17-0724 Monday “Daily Bugle”

17-0724 Monday “Daily Bugle”

Monday, 24 July 2017

The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
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[No items of interest noted today.]

  1. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
  2. Commerce/BIS: (No new postings.)
  3. DHS/CBP Releases CATAIR Updates
  4. DoD/DSCA Publishes SAMM and Policy Memoranda, 23-29 July
  5. State/DDTC: (No new postings.)
  6. White House Releases Presidential Executive Order on Strengthening the U.S. Defense Industry
  1. Bangkok Post: “Export of Dual-Use Items: Are You in Control or Will You Be Caught Out?”
  2. Channel NewsAsia: “Singapore Firm Says Report About Links to North Korea’s Luxury Goods Store is ‘Fake'”
  3. Daily Energy Insider: “Antiquated Export Controls are Constraining U.S. Exporters, According to Nuclear Energy Institute”
  4. Jewish Chronicle: “American Bill to Prevent Israel Boycotts Moves Closer to Becoming Law”
  5. The New York Times: “Trump Orders Review to Strengthen U.S. Defense Industry”
  6. ST&R Trade Report: “Air Cargo Security Program Seen as Aid for E-Commerce Extended Another Year”
  7. ST&R Trade Report: “Willful Diversion of Defense Exports Evident in Only Small Percentage of Cases, Report Finds”
  1. D. Spires & M. Wilson: “BIS Implements 2016 MTCR Changes”
  2. D.R. Stepp: “Change is Coming: China Proposes New Export Control Law (IRB No. 563)”
  3. M. Volkov: “Is Your Company At-Risk for a Government Enforcement Action?”
  1. ECTI Presents U.S. Export Control (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) Seminar Training Focusing on Issues Relevant to Universities, Research Labs & Other Institutions of Higher Learning – Columbus, OH, 2-5 October 
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings 
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Changes: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (13 Jul 2017), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (7 Jul 2017), FACR/OFAC (16 Jun 2017), FTR (19 Apr 2017), HTSUS (28 Jun 2017), ITAR (11 Jan 2017) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 


[No items of interest noted today.]

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OGS_a11. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register

[No items of interest noted today.]
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DHS/CBP Releases CATAIR Updates

CSMS# 17-000417, 24 July 2017.)
  Document Image System Implementation Guide
The DIS XML Implementation Guide has been updated. Please refer to the Table of Changes for the specific list of items that have been updated. Of note, documents for DEA have been removed. (See also CSMS #17-000408) The updated document may be found here.
  CATAIR Appendix B – Valid Codes
The ACE Appendix B CATAIR has been updated. Changes to this documented that were indicated in the change log for March 15 were not made. The updates have now been made. The updated document may be found here.
  Draft CATAIR Importer Security Filing
The Draft Importer Security Filing CATAIR has been updated but the changes do not require any programming. The updated document may be found here.
  – Related CSMS No. 17-000408

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State/DDTC: (No new postings.)

(Source: State/DDTC)

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. White House Releases Presidential Executive Order on Strengthening the U.S. Defense Industry

(Source: The White House)
Presidential Executive Order on Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy
.  A healthy manufacturing and defense industrial base and resilient supply chains are essential to the economic strength and national security of the United States.  The ability of the United States to maintain readiness, and to surge in response to an emergency, directly relates to the capacity, capabilities, and resiliency of our manufacturing and defense industrial base and supply chains.  Modern supply chains, however, are often long and the ability of the United States to manufacture or obtain goods critical to national security could be hampered by an inability to obtain various essential components, which themselves may not be directly related to national security.  Thus, the United States must maintain a manufacturing and defense industrial base and supply chains capable of manufacturing or supplying those items.
The loss of more than 60,000 American factories, key companies, and almost 5 million manufacturing jobs since 2000 threatens to undermine the capacity and capabilities of United States manufacturers to meet national defense requirements and raises concerns about the health of the manufacturing and defense industrial base.  The loss of additional companies, factories, or elements of supply chains could impair domestic capacity to create, maintain, protect, expand, or restore capabilities essential for national security.
As the manufacturing capacity and defense industrial base of the United States have been weakened by the loss of factories and manufacturing jobs, so too have workforce skills important to national defense.  This creates a need for strategic and swift action in creating education and workforce development programs and policies that support job growth in manufacturing and the defense industrial base.
Strategic support for a vibrant domestic manufacturing sector, a vibrant defense industrial base, and resilient supply chains is therefore a significant national priority.  A comprehensive evaluation of the defense industrial base and supply chains, with input from multiple executive departments and agencies (agencies), will provide a necessary assessment of our current strengths and weaknesses.
Sec. 2. Assessment of the Manufacturing Capacity, Defense Industrial Base, and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States
.  Within 270 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of Commerce, Labor, Energy, and Homeland Security, and in consultation with the Secretaries of the Interior and Health and Human Services, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, and the heads of such other agencies as the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate, shall provide to the President an unclassified report, with a classified annex as needed, that builds on current assessment and evaluation activities, and:
  (a) identifies the military and civilian materiel, raw materials, and other goods that are essential to national security;
  (b) identifies the manufacturing capabilities essential to producing the goods identified pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, including emerging capabilities;
  (c) identifies the defense, intelligence, homeland, economic, natural, geopolitical, or other contingencies that may  disrupt, strain, compromise, or eliminate the supply chains of goods identified pursuant to subsection (a) of this section (including as a result of the elimination of, or failure to develop domestically, the capabilities identified pursuant to subsection (b) of this section) and that are sufficiently likely to arise so as to require reasonable preparation for their occurrence;
  (d) assesses the resiliency and capacity of the manufacturing and defense industrial base and supply chains of the United States to support national security needs upon the occurrence of the contingencies identified pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, including an assessment of:
    (i) the manufacturing capacity of the United States and the physical plant capacity of the defense industrial base, including their ability to modernize to meet future needs;
    (ii) gaps in national-security-related domestic manufacturing capabilities, including non-existent, extinct, threatened, and single-point-of-failure capabilities;
    (iii) supply chains with single points of failure or limited resiliency, especially at suppliers third-tier and lower;
    (iv) energy consumption and opportunities to increase resiliency through better energy management;
    (v) current domestic education and manufacturing workforce skills;
    (vi) exclusive or dominant supply of the goods (or components thereof) identified pursuant to subsection (a) of this section by or through nations that are or are likely to become unfriendly or unstable; and
    (vii) the availability of substitutes for or alternative sources for the goods identified pursuant to subsection (a) of this section;
  (e) identifies the causes of any aspect of the defense industrial base or national-security-related supply chains assessed as deficient pursuant to subsection (d) of this section; and
  (f) recommends such legislative, regulatory, and policy changes and other actions by the President or the heads of agencies as they deem appropriate based upon a reasoned assessment that the benefits outweigh the costs (broadly defined to include any economic, strategic, and national security benefits or costs) over the short, medium, and long run to:
    (i) avoid, or prepare for, any contingencies identified pursuant to subsection (c) of this section;
    (ii) ameliorate any aspect of the defense industrial base or national-security-related supply chains assessed as deficient pursuant to subsection (d) of this section; and
    (iii) strengthen the United States manufacturing capacity and defense industrial base and increase the resiliency of supply chains critical to national security.
Sec. 3. General Provisions
  (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
    (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
    (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
  (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
  (c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
July 21, 2017.  

