20-1020 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

20-1020 Tuesday “Daily Bugle”

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Tuesday, 20 October 2020

  1. Treasury/OFAC: “Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions”
  1. Items Scheduled for Future Federal Register Edition
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)
  3. DHS/CBP: “8 Oct Customs Broker License Exam”
  4. State/DDTC: (No new postings)
  5. Treasury/OFAC: “Settlement Agreement between the OFAC and Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.”
  6. EU Council: “EU Renews Its Sanctions Regime Against ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida Until 31 Oct 2021”
  7. New Zealand: “New Catch-all Controls in Effect from 9 Oct Now Cover the Export of All Items for Military End Use to All Countries”
  1. AP News: “Trump Says Sudan to Be Removed from Terrorism List”
  2. EU Sanctions: “China Adopts New Export Control Law”
  1. FTI: “China’s Trade Controls – The Evolution & Development”
  2. Nicholas Turner: “Sanctions Top-5 for the Week Ending 16 Oct”
  3. Thompson Hine: “WTO Arbitrator Ruling on Airbus-Boeing Dispute Allows EU to Impose $4 Billion in Tariffs Annually on U.S. Products”
  1. ECS Presents: 21-22 Oct; “3rd Annual ITAR/EAR Symposium and Managing ITAR/EAR Complexities”
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Find the Latest Amendments Here. 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 
  4. Submit Your Job Opening and View All Job Openings 
  5. Submit Your Event and View All Approaching Events 

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(Source: Federal Register, 20 Oct 2020) [Excerpts]
85 FR 66682 & 66684: Notices
* AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury.
* ACTION: Notice.
* SUMMARY: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing two updates to the identifying information of persons currently included in the list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. All property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of these persons are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: OFAC: Associate Director for Global Targeting, tel.: 202-622-2420; Assistant Director for Licensing, tel.: 202-622-2480; Assistant Director for Regulatory Affairs, tel.: 202-622-4855; or the Assistant Director for Sanctions Compliance & Evaluation, tel.: 202-622-2490.

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OGS_a23. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings)

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OGS_a34. DHS/CBP: Results of Investigation Into 8 Oct Customs Broker License Exam Issues
(Source: DHS/CBP, 20 Oct 2020)

   The bi-annual Customs Broker License Exam (CBLE) was administered on October 8, 2020. The electronic exam was held nationwide at over 120 testing locations. At some testing locations, applicants encountered system issues, while other applicants tested but did not experience any delays throughout the examination. A thorough investigation was conducted and it was determined that there was no time lost for the majority of CBLE testers. This means the majority of testers, regardless of delays, had access to the exam for the time frame allotted.  

   CBP posted the exam questions October 19, 2020 on cbp.gov website. It was crucial that the exam posting was delayed so a determination on the nature of the postponements could be determined.
   Individual CBLE results will be sent to test takers in approximately three to five weeks. If you have questions regarding the 2020 broker exam, contact Headquarters Broker Management Branch (BMB) via email at brokermanagement@cbp.dhs.gov.

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The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today announced a $4,144,651 settlement with Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (“Berkshire”), a multinational conglomerate holding company based in Omaha Nebraska, and its foreign subsidiary, Iscar Kesici Takim Ticareti ve Imalati Limited Sirket (“Iscar Turkey”). Berkshire, on behalf of itself and its subsidiary located in Turkey, has agreed to settle its potential civil liability for 144 apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560 (ITSR).   
Specifically, between December 2012 and January 2016, Iscar Turkey exported 144 shipments of cutting tools and related inserts, with a total value of $383,443, to two third-party Turkish distributors knowing that such goods would be shipped to a distributor in Iran for resale to Iranian end-users, including several entities later identified as meeting the definition of the Government of Iran, which would have been prohibited if engaged in by a U.S. person, under §§ 560.203, 560.204, 560.206, and 560.208 of the ITSR. These transactions appear to have violated § 560.215 of the ITSR.   
OFAC determined that Berkshire voluntarily disclosed the apparent violations on behalf of Iscar Turkey, but the apparent violations constitute an egregious case.
  For more information, please visit the following web notice and settlement agreement.

