17-0824 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

17-0824 Thursday “Daily Bugle”

Thursday, 24 August 2017

The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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  1. Commerce/BIS Seeks Comments on Competitive Enhancement Needs Assessment Survey Program
  2. Commerce/ITA Seeks Comments on Form ITA 358P, Annual Report from Foreign-Trade Zones
  1. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: Cryofab, Inc. of Kenilworth, NJ, to Pay $35,000 to Settle Alleged Export Violations
  3. State/DDTC Updates DDTC In-House Seminar Industry Schedule
  4. Treasury/OFAC: “COSL Singapore Ltd Settles Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations of the ITSR”
  1. Expeditors News: “CBP Provides Additional Details on Next Deployment”
  2. NBC News: “Did Owner of Million-Dollar U.S. Home Help North Korea Evade Sanctions?”
  3. Space News: “Ukrainian Government Investigation Concludes No Engine Transfers to North Korea”
  1. G. Kreijen: “Two-Year Prison Sentence Demanded in Dutch Sanctions Enforcement Case”
  2. R.C. Burns: “BIS Implements Wassenaar’s Note 4 Amendment: Accentuate the Positive”
  1. NAITA Presents 2017 Export Control Update (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) on 18-19 Sep in Huntsville, AL 
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Changes: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (28 Jul 2017), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (15 Aug 2017), FACR/OFAC (16 Jun 2017), FTR (19 Apr 2017), HTSUS (25 Jul 2017), ITAR (11 Jan 2017) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 


82 FR 40135-40126: Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request
   The Department of Commerce will submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for clearance the following proposal for collection of information under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35).
  – Agency: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.
  – Title: Competitive Enhancement Needs Assessment Survey Program.
  – Form Number(s): N/A.
  – OMB Control Number: 0694-0083.
  – Needs and Uses: The information collected from these surveys will be used to assist small- and medium-sized firms in defense transition and in gaining access to advanced technologies and manufacturing processes available from Federal Laboratories. The goal is to improve regions of the country adversely affected by cutbacks in defense spending and military base closures. …
   Written comments and recommendations for the proposed information collection should be sent within 30 days of publication of this notice to OIRA_Submission@omb.eop.gov.
Sheleen Dumas, Departmental PRA Lead, Office of the Chief Information Officer.

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. Commerce/ITA Seeks Comments on Form ITA 358P, Annual Report from Foreign-Trade Zones

82 FR 40136: Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Annual Report from Foreign-Trade Zones
* AGENCY: International Trade Administration, Commerce.
* ACTION: Notice. …
* DATES: Written comments must be submitted on or before October 23, 2017. …
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Requests for additional information or copies of the information collection instrument and instructions should be directed to Christopher Kemp, Office of Foreign-Trade Zones, (202) 482-0862, or email, Christopher.Kemp@trade.gov.
  – OMB Control Number: 0625-0109.
  – Form Number(s): ITA 359P.
  – Abstract: The Foreign-Trade Zone Annual Report is the vehicle by which Foreign-Trade Zone grantees report annually to the Foreign-Trade Zones Board, pursuant to the requirements of the Foreign-Trade Zones Act (19 U.S.C. 81a-81u). The annual reports submitted by grantees are the only complete source of compiled information on FTZs. The data and information contained in the reports relates to international trade activity in FTZs. The reports are used by the Congress and the Department to determine the economic effect of the FTZ program. The reports are also used by the FTZ Board and other trade policy officials to determine whether zone activity is consistent with U.S. international trade policy, and whether it is in the public interest. The public uses the information regarding activities carried out in FTZs to evaluate their effect on industry sectors. The information contained in annual reports also helps zone grantees in their marketing efforts. This is a request for a renewal of a currently approved information collection. …
  Sheleen Dumas, Departmental PRA Lead, Office of the Chief Information Officer.

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OGS_a13.  Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
Federal Register

* Treasury; Foreign Assets Control Office; NOTICES; Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Publication Date: 25 August 2017.]

