20-1118 Wednesday ” Daily Bugle “

20-1118 Wednesday “Daily Bugle”

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Wednesday, 18 November 2020

  1. Commerce/BIS: “Revisions to Export Enforcement Provisions”
  2. USTR: “Product Exclusion: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation”
  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. State/DDTC: (No new postings)
  4. Treasury/OFAC: “Issuance of Venezuela-related General License 8G”
  1. EUS: “Huawei Sells Honor & Qualcomm Granted Licence to Supply 4G Products”
  2. Forbes: “Applied Materials, Lam Research and KLA Continue Selling to China Despite Security Concerns”
  1. Husch Blackwell: “Executive Order Prohibits U.S. Persons from Investing in Communist Chinese Military Companies”
  2. RUSI: “Revising EU Export Controls: A Path to Greater Coherence?”
  3. Steptoe: “Provisional Agreement Reached on Review of EU Dual-Use Regulation, Including Rules on Cyber-Surveillance Items”
  1. ECS Presents: “ECS ITAR/EAR Webinar Series”
  2. FCC Academy Presents: 1 and 3 Dec; “U.S. Export Controls: ITAR/EAR” and “FMS”
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  4. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  5. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 

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(Source: Federal Register, 18 Nov 2020) [Excerpts]
85 FR 73411: Final Rule
* ACTION:  Final rule.
* SUMMARY:  In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending and clarifying certain provisions of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to promote compliance with existing EAR requirements and implement the export enforcement portions of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA). ECRA affirmed existing authorities under the EAR and provided expanded export control authorities to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary). BIS is also amending certain provisions of the EAR not strictly related to the implementation of ECRA concerning the issuance of licenses and denial orders and the payment of civil penalties.
* DATES:  This rule is effective November 18, 2020.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:  John Sonderman, Director, Office of Export Enforcement, Bureau of Industry and Security, Phone: (202) 482-5079, Email: EEinquiry@bis.doc.gov.
Background: On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which included the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) (50 U.S.C. 4801-4852). In its enactment, ECRA repealed most of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), which had lapsed. ECRA continues existing authorities under the EAR that had been issued pursuant to, and been maintained in force under, the EAA until its lapse, and thereafter under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). ECRA provides the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) with additional authorities to ensure the implementation of effective export controls in furtherance of U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.
Accordingly, BIS is amending the EAR to reflect enforcement authorities and to update certain EAR provisions to make them consistent with ECRA. These amendments include replacing existing references to the EAA currently in the EAR with references to ECRA and other export laws and regulations. There are also amendments to the EAR that reflect the expanded scope of authority provided to the Secretary in ECRA. Specifically, this rule amends the EAR to implement the following enforcement provisions: 
   – Pre-license checks (PLCs) and post-shipment verifications (PSVs) (in §§734.11 and 750.4 of the EAR);
   – overseas investigative authority; searches, inspections, detentions, and seizures, and related authorities concerning exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) (in §734.11 of the EAR and in part 758 of the EAR, specifically in §§758.7, 758.8, and 758.9); 
   – inspection of books, records, and other information (in §§758.7 and 762.7 of the EAR); and
   – violations and penalties under ECRA (in part 764 of the EAR, and specifically in §§748.4, 764.1, 764.2, 764.3, and 766.25).   . . .
BIS is renaming part 758 of the EAR as “Export clearance requirements and authorities” and renaming §758.7 of the EAR as “Authorities of the Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Export Enforcement (OEE).” As amended, these provisions more accurately describe the requirements for clearing export shipments and reflect the broader authorities of OEE, and other officials of the United States designated by OEE, including requirements for reexports and transfers (in-country).
BIS is also adding a new paragraph, (a)(4), to EAR §758.7 to reflect the authority under ECRA section 1761(a) (50 U.S.C. 4820(a)) to enforce provisions of the EAR that restrict the activities of U.S. persons in connection with certain weapons of mass destruction-related end uses described in §744.6 of the EAR.
BIS is updating and revising §758.7(b) of the EAR to outline actions OEE may take to ensure that exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) comply with all laws and regulations administered or enforced by the Secretary in conformance with section 1761(a)(4)-(5) of ECRA (50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(4), (5)), as well as 13 U.S.C. 305, 22 U.S.C. 401, the EAR, and the Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR) (15 CFR part 30).