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  The Council today renewed the EU sanctions regime against ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida and the related list of people subject to restrictive measures for another year until 31 October 2021. The decision was taken in light of the ongoing terrorist threat.
  EU sanctions consist of a travel ban to the EU and an asset freeze for individuals, and an asset freeze for groups and entities. In addition, EU persons and entities are forbidden from making funds and economic resources available to those listed.
  Five individuals are currently subject to restrictive measures.
The EU has been able to autonomously adopt restrictive measures against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda, and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, since September 2016. The EU regime is independent from, but complementary to, the regime allowing for sanctions to be adopted at the UN level.
  The relevant legal act will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 20 October 2020.

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  The export of goods, software and technologies which are not listed in the New Zealand Strategic Goods List, but which may be intended for use relating, directly or indirectly, to any or all of the provisions outlined below are prohibited unless a permit to export is obtained from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
  The Catch-all control provisions are given effect through a Gazette Notice  [PDF, 34 KB] with an entry into force date of  9 October 2020.
The Gazette Notice:
  • Carries over the existing prohibition on the export of items with an end-use related to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
  • Establishes a new prohibition on items for use in terrorist acts, as provided for in the Act.
  • Carries forward the existing prohibition on items for military end-use, but removes the caveat that it only apply to countries under a UN arms embargo.
  • Extends military end-use controls to items which “materially enable or support operations or functions of a military or internal security nature”.
  • Applies controls to all countries and products.
  • Provides exemptions for exporters from needing to seek permits for low-risk countries and products; for goods supplied under government assistance programmes; and for parts, components and replacement items (unless incorporated into weapons or used for the production, maintenance or testing of weapons).
  • Provides transition timeframes for the entry into effect of some controls to meet industry and research sector concerns.
A ‘Questions and Answers’ document covering the provisions of the Notice can be accessed here [PDF, 404 KB].

Exporters have a statutory obligation to inform the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade, via the Export Controls Office, if they are aware, or should reasonably be aware, that an export is intended for or may have any of the listed prohibited uses described above.

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(Source: AP News, 19 Oct 2020) [Excerpts]

  President Donald Trump on Monday said Sudan will be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism if it follows through on its pledge to pay $335 million to American terror victims and their families, but some hurt in the attacks weren’t happy with the deal. 
  The move would open the door for the African country to get international loans and aid needed to revive its battered economy and rescue the country’s transition to democracy. The announcement, just two weeks ahead of the U.S. presidential election, also comes as the Trump administration works to get other Arab countries, such as Sudan, to join the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain’s recent recognition of Israel.
  Delisting Sudan from the state sponsors blacklist is a key incentive for the Sudanese government to normalize relations with Israel. Trump’s announcement came after Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin traveled to Bahrain to cement the Gulf state’s recognition of the Jewish state. 
  Trump tweeted: “GREAT news! New government of Sudan, which is making great progress, agreed to pay $335 MILLION to U.S. terror victims and families. Once deposited, I will lift Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. At long last, JUSTICE for the American people and BIG step for Sudan!”
  Sudan has agreed to pay compensation for victims of the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, attacks conducted by Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida network while bin Laden was living in Sudan.
  Gen. Abdel-Farrah Burhan, head of Sudan’s ruling sovereign council, welcomed Trump’s announcement as a “constructive step.” He said in a tweet the removal would come “in recognition of the historic change that has taken place in Sudan.” …
  Once the compensation money has been deposited, Trump is to sign an order removing Sudan from the terrorism list, on which it has languished under heavy American sanctions for 27 years.
  Congress is then expected to act to restore Sudan’s sovereign immunity, which would effectively stop future compensation claims from being filed against it in U.S. courts. Meanwhile, Sudan is to begin the process of normalizing relations with Israel, possibly with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu joining a congratulatory phone call between Trump and Hamdok. …

(Source: EU Sanctions, 19 Oct 2020) [Excerpts]

  The Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China was passed on 17 October 2020 by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and will come into force on 1 December 2020. Press release and Presidential Order.
  This law sets out export control measures to safeguard national security, non-proliferation, and to standardise export controls. It includes a licensing system and applies to all companies in China, including those with foreign ownership. The legislation provides that China can take reciprocal measures if any country abuses its export controls in ways that hurt its national security interests.
Suspected violations will be investigated by state export control authorities which have the power to enter business premises, interrogate parties, copy documents, seize items and interrogate bank accounts. Penalties (including fines and licence revocations) can be imposed on those in and outside China for violating export control regulations and endangering national security.


