20-1119 Thursday ” Daily Bugle “

20-1119 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

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Thursday, 19 November 2020

(No items of interest posted) 

  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings)
  4. DHS/CBP: “GUIDANCE: Section 301 Tranche 3 – $200B Action Technical Amendment to Product Exclusion from China”
  5. Justice: “Former Raytheon Engineer Sentenced for Exporting Sensitive Military Related Technology to China”
  6. Treasury/OFAC: “Treasury Targets Vast Supreme Leader Patronage Network and Iran’s Minister of Intelligence”
  7. UK ECJU Updates Guidance for Service and performance Code for Export Licensing”
  1. EUS: “Atlantic Council Report on Trump Administration Sanctions”
  2. EUS: “Dutch Parliament Calls for Nagorno-Karabagh Sanctions”
  3. Reuters: “Key U.S. Commerce Dept Official Involved in China Policy Resigning”
  1. Baker McKenzie: “US Government Issues Executive Order Prohibiting US Persons from Purchasing Securities of Certain Chinese Companies”
  2. Husch Blackwell: “TikTok Legal Drama Continues to Unfold Across Multiple Courtrooms and Federal Agencies”
  3. Sheppard Mullin: “New Export Control Law: China Strengthens its Regulatory -Great Wall-“
  1. ECTI Presents 15 Dec; The Export Control Year in Review Webinar (just $99/seat!)
  2. FCC Academy Presents: 1 and 3 Dec; “U.S. Export Controls: ITAR/EAR” and “FMS”
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  4. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  5. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 

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[No relevant items for today]

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OGS_a22. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

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(Source: DHS/CBP, 18 Nov 2020)
On November 13, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) published Federal Register (FR) Notice 85 FR 72748, announcing a technical amendment to amend a previously granted exclusion under Section 301 related to goods from China (Tranche 3 – $200B Action).
The technical amendment relates to the imposed additional duties announced in 83 FR 47974, as modified by 83 FR 49153 and 84 FR 20459, on Chinese goods with an annual trade value of approximately $200 billion.  The USTR has granted a technical amendment to amend a previously granted exclusion under product exclusion round 9903.88.46, announced in 85 FR 27489, dated May 8, 2020. The technical amendment will apply as of September 24, 2018, and will extend through August 7, 2020. The functionality for the acceptance of the technical amendment will be available in the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) as of 7 am eastern standard time, November 17, 2020.
Instructions for importers, brokers, and filers on submitting entries to CBP containing granted exclusions by the USTR from the Section 301 measures are set out below:
Per 85 FR 72748, U.S. note 20(yy)(75) under product exclusion round 9903.88.46 is amended by deleting “(described in statistical reporting number 8427.90.0090)” and inserting “(described in statistical reporting number 8427.90.0000 prior to July 1, 2019; described in statistical reporting number 8427.90.0090 effective July 1, 2019)” in lieu thereof.
* Importers shall not submit the corresponding Chapter 99 HTS number for the Section 301 duties when HTS 9903.88.46 is submitted.
Imports which have been granted a product exclusion from the Section 301 measures, and which are not subject to the Section 301 duties, are not covered by the Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) provisions of the Section 301 Federal Register notices, but instead are subject to the FTZ provisions in 19 CFR part 146.

To request a refund of Section 301 duties paid on previous imports of products granted duty exclusions by the USTR, importers may file a Post Summary Correction (PSC) if within the PSC filing timeframe. If the entry is beyond the PSC filing timeframe, importers may protest the liquidation if within the protest filing timeframe. The latest guidance on the process for submitting retroactive claims for product exclusions to CBP is found in CSMS 42566154.
In situations where an importer has requested a product exclusion and the request is pending with the USTR, importers or their licensed representative may submit a request to extend the liquidation of impacted unliquidated entry summaries to CBP.

Reminder: importers, brokers, and/or filers should refer to CSMS 39587858 (Entry Summary Order of Reporting for Multiple HTS when 98 or 99 HTS are required) for guidance when filing an entry summary in which a heading or subheading in Chapter 99 is claimed on imported merchandise.