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Bangkok Post: “Export of Dual-Use Items: Are You in Control or Will You Be Caught Out?”

Bangkok Post, 24 July 2017.) [Excerpts.]
The [Thai] government is preparing to enforce export controls on dual-use items — goods that have both a commercial and military use — starting on Jan 1, 2018, based on a Commerce Ministry notification regarding criteria and licensing requirements issued in October 2015. Consequently, companies will need to check whether their exports are covered under two lists:
List I, based on European Union regulations with some exceptions, is the list of Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCN). The goods on this list require a licence (on a shipment-by-shipment basis) before they can be exported.
List II is a wider list based on HS (harmonised system) classification codes. Companies that export goods covered on this list do not require an export licence but must follow certain procedures before export, including registering with the Foreign Trade Department and self-certifying that the goods are not dual-use items.
It is expected that many industries will be affected by the new rules, but those most likely to be affected include the following: electronics, semiconductors, computers, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, automotive, steel and telecommunications.
Non-compliance with the export control regime could lead to delays in shipments, reputational damage, financial loss and significant penalties and fines, or even imprisonment. … 

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Channel NewsAsia: “Singapore Firm Says Report About Links to North Korea’s Luxury Goods Store is ‘Fake'”

Channel NewsAsia, 24 July 2017.) [Excerpts.]
The director of OCN (Singapore) told Channel NewsAsia that the company pulled out of North Korea in 2012 and has never exported prohibited items to the isolated state. …
Mr Ng Kheng Wah, director of OCN (Singapore), was responding to Channel NewsAsia’s queries on a Jul 17 report by website NK News, which said OCN has been providing luxury goods for sale in North Korea, in possible contravention of international sanctions.
Citing several anonymous sources, the report alleged that OCN formed joint ventures to run two small high-end department stores in Pyongyang. The stores sell a variety of high-end products, including cosmetics, handbags, watches and liquor from well-known international brands. Under UN sanctions, it is illegal to directly or indirectly supply luxury goods to North Korea. …
When contacted, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) said it is “unable to comment on queries pertaining to specific companies and individuals”. The spokesperson added that Singapore takes its obligations under the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) seriously, and is implementing them.
  “We have adopted a whole-of-government approach through our inter-agency processes to implement the UNSCRs. Singapore also maintains a robust export control system that is regularly updated to be in line with the latest international standards,” said the spokesperson, who added that the Government will “investigate any wrongdoing by individuals or entities in Singapore”. …

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Daily Energy Insider: “Antiquated Export Controls are Constraining U.S. Exporters, According to Nuclear Energy Institute”

Daily Energy Insider, 21 July 2017.) [Excerpts.]
The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) antiquated export controls are constraining U.S. exporters and undermining American influence on global nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation, according to recent DOE testimony from the Nuclear Energy Institute’s (NEI) VP of Suppliers, New Reactors, and International Programs Dan Lipman. …
Lipman’s comments were made in response to a May 30 call by DOE officials for interested parties to identify regulations that were “obsolete, unnecessary, unjustified, ineffective or nonsensical.”