* Author: Johnny Xie, 86-21-2315-1019, FTI Consulting
  In recent years, China has planned to introduce its export control law, which aims to consolidate and streamline its numerous but discrete export control legislation. People keep asking about the status of the draft law which is a good sign as it demonstrates that economic operators are keen to learn and comply with the upcoming law. However, in parallel with this enthusiasm, there appears to be a common misunderstanding. Currently, China has no export control enforcement because its export control law is still in draft phase, so thereis no requirement for there to be export control compliance work in practice. In fact, many violations are currently occurring out of this misunderstanding of the existing regulations.
  Therefore, an understanding of the evolution and development of China’s trade control regime is beneficial as this helps to recognise and control the risks and facilitate trade compliance efforts when conducting business with or within China.
  Within the context of dual-use and military transactions, China not only controls the export but also the import. Therefore, the phrase “trade control” is more accurate within a Chinese environment. Whereas “export control” or “strategic control” are the phrases commonly used in other countries or regions.
  China has been trading with the rest of the world for a long time. Throughout history, the Silk Road1 in Han Dynasty and the maritime expeditions of Admiral Zhenghe in the Ming Dynasty are two of the most commonly known voyages. The latest archeological findings indicate that the exchange of goods, technologies and even human beings between China and the rest of the world might have occurred as early as 200 BC. Today, China is one of the leading merchandise traders in the world. Therefore, how China regulates and controls its foreign trade has profound implications for others.
  The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 , and the development of its trade control regime can be divided into four phases.
Phase One: 1949 – 1978
  The earliest legislation made by the People’s Republic of China, which contains provisions concerning export control, is the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference , which was adopted on the 29 September 1949.
  For example, Article 375 of the Common Program deals with Commerce, which states that “all legitimate public and private trade shall be protected. Controls shall be exercised over foreign trade and the policy of trade protection shall be adopted.”
  In 1950, the central government enacted provisional regulations on the administration of foreign trade , stipulating that “importers and exporters shall obtain licenses/approvals from the Central Government or the provincial foreign trade authorities.”However, due to a series of social campaigns in the 1950s, this legislation did not play a significant role in the field of export controls. For instance, as a result of the socialist transformation, by the end of 1956, the nationalizationof foreign trade companies had been established. Consequently, foreign trade was monopolised by a number of state-owned enterprises. That way, foreign trade was directly operated by the government and regulated mainly by administrative measures rather than by statutory laws.
Phase Two: 1979 – 1993
  On 31 January 1979 , the Shekou Industrial Zone ofShenzhen was founded, becoming the first experimental area in China to “open up”. That year, four Special Economic Zones (SEZ) were established in South China, namely Shenzhen, Shantou, Xiamen, and Zhuhai. Foreign direct investment and foreign trade was encouraged in the zones where there was more autonomy and less control. For example, a foreign invested company located in a SEZ could be granted the foreign trade right and import raw materials and export finished products freely.
  Furthermore, the socialist market economy was defined and tested in China. Gradually and cautiously, the whole of China was in transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market-driven one.
  However, the most essential part of a market economy was missing which was a complete and authoritative legal system. On the one hand, the state-owned enterprises were privatised and separated from the government, and on the other hand, unleashed enterprises had to face an institutional legal vacuum in a newly established market economy.
  This was particularly true in the field of export controls where administrative instructions ceased while regulatory legislation was not yet ready. Driven by economic goals, missiles, conventional arms, and nuclear technologies were exported by enterprises for profit. In certain cases, China was criticised and blamed by the international community for its proliferation behaviour which had a negative impact on its reputation.
Phase Three: 1994 – 2001
  As described in the second phase, China was confronted with critics and even sanctions from the international community because of its ignorance of an export control regime. In response to these criticisms, China realised that serious measures needed to be enacted in order to change the situation. Therefore, the development of a legal framework for export controls was given top priority.
  China enacted its first foreign trade law in 1994 , and revised the Customs Law in 2000, which were two primary pieces of legislation pertaining to export controls.
  Other examples include:
– the Regulations on the Administration of Controlled Chemicals in 199512;
– the Regulations on the Administration of Arms Export in 199713; and
– the Regulations on the Nuclear Export Control in 1997
  China also attempted to repair its image by improving the openness and transparency of its export controls system. For instance, China for the first time in history published the Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation White Paper in 199515 and started to publish the National Defense White Paper regularly from 199.
  Moreover, China started to pay attention to the international export control norms and tried to align its efforts. For example, China signed the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty in 1992 , the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, and joined the Zangger Committee in 1997.
Phase Four: 2002 – present
  After resuming its WTO membership in 2001, China expedited the process of modernising its legal framework.
  Thousands of pieces of legislation had been reviewed, revised or abolished according to their applicability with additional legislation being drafted and added to the current system.
  For example, in the realm of export controls, several important regulations were published in 2002 including:
  • The Missile and Related Items and Technology Export Control Regulations;
  • The Certain Chemicals, Related Equipment and Technology Export Control Regulations;
  • Biological Dual-use Items, Related Equipment and Technology Export Control Regulations; and
  • The Arms Export Control Regulations were revised in 200224 to include a newly developed control list.
  In order to facilitate the enforcement of the controls, China introduced a number of licenses that cover a wide variety of items and technologies in trade, formulated essential control lists and amended civil and criminal penalties for different kinds of violations.
  In short, China in this phase made great progress towards building a robust export controls system.
  However, the patchwork of numerous and discrete export control laws hampered the compliance efforts of conducting business and the enforcement efforts of government. Therefore, China has been longing for a significant reform to improve the situation. Eventually, the draft export controls law was released in 201725 to solicit public comment. After amendments were made, the revised draft was released in 201926 for a second round of public commentary. We are looking forward to entering phase five after the law is formally enacted.

