17-0522 Monday “The Daily Bugle”

17-0522 Monday “Daily Bugle”

Monday, 22 May 2017

The Daily Bugle is a free daily newsletter from Full Circle Compliance, containing changes to export/import regulations (ATF, Customs, NISPOM, EAR, FACR/OFAC, FTR/AES, HTSUS, and ITAR), plus news and events.  Subscribe 
here for free subscription.  Contact us
for advertising inquiries and rates.

  1. DHS/CBP Seeks Comments on Form 1303, Ship’s Stores Declaration  
  1. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions 
  2. Commerce/BIS Extends 24 May Public Hearing on the Effect of Steel Imports 
  3. DHS/CBP: Quota Opening Moment Procedures 
  4. Justice/USAO: “Chinese National Pleads Guilty to Economic Espionage and Theft of a Trade Secret From U.S. Company” 
  5. State/DDTC Announces DTAS System Outage on 25 May 
  6. State/DDTC Posts Three Name Change Announcements 
  7. White House Announces Nomination of Richard Ashooh to be Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Export Administration 
  1. CBC News: “B.C. Winery Owners Facing Life in Chinese Prison for Alleged Smuggling” 
  2. The Hindu: “No Room Yet for India in NSG, Says China” 
  1. A.R. Moore & M. Wilson: “Treasury: No Waivers for Bypassing Russian Sanctions” 
  2. B.F. Saulnier, N.A. Stockey & C.J. Baer: “The New Faces of FCPA Enforcement: The Transition to a Sessions-Clayton Enforcement Regime Is Unlikely to Result in Drastic Changes” 
  3. M. O’Kane: “Canadian Government Endorses Magnitsky Sanctions Bill” 
  4. P. Passman: “Compliance’s Role in Preventing the Next “WannaCry” Cyberattack” 
  5. T.P. O’Toole & A.E. Cotterill: “OFAC Imposes Sanctions Against Eight Members of the Venezuelan Supreme Court” 
  1. Are You Joining the Fully Accredited Executive Masters in International Trade Compliance Degree Program? 
  1. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 85 Jobs Posted 
  1. Bartlett’s Unfamiliar Quotations 
  2. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date? Latest Changes: ATF (15 Jan 2016), Customs (27 Jan 2017), DOD/NISPOM (18 May 2016), EAR (18 Apr 2017), FACR/OFAC (10 Feb 2017), FTR (19 Apr 2017), HTSUS (7 Mar 2017), ITAR (11 Jan 2017) 
  3. Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories 


82 FR 23281-23282: Agency Information Collection Activities: Ship’s Store Declaration
* AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland Security.
* ACTION: 60-Day notice and request for comments; extension of an existing collection of information. … 
* DATES: Comments are encouraged and will be accepted (no later than July 21, 2017) to be assured of consideration. …
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Requests for additional PRA information should be directed to CBP Paperwork Reduction Act Officer, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Trade, Regulations and Rulings, Economic Impact Analysis Branch, 90 K Street, NE., 10th Floor, Washington, DC 20229-1177, or via email
. Please note that the contact information provided here is solely for questions regarding this notice. Individuals seeking information about other CBP programs should contact the CBP National Customer Service Center at 877-227-5511, (TTY) 1-800-877-8339, or
CBP Web site
Title: Ship’s Stores Declaration.
OMB Number: 1651-0018.
Form Number: CBP Form 1303.
Current Actions: CBP proposes to extend the expiration date of this information collection with no change to the burden hours. There is no change to the information collected or CBP Form 1303. …
Abstract: CBP Form 1303, Ship’s Stores Declaration, is used by the carriers to declare articles to be retained on board the vessel, such as sea stores, ship’s stores (e.g. alcohol and tobacco products), controlled narcotic drugs or bunker fuel in a format that can be readily audited and checked by CBP. This form collects information about the ship, the ports of arrival and departure, and the articles on the ship. CBP Form 1303 form is provided for by 19 CFR 4.7, 4.7a, 4.81, 4.85 and 4.87 and is accessible
. …
Dated: May 17, 2017.
Seth Renkema, Branch Chief, Economic Impact Analysis Branch, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


OGS_a12. Ex/Im Items Scheduled for Publication in Future Federal Register Editions
(Source: Federal Register

* Foreign Assets Control Office; NOTICES;
 – Blocking or Unblocking of Persons and Properties [Publication Dates: 23 May 2017.]
 – Update to List of Medical Supplies for Ukraine-Related Sanctions [23 May 2017.]
* Industry and Security Bureau; NOTICES; Hearings: Procedures for Attending or Viewing Remotely Public Hearing on National Security Investigation of Imports of Steel [Publication Date: 23 May 2017.]
* Trade Representative, Office of the United States; NOTICES; Requests for Comments: Negotiating Objectives Regarding Modernization of North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico [Publication Date: 23 May 2017.] 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


Commerce/BIS Extends 24 May Public Hearing on the Effect of Steel Imports

Due to unexpectedly high demand to testify at the 24 May Public Hearing on the effect of steel imports on the national security, BIS has reduced the time allotted to each speaker to five minutes and extended the hearing until 1:30pm.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


DHS/CBP: Quota Opening Moment Procedures

CSMS# 17-000291, 22 May 2017.)
Opening Moment Quota Entry Summaries may be transmitted into the ACE Quota Module on opening day from 12 o’clock midnight until 12 o’clock noon Eastern Time Zone only. Entries must be submitted timely and in proper form (error free) to take advantage of the in-quota duty rate. Entry Summaries transmitted late after 12 noon Eastern Time will be accepted into ACE but the presented time will be converted back to their local time. This helps Trade Transformation Office and HQ Quota Branch identify the entry summaries transmitted late. Late transmitted quota entry summaries may not be allowed in Opening Moment Quotas. Filers experiencing transmission problems must notify their ACE Client Representatives and HQ Quota Branch immediately at HQQUOTA@cbp.dhs.gov or 202-863-6560. HQ Quota Branch will review the situation and decide on a case by case basis if entry summaries will be accepted into the quota opening.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


Justice/USAO: “Chinese National Pleads Guilty to Economic Espionage and Theft of a Trade Secret From U.S. Company”