  “A comparative study of export control regimes concluded that Part 810 is more complex, more restrictive and less efficient than the equivalent export authorization regimes of other leading nuclear supplier nations and represents a significant competitive disadvantage for U.S. suppliers relative to foreign vendors,” Lipman said. … 

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Jewish Chronicle: “American Bill to Prevent Israel Boycotts Moves Closer to Becoming Law”

Jewish Chronicle, 21 July 2017.) [Excerpts.]
Offenders could receive a fine of anywhere between $250,000 and $1 million, and up to 20 years in prison
Almost half of the US Senate and over 50 per cent of the House of Representatives have signed a proposed bill which would outlaw boycotts against Israel.
The proposed “Israel Anti-Boycott Act”, co-sponsored by Republican and Democratic Senators, would “amend the Export Administration Act of 1979 to include in the prohibitions on boycotts against allies of the United States boycotts fostered by international governmental organizations against Israel”. It would also “direct the Export-Import Bank of the United States to oppose boycotts against Israel, and for other purposes”.
Those violating the bill could receive a fine of anywhere between $250,000 and $1 million, and up to 20 years in prison.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has spoken out against the bill, saying it “violates first amendment rights”. … 

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The New York Times: “Trump Orders Review to Strengthen U.S. Defense Industry”

The New York Times, 21 July 2017.) [Excerpts.]
President Donald Trump signed an executive order on Friday initiating a government-wide review of the U.S. defense industry and suggest changes to strengthen it.
The review is intended to identify and address potential weak points in the defense manufacturing base including companies that could go out of business and leave gaps in the supply chain for U.S. weapons systems, said Peter Navarro, the White House National Trade Council director.
The executive order asked for recommendations on possible legislative, regulatory and policy changes that would improve and support the defense industry, calling it a “significant national priority”.
  “America’s defense industrial base is now facing increasing gaps in its capabilities,” Navarro said. “There’s just one company in the U.S. that can repair propellers for Navy submarines,” he added in a briefing with reporters. … 

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ST&R Trade Report: “Air Cargo Security Program Seen as Aid for E-Commerce Extended Another Year”

U.S. Customs and Border Protection has extended the Air Cargo Advance Screening pilot program for until July 26, 2018, but is still not accepting new participants. Acting Commissioner Kevin McAleenan has said this pilot positions CBP to better address e-commerce, which requires the agency to screen an increasing number of smaller cargo shipments and thus presents challenges associated with assessing risk, targeting, and facilitating the movement of goods.
The ACAS pilot is a voluntary test used to target high-risk air cargo in which participants (including express carriers, passenger carriers, heavy all-cargo carriers, and freight forwarders) submit a subset of the required advance air cargo data to CBP at the earliest point practicable prior to loading of the cargo onto the aircraft destined to or transiting through the U.S. The data elements submitted as part of this pilot include air waybill number, total quantity based on the smallest external packing unit, total weight, cargo description, shipper name and address, and consignee name and address. Participants must also (1) mitigate, according to Transportation Security Administration screening protocols, any threat identified by the National Targeting Center, (2) respond promptly with complete and accurate information when contacted by the NTC with questions regarding the data submitted, (3) follow any “do not load” instructions, and (4) partake in regular teleconferences or meetings established by CBP, when necessary, to ensure that any issues or challenges regarding the pilot are communicated and addressed.
CBP intends to amend its regulations to incorporate ACAS as an ongoing regulatory program. McAleenan said in December 2016 that CBP was “just about finished with the development” of a proposed rule that would soon “begin to work its way through the multilayered approval process.” The results of the pilot will help determine aspects of this rule such as the relevant data elements and the time frame within which data must be submitted to permit CBP to effectively target, identify, and mitigate any risk with the least practicable impact on trade operations.
In the meantime, CBP is continuing the pilot to provide continuity in the flow of advance air cargo security information, serve as a partial stop-gap security measure, and allow participants to adjust and test business procedures and operations in preparation for the forthcoming rulemaking.

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ST&R Trade Report: “Willful Diversion of Defense Exports Evident in Only Small Percentage of Cases, Report Finds”

The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has posted to its Web site a report outlining the fiscal year 2016 performance of its “Blue Lantern” end-use monitoring program for defense exports. The report states that 26 percent of all Blue Lantern cases closed in FY 2016 were unfavorable; i.e., the findings of fact were inconsistent with the information in the license application or that information could not be verified.
The Blue Lantern program monitors the end-use of defense articles, technical data, services, and brokering activities exported through commercial channels and subject to licensing or other approvals under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Blue Lantern end-use monitoring includes pre-license, post-license, and post-shipment checks to verify the bona fides of foreign consignees and end-users, to confirm the legitimacy of proposed transactions, and to provide reasonable assurance that (a) the recipient is complying with U.S. government requirements with respect to use, transfers, and security of defense articles and defense services and (b) such articles and services are being used for the purposes for which they are provided.
According to the report, in FY 2016 the Blue Lantern program initiated 673 checks in 97 countries, up from 570 checks in 83 countries the year before. East Asia and the Pacific accounted for the largest share of these initiations at 27 percent (down from 29 percent), followed by the Americas at 23 percent (down from 28 percent), Africa at 20 percent (up from six percent), Europe at 14 percent (down from 22 percent), the Near East at 10 percent (up from eight percent), and South/Central Asia at six percent (down from seven percent).
Of the 566 Blue Lantern cases closed in FY 2016 (down from 662), 173 (26 percent, unchanged from FY 2015) were determined to be unfavorable. The Near East had the highest rate of unfavorable checks at 39 percent (up from nine percent), followed by East Asia and the Pacific at 34 percent (up from 19 percent), the Americas at 28 percent (down from 37 percent), South/Central Asia at 26 percent (up from five percent), Europe at 20 percent (down from 29 percent), and Africa at 9 percent (up from zero). In FY 2016 unfavorable cases resulted in DDTC recommending denial or removal of an entity from 65 license applications, returning 47 applications without action, and revoking 14 licenses. DDTC also referred 23 cases to the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance, which in turn referred three cases to law enforcement.