Because the EAR are regulations implemented by the Secretary to carry out his express statutory authority in ECRA and 22 U.S.C. 401, BIS is removing reference to authorities granted to Postmasters and the U.S. Customs Service in §§758.7 and 758.8 of the EAR. This change does not affect the authorities of other agencies or officials under other statutes and regulations. BIS is also renaming §758.8 of the EAR as “Return or Unloading of Cargo.”
Under revised §758.7(b)(2) of the EAR, OEE officials are authorized to require all persons subject to the export laws and regulations administered or enforced by the Secretary to produce books, records, and other information for inspection, consistent with ECRA section 1761(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(2)).
Section 758.7(b)(6) of the EAR now addresses the provisions previously provided for in §758.7(b)(7) and BIS is accordingly renaming §758.7(b)(7) as “Administrative Forfeiture Authority.” BIS is revising §758.7(b)(8) of the EAR to reflect that other legal and procedural principles may govern the conduct of BIS’s enforcement activities. The authority to order the unloading of items previously described in §758.7(b)(8), as well as the authority to order the return of cargo previously described in §758.7(b)(9) is now set forth in §758.8(b) of the EAR. Accordingly, BIS is removing §758.7(b)(9) from the EAR. BIS is also removing §758.7(b)(10) from the EAR as that provision previously described the authority of another agency, the U.S. Customs Service, to designate the time and place of export clearance, which is not reflected in ECRA. However, this change does not affect the authorities of other agencies or officials under other statutes and regulations.
Section 758.8(b) of the EAR is revised to specify actions a carrier must take to return and unload cargo when ordered by OEE and to clarify that OEE may order the return and unloading of cargo to ensure compliance with export laws and regulations administered or enforced by the Secretary. BIS is revising §758.8(c) of the EAR to update references to relevant provisions of §758.5 of the EAR.
Section 758.9 of the EAR is revised to clarify that the provisions of part 758 apply to certain activities of U.S. persons, in addition to exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country).
Violations and Penalties Under ECRA
BIS is making multiple amendments to part 764 of the EAR as well as §748.4(c) of the EAR to align their provisions with ECRA section 1760 (50 U.S.C. 4819). Section 764.1 is revised to include references to conduct that violates ECRA, while retaining references to three sections of the EAA (sections 11A, B, and C) (50 U.S.C. 4611-4613), which remain in force. Section 764.2(f)-“Possession with intent to export illegally”-of the EAR is removed and reserved, as this provision is based on the lapsed EAA and is not carried forward in ECRA. The provisions related to criminal penalties for willful violations of the EAR previously set forth in §764.3(b)(2) are relocated to §764.3(b), while §764.3(b)(2) and (3) are removed from the EAR. Supplement no. 1 to part 764 of the EAR is amended to include a prohibition on transfers (in-country) to, or on behalf of, a denied person in the terms of a standard denial order.
Revisions To Enforcement Provisions Unrelated to the Implementation of ECRA
BIS is making several additional changes to the EAR unrelated to the implementation of ECRA. 
   – First, consistent with existing language in §748.4(d) of the EAR, BIS is amending §750.7(a) of the EAR to clarify that any license obtained based on a false or misleading misrepresentation or the falsification or concealment of a material fact is void as of the date of issuance. 
   – Second, consistent with current BIS practice, BIS is amending §764.3(a)(1)(ii) of the EAR to change the maximum time period for payment of civil penalties, as a condition of receiving certain privileges under the EAR, from one year to two years. 
   – Third, BIS is renaming §764.3(c)(2)(ii) of the EAR to “Actions by other agencies” to reflect collateral actions that other U.S. government agencies may take with respect to persons based on indictment or conviction for criminal export control violations or the issuance of a denial order. 
   – BIS is also revising §764.3(c)(2)(ii)(A) of the EAR to reflect more accurately when the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, Department of State, may not issue licenses, or may deny licenses, involving certain parties indicted for, or convicted of, violations of certain statutes specified in the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(g)(1)(A)). 
   – Finally, BIS is amending §766.25(a), (b), (c), and (h) of the EAR to specify that the Director of OEE is the designated BIS official for the issuance of orders denying the export privileges of persons convicted of certain criminal offenses; providing notification of the issuance of such orders to affected persons; and determining the terms of such orders, as well as their applicability to related persons. The authority to issue an authorization to engage in activities otherwise prohibited by the terms of a denial order will remain with the Director of the Office of Exporter Services (OExS), in consultation with the Director of OEE.  . . .
Matthew S. Borman,  Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.