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Commerce/BIS) [Excerpts.]
* Respondent: Cryofab, Inc., Kenilworth, NJ
* Charges: 2 Charges of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(a) — Engaging in Conduct Prohibited by the Regulations:
  On two occasions, on or about July 19, 2012 and December 4, 2012, respectively, Cryofab engaged in conducted prohibited by the Regulations by exporting gas storage containers and related tools and accessories, items subject to the Regulations, designated EAR99, and valued in total at $21,570, from the United States to the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), an Indian Department of Atomic Energy entity located in Mumbai, India, without the BIS licenses required by Section 744.11 and Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations. On the first occasion, Cryofab exported a liquid helium storage container and accessory (total value: $16,275), and on the second occasion, it exported a liquid nitrogen storage container and operating tool (total value: $5,295). BARC is and at all times pertinent hereto was an organization listed on the Entity List set forth at Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations. BARC was added to the Entity List on June 30, 1997.
  Although an experienced exporter, Cryofab failed to screen the Entity List in connection with these two transactions and failed to seek or obtain the BIS licenses required pursuant to Section 744.11 and Supplement No. 4. It also erroneously listed the items as eligible for shipment without a license (“NLR,” or No License Required) on the Shipper’s Letter of Instructions for each shipment. …
* Penalty:
  – Civil penalty of $35,000;
  – Cryofab shall complete an external audit of its export controls compliance program; and
  – Cryofab shall hire an unaffiliated third-party consultant with expertise in U.S. export control laws to conduct the external audit of its compliance with U.S. export control laws (including recordkeeping requirements).
* Debarred: Not if penalty is paid, and the audit completed as agreed.
* Date of Order: 18 August 2017.
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* 13 September 2017: CANCELLED
* 13 December 2017: RESCHEDULED (See Below)
New Date:
* 14 December 2017
    – Registration Opens – Friday, October 27, 2017
    – Registration Closes – Friday, November 17, 2017

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OGS_a46. Treasury/OFAC: “COSL Singapore Ltd Settles Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations of the ITSR”

(Source: Treasury/OFAC)    
COSL Singapore Ltd (“COSL Singapore”), an oilfield services company located in Singapore and a subsidiary of China Oilfield Service Limited, has agreed to pay $415,350 to settle its potential civil liability for 55 apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560 (ITSR). The apparent violations of §§ 560.203 and 560.204 of the ITSR occurred between the approximate dates of October 7, 2011 and February 20, 2013 when COSL Singapore, through its subsidiary companies COSL Drilling Pan-Pacific (Labuan) Ltd and COSL Drilling Pan-Pacific Ltd, exported or attempted to export 55 orders of oil rig supplies from the United States to Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, and then re-exported or attempted to re-export these supplies to four separate oil rigs located in Iranian territorial waters. The transactional value of the 55 orders is $524,664.
COSL Singapore has several oil rigs in its fleet and enters into time charter agreements with third-party drilling companies to allow the third-party drilling companies to use the oil rigs for their drilling operations for a specified term and within a specified territory. COSL Singapore provides the oil rig and oil rig crews to the third-party drilling companies and is responsible for maintaining the oil rig, including by procuring equipment and spare parts for the oil rig’s operations. Procurement specialists located in Singapore or assigned to an oil rig’s base of operations are responsible for the day-to-day procurement and purchase orders associated with routine maintenance of the oil rigs, including initiating requests for quotation, obtaining quotations, and issuing purchase orders. The procurement specialists purchased at least 55 orders of supplies from vendors located in the United States on behalf of, and that were specifically intended for shipment and/or re-export to, four COSL Singapore oil rigs located and operating in Iranian territorial waters between October 2011 and February 2013. Although some of the purchase order quotations the COSL Singapore procurement specialists received from U.S. vendors included specific language warning that any such goods could not be shipped or re- exported to countries subject to U.S. economic sanctions, specifically including Iran, the company purchased the goods and shipped them to the oil rigs over a period of several years.
OFAC determined that COSL Singapore did not voluntarily disclose the apparent violations and that the apparent violations constitute a non-egregious case. The statutory maximum penalty amount for the apparent violations is $13,750,000, and the base penalty amount for the apparent violations is $923,000.
The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s consideration of the following facts and circumstances, pursuant to the General Factors under OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines,
31 C.F.R. Part 501, app. A. OFAC considered the following to be aggravating factors:
  (1) COSL Singapore failed to exercise a minimal degree of caution when it exported or attempted to export goods from the United States and re-exported or attempted to re-export them to oil rigs located in Iranian territorial waters;
  (2) COSL Singapore’s exportation or re- exportation of equipment to the four oil rigs aided in the development of Iran’s energy resources;
  (3) COSL Singapore is a large, sophisticated company with 14 offshore drilling rigs doing business throughout the world; and
  (4) COSL Singapore did not have an OFAC compliance program in place at the time of the transactions despite conducting business in the United States and/or with U.S. companies in relation to the offshore drilling and petrochemical sectors.
OFAC considered the following to be mitigating factors:
  (1) COSL Singapore has no prior sanctions history with OFAC, including no receipt of a penalty notice or Finding of Violation in the five years preceding the earliest date of these transactions;
  (2) COSL Singapore took remedial action by instituting an OFAC sanctions compliance program; and
  (3) COSL Singapore displayed substantial cooperation throughout the course of OFAC’s investigation, including by entering into a tolling agreement with OFAC.
For more information regarding OFAC regulations, please go to: http://www.treasury.gov/ofac.