The report states that as in years past the leading cause of an unfavorable finding in FY 2016 (40 cases) was derogatory information (e.g., criminal records) or the foreign party being deemed unreliable (e.g., due to concerns regarding its bona fides). The second most common reason (32 cases) was the involvement of an unlicensed party, which “is often because of poor due diligence on the part of the U.S. exporters or the failure of foreign consignees to properly disclose the full chain of custody.” Other reasons include end-users that were uncooperative or failed to respond (23 cases), administrative accounting or inventory problems (15 cases), indications of potential or actual diversion (12 cases), physical security concerns (nine cases), evidence of stockpiling (four cases), and unauthorized reexports or retransfers (three cases). The report notes that only two percent of closed cases revealed indications of willful diversion tactics. 

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14. D. Spires & M. Wilson: “BIS Implements 2016 MTCR Changes”

(Source: Editor)
* Authors: Darrell Spires, Joiner Trade Solutions, 713-395-2215, DSpires@joinertradesolutions.com; and Mike Wilson, Esq., Joiner Law Firm, 713-395-2209, MWilson@joinerlawfirm.com.
On 7 July 2017, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to reflect changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex that were agreed to at the October 2016 Plenary in South Korea and the March 2016 Technical Experts Meeting in Luxembourg.
The MTCR is an export control arrangement among member nations which includes most of the world’s suppliers of advanced missiles, as well as missile-related equipment, materials, software, and technology. The MTCR was established in 1987 by the G-7 nations and has grown to 35 members and two adhering nations.
The Regime’s main objective is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by controlling exports of goods and technologies that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.  In this context, the Regime places particular focus on rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km and on equipment, software, and technology for such systems.
The Regime has established the MTCR Annex, which is a list of controlled items that includes virtually all key equipment, materials, software, and technology needed for missile development, production, and operation. The Annex is divided into two parts: Category I and Category II items.
  – Category I items include complete rocket and unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets, cruise missiles, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km, as well as their major complete subsystems (such as rocket stages, engines, guidance sets, and re-entry vehicles), and related software and technology, as well as specially designed production facilities for these items.
  – Category II items include other less-sensitive and dual-use missile related components, as well as other complete missile systems capable of a range of at least 300 km, regardless of payload.
The MTCR holds an annual policy-level Plenary meeting to discuss and make decisions on all relevant Regime issues. Three Regime sub-groups hold meetings in conjunction with the annual Plenary – the Information Exchange (IE), the Licensing and Enforcement Experts Meeting (LEEM), and the Technical Experts Meetings (TEM). The TEM reviews technical proposals by member nations to determine changes to the MTCR Annex. These changes are usually required to add new technology, remove older more common technology, and clarify the existing text.  If consensus on the proposals is reached by the technical experts, the proposal is forwarded to the Plenary members for approval.
Once the MTCR issues its annual update to the MTCR Annex, BIS implements the changes into the EAR.  This year, BIS revised 13 Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs), added one ECCN, and revised two EAR defined terms to better align the missile technology controls on the Commerce Control List (CCL) with the updated MTCR Annex.
Major changes to the EAR include:
  – ECCN 1C107: This ECCN was revised to add paragraph d.3 to control Ultra High Temperature Ceramic Composites (UHTCC), which are materials that combine Ultra High Temperature Ceramics (UHTC) with fiber reinforcement.  A Note and Technical Notes were also added to clarify the scope of control for paragraphs d and d.3.
  – ECCN 7A103: This ECCN was revised to remove the ambiguous term “other equipment” and add a definition for “inertial measurement equipment or systems” with an illustrative list of such equipment or systems.  The phrase “and systems incorporating such systems” has been removed to reflect changes in the MTCR Annex.
  – ECCNs 9B104, 9D101, 9E001, and 9E002: ECCN 9B104 was added to control certain aerothermodynamic test facilities that are useable for rockets, missiles, or unmanned aerial vehicles capable of achieving a range equal to or greater than 300 km, as well as their subsystems. The new entry controls facilities having an electrical power supply equal to or greater than 5 MW or a gas supply total pressure equal to or greater than 3 MPa. Conforming changes were made to ECCN 9D101, and minor changes were made to ECCNS 9E001and 9E002.
  – ECCN 9D104: This ECCN was revised to add a note that includes specific software for the conversion of manned aircraft to an unmanned aerial vehicle.
Minor changes to the EAR (which do not change the scope of control) include:
  – ECCN 1C111: This ECCN revised paragraph .b.2 to add a Chemical Abstract Service (“CAS”) Number (CAS 69102-90-5) after the material ”Hydroxy-terminated polybutadiene (including hydroxylterminated polybutadiene) (HTPB).”
  – ECCN 2B109: This ECCN was revised to include interstages, which can also be manufactured using flow forming machines described in ECCN 2B109.
  – ECCNs 2B018, 5A101, 9A101, 9E101, and 9E102
: These ECCNs were revised to change the terms “ballistic missile systems,” “cruise missile systems,” and “unmanned air vehicles” to “ballistic missiles,” “cruise missiles,” and “unmanned aerial vehicles,” respectively. Substantively, there is no difference between the old and new terms, but the changes ensure consistent use throughout the EAR.
In total, BIS estimates that these changes will result in one additional license annually.