For ease of reference, a summary of Section 301 duties and product exclusion notifications is attached. Questions from the importing community concerning ACE entry rejections involving product exclusions should be referred to their CBP Client Representative. Questions related to Section 301 entry-filing requirements, please refer to CSMS message #42203908 (Information on Trade Remedy Questions Resources) 

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(Source: Justice, 18 Nov 2020)
Today, Wei Sun, 49, a Chinese national and naturalized citizen of the United States, was sentenced to 38 months in prison by District Court Judge Rosemary Marquez. Sun previously pleaded guilty to one felony count of violating the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).

Sun was employed in Tucson for 10 years as an electrical engineer with Raytheon Missiles and Defense. Raytheon Missiles and Defense develops and produces missile systems for use by the United States military. During his employment with the company, Sun had access to information directly related to defense-related technology. Some of this defense technical information constituted what is defined as “defense articles,” which are controlled and prohibited from export without a license under the AECA and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (the ITAR).

From December 2018 to January 2019, Sun traveled from the United States to China on a personal trip. On that trip, Sun brought along unclassified technical information in his company-issued computer, including data associated with an advanced missile guidance system that was controlled and regulated under the AECA and the ITAR. Despite having been trained to handle these materials correctly, Sun knowingly transported the information to China without an export license in violation of the AECA and the ITAR. …

“This isn’t about a laptop mistakenly taken on a trip, this was the illegal export of U.S. missile technology to China,” said Assistant Director Alan E. Kohler, Jr. of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division. “The FBI will continue to partner with companies to protect their information and our national security while bringing criminals such as Wei Sun to justice.”  The Federal Bureau of Investigation, investigated this matter with the assistance of Raytheon Missiles and Defense.  . . .  

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(Source: Treasury/OFAC, 18 Nov 2020) [Excerpts]
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action today against a key patronage network for the Supreme Leader of Iran, the Islamic Revolution Mostazafan Foundation (Bonyad Mostazafan, or the Foundation), an immense conglomerate of some 160 holdings in key sectors of Iran’s economy, including finance, energy, construction, and mining. While Bonyad Mostazafan is ostensibly a charitable organization charged with providing benefits to the poor and oppressed, its holdings are expropriated from the Iranian people and are used by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to enrich his office, reward his political allies, and persecute the regime’s enemies.
OFAC is also designating Iran’s Minister of Intelligence and Security, Mahmoud Alavi, pursuant to human rights authorities. Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has played a central role in the Iranian regime’s human rights abuses against Iranian citizens, including during the November 2019 protests.
“Iran’s Supreme Leader uses Bonyad Mostazafan to reward his allies under the pretense of charity,” said Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “The United States will continue to target key officials and revenue generating sources that enable the regime’s ongoing repression of its own people.”
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the persons designated above for blocking sanctions must be blocked and reported to OFAC if their property or interests in property are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals or entities designated today may themselves be exposed to sanctions. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the persons designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent account or payable-through account sanctions.

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(Source: UK ECJU, 18 Nov 2020)
This Guidance sets out the government’s service delivery objectives, commitments and targets for management of export licensing applications.
The Department for International Trade (DIT) has overall responsibility for the export licensing process.
The International Trade Secretary is ultimately responsible for the:
  • statutory and regulatory framework of the controls (that is what items and activities are controlled)
  • decision to grant or refuse an export licence in any individual case
In exercising these powers, the International Trade Secretary always consults with other government departments (OGDs).
In March 1998 the Cabinet Office published the Enforcement Concordat. This sets out the level of service and performance that businesses and others being regulated can expect from central and local government.
This service and performance code refers to or complies with the Concordat.
It explains:
  • the government’s commitments to exporters with respect to the controls that are administered by the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU)
  • the basic elements of the export licensing system

