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The Daily Bugle Weekly Highlights: Week 4 (25 – 29 Jan 2021)
Every Monday we post the highlights out of last week’s FCC Export/Import Daily Update (“The Daily Bugle”). Send out every business day to approximately 8,500 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations, The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, edited by James E. Bartlett III and Elina Tsapouri.
We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations. Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items. To subscribe, click here.
Last week’s highlights of The Daily Bugle included in this edition are:
- Commerce/BIS:Releases Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2020; Monday, 25 Jan 2021; Item #3
- Treasury/OFAC: “Sanctions List Search Upgrade”; Tuesday, 26 Jan 2021; Item #4
- Treasury/OFAC: “Issuance of Communist Chinese Military Companies General License 1A and Related FAQs”; Wednesday, 27 Jan 2021; Item #6
- Commerce/BIS Imposes Administrative Penalties for Submission of False or Misleading Export Information Involving Russia; Thursday, 28 Jan 2021; Item #3
- Gao: Report: “DOD Critical Technologies: Plans for Communicating, Assessing, and Overseeing Protection Efforts Should Be Completed”; Thursday, 28 Jan 2021; Item #4
Commerce/BIS: Releases Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2020
(Source: Commerce/BIS), 25 Jan 2021)
Find the full report here.
Treasury/OFAC: “Sanctions List Search Upgrade”
(Source: Treasury/OFAC, 25 Jan 2021)
OFAC has upgraded its sanctions list search tool with fuzzy logic that is more resource efficient. The new fuzzy logic is intended to improve the performance of Sanctions List Search and make it more responsive. As a result of the new logic, users may see differences between search results from the previous version of the tool and the newer version. Please contact OFAC technical support at 1-800-540-6322 Option #8 or O_F_A_C@treasury.gov with any questions that you may have about this change.
Treasury/OFAC: “Issuance of Communist Chinese Military Companies General License 1A and Related FAQs”
(Source: Treasury/OFAC, 27 Jan 2021)
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued General License 1A, “Authorizing Transactions Involving Securities of Certain Communist Chinese Military Companies.” OFAC has also published related frequently asked questions (878, 879).
Commerce/BIS Imposes Administrative Penalties for Submission of False or Misleading Export Information Involving Russia
(Source: Commerce/BIS, 27 Jan 2021) [Excerpts]
On January 27, 2021, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce, announced an Administrative Settlement of $540,000 (partially suspended) with Julian Demurjian of San Francisco, CA. BIS alleged that Mr. Demurjian and CIS Project, a company that Demurjian owned and operated, caused, aided, or abetted seven violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). These seven alleged violations were in connection with the submission of false or misleading information of the values of telecommunications networking equipment controlled for national security, encryption, or anti-terrorism reasons and destined for Russia. . . .
The BIS settlement agreement resolved allegations that on six occasions between December 2014 and August 2015, Demurjian and CIS Project prepared invoices on CIS Project letterhead that significantly undervalued the items, and provided these invoices to a freight forwarder. The freight forwarder subsequently filed Electronic Export Information (EEI) containing the false value information in the Automated Export System for each of the shipments. The BIS settlement also resolved allegations that, in February 2015, Demurjian and CIS Project generated and provided to the freight forwarder an invoice on CIS Project letterhead that falsely undervalued the items so that the stated value did not exceed $2,500, and thus did not appear to trigger an EEI filing requirement. To settle this matter, Mr. Demurjian agreed to a stated penalty of $540,000, of which $480,000 will be suspended for a two-year probationary period, and a two- year suspended denial of export privileges under the EAR. . . .
Gao: Report: “DOD Critical Technologies: Plans for Communicating, Assessing, and Overseeing Protection Efforts Should Be Completed”
(Source: GAO-21-158: Published: Jan 12, 2021) [Excerpts]
Protecting critical technologies-such as those used in aeronautics and space systems-is necessary for maintaining U.S. military superiority. Adversaries often try to steal or illegally export these technologies. Protecting them requires a collective effort from multiple federal agencies. DOD has begun compiling a list of acquisition programs, technologies, manufacturing capabilities, and research areas that are critical for preserving U.S. advantages. But it has not decided how to communicate the list internally and to other agencies. We recommended that DOD specify how it will communicate the list and assess and oversee protection efforts.
Why GAO Did This Study. The federal government spends billions annually to develop and acquire advanced technologies. It permits the sale and transfer of some of these technologies to allies to promote U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic interests. However, the technologies can be targets for adversaries. The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 requires the Secretary of Defense to develop and maintain a list of acquisition programs, technologies, manufacturing capabilities, and research areas that are critical for preserving U.S. national security advantages. Ensuring effective protection of critical technologies has been included on GAO’s high-risk list since 2007.
This report examines (1) DOD’s efforts to identify and protect its critical technologies, and (2) opportunities for these efforts to inform government protection activities. GAO analyzed DOD critical acquisition program and technologies documentation, and held interviews with senior officials at DOD and other federal agencies responsible for protecting critical technologies.
What GAO Recommends. GAO is recommending that DOD specify how it will communicate its critical programs and technologies list, develop metrics to assess protection measures, and select the DOD organization that will oversee protection efforts beyond 2020. DOD concurred with the first recommendation and partially concurred with the second and third. GAO maintains the importance of all recommendations in this report. . . .