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15D.R. Stepp: “Change is Coming: China Proposes New Export Control Law (IRB No. 563)”

(Source: Bryan Cave LLP)
* Author: David R. Stepp, Esq., david.stepp@bryancave.com, Bryan Cave LLP, Los Angeles, CA.
Export control seems to be an overlooked area in China for years. Up until now in China, more focus was placed on the import side of international trade, which provides around 1/3 of the total revenue for the Chinese government. Although China is not yet a member state to the Wassenaar Arrangement, China has enacted a number of separate administrative regulations and lists on each specific category of controlled items, such as biological, nuclear and chemical dual-use items and military items, by referring to the Wassenaar Arrangement. However, China has lacked a comprehensive export control law and, as a result, very few enforcement actions apparently occurred over the past years. 
This situation is going to be changed following the issuance of the draft Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China (the “ECL”) by the Ministry of Commerce (the “MOFCOM”) for public comments on June 16, 2017.
The draft ECL is not just a simple combination or repetition of the existing PRC export control regulations and rules. Instead, it introduces a series of new legal concepts such as “re-export”, “deemed export” and “embargo,” and raised the maximum penalties from the current five (5) times the “illegal gains” to ten (10) times the “illegal turnover.” Once enacted, the law will substantially broaden the outreach of the PRC export control regime and pose significant compliance challenges for multinationals dealing with the PRC controlled items.
(1) Who Will Be Impacted?
Under the draft ECL, the PRC export control regime can essentially impact anyone dealing with the items subject to control. Jurisdiction is extended not only to individuals or entities of the PRC nationality, but also to non-PRC individuals and entities.
Notably, in addition to exporters, foreign importers and end users, the draft ECL also explicitly lists agents, freight forwarders, customs brokers, e-commerce platforms and financial service providers as the parties subject to the PRC export control.
(2) What Items Will Be Controlled?
Generally, the following four (4) categories of items will be subject to control under the draft ECL: (1) dual-use items; (2) military items; (3) nuclear items; and (4) other items that may affect the national security of China.
The control will apply not only to the transfer of “tangible” items, but also to “intangible” items like technologies and services. Unlike in many other jurisdictions, software now is not listed as a category of controlled items in the current version of the draft ECL.
Most of the items subject to control will be listed in the Dual-Use Items Control List and Munitions Control List (collectively, the “Lists”) to be formulated and periodically adjusted by the PRC regulatory authorities. However, as further discussed below, items not on the Lists may be subject to control in certain situations. Currently, China is maintaining several separate lists under the existing export control regulations. It is still unclear whether these existing lists will continue to be used or new lists will be formulated.
(3) What Activities Will Be Controlled?
The draft ECL applies to a wide array of activities relevant to controlled items, including: 
“Export” is broadly defined as the “transfer of controlled items from the PRC to a foreign country or region,” including HK, Macao and Taiwan. No further definition is provided for the term “transfer.” Based on existing PRC export control laws and regulations, “transfer” may be broadly construed to include both export sales and non-sale cross-border movements, such as shipments to trade shows and returns for repairs.
. The newly-introduced re-export rule expands the extraterritorial application of PRC export control laws by covering not only exports directly from the PRC, but also subsequent exports of PRC-origin items or foreign-manufactured products that contain more than de minimis PRC controlled content (the specific de minimis percentage is not specified in the draft ECL) from a foreign country to a third country.
Deemed Export
.  The provision of controlled items by a PRC person or entity to a non-PRC person or entity will be deemed as an export to the home country of such foreign person or entity, and is thus subject to the licensing requirement. This rule applies regardless of whether the provision takes place within or outside the PRC.
Transit, Transshipment and Export via Special Customs Supervision Areas.
The transit and transshipment of controlled items and export of controlled items via a special customs supervision area of the PRC, such as a FTZ, bonded logistic park and bonded zone, will also be subject to the PRC export control.
(4) How to Control?
The draft ECL provides the following measures to restrict the export of controlled items:
Export Qualification
Requirement. The draft ECL appears to change the current registration system for export operators of dual-use items and nuclear items to a simplified record-filing requirement, while continuing to restrict the export privilege of military items to the entities designated only by the PRC authorities. 
Licensing Requirement.
Generally, a license must be obtained for the export, re-export, deemed export, transit and transshipment of controlled items, unless a license exception applies. The following factors are required to be considered in determining whether to grant or deny a license application: (1) international obligations or commitments; (2) the sensitivity of the items; (3) the supply and demand in the market; (4) the end use and end user; and (5) the export control compliance mechanisms of the export operator.
Comprehensive Control Requirement
. The export of items not listed on the Export Control List may be subject to the above licensing requirement, provided the exporter knows or has reason to know that the export may affect the national security of the PRC, have diversion risks or be used to support terrorist activities.
Temporary Export Control
. The draft ECL also authorizes the PRC regulatory authorities to implement temporary controls on items not listed on the Export Control List where necessary.
For the first time, the draft ECL introduces the concept of “embargo” which allows the PRC regulatory authorities to impose a complete ban on the exports of certain controlled items, or prohibit the exports of certain controlled items to specified destinations, individuals or entities.
. The PRC authorities may place the foreign importers and end users violating PRC export control laws on a blacklist, and prohibit the export of controlled items to such foreign importers and end users. They also may revoke the export licenses related to the transactions with such foreign importers and end users.
Retaliatory Measures
. The draft ECL authorizes the PRC authorities to take corresponding retaliatory measures against the countries or regions that implement discriminatory control measures on the PRC.
(5) What Will Be the Consequences for Violations of PRC Export Control Laws?
Violation of the PRC export control laws may result in severe administrative or even criminal penalties on the companies and individuals involved.
Administrative Penalties
. Depending on the specific situations and severity of the violations, the export operators may be subject to, among others, a fine up to ten (10) times the “illegal turnover,” confiscation of illegal gains (if any) and suspension or revocation of the export license or qualification.
The employees, if deemed as the “persons-in-charge” or “other direct responsible persons” (not defined in the draft ECL), may be subject to a fine up to RMB 300,000 (around USD 43,000) as well.
Criminal Penalties
. Criminal prosecution will be pursued if the violations constitute a crime. Under the current PRC criminal laws, the following crimes, among others, may be implicated for violations of PRC export control laws: (1) the crime of smuggling weapons, nuclear materials or prohibited items; (2) the crime of illegal operation; and (3) the crime of stealing, spying, acquiring or illegally providing state secrets or intelligence to foreign entities or individuals. The penalties for these violations could include both a monetary fine and imprisonment (up to life imprisonment in some cases, for instance, the smuggling of military products and similar items).