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The Atlantic Council has published a report which assesses and criticises the Trump administration’s sanctions policy and makes recommendations for the Biden administration to fix what the author Ambassador Daniel Freid describes as “a bad feedback loop”. The report says under President Trump (in summary):
  • Sanctions have become a default policy tool with uneven results – there have been some small achievements but “uneven, uncoordinated, and the trend is in the wrong direction”; and
  • “Under the uncertain policy direction of the Trump administration … many of the gains achieved through the sanctions policy tool are in danger of unraveling while failing credibility and uneven application are weakening the tool”.
The report recommends (in addition to regime-specific recommendations):
  • Articulating an “endgame” for sanctions at the beginning;
  • Keeping objectives “in rough harmony” with means;
  • Not using sanctions as a “short term media strategy” – “don’t get greedy or impatient, or race for the big showy win” – the Trump administration has been “incoherent in its rhetoric, with the president often on a different page than his administration”;
  • Bringing allies along, with respect to both objectives and sanctions – the Trump administration has been “less multilateral, in some cases celebrating the decline or outright abandonment of allied coordination on sanctions”; and
  • Embedding sanctions (as only one tool of economic statecraft) within overall strategies designed to capture as much international support as possible.

The Dutch Parliament has adopted 3 motions concerning the on-going Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, calling on the Government to encourage the EU to:
  • Apply a moratorium on exports of weapons to Turkey that could be used in the conflicts in the Nagorno-Karabagh region, Libya or Syria (motion); 
  • Impose sanctions on people in Azerbaijan and Turkey who are responsible for the violence in Nagorno-Karabagh (motion); and

Impose sanctions against Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, his family members, other key figures in the Azerbaijani offensive, and the Syrian fighters deployed by Turkey in Nagorno-Karabakh (motion).

(Source: Reuters, 18 Nov) [Excerpts]
Cordell Hull, a high-ranking official at the U.S. Department of Commerce who helped craft U.S. policies on exports to China, said he was leaving his post in early December.
Hull led the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security for the past year as it further cut off supplies to Huawei Technologies, the telecommunications equipment maker placed on a U.S. trade blacklist last year over national security concerns.
During his tenure, the department strengthened U.S. export controls in response to China’s policy of eliminating barriers between its civilian and military sectors, and blacklisted video surveillance equipment maker Hikvision and other companies over the treatment of Uighur Muslims. …
But key foreign supply chains remained beyond the reach of U.S. authorities, prompting the agency to apply further curbs.
Hull also worked with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which led an investigation into the Chinese-owned social media platform TikTok. …


(Source: Baker McKenzie, 18 Nov 2020)
* Principal Author: Alison J. Stafford Powell, Esq., 1-650-856-5531, Baker McKenzie 
On November 13, 2020, the Trump Administration issued Executive Order 13959, “Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies” (the “China Securities EO”), which aims to prevent US investors from financing the development of the People’s Republic of China’s military, intelligence, and security capabilities by prohibiting purchases of securities of certain “Communist Chinese military companies.”  This development builds on US Government concerns over China’s civil/military fusion and access to US capital markets and financing.  It could have implications for both direct investors as well as passive investors, such as through mutual funds and retirement plans.  The prohibitions will take effect on January 11, 2021.