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(Source: Federal Register, 18 Nov 2020) [Excerpts]
85 FR 73590: Notice
* AGENCY: Office of the United States Trade Representative.
* ACTION: Notice.
* SUMMARY: Effective August 23, 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative imposed additional duties on goods of China with an annual trade value of approximately $16 billion as part of the action in the Section 301 investigation of China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. The U.S. Trade Representative’s determination included a decision to establish a product exclusion process. The U.S. Trade Representative initiated the exclusion process in September 2018, and stakeholders have submitted requests for the exclusion of specific products. The first set of exclusions was published in July 2019 and expired in July 2020. On April 30, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative established a process for the public to comment whether to extend particular exclusions granted in July 2019 for up to 12 months. In July 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative determined to extend certain exclusions through December 31, 2020. This notice announces the U.S. Trade Representative’s determination to make one technical amendment to a previously extended exclusion.
* DATES: The amendment announced in this notice applies as of July 31, 2020, and continues through December 31, 2020. This notice does not further extend the period for product exclusion extensions. U.S. Customs and Border Protection will issue instructions on entry guidance and implementation.

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OGS_a24. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

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(Source: Treasury/OFAC, 17 Nov 2020)
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Venezuela-related General License 8G, “Authorizing Transactions Involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) Necessary for the Limited Maintenance of Essential Operations in Venezuela or the Wind Down of Operations in Venezuela for Certain Entities.”

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Huawei has announced that it has sold the business assets of Honor, Ltd., (its smartphone company) to a government-backed consortium, Shenzhen Zhixin New Information Technology Co., Ltd. The decision was made in light of the “persistent unavailability of technical elements needed for our mobile phone business [and] to ensure the survival” of Honor’s industry chain. Huawei confirmed that it will have no shares or involvement in the company. The US Commerce Dep’t amended the foreign-produced direct product rule in August 2020, which restricted Huawei’s access to microchips developed or produced with US-origin technology (see post).

In addition, according to a Reuters article, a Qualcomm spokesperson has confirmed that the US government has granted it a licence to supply to Huawei a number of products, including 4G products required for mobile devices. The spokesperson also said that other Huawei-related licence applications are pending.

(Source: Forbes, 17 Nov 2020) [Excerpts]
The 2020 Department of Defense Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments describes China’s military as an existential threat on track to overtake  US forces. The report details that China has stolen or acquired many technologies from the US which it leverages for advanced military capability.
Americans are not alone in their concerns about China.  Negative views of China’s militarization, its handling of the COVID virus, its abuse of human rights, its trashing of the environment, and General Secretary Xi have reached record highs by Americans and its allies. Some made progress to address the China threat, but some see it falling short in implementing Congress’ 2018 requirements to strengthen controls on “foundational” and “emerging” technologies like semiconductors.