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16. M. Volkov: “Is Your Company At-Risk for a Government Enforcement Action?”

(Source: Volkov Law Group Blog. Reprinted by permission.) 
* Author: Michael Volkov, Esq., Volkov Law Group,
For some reason, I have always believed that picking successful stocks should not be very difficult. Unfortunately, my record in the stock market does not back up my self-assessment.
On the other hand, when it comes to compliance and corporate misconduct, I am confident about identifying and defining “at risk” companies.
What is an “at-risk” company?
An at-risk company is a company that suffers both governance and compliance weaknesses significant enough to create a real and substantial risk of misconduct and possible government investigation.
Governance risks relate to corporate management and oversight, primarily in the structure and procedures used within a company to ensure proper reporting and management.  If you combine governance risks with an ineffective ethics and compliance program, a company is “at risk” for government investigation.
An at-risk company is more likely to experience litigation risks, including shareholder, employee, and commercial disputes and litigation, as well as code of conduct and legal violations that may result in government enforcement actions. This situation can combine into a perfect storm of performance that reduce corporate profitability and sustainable growth and undermine employee morale.
Here are some of the indicators of an “at-risk” company:
  (1) CEO serves as chairperson of board. In response to corporate governance concerns, more companies are avoiding appointment of the CEO as Chairperson of the Board of Directors. The rate of common CEO/Board appointments has declined over the last ten years from approximately 75 percent to 50 percent.  (See here).   It is critical that an independent board conducts oversight of the CEO and holds the CEO accountable. When a CEO serves as Chairperson of a corporate board, this important check is absent.
  (2) Board and CEO lip service to ethics and compliance. A Board of Directors and CEO who talk the talk but fail to promote ethical behavior create serious risks for misconduct and ineffective internal controls. Lip service is dangerous to corporate ethics and compliance, promotes complacency and cynicism, and undermines basic cultural and work environment conditions needed to establish a positive ethical culture.
  (3) Unreasonable focus on quarterly financial results. A board, CEO and C-Suite obsessed with quarterly financial results and short-term strategies is a red flag indicator of potential culture and misconduct problems. A culture of narrow success, defined in quarterly targets restricts corporate investment and attention to longer-term issues of sustainability and planning. If success is defined in such narrow terms, a company’s value structure tends to suffer and ethics and compliance takes a back seat to short term goals. Corporate investments that reflect a broader time frame can easily incorporate investments of resources into creating an ethical culture that is premised on long term returns measured by productivity, morale and financial performance.
  (4) An inoperable ethics and compliance program. A compliance program that has not been operationalized is nothing more than a “paper” program. A CCO is only as good as his or her compliance team, including human resources, legal, financial and other natural partners critical to the compliance function. When a CCO operates in a compliance silo, the company’s compliance program is nothing more than window dressing and bound to fail.
  (5) The absence of trust in reporting employee concerns. When employees do not trust a company’s basic system for reporting employee misconduct, either to a supervisor or through a hotline/communications tool, a company will lose a critical source of source of information needed to identify and respond to risks.

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17ECTI Presents U.S. Export Control (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) Seminar Training Focusing on Issues Relevant to Universities, Research Labs & Other Institutions of Higher Learning – Columbus, OH, 2-5 October

(Source: Jill Kincaid; jill@learnexportcompliance.com)
* What: University Export Controls (ITAR/EAR/OFAC) Seminar in Columbus, OH
* When: 2-5 October 2017
* Where: Columbus, OH: The Blackwell Inn on the campus of The Ohio State University
* Sponsor: Export Compliance Training Institute (ECTI), Visual Compliance, Amber Road
* ECTI Speaker Panel: John Black & Scott Gearity, with special presentations by Kevin Wolf (Akin Gump), James Bartlett (Full Circle Compliance), Felice Laird (Export Strategies), Jeanette Miller (OFAC), Jennifer Saak (Traliance), and others
* Register: Here, or Jessica Lemon, 540-433-3977, jessica@learnexportcompliance.com.

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MS_a118. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings

(Source: Editor)  
Published every Monday or first business day of the week. Please send openings in the following format to jobs@fullcirclecompliance.eu.
#” New listing this week:
* Acteon Group Ltd.; Norwich, Suffolk, or London, UK;
Head of Compliance; or email
Mike Pay
* Advanced Micro Devices (AMD); Austin TX; 
Import/Export Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 24061

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP; Washington DC; 
International Trade and Customs Specialist
; Requisition ID: 147

* Amazon; Mexico City, Mexico; Mexico Trade Compliance Program Manager; Requisition ID: 520481

* Amazon; Mexico City, Mexico;
Senior Manager, Mexico Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 520460

* Amazon; Seattle WA; NA Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 256357

* Ansell; Iselin NJ;
Senior Specialist NA Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: IRC6513
* Applied Materials; Alzenau, Germany;
Europe Trade Manager
; Requisition ID: (M3)-1701376

* Arthrex; Naples FL;
Senior Compliance Officer;