(Source: Justice/USAO) [Excerpts.]
Xu Jiaqiang Stole Valuable Source Code from Former Employer with Intent To Benefit the Chinese Government
Joon H. Kim, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Dana Boente, Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security, announced today that XU JIAQIANG pled guilty to economic espionage and theft of a trade secret, in connection with XU’s theft of proprietary source code from XU’s former employer, with the intent to benefit the National Health and Family Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China. XU pled guilty earlier today to all six counts with which he was charged, before the U.S. District Judge Kenneth M. Karas in White Plains federal court. … 
According to the allegations contained in the Complaint and the Superseding Indictment filed against XU, as well as statements made in related court filings and proceedings:
From November 2010 to May 2014, XU worked as a developer for a particular U.S. company (the “Victim Company”). As a developer, XU enjoyed access to certain proprietary software (the “Proprietary Software”), as well as that software’s underlying source code (the “Proprietary Source Code”). The Proprietary Software is a clustered file system developed and marketed by the Victim Company in the United States and other countries. A clustered file system facilitates faster computer performance by coordinating work among multiple servers. The Victim Company takes significant precautions to protect the Proprietary Source Code as a trade secret. Among other things, the Proprietary Source Code is stored behind a company firewall and can be accessed only by a small subset of the Victim Company’s employees. Before receiving Proprietary Source Code access, Victim Company employees must first request and receive approval from a particular Victim Company official. Victim Company employees must also agree in writing at both the outset and the conclusion of their employment that they will maintain the confidentiality of any proprietary information. The Victim Company takes these and other precautions in part because the Proprietary Software and the Proprietary Source Code are economically valuable, which value depends in part on the Proprietary Source Code’s secrecy.
In May 2014, XU voluntarily resigned from the Victim Company. XU subsequently communicated with one undercover law enforcement officer (“UC-1”), who posed as a financial investor aiming to start a large-data storage technology company, and another undercover law enforcement officer (“UC-2”), who posed as a project manager, working for UC-1. these communications, XU discussed his past experience with the Victim Company and indicated that he had experience with the Proprietary Software and the Proprietary Source Code. On March 6, 2015, XU sent UC-1 and UC-2 a code, which XU stated was a sample of XU’s prior work with the Victim Company. A Victim Company employee (“Employee-1”) later confirmed that the code sent by XU included proprietary Victim Company material that related to the Proprietary Source Code.
XU subsequently informed UC-2 that XU was willing to consider providing UC-2’s company with the Proprietary Source Code as a platform for UC-2’s company to facilitate the development of its own data storage system. XU informed UC-2 that if UC-2 set up several computers as a small network, then XU would remotely install the Proprietary Software so that UC-1 and UC-2 could test it and confirm its functionality.
In or around early August 2015, the FBI arranged for a computer network to be set up, consistent with XU’s specifications. Files were then remotely uploaded to the FBI-arranged computer network (the “Xu Upload”). Thereafter, on or about August 26, 2015, XU and UC-2 confirmed that UC-2 had received the Xu Upload. In September 2015, the FBI made the Xu Upload available to a Victim Company employee who has expertise regarding the Proprietary Software and the Proprietary Source Code (“Employee-2”). Based on Employee-2’s analysis of technical features of the Xu Upload, it appeared to Employee-2 that the Xu Upload contained a functioning copy of the Proprietary Software. It further appeared to Employee-2 that the Xu Upload had been built by someone with access to the Proprietary Source Code who was not working within the Victim Company or otherwise at the Victim Company’s direction.
On December 7, 2015, XU met with UC-2 at a hotel in White Plains, New York (the “Hotel”). XU stated, in sum and substance, that XU had used the Proprietary Source Code to make software to sell to customers, that XU knew the Proprietary Source Code to be the product of decades of work on the part of the Victim Company, and that XU had used the Proprietary Source Code to build a copy of the Proprietary Software, which XU had uploaded and installed on the UC Network (i.e., the Xu Upload). XU also indicated that XU knew the copy of the Proprietary Software that XU had installed on the UC Network contained information identifying the Proprietary Software as the Victim Company’s property, which could reveal the fact that the Proprietary Software had been built with the Proprietary Source Code without the Victim Company’s authorization. XU told UC-2 that XU could take steps to prevent detection of the Proprietary Software’s origins – i.e., that it had been built with stolen Proprietary Source Code – including writing computer scripts that would modify the Proprietary Source Code to conceal its origins.
Later on December 7, 2015, XU met with UC-1 and UC-2 at the Hotel. During that meeting, XU showed UC-2 a copy of what XU represented to be the Proprietary Source Code on XU’s laptop. XU noted to UC-2 a portion of the code that indicated it originated with the Victim Company as well as the date on which it had been copyrighted. XU also stated that XU had previously modified the Proprietary Source Code’s command interface to conceal the fact that the Proprietary Source Code originated with the Victim Company and identified multiple specific customers to whom XU had previously provided the Proprietary Software using XU’s stolen copy of the Proprietary Source Code.
XU, 31, formerly of Beijing, China, pled guilty to three counts of economic espionage, each of which carries a maximum sentence of 15 years in prison, and three counts of theft of a trade secret, each of which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. … 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

State/DDTC Announces DTAS System Outage on 25 May

(Source: State/DDTC)  
The DTAS information systems will be unavailable from 6:00PM through 10:00PM on Thursday 25 May, 2017 due to scheduled routine maintenance. 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

State/DDTC Posts Three Name Change Announcements

(Source: State/DDTC) [Excerpts.]
State/DDTC has posted the following three name change announcements on its website.
Effective immediately, Hewlett Packard Enterprise will change as follows: HP Enterprise Services LLC to Enterprise Services LLC; HP Enterprise Services Defence & Security to Enterprise Services Defence & Security UK Ltd.; and Hewlett Packard Enterprise Services UK Ltd to EntServ UK Limited.
  Due to the volume of authorizations requiring amendments to reflect this change, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls is exercising the authority under 22 CFR 126.3 to waive the requirement for amendments to change currently approved license authorizations. The amendment waiver does not apply to approved or pending agreements. …
Effective immediately, Rolls-Royce CDS will change as follows: Rolls- Royce plc. Due to the volume of authorizations requiring amendments to reflect this change, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls is exercising the authority under 22 CFR 126.3 to waive the requirement for amendments to change currently approved license authorizations. The amendment waiver does not apply to approved or pending agreements. …
Effective immediately, Abacus Innovations Australia Pty Limited will change as follows: Leidos Australia Pty Limited. Due to the volume of authorizations requiring amendments to reflect this change, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls is exercising the authority under 22 CFR 126.3 to waive the requirement for amendments to change currently approved license authorizations. The amendment waiver does not apply to approved or pending agreements. … 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

White House Announces Nomination of Richard Ashooh to be Assistant Secretary of Commerce (Export Administration)

(Source: White House Press Office
) [Excerpts.]

President Donald J. Trump today announced his intent to nominate Richard Ashooh, of New Hampshire, to be an Assistant Secretary of Commerce (Export Administration).  Mr. Ashooh currently serves as the Director of Economic Partnerships at the University System of New Hampshire. Before this, he was the Executive Director of the Warren Rudman Center at the University of New Hampshire School of Law.  

Before his work in higher education, Mr. Ashooh served for over two decades as a senior executive in the aerospace industry, starting his career with Lockheed Martin and then BAE Systems. His primary focus was ensuring the success of programs that protect United States and Allied warfighters, particularly in the electronic warfare space. He has also held senior positions in corporate strategy, homeland security, and public affairs. 

Earlier in his career, Mr. Ashooh was a Professional Staff Member for the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, with a concentration on federal procurement policies. He graduated from the University of New Hampshire, where he met his wife, with whom he has five children. They reside in Bedford, New Hampshire.  

Editor’s Note: Mr. Ashooh’s predecessor in this office was Kevin Wolf.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


CBC News: “B.C. Winery Owners Facing Life in Chinese Prison for Alleged Smuggling”

(Source: CBC News) [Excerpts.]
A B.C. husband and wife are facing 10 years to life imprisonment in China for allegedly under-reporting the value of wine they export to that country. And the Canadian government is under fire for not doing more to help them.
Chinese customs officials in Shanghai have charged John Chang, 62, and his wife Allison Lu with smuggling. Their trial is scheduled to begin May 26.
Both have been under arrest since March 2016. Chang has been in jail since then. Lu was held until January, but was forced to surrender her passport and is barred from leaving China. … 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


The Hindu: “No Room Yet for India in NSG, Says China”

(Source: The Hindu) [Excerpts.]
China on Monday said it would oppose India’s unilateral entry into the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), pending a consensus on the membership of the nuclear weapon states that have not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
In response to a question, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said, “China’s position on the non-NPT member’s participation in the NSG has not changed.”
The 48 nation NSG is expected to hold its plenary next month in Bern, Switzerland, where New Delhi’s entry is expected to be discussed. New Delhi formally applied for NSG membership in May last year, but China has consistently blocked India’s bid, pointing to the need for devolving universally applicable membership criteria for all countries that have not signed the NPT, but had become nuclear weapon states.
Pakistan, China’s close ally, is the other declared nuclear weapon state, which has not signed the NPT.
The NSG controls the global exports of nuclear technology and material to ensure that atomic energy is used only for peaceful purposes. … 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