(Source: Husch Blackwell, 16 Nov 2020)
* Principal Author: Grant D. Leach, Esq., 1-402-964-5143, Husch Blackwell
President Trump issued an Executive Order (“E.O.”) of November 12, 2020, titled “Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies.”  The E.O., which was published in the Federal Register on November 17, 2020, and will take effect on January 11, 2021 at 9:30 am EST, designates thirty-one Chinese companies as “Communist Chinese military companies” and prohibits U.S. persons, including U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens, entities organized under U.S. law or any persons in the United States, from conducting “transactions” in publicly traded securities issued by those Communist Chinese military companies.  The E.O. defines a “transaction” as “the purchase for value of any publicly traded security” and also applies to securities that are derivatives of or are designed to provide investment exposure to publicly traded securities issued by the Communist Chinese military companies.

The E.O.’s list of entities identified as Communist Chinese military companies is identical to those Communist Chinese military companies previously identified by the Department of Defense (“DOD”) under the 1999 National Defense Authorization Act in an initial list issued June 12, 2020 and a subsequent list issued later in August 2020.  The identified companies are part of China’s military-industrial complex and include the aerospace, shipbuilding and telecommunications industries.  Many of the listed companies are publicly traded on U.S. exchanges, such as China Telecom and China Mobile, while others, like Huawei, are privately held.  The E.O. does provide investors with a one-year grace period until November 11, 2021 to entirely divest from these 31 Chinese companies.

(Source: RUSI, 17 Nov 2020)
* Author: Maria Shagina, Post-Doc, at Centre for Eastern European Studies (CEES) Zurich University, RUSI
The EU is close to agreement on expanding the list of dual-use cyber-surveillance technology to be banned from sale to autocratic regimes. The move would strengthen the EU’s human rights advocacy and bolster the European Commission’s geopolitical ambitions.

In a rapidly changing technological environment, the EU’s export controls have been lagging behind. Last updated in 2009, the EU’s regulation has excluded emerging surveillance technologies, including spyware and facial recognition tools, while human rights concerns have played an insignificant role in authorisation processes. The recent provisional agreement to update the list of dual-use goods will attest to the EU’s commitment to defend human rights globally and will maximise the deterrent effect of its cyber and human rights sanctions.

The urgent need to revise the EU export control regime became clear almost a decade ago during the Arab uprising, the wave of popular movements which gripped the Middle East and North Africa. In 2011, some regimes in the Middle East and North Africa actively used digital surveillance technologies produced by European companies to crack down on public protests. Since then, EU member states have sought to put intrusion and interception technologies on the list, but to no avail. The revision was impeded by irreconcilable positions over different interpretations of emerging technologies and divergent interests. The opposition to including digital surveillance technologies was primarily driven by commercial interests. Almost one third of the approved licences were destined for countries, such as the UAE, Vietnam or Iran, that Freedom House has marked ‘not free’. The UK, France and Germany account for approximately 35% of the world’s surveillance companies. Other member states raised objections to due diligence obligations and sought to water down the current provisional agreement.

The change in the German position appears to have been a decisive factor. Reports about the misuse of German surveillance technology by the Turkish government may have swayed Berlin’s previously opposing position. The German government has indicated that the updated export control regime should be finalised within its presidency’s term at the EU Council. Currently, it is up to the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper), the EU Parliament and the EU Council to decide on the adoption of the regulation. By adopting a human rights-focused approach, the EU follows the US, whose Department of State has already released guidance encouraging US businesses to integrate human rights due diligence into their compliance programmes. 
If the current proposal is accepted, the revised EU framework, known as Recast Dual Use Regulation, will result in a fundamental deviation from international regimes. Currently, the EU’s control list represents a compilation of the export controls from the multilateral export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Agreement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. With the update, the EU’s dual-use goods list would go beyond that internationally agreed scope and include such items as facial recognition and spyware.

The enforcement of export controls is within the competence of national governments, but its implementation has been weak and patchy. Many member states are not obliged to report issued licences and have often disregarded the human rights concerns in their export compliance programmes. The revised regulation proposes to include an EU-level coordination mechanism for greater exchange of information between member states and improved cooperation between licensing and customs authorities. The revision will not fix all the problems with dual-use exports to autocratic regimes, but it will increase transparency obligations for governments, strengthen the regulation’s human security focus and emphasise a value-based approach of the EU trade policy. Ensuring proper implementation on the national level will continue to be the key.