* ASML; Veldhoven, the Netherlands;
Senior Manager Trade & Customs;
Requisition ID: RC05619
* Babcock; Portsmouth, United Kingdom; 
Divisional Trade & Compliance Manager

* Bemis Company; Neenah WI;
Director – Global Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: REQ_13735
* Berry Plastics Corporation; Evansville IN;
International Trade Compliance Administrator
; Requisition ID: 4054

* Boeing; Sydney, Australia, and other locations;
Global Trade Control Manager; Requisition ID: 1700006067

* Boeing; Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and Brussels, Belgium;

Trade Control Specialist
; Requisition ID: 1700006121

* Brunswick Corporation; Lake Forest IL;
Trade Compliance Auditor
; Becky Longrie, 847-735-4755,
; Requisition ID: 22999

* Cobham Advanced Electronic Solutions; Exeter, NH, Plainview, NY, Eatontown, NJ, or Lansdale, PA;
Export Compliance Manager
; Charles Trokey

Cubic Corporation; San Diego, CA; 
Senior Export Compliance Analyst

Requisition ID: 5982

* Danaher; Wash DC (Other locations possible);
Global Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: DAN000510

* DB Schenker (2 positions); Atlanta GA, and Long Beach CA;
Area Customs Director
; Requisition ID: 17P009

* DRS Technologies; Dayton, OH;
Senior Trade Compliance Manager

* Eaton; Titchfield, United Kingdom;
Global Trade Manager (Trade Compliance); Requisition ID: 020681

* Erickson Inc.; Portland OR;
Trade Compliance Manager
Joanna Rafiner-Jarboe
; Requisition 2017-2267

* Esterline CMC Electronics; Montreal, Quebec, Canada;
Senior Manager Trade Compliance; Requisition ID: 9971BR

* Expeditors; Sunnyvale CA;
Customs Compliance Specialist
* Export Solutions Inc.; Melbourne FL; Trade Compliance Specialist;

* FlightSafety International; Oklahoma; Trade Compliance Advisor; Requisition ID 16480

FLIR; Billerica MA; 
Sr. Defense Trade Licensing & Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 8008

* Fluke; Everett WA; 
Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: FLU005544

* General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.; San Diego CA; 

International Trade Compliance Analyst (ITC) / Export Import Specialist / Global Trade Administrator
; Requisition ID: 12252BR

General Dynamics Land Systems; Sterling Heights, MI; Site Lead/Compliance OfficerRequisition ID: 

General Dynamics Land Systems; Sterling Heights, MI; Compliance Officer


* George Washington University; Washington DC;
Research Compliance Officer, Export Control
; Requisition ID: PI97906765

* Harris Corporation; Clifton NJ; 
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: ES20172404-18675

* Harsco; Columbia, SC; 
Import/Export Specialist

* Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc.; Westfield, IN;
International Trade Compliance Manager
# Johnson and Johnson; Skillman, NJ;
Export Trade Compliance Lead

* KPMG; Antwerp, Brussels;
Manager Global Trade & Customs – SAP GTS
; 122756BR

* Lam Research Corporation; Fremont CA;
Foreign Trade Intern 1

* Lam Research Corporation; Shanghai, China;
Foreign Trade Analyst 

* Lutron; Coopersburg PA;
Trade Manager-Export
; Requisition ID: 2926
Livingston International; Western Region (TX, CA, OR, WA preferred)

Trade Ad

Livingston International; Western Region (TX, CA, OR, WA preferred);
Research Consultant

* L-3 Technologies; Arlington VA;
Sr. Mgr. Corporate Customs Compliance
; Requisition ID: 087862

* L-3 Technologies, Platform Integration Division; Waco TX;
Import/Export Compliance Administrator 3
; Requisition ID 

* Lockheed Martin; Orlando FL;
International Trade Compliance Sr Staff / ITAR / EAR / Export Control Officer
; Requisition ID: 387435BR

* ManTech International; Herndon VA; 
Director of Corporate Export Control
; Requisition ID: 90965BR

* Mars – Wrigley; Chicago IL; 
Global Trade Compliance Analyst (Corporate Export)
; Requisition ID: 69452

* Maxim Integrated; Dallas TX;
Manager, Global Trade
; 3304BR

* Medtronic; Heerlen, The Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requsition ID: 16000DYY

* Medtronic; Wash DC; Global Trade Lawyer;  
; Requisition ID: 170002ON

* Meggitt PLC; Maidenhead, UK;
Trade Compliance Officer 
* Momentive Performance Materials, Inc.; Waterfield, NY;
Manager, Global Trade Compliance
NetApp; Singapore; Trade Compliance Mananger – APAC; Requisition ID 43338BR

* North Dakota State University; Fargo ND;
Director for Research Integrity Compliance; Requisition ID: 1700372

* Northrop Grumman; Falls Church VA; 
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3/4
; Patricia Vives, 
; Requisition ID: 17011893

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Herndon VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 2
; Requisition ID: 17010105

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Herndon VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3/4; Requisition ID: 17001180

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Linthicum MD;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 1
; 17003433
* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Linthicum MD;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3
; 17005262

* Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine; New Malden, UK;
Trade Compliance Coordinator

* Panduit; Tinley Park IL;
Global Trade Compliance Agent
; Requisition ID: PAND-03297

* Plexus Corporation; Neenah Wi;
Manager – Export Compliance
; Requisition ID: 14645BR
* Plexus Corporation; Neenah Wi;
Manager – Import Compliance
; Requisition ID: 14593BR
* Premier Farnell Organisation; Leeds, UK;
Trade Compliance Specialist – Europe
; Requisition ID: 4301
* Raytheon; (El Segundo CA, McKinney TX, Dallas TX, Marlborough MA, or Washington D.C.);
Senior Manager of Global Trade Management
; Requisition ID: 98724BR