11. A.R. Moore & M. Wilson: “Treasury: No Waivers for Bypassing Russian Sanctions”

(Source: Joiner Law Firm)
* Authors: Ashley R. Moore, Esq., amoore@joinertradelaw.com, 713-395-2214; and Mike Wilson, Esq., mwilson@joinertradelaw.com, 713-395-2209.  Both Joiner Law Firm.
On 21 April 2017, Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin issued a statement announcing that the Treasury Department will not issue waivers to U.S. companies – including publicly traded international oil and gas company ExxonMobil – authorizing drilling activities that are otherwise prohibited by current Russian sanctions.  The Trump Administration has repeatedly stated that the U.S. sanctions on Russia, including those targeting Russia’s energy sector, will remain intact until Russia reverses the actions that triggered the sanctions – namely, its occupation and purported annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine and use of force in the country. 
Secretary Mnuchin’s recent announcement further highlights why it is imperative that all companies doing business overseas have a keen understanding of, and know how to comply with, U.S. sanctions.  In this article, we provide: (1) a high-level overview of the U.S. sanctions on Russia’s energy sector, particularly as they relate to oil and gas exploration and production, to help you determine whether these sanctions apply to your transactions; and (2) compliance tips that companies should adhere to when considering whether to do business or work on projects that have the potential to produce Russian oil or gas.
Do the Russian sanctions apply to my transaction?
Back in 2014, President Obama signed a series of Executive Orders authorizing sanctions on those contributing to the growing conflict in the Crimea region of Ukraine, including sanctions on the Russian government. [FN/1]   Executive Order (EO) 13662 of 20 March 2014 also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to impose sanctions on certain sectors of the Russian economy.  These sectoral sanctions were implemented through four Directives issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and prohibit certain activities by U.S. persons and those within the U.S. when they involve entities subject to the relevant Directive, as identified on the Sectoral Sanctions Identification (SSI) List. 
U.S. companies are not prohibited from engaging in all transactions involving the property or property interests of persons listed on the SSI List (as they generally are with persons identified on the SDN List), but only specific transactions described in the Directives.  Directives 1 – 3 prohibit certain dealings in new debt of persons subject to the respective Directives, and Directive 1 also prohibits certain dealings in new equity of subject persons.  Directive 4 – which will be the primary focus of this article – generally prohibits U.S. persons and those within the U.S. from:
  – Providing, exporting, or reexporting, directly or indirectly, goods, services (except for financial services [FN/2]), or technology in support of exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil in the Russian Federation, or in maritime area claimed by the Russian Federation and extending from its territory, and
  – That involve any person (or their property or property interests) determined to be subject to the Directive.  Entities subject to Directive 4 include, but are not limited to, Gazprom, OAO; Gazprom Neft; Lukoil, OAO; Rosneft; and Surgutneftegas. 
OFAC has provided further guidance to help the public understand which activities are captured by Directive 4.  FAQ #413 provides that a “deepwater” project is one that involves underwater activities at depths of more than 500 feet.  FAQ #421 states that the term “Arctic offshore projects” applies to “projects that have the potential to produce oil in areas that (1) involve drilling operations originating offshore, and (2) are located above the Arctic Circle.”  OFAC stated that the prohibitions do not apply to horizontal drilling operations originating onshore where such operations extend under the seabed to areas above the Arctic Circle. 
Additionally, FAQ #418 provides that the term “shale projects” applies to projects that have the potential to produce oil from resources located in shale formations.  OFAC goes on to state that “as long as the projects in question are neither deepwater nor Arctic offshore projects, the prohibitions in Directive 4 do not apply to exploration or production through shale to locate or extract crude oil (or gas) in reservoirs.” It also bears noting that if the deepwater, Artic offshore, or shale project has the potential to produce Russian gas – but not Russian oil – the activity is not subject to the prohibitions described in Directive 4.
Lastly, OFAC states in FAQ #420 that for purposes of Directive 4, the term “production” refers to the lifting of oil to the surface and the gathering, treating, field processing, and field storage of such oil.  OFAC states that the production stage of a project ends when extracted oil is transported out of a field production storage tank or otherwise off of a field production site.  OFAC confirmed that Directive 4 does not prohibit the provision by U.S. persons or within the United States of goods, technology, or services to SSI entities when such transactions relate only to the transportation, refining, or other dealings involving oil that has already been extracted from a deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale project and transported out of a field production storage tank or otherwise off of a field production site.
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) requires a license to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) certain items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) when a person knows or is unable to determine whether that item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production of, oil or gas in Russian deepwater (greater than 500 feet) locations, Arctic offshore locations or shale formations in Russia.  Items subject to this prohibition are items listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 746 of the EAR and items specified in ECCNs 0A998, 1C992, 3A229, 3A231, 3A232, 6A991, 8A992, and 8D999.  Such items include, but are not limited to, drilling rigs, parts for horizontal drilling, drilling and completion equipment, subsea processing equipment, Arctic-capable marine equipment, wireline and down hole motors and equipment, drill pipe and casing, software for hydraulic fracturing, high pressure pumps, seismic acquisition equipment, remotely operated vehicles, compressors, expanders, valves, and risers. 
Moreover, on 17 September 2014, BIS added five Russian energy companies – Gazprom, OAO; Gazprom Neft; Lukoil, OAO; Rosneft; and Surgutneftegas – to the Entity List.  As stated above, these companies were designated by the Secretary of the Treasury as operating in the energy sector of the Russian Federation.  A license is required prior to sending any items subject to the EAR to these five companies, or several others that have been added to the Entity List (including a Russian oil and gas field, Yuzhno-Kirinskoye Field), when the person knows (or is unable to determine whether) the item will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for, or production of, oil or gas in Russian deepwater or Actic offshore locations or shale formations in Russia.  It bears noting that, while OFAC’s prohibition (with respect to Directive 4) only applies to projects that have the potential to produce oil, BIS’s restrictions apply to activities that have the potential to produce oil or gas.  However, BIS will review license applications for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of any item that requires a license for Russia with a presumption of denial when for use directly or indirectly for exploration or production from deepwater (greater than 500 feet), Arctic offshore, or shale projects in Russia that have the potential to produce oil; gas is not mentioned.
Compliance considerations
According to various news sources, ExxonMobil had applied for a waiver from the sanctions in order to resume work on a joint venture with Rosneft – a company majority owned by the Russian government and also subject to Directive 4.  It is important for all companies, especially those involved in the upstream oil and gas industry, to exercise the appropriate due diligence and implement key controls to ensure compliance with U.S. sanctions on Russia’s energy sector.  Below we provide a non-exhaustive list of tips that may assist companies in this process:
  – Determine whether U.S. sanctions apply to any oil and gas project that your company or organization is involved in.  This may seem like a no-brainer, but it can get a little dicey.  For instance, most people assume that if a person is identified on the Entity List then a license is required to do business with them.  This may be the case for many listed persons; however, in the case of the companies described above as well as certain others, BIS only requires a license when items are for use in the above-stated deepwater, Artic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce Russian oil or gas.
  – Establish a process for obtaining Ultimate Destination, End-User, and End-Use certifications, and investigate and respond to any red flags.  While obtaining such certifications does not mean that you can turn a blind-eye to questionable transactions or circumstances, it does at least support that your company became involved with a person or entity in a given transaction based on affirmations and statements in the certifications.
  – Screen customers or parties to transactions against the U.S. Government’s consolidated export screening list.  Please keep in mind that an actual location, a Russian oil and gas field – Yuzhno-Kirinskoye Field – has been added to the Entity List.  
  – Inquire about an item’s final end-user, end-use, and ultimate destination whenever a person or entity will clearly not use the item for its intended purpose (e.g., transactions with a freight forwarder).
  – Review BIS’s guidance on due diligence to prevent unauthorized transshipments and reexports of controlled items to Russia.
  – Thoroughly train all personnel (especially those involved in upstream activities) on the U.S. sanctions on Russia’s energy sector and on how to identify potentially problematic business deals.
In conclusion, until sanctions are lifted, ExxonMobil and other U.S. companies involved in the upstream oil and gas sector will have to carry out their business activities and pursue projects in a way that takes into account and does not run afoul of U.S. sanctions on Russia.  No exceptions allowed.
  [FN/1] While this article does not focus on the sanctions on the Crimea region of Ukraine, in our view, it is important to note that Executive Order 13685 of December 19, 2014 authorizes broad sanctions on Crimea.  As a result, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control generally prohibits the exportation or importation of goods, services, or technology to or from the Crimea region of Ukraine, as well as new investment in Crimea by U.S. persons.  In addition, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security requires a license to export or reexport to, or transfer within, the Crimea region of Ukraine all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations – except food and medicine designated as EAR99 or certain software that is necessary to enable the exchange of personal communications over the Internet.
  [FN/2] While the provision of “financial services” is excluded from the Directive 4 prohibition, it bears noting that Directive 2 – which generally prohibits dealings in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of persons determined to be subject to the Directive (as well as their property and interests in property) – specifically targets Russia’s energy sector.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