The China Securities EO prohibits “US Persons” from engaging in any “transaction” involving publicly traded “securities,” derivative securities, or any securities designed to provide investment exposure to such securities, of any “Communist Chinese military company” identified pursuant to Section 1237 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (“Section 1237”).  For these purposes:   
  • US Persons” include US citizens, permanent resident aliens, entities organized under the laws of the United States, and persons physically located within the United States.  This does not extend to non-US subsidiaries of US companies.
  • A “transaction” is limited to purchases for value of publicly traded securities.  The China Securities EO thus prohibits purchases of securities of the specified “Communist Chinese military companies” on US and foreign securities exchanges.  Given the reference to “purchases for value,” it is not clear whether simply continuing to hold securities would be a prohibited “transaction.”
  • The definition of “securities” is broad and captures both “securities” as defined in the Securities Exchange Act at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(10), as well as certain additional securities, including “currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange or banker’s acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.”  There are a number of questions around the precise scope of the prohibition and type of securities covered, which will require further guidance from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).
  • The prohibition covers both the 31 “Communist Chinese military companies” identified pursuant to Section 1237 in June and August 2020 by the Department of Defense (available here and here, respectively), as well as any person determined in the future by the Secretaries of Defense or Treasury to meet the criteria of a “Communist Chinese military company.”  Subsidiaries of such companies must themselves be designated pursuant to Section 1237 in order for the prohibitions to apply.  Thus, OFAC’s “50% rule,” under which unlisted subsidiaries of parties subject to sanctions are subject to the same prohibitions if the sanctioned person has a 50% or more ownership interest in the unlisted subsidiaries, does not apply.
Certain grace or “wind-down” periods are provided.  For covered securities held as of 9:30 AM EST on January 11, 2021, US Persons have until 11:59 PM EST on November 11, 2021 to engage in transactions solely to divest, in whole or in part, those securities.  Transactions involving the securities of additional Chinese companies designated by the Secretaries of Defense or Treasury pursuant to Section 1237 will be prohibited 60 days following their designation, and transactions made solely to divest from securities held in such additional companies as of the prohibition’s effective date will be authorized for up to one year following their designation. 

Lastly, the China Securities EO authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the heads of other executive departments and agencies, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the China Securities EO and to establish licensing procedures for otherwise prohibited transactions.  The China Securities EO does not provide a timeframe for the issuance of any rules or regulations related to the order, nor are any potential licensing criteria listed. 
We anticipate that the Department of the Treasury will issue guidance further clarifying the scope of the China Securities EO and the expected timeline for any related regulations or licensing procedures in the near future.

(Source: Husch Blackwell, 17 Nov 2020)
* Principal Author: Grant D. Leach, Esq., 1-402-964-5143, Husch Blackwell 
The Trump Administration has encountered further setbacks in its efforts to prevent Chinese company ByteDance Ltd. (“ByteDance”) from providing its popular social media app TikTok in the U.S.  For background:
  • On August 6, 2020, President Trump issued Executive Order 13942 (“EO 13942”) which: (i) determined that ByteDance’s ownership of TikTok threatened U.S. national security, and (ii) imposed a prohibition which was originally scheduled to go into effect on September 20, 2020, and would have prohibited U.S. persons from transacting with ByteDance pursuant to forthcoming rules to be adopted by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce.
  • On August 14, 2020, President Trump issued a separate Administrative Order which formally initiated the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) process forcing ByteDance to divest its ownership of TikTok. ByteDance’s original deadline for completing this CFIUS divestment was November 12, 2020.
  • On September 24, 2020, the U.S. Commerce Department (“Commerce”) published a Federal Register notice to implement EO 13942’s required rules.  Specifically, Commerce’s rules prohibited U.S. app stores from distributing TikTok as of September 27, 2020, and also prohibited U.S. persons from providing internet hosting services to TikTok effective November 12, 2020.
  • On September 27, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted a nationwide preliminary injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the portion of the Commerce rules which would have prohibited U.S. app stores from distributing TikTok. In response, Commerce issued a statement confirming that it would comply with this injunction (see our previous post here).
  • On October 30, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered separate litigation initiated by three TikTok content creators and issued its own separate injunction to prohibit Commerce from enforcing the entirety of proposed EO 13942 rules (including the additional prohibitions which were scheduled to take effect on November 12, 2020).
Late last week, Commerce issued a notice confirming that it would not be implementing the proposed rules for EO 13942 “pending further legal developments.”  ByteDance continues to negotiate its proposed divestment of TikTok to Oracle in order to comply with President Trump’s CFIUS Administrative Order.  Although ByteDance did not complete this divestment by the November 12, 2020 deadline, recent filings by TikTok with the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia indicate that CFIUS has agreed to extend the divestment deadline until November 27, 2020.

