Every Monday we post the highlights out of last week’s FCC Export/Import Daily Update (“The Daily Bugle”). Send out every business day to approximately 9,500 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations, The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, edited by James E. Bartlett III and Elina Tsapouri.
We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOE/NRC, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, FAR/DFARS, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations. Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items. To subscribe, click here.
Last week’s highlights of The Daily Bugle included in this edition are:
- EU Commission: “EU Trade Policy Day 2021”; Monday, 12 Apr 2021; Item #5
- Commerce/BIS: “Complying with U.S. Export Controls” April 28-29, 2021;Tuesday, 13 Apr 2021; Item #5
- State/DDTC: FAQ re Addition of Russia to ITAR; Tuesday, 13 Apr 2021; Item #7
- State: Designations of Russian Entities and Individuals; Thursday, 15 Apr 2021; Item #2
- Canada/TID: “Final report: Review of export permits to Turkey”; Thursday, 15 Apr 2021; Item #8
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EU Commission: “EU Trade Policy Day 2021”
(Source: European Commission)
On Monday 26 April, the European Commission holds its 2021 Trade Policy Day to discuss its new Trade Strategy to promote an open, sustainable and assertive trade policy for the EU.
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Commerce/BIS: “Complying with U.S. Export Controls” April 28-29, 2021
(Source: Commerce/BIS)
The two-day virtual program is led by BIS’s professional counseling staff and provides an in-depth examination of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The program will cover the information exporters need to know to comply with U.S. export control requirements on commercial goods, and other items subject to the EAR. We will focus on what items and activities are subject to the EAR; how to determine your export control classification number (ECCN); steps to take to determine the export licensing requirements for your item; when you can export or reexport without applying for a license; export clearance procedures and record keeping requirements; and guidance in applying this information. Presenters will conduct a number of “hands-on” exercises that will prepare you to apply the regulations to your own company’s export activities. This program is well suited for those who need a comprehensive understanding of their obligations under the EAR.
About the Instructors
The instructors are experienced export policy professionals, engineers, and enforcement personnel from BIS’s Washington, D.C. headquarters and field offices, as well as representatives from other U.S. government agencies as appropriate. The instructors will be available virtually through an on-line chat function to answer your questions on how the export regulations affect the export activities of your organization or client.
Location/time
This program will be held virtually through WebEx. The program will begin at 8:30 a.m. and end at 5:00 p.m. each day.
Registration
The registration fee for the Complying with U.S. Export Controls virtual seminar is $325. The fee is non-refundable after April 21, 2021. The fee includes hard copy materials that will be shipped to each registered attendee in advance, and a certificate of completion for the seminar. Registration and payment must be received no later than April 21, 2021 to guarantee receipt of materials. If received after April 21, 2021, electronic copies will be sent in place of the binder materials. Expedited shipment after April 21, 2021 is available at an extra cost. To guarantee placement for the BIS seminar: Click here to register.
Other Questions?
For more information or questions on the topics to be covered, please call BIS’s Outreach and Educational Services Division at (202) 482-6031 or contact us by email.
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State/DDTC: FAQ re Addition of Russia to ITAR
(Source: State/DDTC, 13 Apr 2021)
The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has added a factsheet and FAQs related to the Russia ITAR amendment published on March 18, 2021. Please review the factsheet here, and the FAQs here.
OVERVIEW: On March 18, 2021, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) published a final rule (86 FR 14802) amending § 126.1 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulation to include Russia and announce that, subject to certain exceptions, it is the policy of the United States to deny licenses and other approvals for exports of defense articles and defense services destined for Russia.
The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) concurrently published a separate notice of sanctions entitled “Determinations Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons by Russia Under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991” (86 FR 14804).
This notice resulted from the Secretary of State’s determination on March 1, 2021, pursuant to that Act that the Government of Russia used chemical weapons in violation of international law or lethal chemical weapons against its own nationals.
The ITAR Amendment. The final rule (86 FR 14802) does the following:
· Adds Russia to ITAR § 126.1(d)(2), which applies a policy of denial for exports, subject to certain exceptions, as specified in ITAR § 126.1(l).
· Provides in ITAR § 126.1(l) that exports of defense articles and defense services to Russia are subject to a policy of denial, except that a license or other approval may be issued on a case-by-case basis: (1) for government space cooperation; and (2) prior to September 1, 2021, for commercial space launches.
· Amends ITAR § 126.1(a) to allow exporters to use the exemptions provided in ITAR § 126.4(a)(2) and (b)(2) for exports to Russia when in support of government space cooperation.
Q: Will DDTC deny all pending license applications involving Russia as a party to the transaction?
A: DDTC is currently assessing license applications involving Russia to determine that country’s role in the transaction. If the transaction does not meet one of the carve-outs, the license application will be denied. If it does meet one of the carve-outs, the license application will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Q: I applied for and received a DDTC issued license or agreement for export to Russia. Is it now automatically void?
A: No. DDTC will contact you in the event that your existing license or other approval is terminated, suspended, or otherwise revoked. No new export licenses or other approvals that identify Russia and do not satisfy one of the carve-outs will be issued; this includes amendments to existing agreements and licenses in furtherance of existing agreements.
Q: Do I need to submit my license application in support of commercial space launches before September 1, 2021, or does DDTC need to approve my license application before September 1, 2021?
A: You should plan to submit any license applications far enough in advance to enable DDTC to complete its case-by-case review of the application prior to September 1, 2021. Average license processing timelines generally range from 35-45 days and exports involving countries listed in ITAR § 126.1 often require additional time to review.