* Raytheon; Rosslyn, VA; 
Export Trade Compliance Specialist; Requisition ID: 97978BR

* Roanoke Insurance Group; Schaumburg IL; 
Carnet Service Representative
; Requisition ID: 1019

* Saab Defense and Security USA LLC; Syracuse NY;
Senior Import/Export Analyst
; Requisition ID: USA_00413

* Science and Engineering Services, LLC; Huntsville AL;
Export Compliance Specialist
bob.davis@ses-i.com; Requisition ID: 157
* Sierra Nevada Corporation; Arlington, VA; 
International Trade Compliance Analyst II; Req ID: R0003259

* SIRE: Noord-Brabant province, the Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Expert; Requisition ID: 33934

* Talbots; Hingham MA;
Sr Mgr Global Trade & Customs Compliance
; Requisition ID: 1077
* Talbots; Lakeville MA;
Dir., Global Logistics & Customs Com
; Requisition ID: 1085

* Tesla Motors; Fremont CA;
Global Supply Manager – Logistics
; Requisition ID: 38153

* Thales Defense and Security, Inc.; Clarksburg MD; Senior Manager Trade Compliance
; William.Denning@thalesdsi.com; Requisition ID: 2592

* ThermoFisher Scientific; Breda, the Netherlands;
Import/Export Specialist – EMEA CMD Commercial Offices
; Requisition ID: 44930BR

* UBC; Monheim, Germany;
Manager Customs and Trade Compliance 
* Ultra Electronics; Greater London, United Kingdom;
International Trade and Export Compliance Specialist

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Brea CA;
Sr. Anlst, Intl Trade Compl
; Requisition ID: 46798BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Burnsville MN;

ITC Tech Manager- SIS
; Requisition ID:38565BR

United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Rockford IL;
Specialist, International Trade Compliance- Operations and Licensing
; Requisition ID: 50118BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Troy OH;
Sr. Manager, Intl Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 44065BR 

# United Technologies Corporation, Climate Controls & Security; Palm Beach Gardens, FL;
Audit & Corrective Action Specialist
; Requistion ID: 50789BR

* University of North Carolina; Chapel Hill, NC;
Export Control Officer

* VAG; Mannheim, Germany;
Trade Compliance Manager (m/w)
; Contact: Mr. Florian Uhl, +49 621 749 – 1870

Vertiv (formerly Emerson Network Power); Columbus, OH,  
International Trade Management (ITM) Senior Specialist
; Req #1700001087

* Vigilant; Unknown location in the U.S.;
BioTech/Pharmaceutical Global Trade Analyst

* Xilinx, Inc.; San Jose, CA, US;
Global Trade Compliance Program Manager; Requisition ID: 153811

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Alexandre Dumas Alexandre Dumas (Dumas Davy de la Pailleterie; 24 Jul 1802 – 5 Dec 1870, was a French writer. His works included historical novels of high adventure originally published as serials, including
The Count of Monte Cristo, The Three Musketeers, Twenty Years After, and
The Vicomte de Bragelonne: Ten Years Later.
  – “It is almost as difficult to keep a first class person in a fourth class job, as it is to keep a fourth class person in a first class job.”
Simon Bolivar (Simón José Antonio de la Santísima Trinidad Bolívar Palacios Ponte y Blanco, 24 Jul 1783 – 17 Dec 1830, was a Venezuelan military and political leader who played a leading role in the establishment of Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Panama as sovereign states, independent of Spanish rule.)
  – “Judgement comes from experience, and experience comes from bad judgement.”
Monday is pun day:
I amended the soil around my flowers to enhance their health and well-being.  And for their personal protection, I gave them a second amendment.
  – Frank Husker

Q. Why did the chicken cross the road?
A. To see her friend Gregory, peck.
  – Tom Ratkowski, Milwaukee, WI

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. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  Changes to applicable regulations are listed below.
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 13 Jul 2017: 82 FR 32232-32241: Electronic Information for Cargo Exported from the United States; Technical Amendments

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and cancelled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM  (Summary here.)

: 15 CFR Subtit. B, Ch. VII, Pts. 730-774

  – Last Amendment: 7 July 2017: 
82 FR 31442-31449: Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations Based on the 
2016 Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Agreements. 

: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
  – Last Amendment: 16 Jun 2017: 82 FR 27613-27614: Removal of Burmese Sanctions Regulations 
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 19 Apr 2017: 82 FR 18383-18393: Foreign Trade Regulations: Clarification on Filing Requirements 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – The latest edition (18 July 2017) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, Census/AES guidance, and to many errors contained in the official text. Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR. 
, 1 Jan 2017: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 28 Jun 2017: Harmonized System Update 1704, containing 2,564 ABI records and 463 harmonized tariff records. 
  – HTS codes for AES are available
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – Last Amendment: 11 Jan 2017: 82 FR 3168-3170: 2017 Civil Monetary Penalties Inflationary Adjustment
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition: 10 Jun 2017) of the ITAR with all amendments is contained in Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III.  The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 800 footnotes containing amendment histories, case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text.  Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.  The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.

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Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories

(Source: Editor) 

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published 

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* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., compiled by: Editor, James E. Bartlett III; Assistant Editors, Alexander P. Bosch and Vincent J.A. Goossen; and Events & Jobs Editor, John Bartlett. The Ex/Im Daily Update is emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

* SUBSCRIPTIONS: Subscriptions are free.  Subscribe by completing the request form on the Full Circle Compliance website.

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