
  – Ensuring that corporate affiliates, particularly those located abroad, understand their US export control and sanctions obligations; and
  – Developing capabilities to initiate an internal investigation to understand the facts involved in the potential misconduct.
 
Once a potential violation has been identified, a company should:
 
  – Initiate an internal investigation and work with outside counsel as appropriate to manage an independent and thorough investigation;
  – Preserve immediately all relevant records;
  – Because of DOJ’s focus on individual misconduct in the corporate context, consider whether to retain separate counsel for individuals associated with the potential wrongdoing;
  – Consider whether and when to disclose potential violations to the regulatory agencies and/or NSD, with the awareness that if the regulatory agencies or other third parties disclose the wrongdoing before the company does, the company likely will not be eligible for full cooperation credit; and
  – Be committed and prepared to provide full disclosure of the relevant facts to receive full cooperation credit, including providing DOJ access to documents and witnesses located abroad in compliance with foreign laws.
 
Companies will have to make the strategic decision when confronted with potential export control and sanctions violations whether to seek the benefits of DOJ’s voluntary self-disclosure program or risk significantly higher penalties and fines. The success of DOJ’s program, which aims to encourage disclosures of potentially criminal violations and to prosecute corporate entities and individuals for those violations, will become clearer as companies and counsel respond to these directives over the next several years.

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COMM_a210. Gary Stanley’s ECR Tip of the Day
(Source: Defense and Export-Import Update; available by subscription from
gstanley@glstrade.com
)
 
* Author: Gary Stanley, Esq., Global Legal Services, PC, (202) 352-3059,
gstanley@glstrade.com
 

The criteria of the definition of “part” is not based on the overall size of the “part.” In many cases, a “part” may be small, but in other cases a “part” may be very large. The importance of the “part” in the overall functioning of the larger “component,” “accessory,” or “attachment” into which it is incorporated has no bearing on whether a commodity is considered a “part.”

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

COMM_a311
.
R.C. Burns: “Just What Part of ‘Executory’ Don’t You Understand?”

(Source:
Export Law Blog
. Reprinted by permission.)
 
* Author: R. Clifton Burns, Esq., Bryan Cave LLP, Wash DC, 202-624-3949,
Clif.Burns@bryancave.com
)
 
A lawyer at another DC firm is having a conniption fit over the part of the new Cuba regulations that authorizes U.S. persons to enter into executory contracts in Cuba that are contingent upon OFAC approval. He apparently thinks that this goes to the “core” of the embargo and that OFAC is overstepping its authority as circumscribed by section 102 of the Helms-Burton Act and, although he does not cite it, section 204 of that same act.
 
We’ve all been through this before: section 204 applies only if the President seeks to “end” the embargo. As long as imports of chia pets and thermal underwear from Cuba are prohibited, the embargo has not been ended, which leaves OFAC and the White House pretty much free to do what they want in this regard.
 
Section 102, which is the provision relied on here by the lawyer in question, codifies the Cuban Assets Control Regulations in effect as of the date of the law’s enactment. But those regulations, in section 515.201, specifically provide that everything prohibited by the regulations may be “authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury (or any person, agency, or instrumentality designated by him) by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise.” So, once again, OFAC can pretty much promulgate general licenses and regulations to its heart’s content. Whether it was Mr. Helms or Mr. Burton who left open this truck-height loophole doesn’t really matter.
 
Leaving aside the broader issue of authority, the blog post criticizing OFAC’s new rules on executory contracts somehow thinks that this rule goes to the “core” of the embargo – but why that is the case is far from clear. The author thinks that the problem arises because the executory contract is somehow or other a “dealing” in the property of a Cuban national. Now granted, OFAC has previously interpreted dealing in such a broad fashion that someone who just thinks about buying a vacation casa in Cuba has probably violated the rules. But, in an actual universe where people speak a language where words have a circumscribed meaning, it seems clear that a contract that says it isn’t dealing in property until OFAC says its okay to deal in that property, isn’t “dealing” in that property. Thus, OFAC can issue this regulation on executory contracts without violating statutory prohibitions  because an executory contract can legitimately be seen as not dealing in the property in question, because this regulation has not ended the embargo and because it remains consistent with the authority that Congress gave OFAC in section 102 of the Helms-Burton Act to authorize whatever it wants by regulations and licenses.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ENEDITOR’S NOTES

(Source: Editor)

 

* Pablo Picasso (Pablo Ruiz y Picasso; 25 Oct 1881 – 8 Apr 1973, was a Spanish painter, sculptor,
printmaker, ceramicist, stage designer, poet and playwright who spent most of his adult life in France.)

   – “Others have seen what is and asked why. I have seen what could be and asked why not.”
(This sentence is also attributed as first used by Picasso’s contemporary, George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950), in his play Back To Methuselah as “You see things; and you say ‘Why?’ But I dream things that never were; and I say ‘Why not?'”  Used by President John F. Kennedy on June 28, 1963, in a speech in Ireland, as “George Bernard Shaw, speaking as an Irishman, summed up an approach to life, ‘Other people, he said, see things and say why? But I dream things that never were and I say, why not?” It was later rephrased by Edward Kennedy in his eulogy for his brother, Robert F. Kennedy, on June 8, 1968, as “Some men see things as they are, and ask why. I dream of things that never were, and ask why not.”

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EN_a2
13. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? 


(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  Changes to applicable regulations are listed below.
 
*
ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm  
 
*
CUSTOMS REGULATIONS
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 26 Aug 2016: 81 FR 58831-58834: Administrative Exemption on Value Increased for Certain Articles  

* DOD NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM): DoD 5220.22-M
  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and canceled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM  (Summary here.)

* EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (EAR): 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774 
  – Last Amendment: 17 Oct 2016: 81 FR 71365-71367: Cuba: Revisions to License Exceptions 

  
*
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR)
: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
  – Last Amendment: 17 Oct 2016: 81 FR 71372-71378: Cuban Assets Control Regulations  
 
*
FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR)
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 15 May 2015; 80 FR 27853-27854: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Reinstatement of Exemptions Related to Temporary Exports, Carnets, and Shipments Under a Temporary Import Bond 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
  – The latest edition (9 May 2016) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, and Census/AES guidance.  Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended.  The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR, please contact us to receive your discount code. 
 
*
HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (HTS, HTSA or HTSUSA)
, 1 Jul 2016: 19 USC 1202 Annex.  (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 30 Aug 2016; Harmonized System Update (HSU) 1612, containing 4,692 ABI records and 935 harmonized tariff records.   
  – HTS codes for AES are available
here
.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
here.
 
*
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR)

22 C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. M, Pts. 120-130 (Caution — The ITAR as posted on GPO’s eCFR website and linked on the DDTC often takes several weeks to update the latest amendments.)

  – Latest Amendment:
12 Oct 2016: 81 FR 70340-70357: Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Revision of U.S. Munitions List Category XII and associated sections.

  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition 12 Oct 2016) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III.  The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, footnotes to amendments that will take effect on 15 November and 31 December, plus a large Index and over 750 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text.  Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.  The BITAR is the essential tool of the ITAR professional. The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance
website.  BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR — please
contact us to receive your discount code.  

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EPEDITORIAL POLICY

* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., edited by James E. Bartlett III and Alexander Bosch, and emailed every business day to approximately 7,500 subscribers to inform readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

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