B.F. Saulnier, N.A. Stockey & C.J. Baer: “The New Faces of FCPA Enforcement: The Transition to a Sessions-Clayton Enforcement Regime Is Unlikely to Result in Drastic Changes”

* Authors: Brian F. Saulnier, Esq., brian.saulnier@klgates.com; Nicole A. Stockey, Esq., nicole.stockey@klgates.com; Connor J. Baer, Esq., connor.baer@klgates.com. All of K&L Gates LLP.
Now that the Trump administration has passed its first 100 days, some additional insights are available with respect to how the administration plans to enforce anti-corruption laws, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA” or the “Act”).  Moreover, all signs from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), including recent statements by recently appointed Attorney General Jeff Sessions and SEC Chair Jay Clayton, indicate that both will continue to investigate and prosecute violations of the FCPA in a manner similar to that of their predecessors.  Accordingly, companies subject to the Act should continue to prioritize robust compliance procedures and a proactive compliance mindset.
The DOJ’s Enforcement of the FCPA Under the Trump Administration
In connection with their confirmation processes, both the Attorney General and SEC Chair have confirmed their intentions to enforce the FCPA in generally the same manner as their respective predecessors.  Specifically, Attorney General Sessions spoke recently at the Ethics and Compliance Initiative Annual Conference (“EIC Conference”), where he emphasized the importance of fair competition both at home and abroad.  Sessions stated that “corruption harms free competition, distorts prices [and] often leads to substandard products and services coming into this country[,] . . . increases the cost of doing business, and hurts honest companies that don’t pay these bribes.” [FN/1]  Accordingly, because the DOJ “wants to create an even playing field for law-abiding companies,” Sessions stressed that the DOJ will “continue to strongly enforce the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws.” [FN/2]
Sessions’s recent statements match his hawkish past positions on corporate wrongdoing.  For example, while questioning James Cole during Cole’s confirmation hearing for Deputy Attorney General in 2010, then-Senator Sessions asked him about his thoughts on charging corporations for misconduct.  Cole replied that prosecutors need to be nuanced in bringing corporate charges and should consider the thousands of innocent shareholders who own corporate stock and would be harmed by a prosecution. [FN/3]  Sessions replied that he recognized the reality of Cole’s position but noted that it comes close to “picking and choosing winners,” which Sessions cautioned to be “a dangerous philosophy.”[FN/4]  He added, “I was taught if they violated a law, you charge them.  If they didn’t violate the law, you don’t charge them.” [FN/5]  Similarly, in a hearing in 2011, Sessions questioned then-Acting Associate Attorney General Tony West regarding the use of non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”) and deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) and whether they “undermine the rule of law by depriving the [DOJ’s] legal arguments of meaningful testing in a judicial forum.” [FN/6]  More generally, Sessions said in 2002, regarding his prosecutions of savings and loans institutions as a U.S. attorney in the 1980s, that “harsh sentencing does deter.” [FN/7]
As Attorney General, Sessions has also expressed a willingness to focus on individual liability.  In response to a question regarding prosecuting cases against corporations for fraudulent sales practices during his recent confirmation hearing, Sessions replied, “it seems to me . . . that the corporate officers who caused the problem should be subjected to more severe punishment than the stockholders of the company who didn’t know anything about it.” [FN/8]  Similarly, at the EIC Conference, he said that “[t]he Department of Justice will continue to emphasize the importance of holding individuals accountable for corporate misconduct.  It is not merely companies, but specific individuals, who break the law.” [FN/9]
Overall, it seems most likely that Attorney General Sessions will seek to enforce anti-corruption laws as written, prosecuting corporations in cases where corporate misconduct is clear.  His comments during Deputy Attorney General Cole’s 2010 confirmation hearing indicate that Sessions would be unlikely to stop short of prosecution simply because the potential corporate defendant seems too big to fail.  At the same time, Sessions’s more recent comments in speeches and his confirmation hearing seem to point toward a greater willingness to carry on the DOJ’s practice of focusing on individual criminality under the so-called Yates’ Memorandum, likely in tandem with parallel corporate prosecutions.
One further point to keep in mind is that, under an informal tradition, the task of crafting and implementing corporate prosecution policies has fallen mostly to the Deputy Attorney General. [FN/10] Accordingly, though Attorney General Sessions is sure to influence the DOJ’s high-level enforcement priorities and tactics, case-specific enforcement decisions (including whether to resolve a matter through a DPA or NPA) is likely to fall more squarely on the shoulders of Sessions’s second-in-command, Rod Rosenstein, former U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland.  Rosenstein has generally affirmed his commitment to prosecuting FCPA violations where appropriate. [FN/11]  Nonetheless, companies subject to the FCPA should recognize that if prosecution patterns do change under the Trump administration, they are perhaps likely to shift in one direction – toward a greater number of prosecutions and fewer NPAs and DPAs. [FN/12]
In late 2016, DOJ imposed massive penalties in a few FCPA enforcement actions and appears to be carrying that momentum into 2017, initiating five new actions in January alone. [FN/13]  Moreover, the DOJ announced that the Pilot Program – under which companies that voluntarily self-report violations, cooperate with the government, and remediate a violation may receive reduced penalties – would not automatically expire in April but will continue in force as DOJ officials determine the program’s effectiveness and whether it can be improved. [FN/14]  Together, these signs indicate that the DOJ is generally planning on continuing FCPA enforcement along the same lines as the past few years.
The SEC’s Enforcement of the FCPA Under the Trump Administration
With regard to the SEC, in response to questions from Senator Sherrod Brown propounded during Chair Clayton’s confirmation process, Clayton stated that “combatting corruption is an important governmental mission.” [FN/15]  Chair Clayton also emphasized that he believes in the effectiveness of “international anti-corruption efforts,” and he plans to work “with [his] fellow Commissioners, Enforcement Division staff, and other authorities in the U.S. and abroad to coordinate enforcement of the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws.” [FN/16]
On the other hand, in 2011, Mr. Clayton chaired a committee of the New York City Bar Association (“NYCBA”) that published a paper (the “NYCBA Paper”) on the international effect of the FCPA on U.S. businesses and generally concluded that the FCPA needed reformation to be fully effective. [FN/17]  The NYCBA Paper does not address directly NPAs or DPAs, but observes that FCPA enforcement is generally unchecked, without much oversight (judicial or otherwise) because the use of NPAs and DPAs keeps enforcement discretion within sealed, private agreements. [FN/18]  This view, to the extent it can even be attributed to Chair Clayton, appears to align generally with then-Senator Sessions’s question to Tony West from the same year.  And to the extent Chair Clayton’s views seem to have shifted over time, his more recent comments affirming his commitment to enforce the FCPA should be given more weight, particularly considering the gravity of the confirmation process.
Based on their recent comments and the fact that new DOJ and SEC appointees have generally continued from where their predecessors left off, early indications suggest that the Sessions-Clayton enforcement regime will look a lot like those of the previous few administrations. [FN/19]  NPAs and DPAs have become integral tools for FCPA enforcement.  Accordingly, it seems unlikely that the administration will significantly pare back its use of such agreements or decrease FCPA enforcement efforts.  Moreover, if Sessions stays true to his words and the DOJ carries on the policy discussed in the so-called Yates Memorandum, individual prosecutions for corporate misconduct could become more common.
Insofar as businesses subject to the FCPA are concerned, absent some unpredictable and unlikely sea change in how the government interprets and enforces the FCPA, robust and effective compliance policies and procedures are still the best method for penalty avoidance and/or mitigation of penalties under the Trump administration.  Further, thorough compliance training will continue to be a critical tool for companies subject to the FCPA to avoid or mitigate FCPA investigations and prosecutions.  The DOJ credits such compliance measures, among other things, in considering whether and how to prosecute potential violations; proactive companies can save themselves headaches – and potentially money – in the future with preventative measures now. [FN/20]