By expanding the scope of export controls to emerging technologies, the EU will achieve greater coherence with other EU policy tools. In particular, it will bolster its human rights sanctions currently in the works. By toughening export regulation, the EU will increase compliance costs for digital surveillance companies and will introduce greater safeguards to minimise the risk of human rights violations. One of the recent examples of the EU’s incongruous decisions is the sale of surveillance drones to Belarusian authorities in the middle of a brutal police crackdown. The updated law will also be consistent with the objectives of the EU’s nascent cyber sanctions, as it will deprive autocratic regimes of access to advanced cyber-surveillance technologies that can be later used for nefarious activities, including cyber attacks. Stricter regulations for export controls will have a signalling effect that may shape more responsible behaviour in cyberspace among the private actors.   
Over the last few years, Washington has weaponised export controls to shield US technology and critical infrastructure from Chinese investors and vendors. President Donald Trump’s administration gradually added export restrictions on the transfer of emerging technologies to Chinese firms, with Huawei and ZTE carrying the brunt. Caught in the crossfire, the EU was at risk of becoming a playground for US-China confrontation, while European companies were under the threat of US extraterritorial sanctions. Feeling the heat from the US-China technology war, a growing number of Western allies – Japan, Australia, the UK, France and now Sweden – have followed the US and banned or de facto excluded Huawei and ZTE from participating in their 5G networks and gaining access to their critical national infrastructure.

The EU’s move to close the gap in export controls is the right step towards strengthening its mandate and bolstering its geopolitical ambitions. The move ultimately complements the EU’s earlier decisions on investment screening and 5G technology, which are part of the same trade-security nexus. With the expanded list of emerging technologies, the EU is set to give export controls a central stage in economic statecraft and to raise its stakes in building strategic autonomy. By merging trade and security policy, the EU is to ensure a consistent and transparent process of licence applications at a time when the distinction between military and civilian items is progressively blurred and tech supply chains are becoming increasingly politicised.

As China passes its own export control law, US-China relations are set to harden under US President-elect Joe Biden’s administration. The EU’s adoption of stricter export controls will provide Brussels with a geostrategic instrument to defend its security interests and could serve as a way back to a coordinated transatlantic relationship.

(Source: Steptoe, 16 Nov 2020)
* Principal Author: Stefan Tsakanakis, Esq., 32-2-626-0517, Steptoe
On 9 November the German Presidency of the Council of the EU and representatives of the European Parliament reached a provisional political agreement on the review of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. The EU’s current export control framework for dual-use items, set out in Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, has been in place since 2009. The regulatory process to review this system and to adapt it to the changing technological, economic and political circumstances has been ongoing for several years.
The revision of the EU Dual-Use Regulation aims at further strengthening EU action on the non-proliferation of WMD, including their means of delivery; contributing to regional peace, security and stability; and helping ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. Most notably, the EU institutions agreed to expand the scope of the framework to cover cyber-surveillance technology with the stated aim of preventing human rights violations and security threats linked to the potential misuse of such technology.

The agreement now needs to be endorsed by EU Member States’ ambassadors sitting on the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper). The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will then be called on to adopt the proposed Regulation at first reading.
Main features of the agreed Regulation
The provisional political agreement provides for a number of important features, including:
  • new provisions on stricter export controls for cyber-surveillance technology,
  • an EU-level coordination mechanism which allows for greater exchange between the Member States as regards the export of cyber-surveillance items,
  • two new, EU general export authorizations, covering cryptographic items and intra-group technology transfers respectively,
  • stronger enforcement of export controls through enhanced cooperation between licensing and customs authorities, including mechanisms allowing Member States to strengthen intra-state cooperation in this area,
  • a new provision on transmissible controls, allowing a Member State to introduce export controls on the basis of the legislation established by another Member State,
  • harmonization at EU-level of certain rules applicable to technical assistance,
  • new reporting rules aiming at increasing transparency on trade in dual-use items.
Export controls for cyber-surveillance items
Unlike initially suggested by the European Commission, the compromise proposal does not provide for the inclusion of any cyber-surveillance equipment in the EU dual-use control list in Annex I to the EU Dual-Use Regulation. However, a new article 4a sets out a catch-all clause covering exports of non-listed cyber-surveillance technology. An authorization is required if the exporter has been informed by the national competent authority that the items are or may be intended for use in connection with internal repression or the commission of serious violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law. Additionally, if an exporter is aware according to its own due diligence findings that non-listed cyber-surveillance items are intended for such uses, it shall notify the competent authority, which must decide whether or not to make the export concerned subject to authorization.