(Source: Medium, 20 Oct Sep 2020)

* Author: Nicholas Turner, Esq., 852-5998-7559, Steptoe & Johnson HK 
  Here are five things that happened this week in the world of economic sanctions that I think you should know about.
(This week’s briefing covers the weeks ending 9 and 16 October 2020)
  1. The US State Department issued a much-anticipated report under Section 5(a) of the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (HKAA) identifying a list of 10 individuals determined by the US government to be materially responsible for the “erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy.” (All 10 were previously sanctioned by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on 7 August 2020.) Meanwhile, OFAC published a set of four FAQs on potential secondary sanctions for foreign financial institutions (FFIs) under the HKAA. (More on this below.)
  2. The European Council agreed “to take further restrictive measures” against high-ranking Belarusian officials including President Aleksandr Lukashenko. Meanwhile, Canada announced sanctions against 31 Belarusian officials, in addition to the eight who were targeted in conjunction with the United Kingdom earlier this month.
  3. The European Union imposed chemical weapon sanctions on six Russian nationals and one entity in response to a suspected nerve agent attack on Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny in August 2020. The UK government announced it would also sanction the individuals and entity.
  4. The US State Department and OFAC announced the designation of 18 Iranian financial institutions pursuant to Executive Order 13902 (one of which was also designated pursuant to Executive Order 13382). Following a 45-day wind-down period, transactions with the 18 banks for non-humanitarian goods or certain licensed activities could expose non-US persons to secondary sanctions risks, a Treasury Department news release warned.
  5. OFAC named a Nicaraguan financial institution and Nicaragua’s attorney general and the country’s secretary of the presidency as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) under Executive Order 13851. The targeted bank is the “main tool for funneling proceeds from Nicaragua’s concessionary oil schemes with Venezuela” to reward supporters of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, according to a State Department news release.


  Under Section 5(b) of the HKAA, the US Treasury Department has 30 to 60 days to issue a report of FFIs (if any) that knowingly conduct a “significant transaction” with one of the 10 individuals on last week’s State Department report. FAQ 850 gives a list of seven factors OFAC could consider in determining if a transaction is significant. (The factors are more or less the same as those used under the Iran and Russia programs.) FAQ 849 summarizes the criteria in Section 5(d) of the HKAA for excluding or removing an FFI from a Treasury Department report – in other words, a bank could conceivably still take steps to avoid secondary sanctions.
  Interestingly, OFAC’s FAQ 848 says the agency “will reach out to an FFI to inquire about its conduct before identifying it” in a report under Section 5(b). It’s not clear what that reach-out will look like or whether banks will be asked to disclose information about their transactions with the 10 individuals. The good news is that most banks would have scoped out their relationships with the individuals when they were first sanctioned under Executive Order 13936 back in August 2020.  