  [FN/1] See Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks at Ethics and Compliance Initiative Annual Conference, DOJ (Apr. 24, 2017), available

  [FN/2] Id.
  [FN/3] See Transcript of the Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Nomination of James Michael Cole, Nominee to be Deputy Attorney General, GPO, available here (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
  [FN/4] Id.
  [FN/5] Id.
  [FN/6] See Jodi Avergun et al., White Collar Crime Law Enforcement in a Trump Justice Department – 8 Predictions, JD Supra (Nov. 30, 2016), available here.  During that same hearing, then-Senator Sessions also asked whether the DOJ’s aggressive FCPA enforcement overseas negatively impacts “the competitiveness of American business overseas relative to that of other countries.”  Id.  To the extent it can be taken as an indication of then-Senator Sessions’s view, in isolation, this question might been seen to reflect an attitude hesitant to enforce the FCPA.  But in the context of Sessions’s other, more-recent statements, this question seems to be an aberration or designed to elicit a response with which he would have taken issue.  In any case, as with Chair Clayton’s NYCBA Paper, Session’s remarks during his confirmation process should be afforded more weight, given the seriousness of the Senate’s vetting and confirmation process.
  [FN/7] See Dennis Kelleher, AG-designate Sessions has been tough on financial crime, The Hill (Jan. 9, 2017, 6:00 PM), available here.
  [FN/8] See Jody Godoy, Sessions Hints Yates Memo, Fraud To Stay On DOJ Radar, Law 360 (Jan. 11, 2017, 8:51 PM), available here.
  [FN/9] See DOJ, supra note 1.  Sessions does not, however, appear to hold this position absolutely.  See Matt Zapotosky, Sessions: Focus on violent crime doesn’t mean lax enforcement for white-collar offenses, Wash. Post (Apr. 24, 2017), available here (noting that Sessions also remarked that charging individuals, rather than companies, is “‘not always possible’ and that lawyers would take into account companies’ cooperation and self-disclosure when making charging decisions”).
  [FN/10] For example, some of the previous Deputy Attorneys General – Eric Holder, Larry Thompson, Paul McNulty, Mark Filip, and Sally Yates – issued policy memoranda regarding factors the DOJ considered in criminally charging corporations.  The most recent iteration of that memorandum, the so-called Yates Memorandum, emphasized the DOJ’s focus on individual prosecutions in corporate criminal investigations.  See Michael D. Riccuiti et al., New DOJ Guidance Sharpens the Focus on Prosecuting and Suing Individuals in Corporate Criminal Investigations, K&L Gates (Sept. 10, 2015), available here.
  [FN/11] See Questions for the Record by Senator Leahy, available here (last visited May 1, 2017).
  [FN/12] See Jody Godoy, Trump DOJ Expected To Cut Down On Deferred Prosecution, Law 360 (Jan. 20, 2017, 9:06 PM), available here.
  [FN/13] See Richard L. Cassin, The 2016 FCPA Enforcement Index, FCPA Blog (Jan. 3, 2017, 8:08AM), available here; Related Enforcement Actions: 2017, DOJ, available here (last visited May 5, 2017); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Clearinghouse, Stan. L. Sch., available here (last visited May 5, 2017).
  [FN/14] See Jody Godoy, DOJ To Continue FCPA Pilot Program While Reviewing Results, Law 360 (Mar. 10, 2017, 10:54 AM), available here.
  [FN/15] See Questions for the Nomination of Mr. Jay Clayton to be a Member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, from Ranking Member Sherrod Brown, available here (last visited May 1, 2017).
  [FN/16] Id.
  [FN/17] Specifically, the NYCBA Paper concluded that “(1) the United States has pursued, and is currently pursuing, a virtually stand-alone approach to deterring foreign corruption (at least in terms of enforcement activity and the significance of fines and other sanctions), (2) this approach places significant costs on companies that are subject to the FCPA as compared to their competitors that are not – i.e., there is a significant asymmetry in regulation and enforcement – and (3) if these circumstances are unlikely to change (e.g., through a substantial portion of other relevant countries adopting similar enforcement postures), the United States should reevaluate its approach to the problem of foreign corruption.”  See Committee on International Business Transactions, The FCPA and its Impact on International Business Transactions – Should Anything be Done to Minimize the Consequences of the U.S.’s Unique Position on Combatting Offshore Corruption?, NYCBA (Dec. 2011), available here.
  [FN/18] See Jay Clayton Leads Committee That Authors Article on FCPA and Its Impact on International Business Transactions, Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 2011), available here.
  [FN/19] For example, Andrew Weissmann, before he became the Chief of the DOJ’s Criminal Division’s Fraud Section in the latter years of the Obama administration, authored a paper proposing significant amendments to the FCPA.  See Andrew Weissmann & Alixandra Smith, Restoring Balance, Institute for Legal Reform, available here.  While serving with the DOJ, Wiessmann’s biggest contribution was to spearhead the DOJ’s FCPA Pilot Program.  See The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance, DOJ (Apr. 5, 2016), available here.
  [FN/20] See The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance, DOJ (Apr. 5, 2016), available here (summarizing the general facets of the DOJ’s Pilot Program: “[w]hen a company has voluntarily self-disclosed misconduct in an FCPA matter in accordance with [DOJ] standards[;] . . . has fully cooperated in a manner consistent with the DAG Memo on Individual Accountability and the USAM Principles; has met the additional stringent requirements of the pilot program; and has timely and appropriately remediated, the company qualifies for the full range of potential mitigation credit”). 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