For the time being, U.S. app stores may continue to distribute TikTok and U.S. service providers may continue to provide TikTok with internet hosting and other services while the injunctions issued by the U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania remain outstanding.

(Source: Sheppard Mullin, 17 Nov 2020)
* Principal Author: Michael X.Y. Zhang, Esq., 86-21-2321-6000, Sheppard Mullin 
Year 2020 definitely is a milestone year for China in building up and strengthening its regulatory legislation in the field of international trade.  Following the Regulations on Unreliable Entity List (“UEL”), the Export Control Law came out on October 17 and will come into effect on December 1, 2020.  Obviously, this Export Control Law of the PRC (“Export Control Law”) is one of the most important bricks to China’s regulatory Great Wall in the ongoing trade war to protect its key national security and interests.

Here is our quick bird’s-eye view of this new Export Control Law and some preliminary thoughts on its possible impact to the future cross-border transactions and multinationals’ China operations.

Enforcement Targets and Enforcement Authority
Article 2 of the Export Control Law defines the controlled items to be any (1) dual-use items, (2) military products, (3) nuclear, (4) other goods, technology and services relating to the protection of the national security and interests and fulfillment of non-proliferation international obligations, and (5) any relevant technology data (collectively, “Controlled Items”).  The enforcement targets under the Export Control Law include citizens, business entities, and other organizations that are related to any exportation, services vendors, foreign importation, and end users of any Controlled Items.

Besides the definitions of military products and nuclear which are highly regulated, the scope of the dual-use items is worthy of attention – any goods, technology or services with both civil usage and military function (or potential to improve military potential) are subject to this newly established export control mechanism under this new law.

Similar to the enforcement mechanism established under the UEL, the enforcement authorities under the Export Control Law consists of multiple governmental agencies at both the central and provincial levels of government bodies.  The departments of the State Council and the Central Military Commission are the key leading governmental agencies to spearhead the enforcement while a “coordination mechanism” will be established under these governmental agencies to coordinate and monitor the enforcement and facilitate information sharing among them.
Enforcement Methods
Generally, the “control” under the Export Control Law is well reflected in both controlling the transaction of Controlled Items and controlling the parties to transact such Controlled Items:
A. Controlled Items List and Export Permit
The Export Control Law indicates that a Controlled Items List will be decided, published, and updated by the enforcement authorities, and any exportation of the Controlled Items listed in such Controlled Items List will be subject to export permit procedure.  According to Article 10 of the Export Control Law, such Controlled Items List will include both Controlled Items that are totally prohibited to be exported outside China, and those prohibited to be exported to certain specific countries, regions, organizations or individuals.  Besides the Controlled Items List, the authorities also have power to decide and publish temporary control on items outside of such Controlled Items List, of which the temporary control term does not exceed 2 years but is subject to further review and decision on whether any extension might be necessary.

Under the export permit procedure, the export operators will need to register with the enforcement authorities for qualification of the export operations of any Controlled Items.  Notably, such export operators are required under Article 14 of the Export Control Law to establish export control compliance procedures for the purpose of being qualified.

B. Controlled List of Importers and End Users
Together with the practice of the Controlled Items List and Export Permit from China’s exportation angle, the Export Control Law also establishes a Controlled List of Importers and End Users, under which the enforcement authorities could further exercise control over the buyer side of trading of any Controlled Items.  Generally, any trade of Controlled Items with any importers or end users on such List will be prohibited or will be subject to more complicated examination and review by the enforcement authorities, although such importers might apply to the enforcement authorities to be de-listed after the applicant’s efforts of correction is accepted by the authorities.

Notable Liabilities
The liabilities under the Export Control Law range from administrative penalties to criminal sentences against different conduct of violation applicable.  The administrative liabilities include cease of illegal operation, confiscation of illegal income, and monetary penalty up to 10 times the amount of the illegal income.  In case of export operations violating the Export Control Law, it is possible that its operation permit of Controlled Items will be suspended for 5 years, and the related management team might face the prohibition of any engagement of business operations for the same term in such industry.