Q: Does the policy of denial apply to temporary imports from Russia? Or does it apply only to exports?
A: As provided in ITAR § 126.1(l), the policy of denial applies to licenses or other approvals for exports of defense articles and defense services destined for Russia. License applications related to temporary imports will continue to be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security considerations.
Q: Does the policy of denial apply to brokering activities involving Russia?
A: Consistent with ITAR § 129.7(d), it is the policy of the Department of State to deny requests for approval of brokering activities or proposals to engage in brokering activities involving any country listed in ITAR § 126.1.
Q: Are certain programs (e.g., the International Space Station (ISS)) affected by the amendment?)
A: The ISS is considered a U.S. government space program. Most exports in support of the ISS should satisfy the carve-out at ITAR § 126.1(l)(1).
Q: Does the policy of denial apply to brokering activities involving Russia?
A: Consistent with ITAR § 129.7(d), it is the policy of the Department of State to deny requests for approval of brokering activities or proposals to engage in brokering activities involving any country listed in ITAR § 126.1.
Q: Do I need to submit my license application in support of commercial space launches before September 1, 2021, or does DDTC need to approve my license application before September 1, 2021?
A: You should plan to submit any license applications far enough in advance to enable DDTC to complete its case-by-case review of the application prior to September 1, 2021. Average license processing timelines generally range from 35-45 days and exports involving countries listed in ITAR § 126.1 often require additional time to review.
Q: Will DDTC deny all pending license applications involving Russia as a party to the transaction?
A: DDTC is currently assessing license applications involving Russia to determine that country’s role in the transaction. If the transaction does not meet one of the carve-outs, the license application will be denied. If it does meet one of the carve-outs, the license application will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Q: What effects do the amendments have on exports to Baikonur Cosmodrome?
A: The Baikonur Cosmodrome spaceport is currently leased by the Kazakh Government to Russia until 2050 and is managed jointly by the Roscosmos State Corporation and the Russian Aerospace Forces. Applicants should consider whether it is possible to conduct exports to Baikonur without exporting any defense articles, including technical data, to Russian persons.
Q: Can I use an exemption to export to Russia?
A: Exemptions generally may not be used for exporting defense articles or defense services to any proscribed country, as defined in ITAR § 126.1, including Russia. There are exceptions for exports to Russia when the recipient is a U.S. government department or agency and for the following exemptions:
ITAR §§ 123.17, 126.4(a)(1) or (3) and (b)(1);
ITAR § 126.4(a)(2) or (b)(2) when the export is destined for Russia and in support of government space cooperation; and
ITAR § 126.6.
Q: Will NASA make the determination whether an export meets the government space cooperation exception?
A: No. Any inquiries regarding ITAR § 126.1(l) should be directed to
DDTC.
Q: I applied for and received a DDTC issued license or agreement for export to Russia. Is it now automatically void?
A: No. DDTC will contact you in the event that your existing license or other approval is terminated, suspended, or otherwise revoked. No new export licenses or other approvals that identify Russia and do not satisfy one of the carve-outs will be issued; this includes amendments to existing agreements and licenses in furtherance of existing agreements.
Q: How long will the ITAR amendment remain in place?
A: The ITAR amendment (86 FR 14802) does not have an expiration date.
Q: Does the policy of denial apply to in furtherance of licenses that do not contain Russia, but where the overarching Technical Assistance Agreement (TAA) does contain Russia?
A: Yes. It applies to new export authorizations that include Russia in the overarching TAAs
Q: Does the policy of denial apply to temporary imports from Russia? Or does it apply only to exports?
A: As provided in ITAR § 126.1(l), the policy of denial applies to licenses or other approvals for exports of defense articles and defense services destined for Russia. License applications related to temporary imports will continue to be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security considerations.
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State: Designations of Russian Entities and Individuals
(Source: 86 FR 19939, 15 Apr 2021) [Excerpts]
* AGENCY: State Department
* ACTION: Notice of Designation of Five Russian Entities and two Russian Individuals Pursuant to Executive Order 13382.
* SUMMARY: Pursuant to the authority in the Executive Order “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” the State Department, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, has determined that FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE, STATE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF ORGANIC CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY, 33RD SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND TESTING INSTITUTE, the 27TH SCIENTIFIC CENTER, the MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE, ALEXANDER YEVGENIYEVICH MISHKIN, and ANATOLIY VLADIMIROVI CHEPIGA engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use such items, by Russia.
* DATE: The designation of these persons was effective on March 2, 2021.
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Canada/TID: “Final report: Review of export permits to Turkey”
(Source: Canada Trade Controls Bureau) [Excerpts]
In October 2019, following Turkey’s military incursion into northeastern Syria, the issuance of all new export permits to Turkey was temporarily suspended. This decision was based on Canada’s concern that Turkey’s military incursion could further destabilize the region, worsen the humanitarian situation, and roll back progress in the fight against Daesh. The suspension did not affect valid export permits, and Canadian companies holding valid permits were able to continue exporting to Turkey. . . . .
From October to December 2020, the department conducted a review of all suspended and valid export permits, and pending export permit applications for military goods and technology destined to Turkey. On November 16, 2020, during the course of the review, the Minister suspended additional relevant export permits to Turkey. In addition to the suspended permits, there are currently a number of valid export permits to Turkey for a wide variety of military goods and technology including, but not limited to: components for the production of aircraft, software and technical data for flight simulators, satellite equipment, and firearm components.
The present review was conducted on the basis of the best and most comprehensive information available at the time. New or previously unknown information could alter the conclusions. . . .