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On 23 August 2017 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) updated the ACE Deployment Information Notice page on the CBP website, providing additional information for Deployment G of the core capabilities.
On 16 September 2017, the below core capabilities will be deployed with the following changes and updates:
  – Duty Deferral – Any duty deferral information submitted on or after 16 September 2017 must be submitted in ACE, even if the process began in ACS.
  – Electronic 214 (e214) – The legacy system will no longer support e214s
  – Importer Security Filing – Importers should verify software is up-to-date, as minor code changes will be required.
  – Manufacturer ID (MID) – Software vendors should be updated to support MID submissions in ACE.
Additional core capabilities will be rolled out later in 2017 and early 2018.
The Information Notice page can be accessed here.
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NBC News) [Excerpts.]
The five-bedroom house in New York’s Long Island suburbs – listed for nearly $1.3 million – boasts a southern exposure and proximity to a country club.
But here’s what’s more interesting: The seller, a Chinese national named Sun Sidong, has been linked by American security experts to a network of Chinese companies under Treasury sanctions for helping companies and individuals who support North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
According to Chinese corporate filings, Sun is the listed owner of Dandong Dongyuan Industrial Co., which has shared an email address with another Chinese company, Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co., a coal exporter suspected of helping North Korea evade sanctions.
The coal company and “four related front companies” were targeted by a federal search warrant allowing prosecutors to secretly monitor their financial transactions at eight U.S. banks, seizing any funds stemming from illegal sanctions-busting, according to a May federal court ruling.
The ruling, by U.S. District Judge Beryl Howell of Washington, D.C., said the eight American financial institutions – Bank of America, Wells Fargo, BNY Mellon, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, and Standard Chartered Bank – had already processed upwards of $700 million in prohibited transactions involving North Korea since 2009. The ruling does not allege any wrongdoing by any of the banks.
On Tuesday, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co. and its primary shareholder in response to “attempted evasion of U.S. sanctions.”
That shareholder, a Chinese businessman named Chi Yupeng, was also named in a civil complaint filed Tuesday by the Justice Department seeking a money laundering penalty against the firm, as well as the seizure of $4 million in funds allegedly laundered for North Korea’s ruling party. The complaint alleges that front companies controlled by Chi Yupeng comprise one of the largest financial facilitators for North Korea.
Chi Yupeng hung up on NBC News several times when asked for comment.
The Justice Department also moved to seize nearly $7 million from a Singapore firm over similar allegations, and Treasury levied sanctions against a number of other Chinese and Russian entities – 16 in total – it accused of helping North Korea evade sanctions. …
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Space News) [Excerpts.]
One week after Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko ordered his government to investigate claims that North Korea may have procured rocket engines from a Ukrainian missile enterprise, the working group came back with an unambiguous answer: “Ukraine was not involved in the development of North Korea’s ballistic missiles program.”
In a 1,300-word letter addressed to Poroshenko Tuesday, the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) Oleksandr Turchynov laid out his government’s defense against a controversial New York Times story published last week. That story heavily referenced a report by Michael Elleman of the International Institute of Strategic Studies.