M. O’Kane: “Canadian Government Endorses Magnitsky Sanctions Bill”

* Author: Michael O’Kane, Esq., Peters & Peters Solicitors LLP, mokane@petersandpeters.com.
The Canadian government has said that it supports a draft bill which, if passed through the Canadian legislature, would impose sanctions on human rights violators anywhere in the world.  The “Magnitsky-style” sanctions were recommended by a Canadian Parliamentary committee last month (see previous blog).  A Russian official responded to the Canadian government’s endorsement of the bill by saying that it would “not be left unanswered”.  The US, UK, and several other countries have already introduced Magnitsky sanctions on human rights violators in Russia and elsewhere.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


P. Passman: “Compliance’s Role in Preventing the Next ‘WannaCry’ Cyberattack”

* Author: Pamela Passman, President and CEO of the Center for Responsible Enterprise and Trade. Contact details are available here.  
The global chaos unleashed by the WannaCry ransomware virus reinforces that cyberattacks are not just the problem of IT departments. Compliance must play an integral part of any organization’s cross-functional cybersecurity program to make sure the policies and procedures that protect organizations against these threats are designed, implemented and enforced.
The insidious nature of WannaCry shows the urgency of this effort. A hybrid between ransomware and a worm, WannaCry reportedly migrates from computer to computer, taking hard drives hostage and demanding a $300 payment to rescue corporate data.
It’s an enterprise-wide threat that requires an enterprise-wide approach.
Compliance professionals, of course, play a key role in that approach. Whenever organizations need to do something on an ongoing, systematic way, where people are to be held accountable, Compliance is front and center. And the potential effects of a hack like WannaCry can be more devastating than an FCPA investigation or a Labor Department probe. That’s because it can effectively put a freeze on an entire organization.
A fire might be the better comparison: By shutting down computer systems and cutting off access to data and systems, a major hack can stop an organization dead in the water and leave customers and other stakeholders without necessary services.
Compliance’s Role
Cybersecurity is a people, process and technology issue. Fortunately, compliance officers are well versed in working across an organization to ensure effective governance and mitigate risks across a range of issues.
: Working with the human resources group, it’s important to make sure employees understand the gravity of cybersecurity, preferably from their initial “onboarding” training. Given the evolving nature of cyberattacks, it is also vital to provide regular updates on emerging threats and monitor systems to ensure they are using the latest software and patches and not introducing improper devices onto the network. And consider what are the penalties for noncompliance, and are they being enforced?
: Monitoring is the weak link in most organizations. The most rigorous cybersecurity measures are useless unless there is a process to make sure they are being enforced. Monitoring can take a variety of forms, from ongoing review of networks to additional training, refresher courses and knowledge quizzes keep employees informed. Also consider processes such as a way to determine how many devices are on the network. Is there a procedure to determine whether or not all software is up to date? Is there an integrated response plan across IT, human resources, operations and other departments? Who needs to be involved and when do you bring in outside experts?
: Protecting against a cyberattack is not unlike protecting the organization against FCPA violations, but it is more complex. Not only does every employee and third-party vendor need to be assessed to gain transparency into vulnerabilities, but it is also important to identify, assess and manage the profusion of devices that connect to the organization’s network. Any party or device represents risk, and so every one of them must be included in a monitoring program.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework is a good starting place to determine the standards that must be in place in any enterprise. The framework directs organizations to have procedures to detect, protect, respond and recover to cyberattacks, with advice on how to implement rules and monitor compliance. For example, in regard to phishing attacks, the NIST Framework includes controls such as security awareness training, communication and exercises; a contingency recovery plan; system back-up; incident response training; and malicious code protection mechanisms.
The steps to prevent a cyberattack share many similarities with a cyberattack itself. Prevention efforts must have a sweeping effect across devices, affect each employee and have a drumbeat that keeps topics top of mind. The compliance function is equipped with the practices and tools to ensure this type of awareness and implementation effort. The trick it to ensure the prevention happens before the attack.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


T.P. O’Toole & A.E. Cotterill: “OFAC Imposes Sanctions Against Eight Members of the Venezuelan Supreme Court”

* Authors: Timothy P. O’Toole, Esq., totoole@milchev.com; and Abigail E. Cotterill, Esq., acotterill@milchev.com. Both of Miller & Chevalier, Washington DC.
On 18 May 2017, the U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced that it was imposing sanctions against eight members of the Venezuelan Supreme Court pursuant to the Venezuela sanctions program.
Background: The Venezuela Sanctions Program
In March 2015, the Obama administration imposed economic sanctions against Venezuela arising out of what U.S. officials believed to be serious human rights violations and corruption by Venezuelan law enforcement officials. [FN/1] Though other sanctions programs such as the Transnational Criminal Organizations program focus on activities in Latin America, [FN/2] the Venezuela program is currently the only program other than the Cuba embargo to focus on a specific country in the region. The Venezuela program allowed OFAC to designate certain Venezuelan officials and entities as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs)-a determination that effectively would cut the designated persons or entities off from the U.S. financial system and prevent any U.S. person from engaging in transactions with them. Under the executive order issued by the president at the time, any designation would be based on a determination by OFAC that such an official was “responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, or to have participated in, directly or indirectly,” actions undermining democratic institutions, penalties against free expression, serious human rights violation or engaged in “significant public corruption.” [FN/3] Soon afterwards, OFAC adopted regulations implementing the Venezuela sanctions program, which can be found at 31 C.F.R. Part 591.
At the time the Venezuela sanctions program was created, President Obama’s executive order designated seven Venezuelan government officials as SDNs. These were mostly Venezuelan police officials, intelligence agents, and prosecutors who were believed by U.S. officials to have been implicated in human rights violations or corruption. Following the original designations, over two years passed without an additional designation under the Venezuela sanctions program. [FN/4] That streak ended on 18 May 2017, when OFAC added eight members to the SDN list. 
The New Designations
According to the press release that accompanied the designations, OFAC determined that these officials were “responsible for a number of judicial rulings in the past year that have usurped the authority of Venezuela’s democratically-elected legislature, the National Assembly, including by allowing the executive branch to rule through emergency decree, thereby restricting the rights and thwarting the will of the Venezuelan people.” [FN/5] In the press release announcing the sanctions, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin stated, “[t]he Venezuelan people are suffering from a collapsing economy brought about by their government’s mismanagement and corruption. Members of the country’s Supreme Court of Justice have exacerbated the situation by consistently interfering with the legislative branch’s authority . . . [b]y imposing these targeted sanctions, the United States is supporting the Venezuelan people in their efforts to protect and advance democratic governance in their country.” The Venezuelan Supreme Court decisions cited in the U.S. Treasury press release arose over the past six months, and each was described as improperly increasing the Court’s own power and/or the power of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by usurping power from the democratically-elected Venezuelan legislature.
Key Takeaways
For the individuals subject to the designation, the immediate consequences are that their assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen and U.S. persons are prohibited from doing any business with them. For companies doing business in Venezuela, the main takeaway is that continuing to deal with these individuals in any way may have serious implications under U.S. law. In addition, the SDN designation applies not only to the individual but also to any entity that is 50 percent or more owned by that SDN, meaning that companies doing business in Venezuela (and especially U.S. companies doing business in Venezuela) must ensure that their compliance program not only screens for transactions involving the named individuals, but also any entities owned by these SDNs. Moreover, as they expressly link foreign public corruption to the imposition of U.S. sanctions, the Venezuela sanctions highlight the need for companies to have a multifaceted compliance program. Finally, because the situation in Venezuela is extremely volatile and additional sanctions are under discussion in the U.S. Congress and in the executive branch, companies doing business in Venezuela should carefully monitor further actions on this issue. 
  [FN/1] For more details on the initiation of the Venezuela sanctions program, see Timothy O’Toole, The United States Sanctions Venezuela (and the sanctions are expected to broaden), FCPAmericas (17 Mar 2015).
  [FN/2] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal Organization (11 Oct 2012).
3 Exec. Order No. 13,692, 80 Fed. Reg. 12,747 (8 Mar 2015).
  [FN/4] In February 2017, OFAC designated the Venezuelan Vice-President, Tareck Zaidan El Aissami Maddah, as an SDN, but this designation was made pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, not the Venezuela sanctions program.
  [FN/5] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Treasury Sanctions Eight Members of Venezuela’s Supreme Court of Justice (18 May 2017).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