(Source: SmarTrade, 15 Oct 2020)

  On October 13, 2020, a World Trade Organization (WTO) arbitrator ruled that the European Union (EU) may take countermeasures/implement retaliatory tariffs against the United States for illegal subsidies to Boeing. This ruling allows the EU to request authorization from the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to take countermeasures against the United States at a level not to exceed $3,993,212,564 annually.
  This ruling is part of the longstanding dispute between the United States and the EU over subsidies to their largest civil aircraft manufacturers, Airbus and Boeing. The arbitrator determined that payments to Boeing by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense were not subsidies but that certain state of Washington tax exemptions and exclusions were subsidies in violation of the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The arbitrator concluded that Airbus suffered “adverse effects” of these subsidies from three sales won by Boeing between 2012 and 2015 that a previous WTO ruling determined would have been won by Airbus had a state of Washington tax break not been in place for Boeing.
  This latest WTO ruling follows a 2019 decision allowing the United States to impose retaliatory tariffs of approximately $7.5 billion annually on various EU goods. See Updates of October 4, 2019 and August 13, 2020. Upon release of the ruling, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer issued a statement that the EU has “no lawful basis to impose tariffs on imports from the United States.” He added, “Because Washington State repealed that tax break earlier this year, the EU has no valid basis to retaliate against any U.S. products. Any imposition of tariffs based on a measure that has been eliminated is plainly contrary to WTO principles and will force a U.S. response.”
  The EU’s Executive Vice-President and Commissioner for Trade, Valdis Dombrovskis, in a statement, said:
  This long-awaited decision allows the European Union to impose tariffs on American products entering Europe. I would much prefer not to do so – additional duties are not in the economic interest of either side, particularly as we strive to recover from the Covid-19 recession. I have been engaging with my American counterpart, Ambassador Lighthizer, and it is my hope that the U.S. will now drop the tariffs imposed on EU exports last year. This would generate positive momentum both economically and politically, and help us to find common ground in other key areas. The EU will continue to vigorously pursue this outcome. If it does not happen, we will be forced to exercise our rights and impose similar tariffs. While we are fully prepared for this possibility, we will do so reluctantly.

   In his statement, Ambassador Lighthizer indicated that the United States also wished to negotiate a settlement to a WTO dispute that began in 2004, noting that he was “waiting for a response from the EU to a recent U.S. proposal and will intensify our ongoing negotiations with the EU to restore fair competition and a level playing field to this sector.”


* What: 3rd Annual ITAR/EAR Symposium and Managing ITAR/EAR Complexities 2-Day Webinar
* When: 21-22 Oct
* Where: Your Computer
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Solutions & Consulting (ECS)
* ECS and Guest Speakers: Phil Kuhn-Commerce/BIS Office of Export Enforcement; Debi Davis-TransDigm, Scott Jackson-Curtiss-Wright: Suzanne Palmer & Lisa Bencivenga-ECS
* Register: here or write to phyllis@exportcompliancesolutions.com or call 1-866-238-4018
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EN_a115. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations

(Source: Editor)

* Stanislaus I (Stanisław Leszczyński; 20 Oct 1677 – 23 Feb 1766; was King of Poland, Grand Duke of Lithuania, Duke of Lorraine and a count of the Holy Roman Empire.)
 – “To believe with certainty we must begin with doubting.”
* YoungBoy Never Broke Again (Kentrell DeSean Gaulden; born October 20, 1999; also known as “NBA YoungBoy”, is an American “gangsta rap” artist and songwriter.)
  – “I don’t trust nobody. I have all bad days. I think I need help. I got an anger problem.”
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The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  The latest amendments are listed below.
Latest Update 


5 Apr 2019: 84 FR 13499:

Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustments for Inflation. 

9 Oct 2020: 
85 FR 64014:  Revisions to the Unverified List (UVL)

DOC FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS (FTR): 15 CFR Part 30.   24 Apr 2018: 83 FR 17749: Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification on the Collection and Confidentiality of Kimberley Process Certificates.  

: DoD 5220.22-M. Implemented by Dep’t of Defense. 

18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)  
DOE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES: 10 CFR Part 810.    23 Feb 2015: 80 FR 9359: comprehensive updating of regulations, updates the activities and technologies subject to specific authorization and DOE reporting requirements. 

15 Nov 2017, 82 FR 52823: miscellaneous corrections include correcting references, an address and a misspelling.

DOJ ATF ARMS IMPORT REGULATIONS: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. 
14 Mar 2019: 84 FR 9239: Bump-Stock-Type Devices.


28 Sep 2020: 85 FR 60874: Temporary Amendment for Republic of Cyprus. The latest edition of the BITAR is 28 Sep 2020. 

DOT FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS (OFAC FACR): 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
International Criminal Court-Related Sanctions Regulations.

1 Jan 2019: 19 USC 1202 Annex.
  – HTS codes for AES are available here.
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available here.

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