In particular, Turchynov’s letter addressed head-on the possibility that Ukraine’s Yuzhmash rocket company – which built Zenit rockets for Sea Launch and components for Orbital ATK’s Antares rockets – was involved in the transfer of Soviet-era RD-250 rocket engines to North Korea for use in the new Hwasong-12 and Hwasong-14 ballistic missiles tested this summer.
Turchynov wrote that Ukraine’s existing export-control mechanisms are sufficient for preventing the transfer of military and dual-use goods to countries sanctioned by the UN Security Council.
  “During the period of Ukraine’s independence [since 1991], the State Service of Export Control has never issued the permission for the supplying [North Korea] with any military and dual-use goods, including the RD-250 missile engines, its modifications and their components,” Turchynov wrote in the letter, which was published on the NSDC’s website.
The letter explained that Yuzhmash, and its R&D wing – the Yuzhnoe design bureau – were not the creators of the RD-250 engine. Rather, the design’s origins trace back to Russia’s Energomash, which builds the RD-180 for ULA’s Atlas 5rockets.
  “In 1965, [Energomash] transferred documentation required for the organization of serial production of these engines to [Yuzhmash],” Turchynov wrote. “All rocket engines suitable for flight use, including the RD-250 engine and its modifications, were delivered from Yuzhmash to [Russia], only as part of missiles.” …
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* Author: Gerard Kreijen, Esq.,
, Loyens & Loeff, Amsterdam.
Another case that seems to betray a tougher line of sanctions enforcement in the Netherlands has emerged. On 21 August 2017, the Dutch public prosecution (the Prosecution) demanded two years of imprisonment for a managing director of a Dutch company which had dealings with Iran (the Defendant). In this case, brought before the Court of Den Bosch, the Prosecution has charged the Defendant with being criminally liable for having directed acts in breach of the nuclear-related EU sanction regulations as they applied before the implementation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
In 2015 a criminal investigation was started as a result of an inspection by Dutch Customs, Team POSS (Precursors, Origin, Strategic goods, and Sanction regulations). The investigation revealed that the company had been supplying packing seals for pipelines throughout 2012-2015 to the National Iranian Gas Company, which was prohibited under EU sanction law. The investigation also showed that the records of the company had been falsified in connection with these transactions.
At the hearing the Prosecution stressed the serious nature of the alleged offences: Iran has been subjected to sanctions by the EU and internationally inter alia for its refusal to provide an insight into its nuclear program. These sanctions can only work and have an effect on Iran if all parties comply and refrain from trading with Iran. The sanction regulations, however, are being undermined and the authorities misled when there is export without a license, supply of goods to prohibited entities and falsification of documents.
According to the Prosecution, the Defendant went to great lengths to cover up the unlawful acts of the company. Thus, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates have been deliberately specified as countries of destination in the respective export documents and company records.
Reportedly, the Prosecution considered a two-year prison term appropriate, because the violations took place over a period of several years, the profits that had been obtained in breach of the sanctions could not be taken away from the company anymore (since it had gone bankrupt), and the Defendant had been issued with a warning in the past.
The Court has scheduled 4 September 2017 for judgment. To be continued …
[Editor’s Note: for Dutch subscribers, the public prosecution news announcement can be found