Technical assistance.  Article 7 of the compromise proposal sets out notification and authorization requirements for technical assistance related to listed dual-use items, if they are intended for use in connection with WMD or certain specific military uses. Member States may extend the application of this provision to non-listed dual-use items.

The revised Regulation provides for a broad definition of “supplier of technical assistance” which includes (1) natural or legal persons supplying technical assistance from the EU to the territory of a third country; (2) natural or legal persons resident or established in the EU which supply technical assistance within the territory of a third country; and (3) natural or legal persons resident or established in the EU which supply technical assistance to a resident of a third country temporarily present in the EU.

Transmissible controls. Based on the new article 8a on transmissible controls, Member State may introduce export controls on the basis of the legislation established by another Member State. More specifically, an authorization shall be required for dual-use items not listed in Annex I but listed on a national control list of another Member State if the exporter has been informed by the competent authority that the items in question are or may be intended for uses of concern with respect to public security or to human rights considerations.
The transmissible controls provision accounts for the failure of the EU institutions to agree on the inclusion of cyber-surveillance equipment in Annex I to the EU Dual-Use Regulation. While Member States remain responsible to consider the risk of cyber-surveillance items and decide on the need for an authorization, their vigilance and observations are formally communicated to other Member States and the Commission. This is likely to lead to a certain coordination among Member States.

Outlook.  The reviewed EU Dual-Use Regulation will widen the scope of EU export controls for dual-use items. At the same time, the EU institutions made efforts to reduce the administrative burden for both companies and licensing authorities by creating new EU general export authorizations for cryptographic items and intra-group technology transfers. Moreover, the revised Regulation will further harmonize rules among Member States, in particular as regards transmissible controls as well as technical assistance.


(Source: ECS)
*What:  ECS ITAR/EAR Webinar Series
*When:  Webinars Each Week Through December 2020
*Where:  Your Computer
*Sponsor: Export Compliance Solutions & Consulting (ECS)
*ECS Speakers:  Suzanne Palmer
*Register: here for individual webinars, here for a 4-pack, here for an 8-pack, or write to phyllis@exportcompliancesolutions.com or call 1-866-238-4018
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U.S. Export Controls: ITAR & EAR from a non-U.S. Perspective (Tuesday, 1 Dec 2020)
Presenters: Jim Bartlett & Marco Crombach
Register or find more information here

The ABC of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (Thursday, 3 Dec 2020)
Presenters: Mike Farrell & Jim Bartlett
Register or find more information here
* Register for both and take advantage of our discounted price!
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EN_a114. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)

* Pierre Bayle (18 Nov 1647 – 28 Dec 1706; was a French philosopher, author, and lexicographer. He is best known for his Historical and Critical Dictionary. Bayle was a notable advocate of religious toleration, and his work had a significant influence on the subsequent development of the European Age of Enlightenment.)
  – There is no less invention in aptly applying a thought found in a book, than in being the first author of the thought.”
  – “The antiquity and general acceptance of an opinion is not assurance of its truth.”
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The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
Latest Update 


5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 

9 Oct 2020: 
85 FR 64014:  Revisions to the Unverified List (UVL)

24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Kimberley Process Certificates.  The latest edition of the BAFTR is 
9 Nov 2020.

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.


28 Sep 2020: 85 FR 60874: Temporary Amendment for Republic of Cyprus. The latest edition of the BITAR is 28 Sep 2020. 

DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
Amendment of Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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