(Editor’s Note: Full Circle Compliance, BV, partners Jim Bartlett, Ghislaine Gillessen, and Mike Farrell are primary visiting lecturers in this program.  Other visiting lecturers have included Beth Ann Johnson, Beth Mersch, David Hayes, Josh Fitzhugh, David Laufman, Giovanna Cinelli, Kevin Lompardo, Thomas Konetschny, Torsten Roeser, Candace Goforth, and Paul Beach.)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


MS_a117. Monday List of Ex/Im Job Openings: 85 Jobs Posted

(Source: Editor)  
Published every Monday or first business day of the week.  Send openings in the following format to jobs@fullcirclecompliance.eu.
#” New listing this week:

* Aerojet Rocketdyne; Huntsville AL; 
Specialist, International Trade & Compliance
; Requisition ID: 11972

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP; Washington DC; 
International Trade and Customs Specialist
; Requisition ID: 147

* Amazon; Mexico City, Mexico; Mexico Trade Compliance Program Manager; Requisition ID: 520481

* Amazon; Mexico City, Mexico;
Senior Manager, Mexico Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 520460

* Amazon; Seattle WA; NA Compliance Analyst; Requisition ID: 256357

* Amazon; Seattle WA;
U.S. Export Compliance PM
; Requisition ID: 475927

* Amazon; Tokyo, Japan;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 481891

* Advanced Micro Devices (AMD); Austin TX;
Import/Export Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 24061

* Ansell; Iselin NJ;
Senior Specialist NA Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: IRC6513
* ASML; Veldhoven, the Netherlands;
Senior Manager Trade & Customs
; Requisition ID: RC05619

* Bemis Company; Neenah WI;
Director – Global Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: REQ_13735
* Berry Plastics Corporation; Evansville IN;
International Trade Compliance Administrator
; Requisition ID: 4054

* Boeing; Sydney, Australia, and other locations;
Global Trade Control Manager; Requisition ID: 1700006067

# Boeing; Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and Brussels, Belgium;
Trade Control Specialist
; Requisition ID: 1700006121

* Brunswick Corporation; Lake Forest IL;
Trade Compliance Auditor
; Becky Longrie, 847-735-4755,
; Requisition ID: 22999

* Cobham Advanced Electronic Solutions; Exeter, NH, Plainview, NY, Eatontown, NJ, or Lansdale, PA;
Export Compliance Manager
; Charles Trokey

* CSRA Inc.; Falls Church VA;
Global Trade & Compliance Principal
; Alan Strober 571-375-4890; Requisition ID: 17002RN

* Danaher; Wash DC (Other locations possible);
Global Trade Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: DAN000510

* DB Schenker (2 positions); Atlanta GA, and Long Beach CA;
Area Customs Director
; Requisition ID: 17P009

* DHL; Netherlands;
Manager Customs Compliance
; Requisition ID: req39070 

* Erickson Inc.; Portland OR;
Trade Compliance Manager
Joanna Rafiner-Jarboe
; Requisition 2017-2267

* Expeditors; Sunnyvale CA;
Customs Compliance Specialist
* Export Solutions Inc.; Melbourne FL; Trade Compliance Specialist;

* FD Associates, Tysons Corner VA;
Senior Export Compliance Associate

* FlightSafety International; Oklahoma; Trade Compliance Advisor; Requisition ID 16480

FLIR; Billerica MA; 
Sr. Defense Trade Licensing & Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 8008

* Fluke: Everett WA; 
Trade Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: FLU005544

# General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.; San Diego CA; 
International Trade Compliance Analyst (ITC) / Export Import Specialist / Global Trade Administrator
; Requisition ID: 12252BR

* General Dynamics Information Technology; Falls Church VA;
Division Export Compliance Coordinator
; Requisition ID: 2017-21288

* Givaudan; Bogor, Indonesia;
Compliance Manager
; Requisition ID: 68063
* Harris Corporation; Clifton NJ; 
Trade Compliance Analyst

; Requisition ID: ES20172404-18675

* KPMG; Antwerp, Brussels;
Manager Global Trade & Customs – SAP GTS
; 122756BR

* Lam Research Corporation; Fremont CA;
Foreign Trade Intern 1

* Lam Research Corporation; Shanghai, China;
Foreign Trade Analyst 

* Lutron; Coopersburg PA;
Trade Manager-Export
; Requisition ID: 2926

* L-3 Technologies; Arlington VA;
Sr. Mgr. Corporate Customs Compliance
; Requisition ID: 087862

* L-3 Technologies, Platform Integration Division; Waco TX;
Import/Export Compliance Administrator 3
; Requisition ID 

* Lockheed Martin; Orlando FL;
International Trade Compliance Sr Staff / ITAR / EAR / Export Control Officer
; Requisition ID: 387435BR

* Mars – Wrigley; Chicago IL; 
Global Trade Compliance Analyst (Corporate Export)
; Requisition ID: 69452

* Maxim Integrated; Dallas TX;
Manager, Global Trade
; 3304BR

* Medtronic; Heerlen, The Netherlands;
Trade Compliance Analyst
; 16000DYY

* Medtronic; Wash DC;
Global Trade Lawyer
; Requisition ID: 170002ON

* Meggitt PLC; Maidenhead, UK;
Trade Compliance Officer 

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Herndon VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 2
; Requisition ID: 17010105

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Herndon VA;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3/4; Requisition ID: 17001180

* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Linthicum MD;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 1
; 17003433
* Northrop Grumman Corporation; Linthicum MD;
International Trade Compliance Analyst 3
; 17005262

* Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine; New Malden, UK;
Trade Compliance Coordinator

* Panduit; Tinley Park IL;
Global Trade Compliance Agent
; Requisition ID: PAND-03297

* Plexus Corporation; Neenah Wi;
Manager – Export Compliance
; Requisition ID: 14645BR
* Plexus Corporation; Neenah Wi;
Manager – Import Compliance
; Requisition ID: 14593BR
* Premier Farnell Organisation; Leeds, UK;
Trade Compliance Specialist – Europe
; 4301

* Roanoke Insurance Group; Schaumburg IL;
Carnet Service Representative
; Requisition ID: 1019

* Raytheon; Andover MA and Woburn MA;
Manager of Export Import Control, Empowered Officials
; Requisition ID: 93622

* Raytheon; Arlington VA;
Export Licensing Manager I
; Requisition ID: 94113BR

* Raytheon Australia; Canberra, Australia;
Export/Import Operations Advisor; Requisition ID: 86438BR

* Raytheon; McKinney TX;
Counsel Global Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 94826BR

* Raytheon; Portsmouth RI;
Manager of Export Import Control, Empowered Official
; Requisition ID: 93628

* Raytheon; Woburn MA;
Supply Chain Compliance Manager; Requisition ID: 93734BR

* Raytheon Space & Airborne Systems; McKinney TX;
Sr Exp License & Compliance Adv;
; 310-334-7499; Requisition ID:

* Saab Defense and Security USA LLC; Syracuse NY;
Senior Import/Export Analyst
; Requisition ID: USA_00413
* SABIC; Houston TX;
Analyst Import/Export Compliance
; Requisition ID: 7792BR

* Talbots; Hingham MA;
Sr Mgr Global Trade & Customs Compliance
; Requisition ID: 1077

* Talbots; Lakeville MA;
Dir., Global Logistics & Customs Com
; Requisition ID: 1085

* Teledyne Microwave Solutions; Mountain View CA;

Trade Compliance Administrator 2
; Requisition ID: 2017-4111

* Tesla Motors; Fremont CA;
Global Supply Manager – Logistics
; Requisition ID: 38153

* Thales Defense and Security, Inc.; Clarksburg MD; Senior Manager Trade Compliance
; William.Denning@thalesdsi.com; Requisition ID: 2592

* ThermoFisher Scientific; Breda, the Netherlands;
Import/Export Specialist – EMEA CMD Commercial Offices
; Requisition ID: 44930BR

* ThermoFisher Scientific; Germering, Germany;
Specialist, Trade Compliance
; 47293BR
* ThermoFisher Scientific; Shanghai, China;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 37381BR
* ThermoFisher Scientific; Shanghai, China;
Trade Compliance Specialist
; Requisition ID: 48394BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Brea CA;
Sr. Anlst, Intl Trade Compl
; Requisition ID: 46798BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CA;

International Trade Compliance Intern
; Requisition ID:

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Chula Vista CT;
International Trade Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 46876BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Troy OH;
Sr. Manager, Intl Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 44065BR 

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Westford MA;
Senior Analyst, International Trade Compliance
; Requisition ID: 31576BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Windsor Locks, CT; Investigations and Disclosures Specialist; Requisition ID: 46282BR

* United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Windsor Lock CT;
International Trade Compliance Site Lead
; Requisition ID: 47259BR

# United Technologies Corporation, UTC Aerospace Systems; Windsor Locks CT;
Sr. Anlst, Intl Trade Compl
; Requisition ID: 48594BR

* Varex Imaging Corp; Salt Lake City UT; 
Senior Customs Compliance Analyst
; Requisition ID: 

* Vigilant; Unknown location in the U.S.;
BioTech/Pharmaceutical Global Trade Analyst

* XPO Logistics; Greenwich CT;
Global Trade Compliance Analyst

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 


Arthur Conan Doyle (Sir Arthur Ignatius Conan Doyle, 22 May 1859 – 7 July 1930, was a British writer best known for his detective fiction featuring the character Sherlock Holmes. Originally a physician, in 1887 he published A Study in Scarlet, the first of four novels about Holmes and Dr. Watson. In addition, Doyle wrote over fifty short stories featuring the famous detective, Sherlock Holmes.)
  – “Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth.”

* Alexander Pope (21 May 1688 – 30 May 1744, was an 18th-century English poet. He is best known for his satirical verse and for his translation of Homer, and he is also famous for his use of the heroic couplet. He is the second-most frequently quoted writer in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations after

  – “No one should be ashamed to admit he is wrong, which is but saying, in other words, that he is wiser today than he was yesterday.”
  – “Be not the the first by whom the new are tried, Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.”

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

. Are Your Copies of Regulations Up to Date?
(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), but are updated as amended in the Federal Register.  Changes to applicable regulations are listed below.
: 27 CFR Part 447-Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War
  – Last Amendment: 15 Jan 2016: 81 FR 2657-2723: Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm. 
: 19 CFR, Ch. 1, Pts. 0-199
  – Last Amendment: 27 Jan 2017: 82 FR 8589-8590: Delay of Effective Date for Importations of Certain Vehicles and Engines Subject to Federal Antipollution Emission Standards; and 82 FR 8590: Delay of Effective Date for Toxic Substance Control Act Chemical Substance Import Certification Process Revisions.

  – Last Amendment: 18 May 2016: Change 2: Implement an insider threat program; reporting requirements for Cleared Defense Contractors; alignment with Federal standards for classified information systems; incorporated and canceled Supp. 1 to the NISPOM  (Summary here.)

  – Last Amendment: 18 Apr 2017: 82 FR 18217-18220: Revision to an Entry on the Entity List)

: 31 CFR, Parts 500-599, Embargoes, Sanctions, Executive Orders
  – Last Amendment:
10 Feb 2017: 82 FR 10434-10440: Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties. 
: 15 CFR Part 30
  – Last Amendment: 19 Apr 2017: 82 FR 18383-18393: Foreign Trade Regulations: Clarification on Filing Requirements 
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – The latest edition (19 Apr 2017) of Bartlett’s Annotated FTR (“BAFTR”), by James E. Bartlett III, is available for downloading in Word format. The BAFTR contains all FTR amendments, FTR Letters and Notices, a large Index, and footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, and Census/AES guidance.  Subscribers receive revised copies every time the FTR is amended. The BAFTR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BITAR subscribers are entitled to a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BAFTR.
, 1 Jan 2017: 19 USC 1202 Annex. (“HTS” and “HTSA” are often seen as abbreviations for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated, shortened versions of “HTSUSA”.)
  – Last Amendment: 7 Mar 2017: Harmonized System Update 1702, containing 1,754 ABI records and 360 harmonized tariff records. 
  – HTS codes for AES are available
  – HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available
  – Latest Amendment: 11 Jan 2017: 82 FR 3168-3170: 2017 Civil Monetary Penalties Inflationary Adjustment
  – The only available fully updated copy (latest edition 8 Mar 2017) of the ITAR is Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (“BITAR”), by James E. Bartlett III. The BITAR contains all ITAR amendments to date, plus a large Index, over 750 footnotes containing case annotations, practice tips, DDTC guidance, and explanations of errors in the official ITAR text.  Subscribers receive updated copies of the BITAR in Word by email, usually revised within 24 hours after every ITAR amendment.  The BITAR is available by annual subscription from the Full Circle Compliance website.  BAFTR subscribers receive a 25% discount on subscriptions to the BITAR, please contact us to receive your discount code.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Review last week’s top Ex/Im stories in “Weekly Highlights of the Daily Bugle Top Stories” published

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *


* The Ex/Im Daily Update is a publication of FCC Advisory B.V., edited by James E. Bartlett III and Alexander Bosch, and emailed every business day to approximately 8,000 readers of changes to defense and high-tech trade laws and regulations. We check the following sources daily: Federal Register, Congressional Record, Commerce/AES, Commerce/BIS, DHS/CBP, DOJ/ATF, DoD/DSS, DoD/DTSA, State/DDTC, Treasury/OFAC, White House, and similar websites of Australia, Canada, U.K., and other countries and international organizations.  Due to space limitations, we do not post Arms Sales notifications, Denied Party listings, or Customs AD/CVD items.

* RIGHTS & RESTRICTIONS: This email contains no proprietary, classified, or export-controlled information. All items are obtained from public sources or are published with permission of private contributors, and may be freely circulated without further permission. Any further use of contributors’ material, however, must comply with applicable copyright laws.

* CAVEAT: The contents of this newsletter cannot be relied upon as legal or expert advice.  Consult your own legal counsel or compliance specialists before taking actions based upon news items or opinions from this or other unofficial sources.  If any U.S. federal tax issue is discussed in this communication, it was not intended or written by the author or sender for tax or legal advice, and cannot be used for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or tax-related matter.

* SUBSCRIPTIONS: Subscriptions are free.  Subscribe by completing the request form on the Full Circle Compliance website.

* TO UNSUBSCRIBE: Use the Safe Unsubscribe link below.

Scroll to Top