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11. R.C. Burns: “BIS Implements Wassenaar’s Note 4 Amendment: Accentuate the Positive”

Export Law Blog
. Reprinted by permission.)
* Author: R. Clifton Burns, Esq., Bryan Cave LLP, Wash DC,
, 202-508-6067).
Last week the Bureau of Industry and Security published a final rule implementing the changes adopted by the December 2016 Wassenaar Arrangements Plenary meeting.  Most of these changes are the usual nits and quibbles cooked up to justify a nice government-paid international trip by the delegates.  Like this:
The Heading of 1C608 is amended by adding double quotes around the defined term “energetic materials” …
The most interesting change, however, at least in my view, was the re-working of Note 4, which provides a broad exception to export controls on encryption.   Allegedly, the change wasn’t supposed to change anything, and BIS’s notes to the amendments say just that.   This, of course, would lead ordinary people to wonder why change something you don’t want to change, but, of course, I guess they felt guilty charging their governments for simply re-arranging semicolons, adding quotation marks and correcting spelling errors in the Wassenaar lists.
Part of the problem in the new, improved version is that it’s going to be harder to explain to clients.  Anyone who has spent much time dealing with software engineers on encryption export matters will immediately see the difficulties ahead.   (That means anyone who has had to argue with a software engineer that his program is still covered even though the encryption routines are called from the operating system.)  This post is intended to help you in that process (as well as to make fun of a note added to 5A002 by the amendment).
So, let’s take a quick trip down memory lane and now look at the text of the old Note 4.

Note 4: Category 5-Part 2 does not apply to items incorporating or using ”cryptography” and meeting all of the following: 
  (a) The primary function or set of functions is not any of the following: 
    (1) “Information security”; 
    (2) A computer, including operating systems, parts and components therefor; 
    (3) Sending, receiving or storing information (except in support of entertainment, mass commercial broadcasts, digital rights management or medical records management); or 
    (4) Networking (includes operation, administration, management and provisioning); 
  (b) The cryptographic functionality is limited to supporting their primary function or set of functions. …

Under the new amendments, the idea is “the creation of positive text in 5A002.a to specify the items subject to control.” I bet the entire encryption world was anxiously awaiting that, don’t you? So, to create this, er, “positive text” subsections 1, 2 and 4 have been moved to the text of ECCN 5A002. Subsection 1 becomes 5A002.a.1, subsection 2 becomes a.3 and subsection 4 becomes a.2 as follows:

a. Designed or modified to use ‘cryptography for data confidentiality’ having ‘in excess of 56 bits of symmetric key length, or equivalent’, where that cryptographic capability is usable without ”cryptographic activation” or has been activated, as follows: 
  a.1. Items having ”information security” as a primary function; 
  a.2. Digital communication or networking systems, equipment or components, not specified in paragraph 5A002.a.1; 
  a.3. Computers, other items having information storage or processing as a primary function, and components therefor, not specified in paragraphs 5A002.a.1 or .a.2

And, if you look closely, you can see that part of 3 was slipped into a.3 when it references items having “information storage” as a primary function. (Operating systems now get caught in 5D002.a.1 which controls software for the use of computers described in 5A002.a.3).
But what about items with the primary purpose of sending and receiving information? In the software context, this meant, for example, email and FTP programs, which were not considered eligible for the Note 4 exemption. You have to assume that is now captured by a.2, which talks not just about networking but also about “digital communication.”
That leaves subsection b on Note 4, which, frankly, never seemed to apply to much of anything. That now becomes a.4:

Items, not specified in paragraphs 5A002.a.1 to a.3, where the ‘cryptography for data confidentiality’ having ‘in excess of 56 bits of symmetric key length, or equivalent’ meets all of the following: 
  a.4.a. It supports a non-primary function of the item; and 
  a.4.b. It is performed by incorporated equipment or ”software” that would, as a standalone item, be specified by ECCNs 5A002, 5A003, 5A004, 5B002 or 5D002.