It is worth noting that the Export Control Law will be applicable to chase liabilities, whether they may be administrative or even criminal, of any foreign organization or individual that violates such Export Control Law.  The last Article of the Export Control Law provides that this Law is of the legal base for reciprocal measures to be taken by the PRC government if any country or region abuses export control measures harming the national security and interest of the PRC.

The Export Control Law obviously strengthens and improves the legal framework of the PRC for its export control and the national security protection laws and regulations. It generally establishes a mechanism for the PRC government agencies to enforce certain measures for the reasons such as promoting its national security or its interest  in the international trade or all kinds of energy and high-tech industries.  Once this Export Control Law takes effect, its provisions are likely to have impacts on not only the domestic companies in export industry but also multinational companies for their daily compliance work.
1)   Contractual language regarding compliance of the Export Control Law needs to be added into external agreements. Similar to those often seen in the U.S. law related compliance clauses in agreements, multinationals need to work with its external counsels for applicable languages under this Export Control Law to make sure its contractual counterparties (e.g., vendors, suppliers, customers, and related third parties) are in compliance with the requirements under the Export Control Law as part of the traditional representations and warranties, as well as the covenants.  We also anticipate that such PRC Export Control Law representation and warranty will soon become a common language in corporate and intellectual property transactions involving Chinese parties or assets.

2)   Any companies involved in business of international trade with supply capability located in China will need to establish Export Control Law compliance mechanism and procedures. These companies need to (i) pay attention to the then applicable Controlled Items List and Controlled List of Importers and End Users, and prepare internal alert as soon as such Lists are updated to include any products of which such companies are engaged in the business, (ii) regularly review current customers and end users to avoid direct or indirect sales to any party included in the Controlled List of Importers and End Users, (iii) identify and assess any possible products that could be deemed as Controlled Items outside of the Controlled Items List (pursuant to Article 12 of the Export Control Law), and (iv) establish an internal team to consult and communicate with the enforcement authorities when and where appropriate and necessary.
3)   With issuance of multiple regulatory laws and regulations (including the Export Control Law and the UEL), internal compliance training will be a necessary action to take for all in-house and compliance departments at multinationals so as to consider and establish a proper program for their business teams. We predict that such compliance training will be a self-evaluation process through which companies could defend themselves as their  efforts to comply with the Export Control Law.


(Source: Ashleigh Foor)
* What: The Export Control Year in Review 
* When: 15 Dec; 1:00 p.m. (EST)
* Where: Webinar
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI)
* ECTI Speaker: Scott Gearity
* Register: here or contact Ashleigh Foor, 1-540-433-3977, ashleigh@learnexportcompliance.com.
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U.S. Export Controls: ITAR & EAR from a non-U.S. Perspective (Tuesday, 1 Dec 2020)
Presenters: Jim Bartlett & Marco Crombach
Register or find more information here

The ABC of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (Thursday, 3 Dec 2020)
Presenters: Mike Farrell & Jim Bartlett
Register or find more information here
* Register for both and take advantage of our discounted price!
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EN_a116. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)

* James A. Garfield (James Abram Garfield; 19 Nov 1831 – 19 Sep 1881; was the 20th president of the United States, serving from March 4, 1881, until his death by assassination six and a half months later. He is the only sitting member of the United States House of Representatives to be elected to the presidency.)
  – “Poverty is uncomfortable; but nine times out of ten the best thing that can happen to a young man is to be tossed overboard and compelled to sink or swim.”
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The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
Latest Update 


5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 

9 Oct 2020: 
85 FR 64014:  Revisions to the Unverified List (UVL)

24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Kimberley Process Certificates.  The latest edition of the BAFTR is 
9 Nov 2020.

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.


28 Sep 2020: 85 FR 60874: Temporary Amendment for Republic of Cyprus. The latest edition of the BITAR is 28 Sep 2020. 

DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
Amendment of Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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