Because it’s not clear what exactly such an item would be, the amendment adds a not very helpful note, in the theme of creating “positive text,” to the new 5A002 to give examples of some items that are not 5A002.a.4. Here’s one:
An automobile where the only ‘cryptography for data confidentiality’ ‘in excess of 56 bits of symmetric key length, or equivalent’ is performed by a Category 5-Part 2 Note 3 eligible mobile telephone that is built into the car. In this case, secure phone communications support a non-primary function of the automobile but the mobile telephone (equipment), as a standalone item, is not controlled by ECCN 5A002 because it is excluded by the Cryptography Note (Note 3)
Okay, I’m going to say it: what century do the plenary delegates live in? Did they all travel in a time machine from 1980 to Wassenaar? Mobile phones built into cars?
So while we’re engaged in time travel, here’s an example of something that would be caught by 5A002.a.4: Maxwell Smart’s shoe phone. Of course, I’m assuming that like any good phone it incorporates non-standard cryptography. The principal purpose of the shoe is, of course, walking and the cryptography supports its non-primary function of talking. So there.

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TE_a112. NAITA Presents 2017 Export Control Update (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) on 18-19 Sept in Huntsville, AL

(Source: Amanda Berkey; apberkey@madisoncountyal.gov)  
* What: NAITA 2017 Export Control Update (ITAR/EAR/OFAC).
* When: 18-19 September 2017.
* Where: The Westin Huntsville; 6800 Governors West, Huntsville, AL 35806.
* Sponsor: North Alabama International Trade Association (NAITA) and Maynard Cooper & Gale PC.
* Speakers Include: Kevin Wolf, Candace Goforth, Michael Laychak, and Jim Bartlett.
* Credits: Approved by the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Commission of the Alabama State Bar for 12.5 CLEs.
* Register: Click here for details & registration link or contact Amanda Berkey/NAITA at 256-532-3505, apberkey@madisoncountyal.gov or naita@naita.org.

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* Duke Kahanamoku (Duke Paoa Kahinu Mokoe Hulikohola Kahanamoku; 24 Aug 1890 – 22 Jan 1968; was a Native Hawaiian competition swimmer who popularized the ancient Hawaiian sport of surfing. He was born towards the end of the Kingdom of Hawaii, just before the overthrow, living into statehood as a United States citizen. He was a five-time Olympic medalist in swimming.)
  – “Just take your time – wave comes. Let the other guys go, catch another one.”
* Theodore Parker (24 Aug 1810 – 10 May 1860; was an American Transcendentalist and minister of the Unitarian church. A reformer and abolitionist, his words and popular quotations would later inspire speeches by Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr.
  – “Never violate the sacredness of your individual self-respect.”

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. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  Changes to applicable regulations are listed below.
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 28 Jul 2017: 82 FR 35064-35065: Technical Corrections to U.S. Customs and Border Protection Regulations
  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM (Summary here.)

: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  – Last Amendment: 15 Aug 2017: 
82 FR 38764-38819: Wassenaar Arrangement 2016 Plenary Agreements Implementation 

: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
  – Last Amendment: 16 Jun 2017: 82 FR 27613-27614: Removal of Burmese Sanctions Regulations 
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 19 Apr 2017: 82 FR 18383-18393: Foreign Trade Regulations: Clarification on Filing Requirements 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – The latest edition (18 July 2017) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and to many errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR.
, 1 Jan 2017: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 25 Jul 2017: Harmonized System Update 1706, containing 834 ABI records and 157 harmonized tariff records.
  – HTS codes for AES are available
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – Last Amendment: 11 Jan 2017: 82 FR 3168-3170: 2017 Civil Monetary Penalties Inflationary Adjustment
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 10 Jun 2017) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III.  The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text.  Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.  The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.

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Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 

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* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

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